Pub Date : 2023-03-05DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2023.2183370
Diana Arghirescu
{"title":"Peace as Awakening to the Other: A Comparative Hermeneutics of Levinasian Face and Qisong’s Chan Buddhist Notion of Inherent Nature (Xing 性)","authors":"Diana Arghirescu","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2023.2183370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2023.2183370","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41946160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2023.2184541
Ryan Harte
ABSTRACT This essay thinks through Nanguo Ziqi’s famous “I lost myself” (wu sang wo 吾喪我) remark in the Qiwulun 齊物論 in light of Weil’s notion of decreation. The desire to undo the self is paradoxical, and most philosophical interpretations of the Zhuangzi passage try to avoid the paradox of “I lost myself” by positing various levels of self. Weil’s decreation embraces the paradox, and thereby helps clarify how Nanguo’s “I lost myself” connects with his subsequent metaphor of pipes of Heaven. More broadly, this essay is a first step in drawing together these two uniquely unsystematic and paradoxical thinkers.
{"title":"Zhuangzi and Simone Weil on Decreating the Self","authors":"Ryan Harte","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2023.2184541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2023.2184541","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay thinks through Nanguo Ziqi’s famous “I lost myself” (wu sang wo 吾喪我) remark in the Qiwulun 齊物論 in light of Weil’s notion of decreation. The desire to undo the self is paradoxical, and most philosophical interpretations of the Zhuangzi passage try to avoid the paradox of “I lost myself” by positing various levels of self. Weil’s decreation embraces the paradox, and thereby helps clarify how Nanguo’s “I lost myself” connects with his subsequent metaphor of pipes of Heaven. More broadly, this essay is a first step in drawing together these two uniquely unsystematic and paradoxical thinkers.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49654548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2158432
Jennifer Liu
{"title":"The Fractal Self: Science, Philosophy, and the Evolution of Human Cooperation","authors":"Jennifer Liu","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2158432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2158432","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42124357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2195754
David Jones
{"title":"Charlie’s Reading Room: Comparative Philosophy as Just Philosophy","authors":"David Jones","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2195754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2195754","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42537471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2170876
Rafal K. Stepien
ABSTRACT This is an essay in comparative philosophy and philosophy of religion building on the ontological claims espoused by two major thinkers in the Buddhist and Christian philosophical traditions: Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250) and Hegel (1770–1831). I use Nāgārjuna’s fourfold tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) and Hegel’s threefold dialectic (Dialektik) to propose a novel understanding of the ontological status of the self in its relation to itself and to its other, the no-self. Thus, I apply the tetralemma to the self, arguing that, to attain ontic completion, the self must itself reflect the tetralemmic form in the totality of its being – nothing – both-being-and-nothing – neither-being-nor-nothing. These in turn correspond to the Hegelian in-itself, for-another, both-in-itself-and-for-another, and neither-in-itself-nor-for-another.
{"title":"Tetralemma and Trinity: An Essay on Buddhist and Christian Ontologies","authors":"Rafal K. Stepien","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2170876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2170876","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 This is an essay in comparative philosophy and philosophy of religion building on the ontological claims espoused by two major thinkers in the Buddhist and Christian philosophical traditions: Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250) and Hegel (1770–1831). I use Nāgārjuna’s fourfold tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) and Hegel’s threefold dialectic (Dialektik) to propose a novel understanding of the ontological status of the self in its relation to itself and to its other, the no-self. Thus, I apply the tetralemma to the self, arguing that, to attain ontic completion, the self must itself reflect the tetralemmic form in the totality of its being – nothing – both-being-and-nothing – neither-being-nor-nothing. These in turn correspond to the Hegelian in-itself, for-another, both-in-itself-and-for-another, and neither-in-itself-nor-for-another.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41295731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2155340
Robert Gall
ABSTRACT This paper returns to one of Heidegger’s pivotal references to ethics – his remarks in the “Letter on Humanism” – and attempts to follow up on a line of thinking in those remarks that Heidegger himself did not expand upon, namely, the link between ethics and Sophoclean tragedy. Reading Heidegger’s analysis of Heraclitus’s Fragment 119 on ἤθος with reference to Sophoclean tragedy and in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking and his comments elsewhere on ethics and tragedy, the paper seeks to clarify how the thinking of being is, as Heidegger called it, an “original ethics” and what that means for ethical thinking following Heidegger.
