Abstract We argue that Kraay's "theistic multiverse" response to the objections to theism [11] is unsuccessful as it simply shifts the problems leveled against theism from the level of possible worlds to the level of possible universes. Furthermore, when we restate the objections at the level of possible universes, we can show how Kraay's conclusion about the uniqueness of the theistic multiverse is undermined.
{"title":"Against the Theistic Multiverse","authors":"S. Uckelman","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340404","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We argue that Kraay's \"theistic multiverse\" response to the objections to theism [11] is unsuccessful as it simply shifts the problems leveled against theism from the level of possible worlds to the level of possible universes. Furthermore, when we restate the objections at the level of possible universes, we can show how Kraay's conclusion about the uniqueness of the theistic multiverse is undermined.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130229713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of van Inwagen's famous argument for incompatibilism. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen's own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a first-order predicate logic. I show, however, that even though this reconstruction is not susceptible to the same objection, this reconstruction can be shown to be inconsistent (given van Inwagen's own assumptions). At the end of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a quantified counterfactual logic with propositional quantifiers. I show that within this formal framework van Inwagen would not only be able to argue directly for incompatibilism, he would also be able to argue for crucial assumptions of his argument.
{"title":"The Consequence of the Consequence Argument","authors":"Marco Hausmann","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340406","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of van Inwagen's famous argument for incompatibilism. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen's own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a first-order predicate logic. I show, however, that even though this reconstruction is not susceptible to the same objection, this reconstruction can be shown to be inconsistent (given van Inwagen's own assumptions). At the end of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a quantified counterfactual logic with propositional quantifiers. I show that within this formal framework van Inwagen would not only be able to argue directly for incompatibilism, he would also be able to argue for crucial assumptions of his argument.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124986808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Antirealist explanations for the success of science have been widely discussed up to today and have received several formulations. This makes it rather complex to assess them all. The objective of this paper is to help understand and assess the proposal of an anti-realist explanation for science's success. I show the core assumptions contained in the several anti- realist explanations, how they relate to each other, and which background assumptions are required in order to warrant each position. I argue that, since the many anti-realist explanations are only plausible when maintained conjointly, there is essentially only one anti-realist account to science's success: scientists find successful (and even fertile) theories because they use methods of theory-selection and theory-construction that preserve only successful theories; the fact that these theories prove themselves successful will not be mysterious if it is conjointly assumed that false theories are often empirically successful. This explanation relies on a semantic and a methodological view concerning the probabilistic relation between success and truth, and also on an epistemic stance regarding the limits of explanatory reasoning. The crucial divergence between realist and antirealist accounts of science's success lies in how probable they assess the possibility of a theory to be false and empirically successful. Since the stale-mate between realist and antirealist explanations results from a prior disagreement about the probabilistic connection between success and truth (or the underdetermination thesis), the challenge raised by the antirealist explanation to realism becomes equivalent to the traditional charge that the no-miracles argument is circular.
{"title":"The Anti-Realist Explanation for Science's Success: Semantics, Method and Attitude","authors":"Bruno Malavolta e Silva","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340405","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Antirealist explanations for the success of science have been widely discussed up to today and have received several formulations. This makes it rather complex to assess them all. The objective of this paper is to help understand and assess the proposal of an anti-realist explanation for science's success. I show the core assumptions contained in the several anti- realist explanations, how they relate to each other, and which background assumptions are required in order to warrant each position. I argue that, since the many anti-realist explanations are only plausible when maintained conjointly, there is essentially only one anti-realist account to science's success: scientists find successful (and even fertile) theories because they use methods of theory-selection and theory-construction that preserve only successful theories; the fact that these theories prove themselves successful will not be mysterious if it is conjointly assumed that false theories are often empirically successful. This explanation relies on a semantic and a methodological view concerning the probabilistic relation between success and truth, and also on an epistemic stance regarding the limits of explanatory reasoning. The crucial divergence between realist and antirealist accounts of science's success lies in how probable they assess the possibility of a theory to be false and empirically successful. Since the stale-mate between realist and antirealist explanations results from a prior disagreement about the probabilistic connection between success and truth (or the underdetermination thesis), the challenge raised by the antirealist explanation to realism becomes equivalent to the traditional charge that the no-miracles argument is circular.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124200400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Time travel, it has been argued, leads to paradoxes, and in particular to a problem known as the grandfather paradox. Lewis has famously argued for the now standard view that the grandfather paradox is merely apparent. But underlying Lewis's solution is a faulty account of ability statements - one, according to which ability statements express possibility statements. I argue, contrary to Vihvelin and others, that an ameliorated view of ability statements allows for the same treatment of the seeming paradox. Hence, Lewis's take on the grandfather paradox stands despite the failure of the particular view of ability statements it is built upon.
