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Frontmatter
Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-frontmatter2
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引用次数: 0
Grounding Personal Persistence 个人坚持的基础
Pub Date : 2021-05-18 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0011
H. Baber
Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.
抽象模态对应物理论认为一个事物可能是F它在另一个可能世界有一个对应物是F;时间对应物理论认为一件事曾经是F或将会是F,它在另一个时间有一个对应物是F。Benovsky, J. 2015。真性模态,时间模态和表征。Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18-34在本刊中赞同模态对应物理论,但认为时间对应物理论是站不住脚的,因为它不允许将直觉上正确的时间属性归因于普通物体,因此我们应该将普通物体,包括人,理解为瞬时的“蠕虫”。我认为,蠕虫理论在解释什么对生存至关重要时是有问题的,而时间对应物理论为个人持久性提供了一个合理的解释。
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引用次数: 0
Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems 连贯性与确证:不可能定理的认识局限
Pub Date : 2021-04-21 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0008
Ted L. Poston
Abstract It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. “Probability and Coherence Justification.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463–72, Olsson, E. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” Journal of Philosophy XCIX (5): 246–72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’ have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic interpretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to coherence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication, we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of confirmation.
人们普遍认为,独立报告的连贯性为相信报告的真实性提供了强有力的理由。Huemer, M. 1997的正式结果。"概率与一致性证明"李志强,2002.中国哲学研究进展。“连贯性和真理的问题是什么?”李建平。2005.中国哲学研究进展(5):379 - 379。反对连贯性:真理、可能性和正当性。牛津大学出版社。Bovens, L.和S. Hartmann. 2003。贝叶斯认识论。牛津大学出版社,证明,在一定条件下,连贯不能增加目标主张的概率。这些形式化的结果,被称为“不可能定理”,在文献中被广泛讨论。它们被认为具有重要的认知结果。特别要指出的是,报告必须首先单独证实目标索赔,然后多份报告的一致性才能提供任何积极的证实。在本文中,我对这种认识论的解释提出了质疑。不可能性定理与这样一种观点是一致的,即独立报告的连贯性提供了一个强有力的理由,使人们相信这些报告是真实的,即使这些报告在连贯性之前没有单独证实。一旦我们看到正式的发现没有这个含义,我们就可以恢复一个与贝叶斯主义和这些结果一致的一致性证明模型。因此,本文试图通过捍卫连贯性作为确认的独特来源来扭转连贯性推理的负面结果。
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引用次数: 1
Giving the Value of a Variable 给出变量的值
Pub Date : 2021-04-09 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0007
Richard Lawrence
Abstract What does it mean to ‘give’ the value of a variable in an algebraic context, and how does giving the value of a variable differ from merely describing it? I argue that to answer this question, we need to examine the role that giving the value of a variable plays in problem-solving practice. I argue that four different features are required for a statement to count as giving the value of a variable in the context of solving an elementary algebra problem: the variable must be in the scope opened by the problem statement; the values given must be in the range of the variable, which is determined by the problem; the statement giving the values must represent a complete solution; and it must be in a canonical form. This account helps us better understand elementary algebra itself, as well as the use of algebraic tools to analyze phenomena in natural language.
在代数环境中“给出”一个变量的值意味着什么?给出一个变量的值与仅仅描述它有什么不同?我认为,要回答这个问题,我们需要检查给出变量的值在解决问题的实践中所起的作用。我认为在解决初等代数问题的情况下,一个语句需要四个不同的特征来计算给出变量的值:变量必须在问题语句打开的范围内;给定的值必须在变量的范围内,这是由问题决定的;给出值的语句必须代表一个完整的解;它必须是标准形式。这有助于我们更好地理解初等代数本身,以及使用代数工具来分析自然语言中的现象。
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引用次数: 1
Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs 没有共同信念的联合行动
Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0004
Giacomo Figà Talamanca
Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.
人类之间的联合行动的特点是使用复杂的认知技巧,例如代表他人对某一事态的心理状态。这些能力是如何在原始人谱系中进化而来的仍然存在争议。我认为,随着时间的推移,共同实践的巩固可以培养对他人行为的可预测性。这可能会促进进化的过程,从简单地通过看到别人和他们正在看的东西来推断别人可能知道什么,到相互意识到彼此的信仰。我将研究一个黑猩猩群体的合作狩猎案例,并认为这是它们有可能达成共识的证据,表明一种实践的巩固可能支持了原始人谱系中更高社会认知的进化。
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引用次数: 1
The Quest for Certainty 对确定性的追求
Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0005
Luca Zanetti
Abstract The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as to whether p in so far as one takes the truth of p to be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth of p to be certain, one is no longer able to genuinely wonder whether p is true; third, to ask the question whether p is to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging that p we commit ourselves to p’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty.
