This study examines the informational role of local newspapers in institutional investments. Exploring local newspaper closures across US counties, we document that institutional investors significantly reduce their holdings in firms located near the closed newspapers. The post-closure decrease in institutional holdings is concentrated for non-local or non–hedge fund institutions. In contrast, institutions that are likely to possess information advantages—local institutions or hedge funds—do not decrease their holdings and may even increase them when faced with a lack of local news coverage. Further analysis reveals that local newspaper closures adversely impact institutional investors' ability to predict firms' stock returns, particularly for non-local or non–hedge fund institutions. Collectively, we provide novel evidence suggesting that local newspapers are a key channel through which institutional investors acquire geographically scattered information.
{"title":"Do local newspapers matter to institutional investors?","authors":"Byoung Uk Kang, Jonathan Sangwook Nam","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13049","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the informational role of local newspapers in institutional investments. Exploring local newspaper closures across US counties, we document that institutional investors significantly reduce their holdings in firms located near the closed newspapers. The post-closure decrease in institutional holdings is concentrated for non-local or non–hedge fund institutions. In contrast, institutions that are likely to possess information advantages—local institutions or hedge funds—do not decrease their holdings and may even increase them when faced with a lack of local news coverage. Further analysis reveals that local newspaper closures adversely impact institutional investors' ability to predict firms' stock returns, particularly for non-local or non–hedge fund institutions. Collectively, we provide novel evidence suggesting that local newspapers are a key channel through which institutional investors acquire geographically scattered information.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1713-1743"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using two experiments, I examine the effects of relative performance information (RPI) on social bonding and subsequent cooperation. In Experiment 1, participants in groups of four first complete a more or less difficult individual math task and then participate in a public goods game. I find that RPI significantly increases contributions in the public goods game when group members exhibit similar performance levels in the individual task and when the task is more difficult. Conceptually, RPI in such a setting fosters social bonds by revealing a common challenge shared by group members. In scenario-based Experiment 2, with performance level held constant, RPI strengthens social bonds when peers similarly miss a difficult target but not when they similarly surpass an easy target. Additionally, the inclusion of ranking information in RPI negatively impacts social bonding, regardless of target difficulty. While prior research predominantly examines RPI through the lens of social comparison, this study illustrates the conditions under which RPI can also foster social bonds and enhance subsequent cooperation.
{"title":"The effects of relative performance information on subsequent cooperation","authors":"Xinyu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13045","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using two experiments, I examine the effects of relative performance information (RPI) on social bonding and subsequent cooperation. In Experiment 1, participants in groups of four first complete a more or less difficult individual math task and then participate in a public goods game. I find that RPI significantly increases contributions in the public goods game when group members exhibit similar performance levels in the individual task <i>and</i> when the task is more difficult. Conceptually, RPI in such a setting fosters social bonds by revealing a common challenge shared by group members. In scenario-based Experiment 2, with performance level held constant, RPI strengthens social bonds when peers similarly miss a difficult target but not when they similarly surpass an easy target. Additionally, the inclusion of ranking information in RPI negatively impacts social bonding, regardless of target difficulty. While prior research predominantly examines RPI through the lens of social comparison, this study illustrates the conditions under which RPI can also foster social bonds and enhance subsequent cooperation.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1684-1712"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2008, the IRS added several schedules to Form 990, including Schedule R, related party transactions. Utilizing Schedule R, we investigate and descriptively document the existence of related parties and the types of transactions engaged in with those related parties. Then, to provide evidence of the usefulness of these disclosures, we tie into the literature on financial reporting quality. Prior research into financial reporting quality shows that donors discount program ratios when a nonprofit organization reports zero fundraising expenses, implying that they find reporting zero fundraising expenses to be a proxy for poor financial reporting quality. A plausible reason for organizations reporting zero fundraising expenses is that a related party conducts fundraising on the organization's behalf. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that when nonprofits disclose that fundraising services are provided by a related entity, they are more likely to report zero fundraising expenses. We also find that disclosure of related party fundraising mitigates donor discounting of the program ratio when zero fundraising expenses are reported. However, we only find that this mitigation occurs in nonprofits with sophisticated donors. In sum, we find evidence consistent with donors—in particular, sophisticated donors—using disclosures provided in Form 990 to supplement the amounts recognized. Our findings demonstrate the importance of, and are consistent with the use of, these related party disclosures. On a broader level, these findings provide insight into how thoroughly donors are willing to review Form 990 to get information relevant to their donation decision.