{"title":"What Tim Can and Cannot Do: A Paradox of Time Travel Revisited","authors":"Romy Jaster","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340408","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Time travel, it has been argued, leads to paradoxes, and in particular to a problem known as the grandfather paradox. Lewis has famously argued for the now standard view that the grandfather paradox is merely apparent. But underlying Lewis's solution is a faulty account of ability statements - one, according to which ability statements express possibility statements. I argue, contrary to Vihvelin and others, that an ameliorated view of ability statements allows for the same treatment of the seeming paradox. Hence, Lewis's take on the grandfather paradox stands despite the failure of the particular view of ability statements it is built upon.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131071629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The current discourse on moral epistemology (ME), has hardly paid any attention to the question concerning the demarcation of the domain of ME within epistemology. Neither is the subject matter of ME considered unique, nor is the methodology adopted in its investigations considered distinct. We attempt to show in this paper that this omission does not restrict itself to a mere taxonomical oversight but rather leads to certain deeper conceptual concerns. We argue that a casual and porous understanding of the subject matter of ME is the result of conflating moral beliefs and justification with non-moral beliefs and justification. If ME doesn't merit a clear demarcation within epistemology, then the very legitimacy of ME is brought under a cloud, thereby threatening the distinction between ethics and epistemology. We believe G. E Moore foresaw this predicament and our interpretation of his work could offer a possible solution.
{"title":"Why Moral Epistemology is Not Just Epistemology Applied to Moral Beliefs","authors":"Sushruth Ravish, Chaitanya Joshi","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340407","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The current discourse on moral epistemology (ME), has hardly paid any attention to the question concerning the demarcation of the domain of ME within epistemology. Neither is the subject matter of ME considered unique, nor is the methodology adopted in its investigations considered distinct. We attempt to show in this paper that this omission does not restrict itself to a mere taxonomical oversight but rather leads to certain deeper conceptual concerns. We argue that a casual and porous understanding of the subject matter of ME is the result of conflating moral beliefs and justification with non-moral beliefs and justification. If ME doesn't merit a clear demarcation within epistemology, then the very legitimacy of ME is brought under a cloud, thereby threatening the distinction between ethics and epistemology. We believe G. E Moore foresaw this predicament and our interpretation of his work could offer a possible solution.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132694106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Among fundamental metaphysical quests, one might wonder: Why is there anything at all rather than just nothing? Many reject that question because they think it is meaningless, trivial, or necessarily unanswerable. But I provide reasons for thinking that the Why question could make sense and one might even expect an answer to it. I begin by asking why the world is not empty of all concrete things. One might regard this question as important if one accepts that it is, in some sense, possible for all concrete things to vanish, one-by-one. I argue finally that possible replies to the Why question concerning concrete things might point to realities that are abstract instead of concrete. Abstract realities might be explanatorily powerful without their power being guaranteed by Logic.
{"title":"Much Ado about Nothingness?","authors":"Mohsen Moghri","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340305","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Among fundamental metaphysical quests, one might wonder: Why is there anything at all rather than just nothing? Many reject that question because they think it is meaningless, trivial, or necessarily unanswerable. But I provide reasons for thinking that the Why question could make sense and one might even expect an answer to it. I begin by asking why the world is not empty of all concrete things. One might regard this question as important if one accepts that it is, in some sense, possible for all concrete things to vanish, one-by-one. I argue finally that possible replies to the Why question concerning concrete things might point to realities that are abstract instead of concrete. Abstract realities might be explanatorily powerful without their power being guaranteed by Logic.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130087476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist during a jog is very different from the interaction we might experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate. We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical cues. Considering that the ears of today's listeners are used to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of Godlovitch's main thoughts expounded in his work on "musical performance" [11] serve as a reference and starting point for this investigation. His concept of `personalism', which deprives computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a reective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression. The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical live performance.
{"title":"Musicians (Don't) Play Algorithms. Or: What makes a musical performance","authors":"Mira Magdalena Sickinger","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340302","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist during a jog is very different from the interaction we might experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate. We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical cues. Considering that the ears of today's listeners are used to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of Godlovitch's main thoughts expounded in his work on \"musical performance\" [11] serve as a reference and starting point for this investigation. His concept of `personalism', which deprives computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a reective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression. The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical live performance.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128083946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract When it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant `live-and-let-live' attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance.
{"title":"Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist","authors":"Dominik Balg","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant `live-and-let-live' attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124016668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson's object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson's claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.
{"title":"The Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Identity","authors":"Radim Bělohrad","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340303","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson's object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson's claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127701163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.
{"title":"Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's Views on Ontology","authors":"Artur Kosecki","doi":"10.1515/krt-2020-340306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340306","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"263 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123361420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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