Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0017
J. Dancy
This paper (a forerunner of the author’s Practical Reality) considers in detail the distinction between the reasons we have to act in certain ways, often known as justifying reasons, and the reasons for which we act when the time comes, often known as motivating reasons. It argues that it must be possible for one and the same reason to play both roles. It warns accordingly against the popular version of that distinction which understands the reasons we have to act in certain ways with relevant features of the situation and reasons for which we act as certain psychological states of our own, combinations of beliefs and desires. Any such distinction makes it impossible to act for a good reason. The paper also offers some suggestions about what a better account of the distinction would look like.
{"title":"Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper (a forerunner of the author’s Practical Reality) considers in detail the distinction between the reasons we have to act in certain ways, often known as justifying reasons, and the reasons for which we act when the time comes, often known as motivating reasons. It argues that it must be possible for one and the same reason to play both roles. It warns accordingly against the popular version of that distinction which understands the reasons we have to act in certain ways with relevant features of the situation and reasons for which we act as certain psychological states of our own, combinations of beliefs and desires. Any such distinction makes it impossible to act for a good reason. The paper also offers some suggestions about what a better account of the distinction would look like.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123232527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0114.1985.TB00246.X
J. Dancy
This paper examines the rationale for the standard practice in ethics of arguing from imaginary cases to real ones. Challengeable aspects of this practice are exposed. One question is whether an imaginary case is being taken to establish a Rossian prima facie duty or a duty proper. Another is whether, once we have established the correct account of an imaginary case, we can be sure that another case similar to the first in all respects relevant to our account of the first must be given the same account, irrespective of other differences. A generalist will try to extract principles from the imaginary case and apply them to the real case. This paper argues that this is hopeless. Is particularism in a better situation? A possible line is that what the imaginary case reveals is the importance that certain features can have and may have in the real case before us. No more can be expected.
{"title":"The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0114.1985.TB00246.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0114.1985.TB00246.X","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the rationale for the standard practice in ethics of arguing from imaginary cases to real ones. Challengeable aspects of this practice are exposed. One question is whether an imaginary case is being taken to establish a Rossian prima facie duty or a duty proper. Another is whether, once we have established the correct account of an imaginary case, we can be sure that another case similar to the first in all respects relevant to our account of the first must be given the same account, irrespective of other differences. A generalist will try to extract principles from the imaginary case and apply them to the real case. This paper argues that this is hopeless. Is particularism in a better situation? A possible line is that what the imaginary case reveals is the importance that certain features can have and may have in the real case before us. No more can be expected.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124646851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0012
J. Dancy
This paper focuses on the way in which thick concepts manage to combine the descriptive and the evaluative. It accepts Blackburn’s suggestion that thick terms have variable relevance, but disputes his conclusion that there are no thick concepts. The views of Wiggins and McDowell on these topics play an important role in the discussion. In the process a richer picture of the thick begins to emerge. The paper ends by considering the question whether the doctrine of the supervenience of the evaluative on the natural can still be sustained as a result.
{"title":"In Defence of Thick Concepts","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the way in which thick concepts manage to combine the descriptive and the evaluative. It accepts Blackburn’s suggestion that thick terms have variable relevance, but disputes his conclusion that there are no thick concepts. The views of Wiggins and McDowell on these topics play an important role in the discussion. In the process a richer picture of the thick begins to emerge. The paper ends by considering the question whether the doctrine of the supervenience of the evaluative on the natural can still be sustained as a result.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121167034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper suggests a way of avoiding two very implausible claims. These are the claim that all our beliefs about how we ought to act are true and the claim that there are two senses of ‘ought’, one subjective and the other objective. We avoid these claims by appeal to a distinction between wide and narrow scope which has application not merely to moral theory but also to the theory of rationality. For the same question arises: is it rational to do what one (perhaps falsely) believes it rational for one to do? The trick is to recognize a structural ambiguity.
{"title":"The Logical Conscience","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/ANALYS/37.2.81","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ANALYS/37.2.81","url":null,"abstract":"This paper suggests a way of avoiding two very implausible claims. These are the claim that all our beliefs about how we ought to act are true and the claim that there are two senses of ‘ought’, one subjective and the other objective. We avoid these claims by appeal to a distinction between wide and narrow scope which has application not merely to moral theory but also to the theory of rationality. For the same question arises: is it rational to do what one (perhaps falsely) believes it rational for one to do? The trick is to recognize a structural ambiguity.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"494 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116543642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0022
J. Dancy
This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.
