Andrew Jeffrey, O. Linton, Thong Nguyen, P. Phillips
We propose a new nonparametric estimator for the volatility structure of the zero-coupon yield curve inside the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework. The estimator incorporates cross-sectional restrictions along the maturity dimension, and also allows for measurement errors, which can arise from estimation of the yield curve from noisy data. The estimates are implemented with daily CRSP bond data.
{"title":"Nonparametric Estimation of a Multifactor Heath-Jarrow-Morton Model: An Integrated Approach","authors":"Andrew Jeffrey, O. Linton, Thong Nguyen, P. Phillips","doi":"10.1093/JJFINEC/NBH010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JJFINEC/NBH010","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new nonparametric estimator for the volatility structure of the zero-coupon yield curve inside the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework. The estimator incorporates cross-sectional restrictions along the maturity dimension, and also allows for measurement errors, which can arise from estimation of the yield curve from noisy data. The estimates are implemented with daily CRSP bond data.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"81 5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77512950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the financial performance of 1,664 commercial banks chartered between 1980 and 1985, a period of intense chartering activity just preceding the banking recession of the late-1980s. We compare new banks to a benchmark sample of 2,047 small established banks. Using a split population duration model, we estimate the probability distribution of long-run failure for both sets of banks over a 14 year period, and assess how regulatory, environmental, and bank specific conditions affect that probability distribution. We find that the fragility of a new bank varies over time in a fairly regular ‘life cycle’ pattern, but that how this basic life cycle pattern is positioned vis a vis the business cycle also matters. On average, new banks are initially less likely to fail than established banks; after about four years they become more likely to fail than established banks; and as time passes and new banks mature they fail at rates similar to established banks. But banks chartered just prior to the banking recession failed at the highest rates, and their estimated hazard functions followed an extreme life cycle shape. State laws restricting the acquisition of de novo banks are associated with higher rates of new bank failure, but easy-entry chartering policies are not. We find that de novo failure is more sensitive to capital levels than established bank failure, evidence that Justifies recent increases in minimum capital requirements for de novo banks. Finally, our results suggest that early warning signals may be easier to identify for de novo banks than for established banks, perhaps because banks in the early stages of their life cycles are less heterogeneous and hence simpler to model than mature banks.
{"title":"For How Long are Newly Chartered Banks Financially Fragile?","authors":"Robert DeYoung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.265751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265751","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the financial performance of 1,664 commercial banks chartered between 1980 and 1985, a period of intense chartering activity just preceding the banking recession of the late-1980s. We compare new banks to a benchmark sample of 2,047 small established banks. Using a split population duration model, we estimate the probability distribution of long-run failure for both sets of banks over a 14 year period, and assess how regulatory, environmental, and bank specific conditions affect that probability distribution. We find that the fragility of a new bank varies over time in a fairly regular ‘life cycle’ pattern, but that how this basic life cycle pattern is positioned vis a vis the business cycle also matters. On average, new banks are initially less likely to fail than established banks; after about four years they become more likely to fail than established banks; and as time passes and new banks mature they fail at rates similar to established banks. But banks chartered just prior to the banking recession failed at the highest rates, and their estimated hazard functions followed an extreme life cycle shape. State laws restricting the acquisition of de novo banks are associated with higher rates of new bank failure, but easy-entry chartering policies are not. We find that de novo failure is more sensitive to capital levels than established bank failure, evidence that Justifies recent increases in minimum capital requirements for de novo banks. Finally, our results suggest that early warning signals may be easier to identify for de novo banks than for established banks, perhaps because banks in the early stages of their life cycles are less heterogeneous and hence simpler to model than mature banks.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90049678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture-capital-backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.
{"title":"Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence","authors":"Thomas Hellmann, M. Puri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.243149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.243149","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture-capital-backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90388119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The burden of resolving an environmental problem is typically shared among several responsible parties. To clarify the nature and extent of the problem, these parties must provide information to the regulator. Based on this information, the regulator will instigate an investigation of the problem, to determine an appropriate remedy. This paper investigates the incentives facing agents to promote excessive investigation and postpone remediation. Our incomplete information game-theoretic model may be of general interest to game theorists: we apply a new theorem guaranteeing pure-strategy equilibria and introduce a class of games called " aggregation games" which have interesting properties and are widely applicable.
