Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust
Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value‐increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value‐enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.
{"title":"The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure","authors":"Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12960","url":null,"abstract":"Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value‐increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value‐enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141513303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pierre Chaigneau, Woo‐Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist
While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options‐based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.
研究分析了激励薪酬的结构与绩效衡量分布的分散性（以方差或波动性衡量）之间的关系，而我们则研究了激励薪酬的结构与分布的不对称性（以偏斜度衡量）之间的关系。与方差不同的是，偏度会影响绩效高和绩效低对代理人努力程度的相对信息量，这决定了为激励目的提供奖励和惩罚的相对效率。因此，偏度是薪酬凸性的一个重要决定因素，而薪酬凸性是由股票和期权的相对持有量决定的。与我们的分析和计算结果一致，我们发现预期收益的偏度与首席执行官薪酬的凸性呈负相关。我们的结果在经济上是显著的，对其他规格也是稳健的，而且似乎不是由反向因果关系驱动的。此外，我们还发现，收益偏度与 CEO 薪酬总额呈负相关，而这种关联是由较低的期权薪酬驱动的。这些发现与首席执行官偏好正向倾斜的绩效指标是一致的。总之，我们提供的理论、数字和经验证据表明，偏度是 CEO 薪酬凸性和结构的一个比波动性更重要的决定因素。
{"title":"Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau, Woo‐Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12959","url":null,"abstract":"While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options‐based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven
Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi-structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender-stereotypical behavior.
{"title":"CEO gender and responses to shareholder activism","authors":"Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12962","url":null,"abstract":"Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi-structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender-stereotypical behavior.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.
{"title":"Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China","authors":"Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang, Sijia Yu, Haoran Zhu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12953","url":null,"abstract":"This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141364926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Clara Xiaoling Chen, Laura W. Wang, Anne Wu, Steve Yu-Ching Wu
Penalty contracts are commonly utilized in developing countries. Such contracts may be perceived as unfair, potentially reducing employee motivation and performance. We predict that adding a second‐chance provision, an opportunity to reverse a penalty for poor performance if subsequent performance improves, could improve the effectiveness of penalty contracts. In a quasi field experiment at a company with two manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, we treated one facility with a traditional‐penalty contract without a second‐chance provision and the other with a penalty contract with a second‐chance provision. We observe a significant difference in the two treatment effects, with employee performance decreasing significantly after the traditional‐penalty treatment but showing no decrease when a second‐chance provision was included. Further analysis reveals that this difference is mediated by employees' fairness perceptions. These results provide valuable insights to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinationals as they work together to improve the fairness of global compensation practices.
{"title":"Can second‐chance provisions increase the effectiveness of penalty contracts? Evidence from a quasi field experiment","authors":"Clara Xiaoling Chen, Laura W. Wang, Anne Wu, Steve Yu-Ching Wu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12961","url":null,"abstract":"Penalty contracts are commonly utilized in developing countries. Such contracts may be perceived as unfair, potentially reducing employee motivation and performance. We predict that adding a second‐chance provision, an opportunity to reverse a penalty for poor performance if subsequent performance improves, could improve the effectiveness of penalty contracts. In a quasi field experiment at a company with two manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, we treated one facility with a traditional‐penalty contract without a second‐chance provision and the other with a penalty contract with a second‐chance provision. We observe a significant difference in the two treatment effects, with employee performance decreasing significantly after the traditional‐penalty treatment but showing no decrease when a second‐chance provision was included. Further analysis reveals that this difference is mediated by employees' fairness perceptions. These results provide valuable insights to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinationals as they work together to improve the fairness of global compensation practices.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141370038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frank Heflin, Jacqueline Tan, Karen Ton, Jasmine Wang
Regulators and practitioners have concerns that the lack of standardization in non‐GAAP disclosure can make it challenging for users to process non‐GAAP earnings and use it in decision‐making. We examine whether auditor style extends beyond mandatory disclosures to induce similarity in non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Specifically, we find that clients audited by the same auditor are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings in a similar manner. We assess disclosure similarity using (1) the decision to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, (2) the disclosure prominence of non‐GAAP earnings in the earnings press release, (3) the discussion of non‐GAAP earnings in the management discussion and analysis of the annual report, (4) the choice to exclude recurring items, and (5) the receipt of SEC comment letters related to non‐GAAP earnings. We find that the association between auditor style and non‐GAAP disclosure is determined by Big 4 accounting firms and clients audited by the same audit office. The results are stronger for larger audit offices and smaller clients. We provide evidence that auditors facilitate non‐GAAP disclosure, which can improve compliance with SEC requirements and increase the standardization of non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Our results are relevant to current policy discussions regarding auditor involvement in unaudited non‐GAAP earnings reporting.