{"title":"Related parties, financial reporting quality, and donations","authors":"Steven Balsam, Erica E. Harris, Paul Wong","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2008, the IRS added several schedules to Form 990, including Schedule R, related party transactions. Utilizing Schedule R, we investigate and descriptively document the existence of related parties and the types of transactions engaged in with those related parties. Then, to provide evidence of the usefulness of these disclosures, we tie into the literature on financial reporting quality. Prior research into financial reporting quality shows that donors discount program ratios when a nonprofit organization reports zero fundraising expenses, implying that they find reporting zero fundraising expenses to be a proxy for poor financial reporting quality. A plausible reason for organizations reporting zero fundraising expenses is that a related party conducts fundraising on the organization's behalf. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that when nonprofits disclose that fundraising services are provided by a related entity, they are more likely to report zero fundraising expenses. We also find that disclosure of related party fundraising mitigates donor discounting of the program ratio when zero fundraising expenses are reported. However, we only find that this mitigation occurs in nonprofits with sophisticated donors. In sum, we find evidence consistent with donors—in particular, sophisticated donors—using disclosures provided in Form 990 to supplement the amounts recognized. Our findings demonstrate the importance of, and are consistent with the use of, these related party disclosures. On a broader level, these findings provide insight into how thoroughly donors are willing to review Form 990 to get information relevant to their donation decision.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1652-1683"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.
{"title":"Local newspaper closures and bank loan contracts","authors":"Zhiming Ma, Derrald Stice, Han Stice, Yue Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13046","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1620-1651"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13046","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the role of accounting in the recursive processes of continuous adjustment to programs that emerge when programs are imposed by central government on local government. Focusing on the Italian context and adopting the conceptual lens of governmentality, our study contributes to the extant literature by highlighting the role of accounting in the power dynamics and transactional realities at the intersection between the governors and the governed. In doing so, it considers how accounting can shape plural local government conducts and counter-conducts and how this, in turn, affects programs imposed centrally. It also sheds light on the transactional realities inherent in multiple, layered forms of central disciplining power and how this plays out to recursively redefine central discipline and local autonomy. The study highlights the importance of considering the different ways in which power is enacted and resisted through accounting in governmentality studies. By taking a pluralist and dynamic view of the ways in which programs are implemented, the study reveals multiple local translations and outcomes, as well as the underlying power dynamics at play.
{"title":"Translating, resisting, or escalating government programs? Accounting at the intersection of centrally imposed programs and local responses","authors":"Ileana Steccolini, Carmela Barbera","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13033","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the role of accounting in the recursive processes of continuous adjustment to programs that emerge when programs are imposed by central government on local government. Focusing on the Italian context and adopting the conceptual lens of governmentality, our study contributes to the extant literature by highlighting the role of accounting in the power dynamics and transactional realities at the intersection between the governors and the governed. In doing so, it considers how accounting can shape plural local government conducts and counter-conducts and how this, in turn, affects programs imposed centrally. It also sheds light on the transactional realities inherent in multiple, layered forms of central disciplining power and how this plays out to recursively redefine central discipline and local autonomy. The study highlights the importance of considering the different ways in which power is enacted and resisted through accounting in governmentality studies. By taking a pluralist and dynamic view of the ways in which programs are implemented, the study reveals multiple local translations and outcomes, as well as the underlying power dynamics at play.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1589-1619"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jordan Samet, Karl Schuhmacher, Kristy L. Towry, Jacob Zureich
Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees' immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to sticky control decisions (e.g., budgets, pay, decision rights). Focusing on these long-term settings, we predict and find that, while negative reciprocity is initially stronger than positive reciprocity, it also fades more over time than positive reciprocity. This differential fading is so pronounced in our setting that positive reciprocity is stronger overall in the long run. Thus, in long-term settings, positive responses to kind controls may play a more important role than negative responses to unkind controls. Our results inform managerial decisions about the use of kind versus unkind controls and suggest potential long-term benefits of pay disparity and other policies that treat employees differentially.
