Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

Beginning May 1, 2020, with the strong support of our team of Editors, CAR implemented a reviewer recognition program. The purpose of the program is to annually recognize reviewers, nominated by the Editors, who regularly perform exceptionally high-quality and timely reviews. CAR has a long-standing tradition of providing thoughtful and constructive reviews, so to receive recognition under this program is a very noteworthy accomplishment. Of the 830 individuals who submitted high-quality reviews from July 1, 2023, to June 1, 2024, the 17 listed below were selected by the Editors as being especially worthy of receiving recognition. Congratulations and thank you to each of them!

En date du 1^er mai 2020, grâce au solide soutien de son équipe de rédacteurs, RCC a mis en œuvre un programme de reconnaissance des réviseurs. Ce programme vise à souligner annuellement la contribution de réviseurs, nommés par les rédacteurs, qui effectuent régulièrement des révisions de qualité exceptionnelle dans les délais impartis. En regard de la longue tradition de RCC en matière de production de révisions judicieuses et constructives, le fait d'être reconnu dans le cadre de ce programme est un accomplissement remarquable. Parmi les 830 personnes qui ont soumis des révisions de grande qualité entre le 1^er juillet 2023 et le 1^er juin 2024, les rédacteurs ont jugé que l'apport des 17 personnes énumérées ci-dessous méritait tout particulièrement d'être souligné. Félicitations et merci à chacun de vous!

• Hamilton Scott Asay, University of Iowa

• Emily Blum, Texas A&M University

• Dmitri Byzalov, Temple University

• James Chyz, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

• Aytekin Ertan, London Business School

• Bingxu Fang, Singapore Management University

• Kurt Gee, The Ohio State University

• Jurian Hendrikse, Tilburg University

• Yu Hou, Queen's University

• Yongtae Kim, Santa Clara University

• Lian Fen Lee, Boston College

• Melissa Martin, University of Illinois Chicago

• Martin Messner, Universität Innsbruck

• Alexander Nekrasov, University of Illinois Chicago

• Nate Newton, Florida State University

• Steve Salterio, Queen's University

• Yuping Zhao, University of Houston

Classic disclosure theory suggests that investor uncertainty increases the probability of discretionary disclosure, while managerial uncertainty decreases this disclosure. Because R&D projects are inherently risky, R&D-intensive firms face high managerial uncertainty as well as high investor uncertainty. This paper empirically examines how R&D intensity impacts the provision, horizon, and content of management earnings guidance. To address endogeneity concerns, state-level R&D tax credits serve as an instrumental variable for R&D intensity. I find that high R&D firms do not provide less earnings guidance than low R&D firms. However, they issue more quarterly guidance but less annual guidance. This substitution strengthens when there is high managerial uncertainty about the success of R&D projects. Consistent with litigation risk leading to asymmetric disclosure incentives, the decrease in annual earnings guidance is concentrated in positive guidance. Overall, the results imply that firms modify the horizon and content of their earnings guidance by substituting long-term positive guidance with short-term guidance when managerial uncertainty discourages the issuance of the former.

Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.