Ocean Management最新文献

The current Law of the Sea Convention assigns exclusive jurisdiction over the living and non-living resources within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone to coastal states. In the case of fisheries exclusive jurisdiction also means development planning and management by the coastal nation for optimum utilization of the pelagic and demersal resources. This paper attempts to quantify the economic benefits and costs to the government of Indonesia, as steward over the resources within the E.E.Z., of choosing between alternative institutional arrangements for tuna fisheries development.

In evaluating the alternative institutional arrangements for tuna fisheries development within the E.E.Z., we distinguish between indigenous enterprises and foreign enterprises who might lease rights to fish for tuna for payment of an access fee. Prior to the E.E.Z. declaration in 1980 (and currently), all relatively large-scale tuna fishing in Indonesian waters was pioneered by state enterprises, for both skipjack and large tuna, a joint venture for skipjack and a licensing (fee-fishing) arrangement with Japanese longline tuna fishermen. These are considered to be the options facing the government for pioneering the development of the potential tuna resources in the E.E.Z. The objective function of the government is to maximize the potential value of the net benefits derived from utilization of the tuna resources under its jurisdiction.

In this paper, because we have no means of estimating or weighting socio-political objectives, we consider only economic objectives which are translated to economic benefits. Since we want to compare benefits as a function only of the particular arrangement, we correct for scale of operations by measuring foreign exchange earnings per 1,000 metric tons of tuna caught, employment generation per million dollars of gross income, and net income in terms of net present value of 1,000 metric tons of tuna production.

Fisheries resource management in many countries has been relatively unsuccessful in sustaining optimal yields; frequently this has been in spite of the availability of good science. Some have suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on physical and biological parameters while other aspects have been neglected. Renewable marine resources are generally common property in most nations, thus under public stewardship. Jurisdiction for resources resides with the Canadian federal government. By contrast, individual American maritime states have jurisdiction to 3 miles. This has tended to cast the American federal fisheries agency in a resource development role. The influence on conservation of the different hierarchical systems employed within Canada and The United States of America (U.S.A. or America) is assessed. Two examples are chosen, the Canadian Irish moss and the California sardine fisheries, to illustrate the influence of fishery agency structure on conservation. The Canadian Atlantic Irish moss (Chondrus crispus) fishery from 1950 to the present was traced. Government-sponsored industrial and resource development preceded stock assessment science and regulations by 10 years. Consequently, resource overexploitation occurred. Resource management activities appeared not to follow a logical sequence because all resource management functions, although within a single government, were not within a single ministry. The state of California passed legislation in the 1880's supporting conservation of renewable marine resources. Fishery assessment science was initiated in 1914. Nevertheless, the California sardine (Sardinops sagax) fishery collapsed in 1947. Rivalry had developed between state, federal, and university fishery scientists. Industry exploited this split to avoid annual catch quotas until 1967, 20 years after the fishery collapsed. It is concluded that the placement of fishery management personnel in two agencies may have indirectly brought about the collapse of the fishery. A hypothesis that the structure of the fishery resource management agency can critically influence conservation of the resource is formulated.