{"title":"Moore’s Account of Vindictive Punishment: A Test Case for Theories of Organic Unities","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0022","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124143093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-02-19DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.003.0006
J. Dancy
This paper argues that Ross, despite the importance and innovativity of his conception of a prima facie duty, fails entirely to make sense of the relation between prima facie duty, as he understands it, and duty proper. He thus fails to make any sense of what it is to be a moral reason for action, and of right-making and wrong-making properties. Basing my approach on some suggestions of Prichard’s, I suggest that the only way to do this is to abandon any distinct conception of duty proper, restricting ourselves to the idea of what we have most duty to do – what we most ought to do. This retains, but reframes, Ross’s focus on something that is a matter of degree.
{"title":"More Right than Wrong","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that Ross, despite the importance and innovativity of his conception of a prima facie duty, fails entirely to make sense of the relation between prima facie duty, as he understands it, and duty proper. He thus fails to make any sense of what it is to be a moral reason for action, and of right-making and wrong-making properties. Basing my approach on some suggestions of Prichard’s, I suggest that the only way to do this is to abandon any distinct conception of duty proper, restricting ourselves to the idea of what we have most duty to do – what we most ought to do. This retains, but reframes, Ross’s focus on something that is a matter of degree.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132582798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-04-17DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199660025.003.0005
J. Dancy
This chapter is about the question whether one can act for the reason that p when one does not know that p. A negative answer to this question has been promoted by Unger, Hornsby, Hyman, and others, suggesting that the picture of motivation presented in my Practical Reality is not sufficiently respectful of the important differences between acting in the light of knowledge and acting in the light of mere belief, justified or otherwise. In responding to these criticisms, this paper revisits various themes from that book, in particular the non-factivity of reasons-explanations, and certain changes to the views expressed there are accepted.
{"title":"On Knowing One’s Reason","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199660025.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199660025.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is about the question whether one can act for the reason that p when one does not know that p. A negative answer to this question has been promoted by Unger, Hornsby, Hyman, and others, suggesting that the picture of motivation presented in my Practical Reality is not sufficiently respectful of the important differences between acting in the light of knowledge and acting in the light of mere belief, justified or otherwise. In responding to these criticisms, this paper revisits various themes from that book, in particular the non-factivity of reasons-explanations, and certain changes to the views expressed there are accepted.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127141421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper lays out in detail various versions of an argument from illusion in areas of philosophy other than the familiar one in the theory of perception. Those are the philosophy of action (doing vs. trying), the theory of motivation, the theory of knowledge, the theory of justification, and, in the philosophy of action, the distinction between act and agent. The suggestion is that we learn something about the force of such arguments, and about the best way to resist them, by seeing how they function in different contexts. There is also a suggestion (but no more than that) that if you are tempted by one instance, you should be equally tempted by the others. The paper also examines the much less familiar distinction between disjunctivism and non-conjunctivism.
{"title":"Arguments from Illusion","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.2307/2220307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2220307","url":null,"abstract":"This paper lays out in detail various versions of an argument from illusion in areas of philosophy other than the familiar one in the theory of perception. Those are the philosophy of action (doing vs. trying), the theory of motivation, the theory of knowledge, the theory of justification, and, in the philosophy of action, the distinction between act and agent. The suggestion is that we learn something about the force of such arguments, and about the best way to resist them, by seeing how they function in different contexts. There is also a suggestion (but no more than that) that if you are tempted by one instance, you should be equally tempted by the others. The paper also examines the much less familiar distinction between disjunctivism and non-conjunctivism.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114455211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1986-07-01DOI: 10.1093/ARISTOTELIANSUPP/60.1.167
J. Dancy, C. Hookway
This paper considers the comparative merits of two conceptions of real properties, as applied to the moral domain. On the weaker conception, real properties or facts are there anyway, independent of any experience. On the stronger conception, real properties are those not constituted by the availability of some response to them. The question is whether moral realists should restrict themselves to the weaker conception, allowing that a wrong action is one that is such as to elicit blame but not holding that this could constitute wrongness in the object. This paper argues that the weaker conception is inconsistent with the main argument for moral realism, which the author takes to appeal to the phenomenology of moral deliberation.
{"title":"Two Conceptions of Moral Realism","authors":"J. Dancy, C. Hookway","doi":"10.1093/ARISTOTELIANSUPP/60.1.167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISTOTELIANSUPP/60.1.167","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the comparative merits of two conceptions of real properties, as applied to the moral domain. On the weaker conception, real properties or facts are there anyway, independent of any experience. On the stronger conception, real properties are those not constituted by the availability of some response to them. The question is whether moral realists should restrict themselves to the weaker conception, allowing that a wrong action is one that is such as to elicit blame but not holding that this could constitute wrongness in the object. This paper argues that the weaker conception is inconsistent with the main argument for moral realism, which the author takes to appeal to the phenomenology of moral deliberation.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1986-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128756537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1983-10-01DOI: 10.1093/MIND/XCII.368.530
J. Dancy
This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.
{"title":"Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/MIND/XCII.368.530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MIND/XCII.368.530","url":null,"abstract":"This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1983-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127051610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：