{"title":"Thinking What Is Strange and Dangerous: Heidegger, Tragedy, and Original Ethics","authors":"Robert Gall","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2155340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2155340","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper returns to one of Heidegger’s pivotal references to ethics – his remarks in the “Letter on Humanism” – and attempts to follow up on a line of thinking in those remarks that Heidegger himself did not expand upon, namely, the link between ethics and Sophoclean tragedy. Reading Heidegger’s analysis of Heraclitus’s Fragment 119 on ἤθος with reference to Sophoclean tragedy and in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking and his comments elsewhere on ethics and tragedy, the paper seeks to clarify how the thinking of being is, as Heidegger called it, an “original ethics” and what that means for ethical thinking following Heidegger.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45792939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2158431
J. Wirth, Jennifer Liu, Rein Raud
ABSTRACT This is the first of an ongoing series of review essays in which the authors of significant new works of philosophy engage their readers. These inaugural two readings discuss Rein Raud’s important new reassessment of contemporary ontology, Being in Flux: A Post-Anthropocentric Ontology of the Self. They consider its accomplishments, both on its own terms and with reference to its East Asian and South Asian precursors. Raud then offers a response.
{"title":"Author Meets Readers: On Rein Raud’s Being in Flux","authors":"J. Wirth, Jennifer Liu, Rein Raud","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2158431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2158431","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is the first of an ongoing series of review essays in which the authors of significant new works of philosophy engage their readers. These inaugural two readings discuss Rein Raud’s important new reassessment of contemporary ontology, Being in Flux: A Post-Anthropocentric Ontology of the Self. They consider its accomplishments, both on its own terms and with reference to its East Asian and South Asian precursors. Raud then offers a response.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41808568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2158516
Ian Y. H. Tan
ABSTRACT In his lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn “The Ister,” Heidegger makes a striking claim about translation which implies that the paradigm of translation can never be encapsulated by a passive substitution of one linguistic signifier for another, for what is involved is no less than the stance the translator takes within his original language as unconcealment, and how he ex-sists toward the other language as the site of another revelation. If the human being and Being belong together by the happening of Ereignis in the way beings presence through language, the hermeneutical event of translation as unfolding, not only within history but also toward that which opens up historical understanding, grounds his entire authentic comportment toward this unconcealment. This article will argue that translation provides a useful correlative through which we can understand Ereignis as appropriative event.
{"title":"Ereignis and the Grounding of Interpretation: Toward a Heideggerian Reading of Translation and Translatability as Appropriative Event","authors":"Ian Y. H. Tan","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2158516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2158516","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In his lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn “The Ister,” Heidegger makes a striking claim about translation which implies that the paradigm of translation can never be encapsulated by a passive substitution of one linguistic signifier for another, for what is involved is no less than the stance the translator takes within his original language as unconcealment, and how he ex-sists toward the other language as the site of another revelation. If the human being and Being belong together by the happening of Ereignis in the way beings presence through language, the hermeneutical event of translation as unfolding, not only within history but also toward that which opens up historical understanding, grounds his entire authentic comportment toward this unconcealment. This article will argue that translation provides a useful correlative through which we can understand Ereignis as appropriative event.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43605934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2184543
Jennifer Liu, J. Wirth
Our final issue in the fourteenth volume is a treasure trove of thought, including two essays on Nāgārjuna, two essays on Heidegger, a major statement by the renowned Italian philosopher Paolo Diego Bubbio, an interface between Zhuangzi and Simone Weil, the premiere of our new Author Meets Readers feature, and some reviews of important new works. This issue kicks off with a special feature where the celebrated Italian philosopher Paolo Diego Bubbio responds to the article that we published earlier this year (14.1) by Daniele Fulvi on Bubbio’s conception of kenōsis. Bubbio’s defends himself against Fulvi’s charge of ontological anthropocentrism, which he contends is inevitable but not crippling. Bubbio’s defense is executed through an honest engagement with Fulvi’s remarks and takes care in laying out a detailed roadmap of his and Gianni Vattimo’s concept of kenōsis and its ethical implications. The article impressively concludes with an original discussion of the relationship between truth and nature. In the next piece, “Becoming and Negation, Protagoras and Nāgārjuna,” Robin Reames examines the “historical pairing of becoming and negation” as articulated by Protagoras and Nāgārjuna. The author argues that Protagoras’s account is speculative while Nāgārjuna’s is more comprehensive, given its deep analysis of the logic of becoming and negation. An examination of the resonances between these two thinkers illuminates their capacity to engage the problem of sophistry. Reames’s study is as enriching as it is informative as she engages with the intellectual history of both traditions without overshadowing the philosophical insights. Regarding comparing Buddhist and Western thought, especially regarding Nāgārjuna, we turn to Rafal Stepien’s “Tetralemma and Trinity: An Essay