Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-002
T. Sayle, H. Brands
{"title":"Introduction: The American Occupation Of Iraq By 2006 And The Search For A New Strategy Timothy Andrews Sayle And Hal Brands","authors":"T. Sayle, H. Brands","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128596899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501715204-fm
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501715204-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501715204-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131767675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0004
This chapter examines debates over US policy in the summer of 2006, focusing particularly on the unhappy results of military efforts to tamp down violence in Baghdad. Two major military operations—Operations Together Forward I and II—were launched, intended, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace, recalled, to “begin the process of turning over the battlefield responsibilities to the Iraqi armed forces.” Both were clear disappointments, however, revealing how unprepared Iraqi forces were to assume responsibility for their country's security. Iraqi forces themselves were, in the words of the National Security Council's Meghan O'Sullivan, “perpetuating acts of sectarian violence” and were “as much part of the problem as they are a solution to the problem.” Throughout the summer, NSC staff thus sought to press the Iraq country team for a review of Iraq strategy, and pushed the president to ask General George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), harder questions about where the current approach was leading. However, MNF-I and the US Embassy in Iraq continued to champion existing plans, believing that the existing strategy merely required more time.
{"title":"Together Forward?","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines debates over US policy in the summer of 2006, focusing particularly on the unhappy results of military efforts to tamp down violence in Baghdad. Two major military operations—Operations Together Forward I and II—were launched, intended, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace, recalled, to “begin the process of turning over the battlefield responsibilities to the Iraqi armed forces.” Both were clear disappointments, however, revealing how unprepared Iraqi forces were to assume responsibility for their country's security. Iraqi forces themselves were, in the words of the National Security Council's Meghan O'Sullivan, “perpetuating acts of sectarian violence” and were “as much part of the problem as they are a solution to the problem.” Throughout the summer, NSC staff thus sought to press the Iraq country team for a review of Iraq strategy, and pushed the president to ask General George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), harder questions about where the current approach was leading. However, MNF-I and the US Embassy in Iraq continued to champion existing plans, believing that the existing strategy merely required more time.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124783768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0005
This chapter assesses how, by late August and into the early fall of 2006, the internal impetus for change was growing stronger across the government. The core premises of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) were no longer tenable. These officials also worried that Washington had only limited time to make a course correction before the violence in Iraq spiraled out of control. The chapter then details a low-profile but intensive effort by National Security Council (NSC) staff to review US options. Some officials believed it was necessary to increase US forces in Iraq as part of an overall change in strategy. Whether or not any such forces were available was another question entirely, and so the NSC staff undertook a clandestine effort within the US bureaucracy to calculate just how many additional troops might be available. It was a remarkable aspect of the Iraq strategy debate that so little of these policy discussions leaked to the public, or were even known to those involved in parallel strategy reviews.
{"title":"Silos and Stovepipes","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses how, by late August and into the early fall of 2006, the internal impetus for change was growing stronger across the government. The core premises of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) were no longer tenable. These officials also worried that Washington had only limited time to make a course correction before the violence in Iraq spiraled out of control. The chapter then details a low-profile but intensive effort by National Security Council (NSC) staff to review US options. Some officials believed it was necessary to increase US forces in Iraq as part of an overall change in strategy. Whether or not any such forces were available was another question entirely, and so the NSC staff undertook a clandestine effort within the US bureaucracy to calculate just how many additional troops might be available. It was a remarkable aspect of the Iraq strategy debate that so little of these policy discussions leaked to the public, or were even known to those involved in parallel strategy reviews.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127439267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0016
R. Immerman
This chapter argues—using the Eisenhower administration as a model of peacetime national security decision making—that the surge decision-making process displayed by the oral histories was idiosyncratic, excessively compartmentalized, and profoundly flawed. No president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has fully adopted his model, and each has tailored procedures appropriate for his needs. The Bush process had to take into account his lack of expertise in military affairs, an increasingly polarized political climate, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the proliferation of leaks of sensitive information in the new media age, the resistance of the uniformed military leadership, and most important, Rumsfeld. Administration insiders argue that for these reasons Bush jettisoned fundamental tenets of Eisenhower's system in an effort to make a virtue out of necessity. Yet the evidence suggests that Eisenhower's best practices are just that—best practices. It further suggests that their rigorous application would have benefited Bush's process by expediting the instigation of a comprehensive review, co-opting opponents of a change in strategy, mitigating politicization, facilitating the exchange of information and advice, and accelerating implementation.