{"title":"Environmental Remedies: An Incomplete Information Aggregation Game","authors":"G. Rausser, Leo Simon, Jinhuan Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.213835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.213835","url":null,"abstract":"The burden of resolving an environmental problem is typically shared among several responsible parties. To clarify the nature and extent of the problem, these parties must provide information to the regulator. Based on this information, the regulator will instigate an investigation of the problem, to determine an appropriate remedy. This paper investigates the incentives facing agents to promote excessive investigation and postpone remediation. Our incomplete information game-theoretic model may be of general interest to game theorists: we apply a new theorem guaranteeing pure-strategy equilibria and introduce a class of games called \" aggregation games\" which have interesting properties and are widely applicable.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75763547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the design of an artifact is "modularized," the elements of the design are split up and assigned to modules according to a formal architecture or plan. Some of the modules are "hidden," meaning that design decisions in those modules do not affect decisions in other modules; some of the modules are "visible," meaning that they embody "design rules" that hidden-module designers must obey if the modules are to work together. Modular designs offer alternatives that non-modular ("interdependent") designs do not provide. Specifically, in the hidden modules, designers may replace early, inferior solutions with later, superior solutions. Such alternatives can be modeled as "real options." In Design Rules, Volume 1: The Power of Modularity (MIT Press, 2000) we sought to categorize the major options implicit in a modular design, and to explain how each type can be valued in accordance with modern finance theory. This paper provides an example of the valuation of the modular options "splitting" and "substitution." We show that the key drivers of the "net option value" of a particular module are (1) its "technical potential" (labeled s, because it operates like volatility in financial option theory); (2) the cost of mounting independent design experiments; and (3) the "visibility" of the module in question. The option value of a system of modules in turn can be approximated by adding up the net option values inherent in each module and subtracting the cost of creating the modular architecture. A positive value in this calculation justifies investment in a new modular architecture.
{"title":"The Option Value of Modularity in Design: An Example From Design Rules, Volume 1: The Power of Modularity","authors":"K. Clark, Carliss Y. Baldwin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.312404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.312404","url":null,"abstract":"When the design of an artifact is \"modularized,\" the elements of the design are split up and assigned to modules according to a formal architecture or plan. Some of the modules are \"hidden,\" meaning that design decisions in those modules do not affect decisions in other modules; some of the modules are \"visible,\" meaning that they embody \"design rules\" that hidden-module designers must obey if the modules are to work together. Modular designs offer alternatives that non-modular (\"interdependent\") designs do not provide. Specifically, in the hidden modules, designers may replace early, inferior solutions with later, superior solutions. Such alternatives can be modeled as \"real options.\" In Design Rules, Volume 1: The Power of Modularity (MIT Press, 2000) we sought to categorize the major options implicit in a modular design, and to explain how each type can be valued in accordance with modern finance theory. This paper provides an example of the valuation of the modular options \"splitting\" and \"substitution.\" We show that the key drivers of the \"net option value\" of a particular module are (1) its \"technical potential\" (labeled s, because it operates like volatility in financial option theory); (2) the cost of mounting independent design experiments; and (3) the \"visibility\" of the module in question. The option value of a system of modules in turn can be approximated by adding up the net option values inherent in each module and subtracting the cost of creating the modular architecture. A positive value in this calculation justifies investment in a new modular architecture.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91296904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is an attempt to assess the contribution of R&D to growth of output in U.S. manufacturing industries. The important issues to address are: whether the slower growth of R&D expenditures in recent years has been the cause of slowdown in the growth of productivity, and what the factors are in explaining the slower growth of R&D expenditures. After a brief survey of the major issues on this topic, a production function is formulated and estimated using tine series cross-section data for the manufacturing industries. Also, the factors determining the rate of growth of R&D expenditures in the 1958-75 period are identified by formulating a dynamic model of demand for R & D activity. The estimation results indicate that the stock of R & D, as a measure of stock of knowledge, positively and strongly affect growth of output in total manufacturing, total durable, and total nondurable industries. Potential growth of output is affected because of the slowdown of growth of stock of R&D since 1966, but the gross rates of return on stock of R&D have not changed much in the 1966-75 period. Growth of output, changes in relative prices, cyclical fluctuations of the economy, as well as changes in level of employment and capital stocks are the factors affecting R&D expenditures. The effect of government financing of R&D on private decisions regarding R & D expenditures differs among different industries. By and large, the results on this issue are basically inconclusive and require further investigation.
{"title":"Contributions and Determinants of Research and Development Expenditures in the U.S. Manufacturing Industries","authors":"M. Nadiri","doi":"10.3386/W0360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W0360","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an attempt to assess the contribution of R&D to growth of output in U.S. manufacturing industries. The important issues to address are: whether the slower growth of R&D expenditures in recent years has been the cause of slowdown in the growth of productivity, and what the factors are in explaining the slower growth of R&D expenditures. After a brief survey of the major issues on this topic, a production function is formulated and estimated using tine series cross-section data for the manufacturing industries. Also, the factors determining the rate of growth of R&D expenditures in the 1958-75 period are identified by formulating a dynamic model of demand for R & D activity. The estimation results indicate that the stock of R & D, as a measure of stock of knowledge, positively and strongly affect growth of output in total manufacturing, total durable, and total nondurable industries. Potential growth of output is affected because of the slowdown of growth of stock of R&D since 1966, but the gross rates of return on stock of R&D have not changed much in the 1966-75 period. Growth of output, changes in relative prices, cyclical fluctuations of the economy, as well as changes in level of employment and capital stocks are the factors affecting R&D expenditures. The effect of government financing of R&D on private decisions regarding R & D expenditures differs among different industries. By and large, the results on this issue are basically inconclusive and require further investigation.","PeriodicalId":11044,"journal":{"name":"delete","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87846900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：