Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0018
J. Dancy
This paper revisits some issues discussed in the author’s Practical Reality. It responds to work by Jennifer Hornsby in particular. It considers various detailed suggestions about which form of disjunctivism is most appropriate in the theory of acting for a reason. Its general conclusion is, in line with what was argued in Practical Reality, that even the best form is unacceptable, but that the reasons why this is so are peculiar to the philosophy of action and so do not do anything to destabilise disjunctivism in the theory of perception. The paper also attempts to contribute to the understanding of disjunctivism more generally.
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This paper discusses the relation between meta-ethics and meta-epistemology and attempts to move forward on both fronts at once. Internalism claims that only facts believed by the agent are relevant to justification. An extreme externalism allows that facts of which the agent has no inkling can be relevant to justification. An extreme internalism maintains that only matters internal to the believer’s perspective are relevant to questions of justification. Less extreme forms of these views are introduced, e.g. Alston’s internalistic externalism. Eventually progress is supposed possible only if we distinguish between reasons/justifiers and enablers, and between motivating reasons and states which enable those considerations to motivate. These distinctions enable our meta-ethics and our meta-epistemology to come together
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0006
J. Dancy
This paper considers the merits of an important argument of Prichard’s against Sidgwick’s claim that nobody has ever been an intuitionist. Prichard tries to turn the tables on that argument, arguing that nobody has ever been a non-intuitionist. This paper tries to adjudicate. One of the hinge points is the question in the philosophy of action where the distinction between an action and its consequences is supposed to lie. If enough of the consequences are sucked up into the action by understanding the latter as the action of causing those consequences, the structure of the debate changes. The discussion generates a much better understanding of ethical intuitionism and of the distinction between intuitionism and consequentialism.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0019
J. Dancy
This is a paper in the theory of reasons. Reasons to act are commonly understood in terms of the ways in which they can combine to make it the case that one ought to act or vice versa; what one ought to do is what one has most reason to do. The paper argues that this approach founders on the possibility of enticing reasons, which, no matter how ‘strong’ they are, are not in the business of making it the case that one ought to act as they suggest. It makes some suggestions about what enticing reasons do, if they don’t do that. The might, for instance, manage to establish that an action would be fun, and recommend it therefore and in that way, without thereby showing that it is what one has most reason to do, which is what reasoning to action is standardly understood as trying to show.
{"title":"Enticing Reasons","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"This is a paper in the theory of reasons. Reasons to act are commonly understood in terms of the ways in which they can combine to make it the case that one ought to act or vice versa; what one ought to do is what one has most reason to do. The paper argues that this approach founders on the possibility of enticing reasons, which, no matter how ‘strong’ they are, are not in the business of making it the case that one ought to act as they suggest. It makes some suggestions about what enticing reasons do, if they don’t do that. The might, for instance, manage to establish that an action would be fun, and recommend it therefore and in that way, without thereby showing that it is what one has most reason to do, which is what reasoning to action is standardly understood as trying to show.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130661889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0011
Jonathan Dancy
This critical notice of Nagel’s The View from Nowhere argues that Nagel runs two distinct conceptions of objectivity together, in a way that unsettles many of the main conclusions of his book. The ‘Hegelian conception’ involves stepping back from our view of the world to a new conception about the relation between that view and the world so viewed. The ‘absolute conception’ requires us to eliminate from our view of the world any element which can be seen as a product of one’s own perspective. If one tries to combine these two conceptions, the result is likely to be unstable.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0013
J. Dancy
This paper is concerned with a disagreement between Bernard Williams and John McDowell. It starts by asking what form a dispositional account of value should take. A no-priority view could hold that value is a disposition to elicit a certain response, and the response is to the object as disposed to elicit just that response. But a different no-priority view could talk of meriting a response and responding in the way merited. The response is explained as an instance of things being as they rationally ought to be. The paper debates the merits of such a view, and then turns to ask how much truth there is in the common claim that McDowell is an intuitionist.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0003
J. Dancy
This paper is a successor to the author’s ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’. It asks first whether all thick concepts have a default valence. It then considers how to account for the combination of the descriptive and the evaluative (which is sometimes called ‘interpenetration’) in a thick concept, and suggests that the so-called ‘no-priority’ view fails to do this. We might also wonder why the descriptive element is not always capable of separate instantiation. Various alternative moves are considered. The paper offers a considerably more varied list of supposedly thick concepts than is normal. It ends by suggesting that thick concepts are evaluative because competence with them involves grasp of their evaluative point.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0021
J. Dancy
This paper is an examination of a paper by Prichard, which converted Ross from externalism to internalism. Externalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded in features of the situation that they are in. Internalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded not in how things actually are, but in how the agent believes them to be. I conclude that Prichard’s arguments are not as powerful as Ross thought; Ross would have done better to stick to his original position. The paper also considers the relevance of a peculiar postscript to Prichard’s paper which was not printed until after his death; it suggests that the postscript does not improve things.
{"title":"Prichard on Duty and Ignorance of Fact","authors":"J. Dancy","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0021","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an examination of a paper by Prichard, which converted Ross from externalism to internalism. Externalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded in features of the situation that they are in. Internalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded not in how things actually are, but in how the agent believes them to be. I conclude that Prichard’s arguments are not as powerful as Ross thought; Ross would have done better to stick to his original position. The paper also considers the relevance of a peculiar postscript to Prichard’s paper which was not printed until after his death; it suggests that the postscript does not improve things.","PeriodicalId":101978,"journal":{"name":"Practical Thought","volume":"110 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126113366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0001
J. Dancy
This Introduction is a short intellectual biography. In addition to telling how it was that the author ended up in philosophy, it tracks the development of his views in the theory of reasons and the way in which combining those views with views he later developed in the theory of motivation reveal the possibility of a new form of Aristotelianism in the theory of practical reasoning. It ends by discussing the relevance of the distinction between knowledge and true belief to the theory of motivation.
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