Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-011
P. Feaver, M. O'sullivan, Stephen J. Hadley
{"title":"9. How The “Surge” Came To Be","authors":"P. Feaver, M. O'sullivan, Stephen J. Hadley","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129767379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-006
{"title":"4. Silos And Stovepipes: September– October 2006","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126112108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-007
{"title":"5. Setting The Stage: Early November 2006","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117283033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-fm
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114698367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-003
{"title":"1. America’S War In Iraq: 2003–2005","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501715204-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501715204-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115653672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/CORNELL/9781501715181.003.0011
A. Preston
This chapter offers a comparison of George W. Bush's decision-making process in the Iraq War with that of Lyndon B. Johnson's in the Vietnam War. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the United States had to fight an insurgent campaign that was supported by powerful regional adversaries determined to bring down a US-backed government. In both Vietnam and Iraq, America's superior military technology had limited effectiveness against an enemy who relied on simple but lethal weapons and could blend into the general population. In both Vietnam and Iraq, gaining the trust of that population was vital to the success of the overall mission yet proved frustratingly elusive. And in deciding what to do in response, the national security decision-making apparatus in both the Johnson and Bush administrations ultimately produced a consensus behind the president's decision, either to surge US troops to restore deteriorating security and political stability (in 1965 and 2007) or to begin the process of de-escalation and eventually withdrawal (1968). There were key differences, too, which the chapter also explores, but the similarities are uncanny.
{"title":"Iraq, Vietnam, and the Meaning of Victory","authors":"A. Preston","doi":"10.7591/CORNELL/9781501715181.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/CORNELL/9781501715181.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter offers a comparison of George W. Bush's decision-making process in the Iraq War with that of Lyndon B. Johnson's in the Vietnam War. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the United States had to fight an insurgent campaign that was supported by powerful regional adversaries determined to bring down a US-backed government. In both Vietnam and Iraq, America's superior military technology had limited effectiveness against an enemy who relied on simple but lethal weapons and could blend into the general population. In both Vietnam and Iraq, gaining the trust of that population was vital to the success of the overall mission yet proved frustratingly elusive. And in deciding what to do in response, the national security decision-making apparatus in both the Johnson and Bush administrations ultimately produced a consensus behind the president's decision, either to surge US troops to restore deteriorating security and political stability (in 1965 and 2007) or to begin the process of de-escalation and eventually withdrawal (1968). There were key differences, too, which the chapter also explores, but the similarities are uncanny.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"442 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123586999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0013
R. Betts
This chapter places the surge decision in the context of the broader history of the Iraq War and offers a modestly positive appraisal. Indeed, the surge is only important in how it affected the overall project of the American war in Iraq. The significant question is whether the history of the surge offers lessons beyond itself, or at least whether the surge was decisive for achieving US objectives. The chapter then examines various dilemmas and challenges that the war occasioned—of relating strategy to both operations and politics; of promoting democratization in Iraq while also seeking some control over Iraqi decision making; and of seeking to exert presidential command over a complex decision-making process. It argues that the surge decision reflected a “delicate and skillful exercise in leadership” given civil-military tensions, but questions how well the surge answered the broader strategic questions surrounding American involvement.
{"title":"Blood, Treasure, and Time","authors":"R. Betts","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter places the surge decision in the context of the broader history of the Iraq War and offers a modestly positive appraisal. Indeed, the surge is only important in how it affected the overall project of the American war in Iraq. The significant question is whether the history of the surge offers lessons beyond itself, or at least whether the surge was decisive for achieving US objectives. The chapter then examines various dilemmas and challenges that the war occasioned—of relating strategy to both operations and politics; of promoting democratization in Iraq while also seeking some control over Iraqi decision making; and of seeking to exert presidential command over a complex decision-making process. It argues that the surge decision reflected a “delicate and skillful exercise in leadership” given civil-military tensions, but questions how well the surge answered the broader strategic questions surrounding American involvement.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132604026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0014
J. Rovner
This chapter studies the relationship between strategy and the surge. Strategy is the bridge that links military operations and political objectives in war. A practical strategy describes those objectives and explains how military action will achieve them. The chapter disputes the idea that the surge constituted a new US strategy in Iraq. Instead, it can be considered as a “decision to put strategy on hold.” The surge, the chapter argues, encouraged a perverse strategic effect—by obscuring the political objectives of the war, it undercut efforts to forge competent and self-reliant governance in Iraq and contributed to the breakdown of the Iraqi state in the face of the subsequent rise of the Islamic State.
{"title":"Strategy and the Surge","authors":"J. Rovner","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies the relationship between strategy and the surge. Strategy is the bridge that links military operations and political objectives in war. A practical strategy describes those objectives and explains how military action will achieve them. The chapter disputes the idea that the surge constituted a new US strategy in Iraq. Instead, it can be considered as a “decision to put strategy on hold.” The surge, the chapter argues, encouraged a perverse strategic effect—by obscuring the political objectives of the war, it undercut efforts to forge competent and self-reliant governance in Iraq and contributed to the breakdown of the Iraqi state in the face of the subsequent rise of the Islamic State.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127507489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2000-09-27DOI: 10.1201/9781420025514.AXB
F. Smith, R. Lilly
{"title":"Appendix B. Time Line","authors":"F. Smith, R. Lilly","doi":"10.1201/9781420025514.AXB","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420025514.AXB","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125275759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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