摘要本文的目的是通过论证以确定性为目标是认知的一个构成特征来证明笛卡尔对确定性的追求是正确的。我的论证取决于关于怀疑和判断的性质的三个观察:第一,只要一个人认为p的真理是不确定的,那么对p是否存在怀疑总是可能的;第二,只要一个人认为p的真理是确定的,他就不再能够真正地怀疑p是否为真;第三,问p是否表示希望得到一个真实的答案。在此基础上,我阐明在什么意义上确定性是认识的目的。然后我认为在判断p时我们承诺p是确定的确定性是判断的构成规范。这篇论文作为一个整体提供了怀疑和判断之间相互作用的画面,旨在证明我们怀疑的能力证明了我们对绝对确定的知识的渴望。
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引用次数: 2
Miller’s Tale: Why the Sympathy Principle is Inadequate 米勒的故事:为什么同情原则是不充分的
Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0006
J. Slater
Abstract In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns our dispositions rather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents.
在彼得·辛格的《饥荒、富裕和道德》发表之后,他提出的论点受到了严重的批评,主要原因是他对道德主体的要求过高。自那以后,人们曾多次尝试制定道德原则,以充分表达我们行善义务的严谨性。理查德·米勒提出了一个这样的选择,与辛格的原则相比,它有几个优点。特别是,因为它关注我们的性情,而不是在每一个可能的场合操作,它避免了迭代需求的问题。然而,我认为米勒的原则是不充分的,因为1)它似乎太弱了,2)它似乎含糊不清,3)它可能对不幸的道德行为者做出过分严厉的判决。
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引用次数: 0
Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science 实在论与科学的认识客观性
Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0002
H. Sankey
Abstract The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.
摘要本文对科学的认识论客观性进行了现实主义的阐释。认识客观性区别于本体论客观性和真理客观性。本文以库恩的科学理论选择是基于共同的科学价值观,客观因素和主观因素都有作用的观点为背景。库恩的价值观在认识论上是没有根据的,因此提供了最低限度的客观性。一个强有力的认识客观性的说明,方法规范是到达真理的可靠手段。问题仍然是,需要审慎判断来确定一系列方法规范的相关性和相对重要性。在审慎判断的过程中,认知美德可能会发挥作用。
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引用次数: 6
Physics’ Contribution to Causation 物理学对因果关系的贡献
Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/krt-2021-0003
M. Kistler
Abstract Most philosophers of physics are eliminativists about causation. Following Bertrand Russell’s lead, they think that causation is a folk concept that cannot be rationally reconstructed within a worldview informed by contemporary physics. Against this thesis, I argue that physics contributes to shaping the concept of causation, in two ways. (1) Special Relativity is a physical theory that expresses causal constraints. (2) The physical concept of a conserved quantity can be used in the functional reduction of the notion of causation. The empirical part of this reduction makes the hypothesis that the transference of an amount of a conserved quantity is a necessary and sufficient condition for causation. This hypothesis is defended against several objections from physics: that amounts of energy do not possess the appropriate identity conditions required for being able to be transmitted, that there is no universal principle of the conservation of energy in General Relativity, and that there are at least two types of physical systems in which causation does not involve any transference: entangled systems in quantum mechanics and the Aharonov–Bohm effect. In order to show that physics provides means to elaborate the concept of causation it is important to avoid certain misunderstandings. In particular, the claim that there is causation in a physical world does not mean that causation is an additional ingredient of the “furniture” of the world, over and above the ingredients identified by physics.
大多数物理学家对因果关系持否定态度。在伯特兰·罗素(Bertrand Russell)的领导下,他们认为因果关系是一个民间概念,不能在当代物理学的世界观中理性地重建。为了反驳这一论点,我认为物理学以两种方式有助于形成因果关系的概念。狭义相对论是一种表达因果约束的物理理论。(2)守恒量的物理概念可用于因果关系概念的泛函化简。这种还原的经验部分提出一个假设,即一定数量的守恒量的转移是因果关系的充分必要条件。这一假设受到了物理学家的反对:能量的数量不具备传输所需的适当的同一性条件,广义相对论中不存在能量守恒的普遍原理,至少有两种类型的物理系统的因果关系不涉及任何转移:量子力学中的纠缠系统和Aharonov-Bohm效应。为了说明物理学提供了阐述因果关系概念的方法,重要的是要避免某些误解。特别是,在物理世界中存在因果关系的说法并不意味着因果关系是世界“家具”的一个额外成分,超出了物理学所确定的成分。
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引用次数: 2
Bayesian Epistemology 贝叶斯认识论
Pub Date : 2021-01-12 DOI: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_693-1
J. Landes
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引用次数: 0
期刊
KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy
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