Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

I examine whether a strategic focus on data analytics is associated with improvements in firms' internal information quality. Using textual analysis of firm disclosures to identify a data analytics strategy, I first document that firm, leadership, and operating environment characteristics are all important determinants of the decision to adopt a data analytics strategy. I next use operating and financial reporting outcomes to infer whether a data analytics strategy improves internal information quality. I find that a data analytics strategy is associated with enhanced operating efficiency, as adopting firms invest and utilize existing resources more efficiently. I also find that a data analytics strategy is associated with more accurate management forecasts. These results, collectively, are consistent with a data analytics strategy improving firms' internal information quality. Lastly, I corroborate and extend my findings with job postings data, and the results suggest that firm leadership signals their support for data analytics initiatives through disclosure.

In 2018, the European Union (EU) introduced a new mandatory reporting requirement for a wide range of cross-border tax arrangements (EU Directive 2018/822, also known as DAC6). Unlike prior corporate transparency initiatives, which put the reporting responsibility primarily on the taxpayers, this directive puts the initial reporting responsibility on the third-party intermediaries who are involved in the reportable arrangement at any stage during the planning and execution process. We exploit the adoption of DAC6 in the EU to examine the effectiveness of third-party reporting in curbing cross-border tax planning by multinationals. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that affected firms reduce income shifting and report higher effective tax rates in the post-adoption period. The reduction in income shifting is stronger for affiliates operating in countries without legal professional privilege extensions and in countries where noncompliance penalties are higher. Our results highlight the importance of strong third-party reporting requirements in constraining cross-border tax planning.

In this study, we examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) can reduce the effect of independence conflicts on audit firm liability. In two experiments, we manipulate (1) whether procedures are performed by a human auditor or with AI and (2) whether the audit firm was careful in maintaining the appearance of independence from the audit client. Results of both experiments indicate that the use of AI significantly reduces the impact of the appearance of independence conflicts on jurors' judgments of audit firm liability. When concerns relating to the appearance of independence conflicts are present, the use of AI helps maintain the perceived objectivity of the auditor, which results in jurors maintaining higher overall trust in the audit process. Our study contributes to literature on determinants of auditor litigation risk and how technological change that is likely to grow in prominence might affect audit firm liability.

IPOs and direct listings (DLs) offer two different mechanisms for firms to go public. In contrast to IPOs, DLs do not employ an underwriter or raise new capital. Using a sample of IPOs and DLs on major stock markets in the European Union, we document that firms that choose to go public via DLs are larger, more profitable, and less levered, on average, than IPO firms. These pre-listing differences suggest that DL firms should be less risky than IPO firms; however, controlling for this selection effect, we find that DLs have higher aftermarket price volatility than IPOs. This is consistent with some policy-makers' concerns that, because they lack an underwriter, DLs expose investors to higher risk than IPOs in the immediate post-listing period. We show that this heightened price volatility persists, on average, for the first 20 trading days after listings, and is larger in industries where listed peer firms provide relatively low-quality disclosures. Our results provide new evidence regarding the types of firms that choose to list via DLs versus IPOs and the riskiness of IPOs versus DLs in the immediate post-listing period; additionally, our results are consistent with underwriters improving the quality of information available to investors for IPO firms in the pre-listing period.

We examine the information asymmetry between local and nonlocal investors with a large dataset of stock message board postings. We document that abnormal relative postings of a firm, that is, unusual changes in the volume of postings from local versus nonlocal investors, capture locals' information advantage. This measure positively predicts firms' short-term stock returns as well as those of peer firms in the same city. Sentiment analysis shows that posting activities primarily reflect good news, potentially due to social transmission bias and short-sales constraints. We identify the information driving return predictability through content-based analysis. Abnormal relative postings also lead analysts' forecast revisions. Overall, investors' interactions on social media contain valuable geography-based private information.