{"title":"Does auditor style influence non‐GAAP earnings disclosure?","authors":"Frank Heflin, Jacqueline Tan, Karen Ton, Jasmine Wang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12952","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators and practitioners have concerns that the lack of standardization in non‐GAAP disclosure can make it challenging for users to process non‐GAAP earnings and use it in decision‐making. We examine whether auditor style extends beyond mandatory disclosures to induce similarity in non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Specifically, we find that clients audited by the same auditor are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings in a similar manner. We assess disclosure similarity using (1) the decision to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, (2) the disclosure prominence of non‐GAAP earnings in the earnings press release, (3) the discussion of non‐GAAP earnings in the management discussion and analysis of the annual report, (4) the choice to exclude recurring items, and (5) the receipt of SEC comment letters related to non‐GAAP earnings. We find that the association between auditor style and non‐GAAP disclosure is determined by Big 4 accounting firms and clients audited by the same audit office. The results are stronger for larger audit offices and smaller clients. We provide evidence that auditors facilitate non‐GAAP disclosure, which can improve compliance with SEC requirements and increase the standardization of non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Our results are relevant to current policy discussions regarding auditor involvement in unaudited non‐GAAP earnings reporting.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141188683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we investigate whether federal judge ideology, ceteris paribus, affects auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior. We find that auditors whose client firms are in jurisdictions dominated by liberal judges are more likely to be sued and make higher payouts to plaintiffs when sued. Furthermore, these client firms are more likely to receive going‐concern opinions and pay higher audit fees. Finally, we find no evidence that the quality of audited financial statements is affected by judge ideology. The evidence documented in this paper indicates that federal judge ideology affects auditor litigation risk and some aspects of auditor behavior.
{"title":"The impacts of federal judge ideology on auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior","authors":"Liuchuang Li, Baolei Qi, Ping Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12950","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate whether federal judge ideology, ceteris paribus, affects auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior. We find that auditors whose client firms are in jurisdictions dominated by liberal judges are more likely to be sued and make higher payouts to plaintiffs when sued. Furthermore, these client firms are more likely to receive going‐concern opinions and pay higher audit fees. Finally, we find no evidence that the quality of audited financial statements is affected by judge ideology. The evidence documented in this paper indicates that federal judge ideology affects auditor litigation risk and some aspects of auditor behavior.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141197560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the impact of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm‐level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm‐level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non‐pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship‐based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting.
{"title":"Firm‐level political risk and bank loan contracting","authors":"Walid Saffar, Yang Wang, K. C. John Wei","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12951","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm‐level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm‐level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non‐pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship‐based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141188650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Building effective corporate culture is challenging as it requires senior managers to embed shared values within the firm. Yet some firms can do so, and some cannot. This study examines whether managers' career preferences influence manager‐employee value misalignment and weaken corporate culture. Career preferences for job‐hopping provide incentives for managers to signal their leadership quality in the labor market. We capture managers' and employees' attention allocation across different cultural values using data from conference calls and Glassdoor. We predict and find that job‐hopping managers direct their attention away from soft cultural values (e.g., respect and integrity) that are less observable by the external labor market. Furthermore, job‐hopping managers who pay insufficient attention to soft cultural values fail to address the concerns that employees have in their everyday work, resulting in lower overall employee culture ratings. Our study highlights the significance of managers' career preferences in shaping different cultural values and offers implications for firms selecting senior managers.
{"title":"Managers' career preferences and corporate culture","authors":"M. Abernethy, Chung‐Yu Hung, Like Jiang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12948","url":null,"abstract":"Building effective corporate culture is challenging as it requires senior managers to embed shared values within the firm. Yet some firms can do so, and some cannot. This study examines whether managers' career preferences influence manager‐employee value misalignment and weaken corporate culture. Career preferences for job‐hopping provide incentives for managers to signal their leadership quality in the labor market. We capture managers' and employees' attention allocation across different cultural values using data from conference calls and Glassdoor. We predict and find that job‐hopping managers direct their attention away from soft cultural values (e.g., respect and integrity) that are less observable by the external labor market. Furthermore, job‐hopping managers who pay insufficient attention to soft cultural values fail to address the concerns that employees have in their everyday work, resulting in lower overall employee culture ratings. Our study highlights the significance of managers' career preferences in shaping different cultural values and offers implications for firms selecting senior managers.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140966371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Allen N. Berger, Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Xiaonan “Flora” Ma
We analyze how bank sentiment affects bank liquidity hoarding, distinguishing unexplained beliefs of bank managers from fundamental‐based beliefs. We build a bank management sentiment measure from textual analysis of 10‐Ks and utilize a comprehensive bank liquidity hoarding measure. We find that negative bank sentiment increases liquidity hoarding not warranted by a bank's fundamental conditions or external circumstances. Further analysis confirms that our findings reflect bank volition rather than being driven solely by borrowers or depositors. We address endogeneity concerns using exogenous weather conditions as instruments. Overall, our findings suggest that bank sentiment can influence how much liquidity banks provide to the economy and financial system.
{"title":"Bank sentiment and liquidity hoarding","authors":"Allen N. Berger, Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Xiaonan “Flora” Ma","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12949","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how bank sentiment affects bank liquidity hoarding, distinguishing unexplained beliefs of bank managers from fundamental‐based beliefs. We build a bank management sentiment measure from textual analysis of 10‐Ks and utilize a comprehensive bank liquidity hoarding measure. We find that negative bank sentiment increases liquidity hoarding not warranted by a bank's fundamental conditions or external circumstances. Further analysis confirms that our findings reflect bank volition rather than being driven solely by borrowers or depositors. We address endogeneity concerns using exogenous weather conditions as instruments. Overall, our findings suggest that bank sentiment can influence how much liquidity banks provide to the economy and financial system.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140936396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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