{"title":"Reciprocity over time: Do employees respond more to kind or unkind controls?","authors":"Jordan Samet, Karl Schuhmacher, Kristy L. Towry, Jacob Zureich","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13023","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees' immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to sticky control decisions (e.g., budgets, pay, decision rights). Focusing on these long-term settings, we predict and find that, while negative reciprocity is initially stronger than positive reciprocity, it also fades more over time than positive reciprocity. This differential fading is so pronounced in our setting that positive reciprocity is stronger overall in the long run. Thus, in long-term settings, positive responses to kind controls may play a more important role than negative responses to unkind controls. Our results inform managerial decisions about the use of kind versus unkind controls and suggest potential long-term benefits of pay disparity and other policies that treat employees differentially.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 2","pages":"1490-1520"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines whether a simple measure of internet search intensity for publicly traded retail firms can enhance the capital market's firm-level revenue expectations and provide insights into economy-wide retail sales. At the firm level, the search index is predictive of analyst nowcast and forecast errors after controlling for past sales, deferred revenue, firm characteristics, and firm and time fixed effects. An implementable trading strategy generates abnormal returns of roughly 2% to 3% from the fiscal quarter end through the earnings announcement, well above transaction costs. We also find that approximately two-thirds of the abnormal returns occur around earnings announcements, with an even greater fraction for firms with coarser information environments. At the macro level, we find that the permanent, seasonal, and transitory components of our search intensity index align with those of the Census Bureau's retail sales data and US real gross domestic product, suggesting our measure is a leading indicator of personal consumption expenditures, a key driver of aggregate output. The aggregated search index nowcasts aggregated publicly traded retail firm sales both within and out-of-sample after controlling for past sales.
{"title":"Using internet search data to predict aggregate retail sales and enhance firm-level revenue expectations","authors":"Gary Lind, K. Ramesh","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13043","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines whether a simple measure of internet search intensity for publicly traded retail firms can enhance the capital market's firm-level revenue expectations and provide insights into economy-wide retail sales. At the firm level, the search index is predictive of analyst nowcast and forecast errors after controlling for past sales, deferred revenue, firm characteristics, and firm and time fixed effects. An implementable trading strategy generates abnormal returns of roughly 2% to 3% from the fiscal quarter end through the earnings announcement, well above transaction costs. We also find that approximately two-thirds of the abnormal returns occur around earnings announcements, with an even greater fraction for firms with coarser information environments. At the macro level, we find that the permanent, seasonal, and transitory components of our search intensity index align with those of the Census Bureau's retail sales data and US real gross domestic product, suggesting our measure is a leading indicator of personal consumption expenditures, a key driver of aggregate output. The aggregated search index nowcasts aggregated publicly traded retail firm sales both within and out-of-sample after controlling for past sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 3","pages":"1557-1588"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Inder K. Khurana, K. K. Raman, Byongwook (Brian) Yun
We examine the implications of the PCAOB international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference-in-differences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship-specific investments and for foreign countries with less transparency, weak auditor oversight, and low social trust. Our findings suggest that the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad serves as a public signal of oversight that increases trust in financial reporting integrity abroad, thereby facilitating growth in trade credit and an increase in US exports to companies in that country. Our findings suggest that stakeholders other than investors benefit from PCAOB international inspection reports and highlight a novel externality of the PCAOB international inspection regime benefiting US companies.