In response to the extended audit report regulations implemented in the United States and internationally, both audit firms and regulators have increased scrutiny over critical audit matters/key audit matters (collectively referred to as CAMs) through internal and external inspections. At the same time, auditors and audit committees (ACs) have altered the content and timing of CAM-related discussions by communicating specific planned audit procedures earlier in the audit process. This study explores the effect of early communication of CAM-related audit procedures to the AC and increased scrutiny from inspections on auditors' propensity to adjust planned audit procedures in the presence of newly identified audit risks. Based on self-justification theory, we predict and find that early communication of planned audit procedures to the AC causes auditors to be less likely to adjust planned audit procedures even when additional risks arise that necessitate change, especially when inspection is likely. This has the potential for diminished audit quality. Interviews with audit partners provide context for how these findings relate to the current auditing environment.

This paper studies voluntary disclosures that firms have suspended, resumed, or completed their open market repurchase programs. Voluntary disclosures of repurchase status updates are common and value-relevant. They also inform subsequent repurchase activities: voluntary disclosers are more likely to complete their repurchase programs and to initiate new repurchase programs than firms with undisclosed repurchase status changes. Moreover, firms that disclose repurchase suspensions experience larger returns to subsequent repurchase authorizations, consistent with a reward for establishing a reputation for transparency via voluntary bad news disclosure. Finally, exploiting a change in repurchase reporting requirements, we document that voluntary updates are less frequent when mandatory disclosure increases. An important exception, however, is when macroeconomic uncertainty is high, such as during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2017, the PCAOB began requiring audit firm tenure disclosure within the audit report for SEC registrant clients. Many commenters raised the concern that prominent disclosure of firm tenure would lead investors to inappropriately infer a negative relation between audit quality and long tenure. This is particularly troubling given that empirical evidence generally does not support this concern. In our first experiment, we predict and find that disclosing an audit firm's long tenure within the audit report increases investors' perceptions that the audit firm's independence was impaired while conducting the audit. However, we also identify an intervention that mitigates the effects of disclosing long tenure—an accompanying disclosure in the audit report of the firm's adherence to the SEC's mandatory partner rotation requirement. We find that such a disclosure moderates the effect of long tenure disclosure such that in the absence (presence) of a partner rotation disclosure, investors do (do not) perceive increased independence impairment when long firm tenure is disclosed. In a second experiment, we predict and find that long firm tenure disclosure reduces investors' preference to invest in an otherwise quantitatively optimal investment and that this relation is driven, in part, by perceptions of independence impairment. Again, this result is attenuated by partner rotation disclosure. Our results should be useful to regulators in understanding the effects of their disclosure mandate and to audit firms in understanding a practical way in which they might mitigate the implications of such effects.

We investigate whether a larger CEO employment network provides access to information that improves firms' earnings forecasts and find a significantly positive relation between CEO employment network size and management earnings forecast accuracy. Our results suggest that firms use information obtained from CEO contacts to increase the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our conclusion is further supported by evidence of positive associations between CEO employment network size and the likelihood, frequency, and precision of management earnings forecasts. We also find that CEO employment network size is positively related to analysts' reactions to the forecast news and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts relative to analyst forecasts. Overall, our results are consistent with a larger CEO employment network generating external information that increases the accuracy of firms' earnings forecasts.

We study the role of segment disaggregation in equity-based pay contracts in diversified firms. Disaggregated segment disclosures can improve the observability of managerial actions in internal capital markets and thus increase implicit incentives for managers to allocate resources as desired by shareholders, substituting for explicit incentives provided to CEOs. We use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 as an identification strategy and find that firms affected by this segment reporting mandate significantly decreased the provision of equity-based incentives in the post-adoption period, especially for firms with higher operating volatilities. This effect is also more pronounced for firms with weaker board monitoring in the pre-adoption period but with stronger external monitoring in the post-adoption period. Overall, our results suggest that disaggregated segment disclosures reduce the use of equity-based pay contracts in diversified firms by enhancing the monitoring of managers.