Abstract Claims about freedom and predestination are ubiquitous in movies, novels, and myths. These claims touch upon the philosophical problem of the compatibility of free will and determination. In order to make an informed judgment about whether these claims are true, it is helpful to know what philosophers have to say about free will. However, philosophical discussions are usually absent in popular culture. It is perhaps no wonder, since free will is a topic that has been discussed for millennia. Consequently, these discussions have become quite complicated and not easy to decipher. This essay is a popular introduction to these discussions, accessible to readers without former acquaintance with the topic. I provide references to other works for readers interested in knowing more. My aim is to show that while there are persuasive arguments against free will, there are no fewer persuasive replies to these arguments. Free will is a fascinating topic, and I hope that acquaintance with the relevant philosophical discussion will prove useful for those who wonder if anyone is free to create their own destiny.
{"title":"Androids, Oracles and Free Will","authors":"M. Sekatskaya","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Claims about freedom and predestination are ubiquitous in movies, novels, and myths. These claims touch upon the philosophical problem of the compatibility of free will and determination. In order to make an informed judgment about whether these claims are true, it is helpful to know what philosophers have to say about free will. However, philosophical discussions are usually absent in popular culture. It is perhaps no wonder, since free will is a topic that has been discussed for millennia. Consequently, these discussions have become quite complicated and not easy to decipher. This essay is a popular introduction to these discussions, accessible to readers without former acquaintance with the topic. I provide references to other works for readers interested in knowing more. My aim is to show that while there are persuasive arguments against free will, there are no fewer persuasive replies to these arguments. Free will is a fascinating topic, and I hope that acquaintance with the relevant philosophical discussion will prove useful for those who wonder if anyone is free to create their own destiny.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115205333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Fake news is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of “fake news” within philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of definitions of “fake news” and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of defining “fake news”. This new definition hinges upon the fact that fake news has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news.
{"title":"Defining Fake News","authors":"Glenn Anderau","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fake news is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of “fake news” within philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of definitions of “fake news” and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of defining “fake news”. This new definition hinges upon the fact that fake news has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129403744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The idea that good explanations come with strong changes in probabilities has been very common. This criterion is called probabilistic difference-making. Since it is an intuitive criterion and has a long tradition in the literature on scientific explanation, it comes as a surprise that probabilistic difference-making is rarely discussed in the context of interventionist causal explanation. Specificity, proportionality, and stability are usually employed to measure explanatory power instead. This paper is a first step into the larger project of connecting difference-making to the interventionist debate, and it starts by investigating whether probabilistic difference-making is contained in the notion of specificity. The choice of specificity is motivated by the observation that both probabilistic difference-making and specificity build on similar underlying intuitions. When comparing measures for both specificity and probabilistic difference-making, it turns out that the measures are not strictly correlated, and so the thesis that probabilistic difference-making is encoded within specificity has to be rejected. Some consequences of this result are discussed as well.
{"title":"Searching Probabilistic Difference-Making within Specificity","authors":"Andreas Lüchinger","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The idea that good explanations come with strong changes in probabilities has been very common. This criterion is called probabilistic difference-making. Since it is an intuitive criterion and has a long tradition in the literature on scientific explanation, it comes as a surprise that probabilistic difference-making is rarely discussed in the context of interventionist causal explanation. Specificity, proportionality, and stability are usually employed to measure explanatory power instead. This paper is a first step into the larger project of connecting difference-making to the interventionist debate, and it starts by investigating whether probabilistic difference-making is contained in the notion of specificity. The choice of specificity is motivated by the observation that both probabilistic difference-making and specificity build on similar underlying intuitions. When comparing measures for both specificity and probabilistic difference-making, it turns out that the measures are not strictly correlated, and so the thesis that probabilistic difference-making is encoded within specificity has to be rejected. Some consequences of this result are discussed as well.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125311014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I argue that Goff’s view that universal consciousness grounds logical laws such as the law of non-contradiction cannot be true on the grounds that we cannot guarantee the classical logic loving nature of universal consciousness that Goff desires in order to ground logical laws. I will present three arguments to show this.
{"title":"Three Short Arguments Against Goff’s Grounding of Logical Laws in Universal Consciousness","authors":"Andrew Thomas","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue that Goff’s view that universal consciousness grounds logical laws such as the law of non-contradiction cannot be true on the grounds that we cannot guarantee the classical logic loving nature of universal consciousness that Goff desires in order to ground logical laws. I will present three arguments to show this.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121451182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deborah Kant, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya
Abstract This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a Freeway explorer approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians (since they are sometimes hard to grasp even for mathematicians). This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory.
{"title":"Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics do Not Come for Free","authors":"Deborah Kant, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a Freeway explorer approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians (since they are sometimes hard to grasp even for mathematicians). This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134454948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.
{"title":"Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences","authors":"D. Greimann","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134189079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Between June 9 and June 11, 2021 approximately 80 speakers participated at the third East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) conference that took place in a hybrid format, online and in person at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade in Serbia. The EENPS was founded in 2015 by the fellows of the first cohort of European Philosophy of Science (EPSA) fellowship scheme for junior philosophers working in Central and Eastern Europe. Not to overlapwith EPSA biannual conferences, the EENPS decided to organize its conferences in even years: the first conference took place in Sofia, Bulgaria in 2016 and the second in Bratislava, Slovakia 2018. The third conference of the network was likewise planned for June 2020, but it was delayed for one year because of the pandemic. Select papers from each conference have been published in special issues of various journals – this year they will be published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ISPS). The participants joined from all over the world, which also fulfilled one of the main aims of the network: to foster connections between philosophers of science working in Central and Eastern Europe (the network’s focal region) and those working inWestern Europe and elsewhere. The conference provided a good variety of topics, ranging from general philosophy of science to philosophy of specific sciences, history and philosophy of science, formal philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics and logic, and had two keynote talks, given by Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge) and Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf). The next conference of the EENPS will take place in summer 2022 in Tartu, Estonia, andwe expect that it will attract evenmore submissions and that by then it
{"title":"Conference Report: The Third Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS 2021), 9–11 June, 2021","authors":"Borut Trpin","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Between June 9 and June 11, 2021 approximately 80 speakers participated at the third East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) conference that took place in a hybrid format, online and in person at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade in Serbia. The EENPS was founded in 2015 by the fellows of the first cohort of European Philosophy of Science (EPSA) fellowship scheme for junior philosophers working in Central and Eastern Europe. Not to overlapwith EPSA biannual conferences, the EENPS decided to organize its conferences in even years: the first conference took place in Sofia, Bulgaria in 2016 and the second in Bratislava, Slovakia 2018. The third conference of the network was likewise planned for June 2020, but it was delayed for one year because of the pandemic. Select papers from each conference have been published in special issues of various journals – this year they will be published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ISPS). The participants joined from all over the world, which also fulfilled one of the main aims of the network: to foster connections between philosophers of science working in Central and Eastern Europe (the network’s focal region) and those working inWestern Europe and elsewhere. The conference provided a good variety of topics, ranging from general philosophy of science to philosophy of specific sciences, history and philosophy of science, formal philosophy of science, and philosophy of mathematics and logic, and had two keynote talks, given by Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge) and Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf). The next conference of the EENPS will take place in summer 2022 in Tartu, Estonia, andwe expect that it will attract evenmore submissions and that by then it","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115562705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.
{"title":"Two Shapes of Pragmatism","authors":"Léna Mudry","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128795558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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