{"title":"PCAOB international inspections and US companies' exports","authors":"Inder K. Khurana, K. K. Raman, Byongwook (Brian) Yun","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13041","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the implications of the PCAOB international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference-in-differences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship-specific investments and for foreign countries with less transparency, weak auditor oversight, and low social trust. Our findings suggest that the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad serves as a public signal of oversight that increases trust in financial reporting integrity abroad, thereby facilitating growth in trade credit and an increase in US exports to companies in that country. Our findings suggest that stakeholders other than investors benefit from PCAOB international inspection reports and highlight a novel externality of the PCAOB international inspection regime benefiting US companies.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 2","pages":"1455-1489"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144207055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jessica R. Filosa, Jingjing (Jing) Huang, Lijun (Gillian) Lei, Sarah E. Stein
International standards encourage auditors to consider regulatory factors and external parties during the risk assessment process. One such external party is the taxation authority, which monitors corporate conduct and uses the threat of tax audits to constrain managerial opportunism. This study examines whether tax enforcement influences auditors' perception of the risk of material misstatement on their engagements. Using a sample of companies listed on European exchanges, we assess the strength of tax enforcement at the country level based on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees in the tax audit and verification function relative to the size of the economy. Since auditors of these European listed companies must publicly disclose key audit matters (KAMs), we use the number of KAMs to capture auditors' perceptions of client-level misstatement risk. Our results indicate that auditors report fewer KAMs in the presence of more FTEs in the tax audit and verification function. In cross-sectional tests, we find that this negative association is stronger in settings where auditors are more inclined to incorporate the monitoring potential of the tax authority into their risk assessment, such as in countries with high book-tax conformity and for auditors with greater exposure to complex tax issues. These findings offer new insights into the role of tax enforcement in auditors' decision-making and have timely implications for accounting regulators and academics studying the determinants of KAMs.
{"title":"Does tax enforcement inform auditors' risk assessment? Evidence from key audit matters","authors":"Jessica R. Filosa, Jingjing (Jing) Huang, Lijun (Gillian) Lei, Sarah E. Stein","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13042","url":null,"abstract":"<p>International standards encourage auditors to consider regulatory factors and external parties during the risk assessment process. One such external party is the taxation authority, which monitors corporate conduct and uses the threat of tax audits to constrain managerial opportunism. This study examines whether tax enforcement influences auditors' perception of the risk of material misstatement on their engagements. Using a sample of companies listed on European exchanges, we assess the strength of tax enforcement at the country level based on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees in the tax audit and verification function relative to the size of the economy. Since auditors of these European listed companies must publicly disclose key audit matters (KAMs), we use the number of KAMs to capture auditors' perceptions of client-level misstatement risk. Our results indicate that auditors report fewer KAMs in the presence of more FTEs in the tax audit and verification function. In cross-sectional tests, we find that this negative association is stronger in settings where auditors are more inclined to incorporate the monitoring potential of the tax authority into their risk assessment, such as in countries with high book-tax conformity and for auditors with greater exposure to complex tax issues. These findings offer new insights into the role of tax enforcement in auditors' decision-making and have timely implications for accounting regulators and academics studying the determinants of KAMs.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 2","pages":"1423-1454"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian Akins, Jonathan Bitting, David De Angelis, Maclean Gaulin
This paper shows that creditors' horizon interests impact the design of CEO compensation contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that borrowing firms provide shorter incentives to their CEO following a loan covenant violation. They do so by decreasing the horizon of pay and tilting the choice of performance metrics toward accounting goals, in particular short-term ones. This effect is stronger when creditors' interests are more immediate, such as among loans with short remaining maturity and when borrowers have lower cash reserves. This effect is weaker when the cost to shareholders is higher, such as among firms with high growth opportunities. Together these results are consistent with boards intending to facilitate renegotiation and mitigate repayment risk while balancing shareholder interests. Overall, our evidence supports a novel reason for the use of short-term incentives, namely to reduce the agency cost of debt.
{"title":"CEO short-term incentives and the agency cost of debt","authors":"Brian Akins, Jonathan Bitting, David De Angelis, Maclean Gaulin","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13021","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper shows that creditors' horizon interests impact the design of CEO compensation contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that borrowing firms provide shorter incentives to their CEO following a loan covenant violation. They do so by decreasing the horizon of pay and tilting the choice of performance metrics toward accounting goals, in particular short-term ones. This effect is stronger when creditors' interests are more immediate, such as among loans with short remaining maturity and when borrowers have lower cash reserves. This effect is weaker when the cost to shareholders is higher, such as among firms with high growth opportunities. Together these results are consistent with boards intending to facilitate renegotiation and mitigate repayment risk while balancing shareholder interests. Overall, our evidence supports a novel reason for the use of short-term incentives, namely to reduce the agency cost of debt.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 2","pages":"1388-1422"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}