on Buddhist and Christian Ontologies.” The author brings Nāgārjuna’s fourfold tetralemma in relation to Hegel’s threefold dialectic in a rearticulation of the self and other. Stepien clarifies that his approach is not to read one thinker through the perspective of the other (which he warns can distort these two thinkers), but rather to “adapt”—not adopt—their ideas into Stepien’s own ontological philosophy. What such a project would look like we leave to readers to explore on their own. Given that our journal tries to engage more generously the world’s wisdom heritage, Ian Tan’s “Ereignis and the Grounding of Interpretation: Towards a Heideggerian Reading of Translation and Translatability as Appropriative Event” is of special interest. He turns to what has become one of Heidegger’s most provocative and contentious claims. In his lectures on Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” Heidegger pronounced that “Translation is never merely a technical issue but concerns the relation of human beings to the essence of the word and to the worthiness of language. Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you are.” Tan contextualizes this claim within Heidegger’s ontological project, the
{"title":"In This Issue 14.3","authors":"Jennifer Liu, J. Wirth","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2184543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2184543","url":null,"abstract":"Our final issue in the fourteenth volume is a treasure trove of thought, including two essays on Nāgārjuna, two essays on Heidegger, a major statement by the renowned Italian philosopher Paolo Diego Bubbio, an interface between Zhuangzi and Simone Weil, the premiere of our new Author Meets Readers feature, and some reviews of important new works. This issue kicks off with a special feature where the celebrated Italian philosopher Paolo Diego Bubbio responds to the article that we published earlier this year (14.1) by Daniele Fulvi on Bubbio’s conception of kenōsis. Bubbio’s defends himself against Fulvi’s charge of ontological anthropocentrism, which he contends is inevitable but not crippling. Bubbio’s defense is executed through an honest engagement with Fulvi’s remarks and takes care in laying out a detailed roadmap of his and Gianni Vattimo’s concept of kenōsis and its ethical implications. The article impressively concludes with an original discussion of the relationship between truth and nature. In the next piece, “Becoming and Negation, Protagoras and Nāgārjuna,” Robin Reames examines the “historical pairing of becoming and negation” as articulated by Protagoras and Nāgārjuna. The author argues that Protagoras’s account is speculative while Nāgārjuna’s is more comprehensive, given its deep analysis of the logic of becoming and negation. An examination of the resonances between these two thinkers illuminates their capacity to engage the problem of sophistry. Reames’s study is as enriching as it is informative as she engages with the intellectual history of both traditions without overshadowing the philosophical insights. Regarding comparing Buddhist and Western thought, especially regarding Nāgārjuna, we turn to Rafal Stepien’s “Tetralemma and Trinity: An Essay on Buddhist and Christian Ontologies.” The author brings Nāgārjuna’s fourfold tetralemma in relation to Hegel’s threefold dialectic in a rearticulation of the self and other. Stepien clarifies that his approach is not to read one thinker through the perspective of the other (which he warns can distort these two thinkers), but rather to “adapt”—not adopt—their ideas into Stepien’s own ontological philosophy. What such a project would look like we leave to readers to explore on their own. Given that our journal tries to engage more generously the world’s wisdom heritage, Ian Tan’s “Ereignis and the Grounding of Interpretation: Towards a Heideggerian Reading of Translation and Translatability as Appropriative Event” is of special interest. He turns to what has become one of Heidegger’s most provocative and contentious claims. In his lectures on Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” Heidegger pronounced that “Translation is never merely a technical issue but concerns the relation of human beings to the essence of the word and to the worthiness of language. Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you are.” Tan contextualizes this claim within Heidegger’s ontological project, the","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44426579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2022.2146062
Paolo Diego Bubbio
ABSTRACT In this paper I address the issues raised by Daniele Fulvi, by focusing on the alleged anthropocentrism of my approach to kenotic thought. I defend ontological anthropocentrism (as opposed to ethical anthropocentrism), arguing that a qualified ontological anthropocentrism is not only inevitable, but also more appropriate in order to think of nature in the context of kenotic thought. Subsequently, I address the question of the relation between kenosis and truth, and the issue of how kenotic thought could, and should, relate to nature. I conclude by arguing that only by conceiving truth as mediated is it possible to develop a kenotic approach to nature that has the potential to contribute fruitfully to environmental ethics.
{"title":"Kenosis, Nature, and Anthropocentrism: A Response to Fulvi","authors":"Paolo Diego Bubbio","doi":"10.1080/17570638.2022.2146062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2146062","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper I address the issues raised by Daniele Fulvi, by focusing on the alleged anthropocentrism of my approach to kenotic thought. I defend ontological anthropocentrism (as opposed to ethical anthropocentrism), arguing that a qualified ontological anthropocentrism is not only inevitable, but also more appropriate in order to think of nature in the context of kenotic thought. Subsequently, I address the question of the relation between kenosis and truth, and the issue of how kenotic thought could, and should, relate to nature. I conclude by arguing that only by conceiving truth as mediated is it possible to develop a kenotic approach to nature that has the potential to contribute fruitfully to environmental ethics.","PeriodicalId":10599,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and Continental Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43102543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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