本章以艾森豪威尔政府作为和平时期国家安全决策的典范，认为口述历史所显示的增兵决策过程是特殊的，过度划分的，并且存在严重缺陷。自德怀特·d·艾森豪威尔(Dwight D. Eisenhower)以来，没有一位总统完全采用了他的模式，每位总统都根据自己的需要量身定制了适合自己的程序。布什的进程必须考虑到他在军事事务方面缺乏专业知识、日益两极分化的政治气候、越南战争的遗留问题、新媒体时代敏感信息泄露的扩散、穿制服的军事领导层的抵制，以及最重要的拉姆斯菲尔德。政府内部人士认为，出于这些原因，布什放弃了艾森豪威尔体制的基本原则，试图在必要的情况下树立美德。然而，有证据表明，艾森豪威尔的最佳做法只是最佳做法。报告进一步指出，严格执行这些条款将有利于布什的进程，因为它可以加快推动全面审查，吸收反对改变战略的人，减轻政治化，促进信息和建议的交流，并加快实施。
{"title":"The Bush Administration’s Decision to Surge in Iraq","authors":"R. Immerman","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues—using the Eisenhower administration as a model of peacetime national security decision making—that the surge decision-making process displayed by the oral histories was idiosyncratic, excessively compartmentalized, and profoundly flawed. No president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has fully adopted his model, and each has tailored procedures appropriate for his needs. The Bush process had to take into account his lack of expertise in military affairs, an increasingly polarized political climate, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the proliferation of leaks of sensitive information in the new media age, the resistance of the uniformed military leadership, and most important, Rumsfeld. Administration insiders argue that for these reasons Bush jettisoned fundamental tenets of Eisenhower's system in an effort to make a virtue out of necessity. Yet the evidence suggests that Eisenhower's best practices are just that—best practices. It further suggests that their rigorous application would have benefited Bush's process by expediting the instigation of a comprehensive review, co-opting opponents of a change in strategy, mitigating politicization, facilitating the exchange of information and advice, and accelerating implementation.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126795771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501715204-023
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501715204-023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501715204-023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128974782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-018
C. Dueck
{"title":"16. The President As Policy Entrepreneur: George W. Bush And The 2006 Iraq Strategy Review","authors":"C. Dueck","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122833068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-024
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"279 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121642121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0009
This chapter addresses how, even by late December of 2006, just what the surge would mean in terms of the number and timing of troop deployments remained uncertain. It describes the trip by the new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, to Iraq, his recommendations regarding the surge, and the deliberations by the president and his advisors as to just what means would be available for a new American strategy. By January, however, as Bush publicly announced the change of direction, he had made the crucial decisions to adopt a new counterinsurgency strategy, which included committing up to five brigades, enlarging the overall size of the Army and Marine Corps, and appointing a new country team for Iraq—David Petraeus as commander, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), and Ryan Crocker as ambassador. Moreover, the president had largely unified the executive branch—which had just recently been riven by disagreement on Iraq—in support of this new strategy. By January, recalls Stephen Hadley, the president had “brought his national security team on board; he's brought his military on board; and he's got a strategy... The effect the president wanted to achieve has been achieved.” The surge had been ordered.
{"title":"What Kind of Surge?","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses how, even by late December of 2006, just what the surge would mean in terms of the number and timing of troop deployments remained uncertain. It describes the trip by the new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, to Iraq, his recommendations regarding the surge, and the deliberations by the president and his advisors as to just what means would be available for a new American strategy. By January, however, as Bush publicly announced the change of direction, he had made the crucial decisions to adopt a new counterinsurgency strategy, which included committing up to five brigades, enlarging the overall size of the Army and Marine Corps, and appointing a new country team for Iraq—David Petraeus as commander, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), and Ryan Crocker as ambassador. Moreover, the president had largely unified the executive branch—which had just recently been riven by disagreement on Iraq—in support of this new strategy. By January, recalls Stephen Hadley, the president had “brought his national security team on board; he's brought his military on board; and he's got a strategy... The effect the president wanted to achieve has been achieved.” The surge had been ordered.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126549939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0003
This chapter discusses the Samarra bombing and the resulting debates over its significance. The winter and spring of 2006 was a time of conflicting signals and conflicting efforts in Washington. Some officials began to believe that the strategy in Iraq was not working. The predominant view in the intelligence community, according to David Gordon, vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, was that “we were transitioning into something very different, that we were really transitioning from insurgency to a civil war.” Around the same time, the failings of the US mission in Iraq led a number of retired generals to publicly call for the ouster of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Unknown to its advocates, the public “Revolt of the Generals” actually undermined ongoing, internal efforts to replace the secretary of defense—and thus, ironically, delayed rather than accelerated a review of strategy in Iraq. Meanwhile, efforts from within government to rethink US strategy remained nascent and largely disconnected. The successful seating of the Iraqi government and a new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and the success of US forces in locating and killing Sunni militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, undercut arguments that the war was failing, and in particular derailed efforts to kick off a major strategy review beginning with a high-level meeting at Camp David in June of 2006.
{"title":"This Strategy Is Not Working","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the Samarra bombing and the resulting debates over its significance. The winter and spring of 2006 was a time of conflicting signals and conflicting efforts in Washington. Some officials began to believe that the strategy in Iraq was not working. The predominant view in the intelligence community, according to David Gordon, vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, was that “we were transitioning into something very different, that we were really transitioning from insurgency to a civil war.” Around the same time, the failings of the US mission in Iraq led a number of retired generals to publicly call for the ouster of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Unknown to its advocates, the public “Revolt of the Generals” actually undermined ongoing, internal efforts to replace the secretary of defense—and thus, ironically, delayed rather than accelerated a review of strategy in Iraq. Meanwhile, efforts from within government to rethink US strategy remained nascent and largely disconnected. The successful seating of the Iraqi government and a new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and the success of US forces in locating and killing Sunni militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, undercut arguments that the war was failing, and in particular derailed efforts to kick off a major strategy review beginning with a high-level meeting at Camp David in June of 2006.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130249183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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