Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2252022
Chang He, Lixin (Nancy) Su, Zheng Wang, X. Zhu
We examine the spillover effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on improving the contracting role of accounting numbers in executive compensations in an international setting. For a sample of non-U.S.-listed foreign public firms with PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors, we find a significant increase in the sensitivity of their executive cash compensations to earnings after the release of the first inspection reports on their auditors by the PCAOB, relative to those without PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors. Such a result suggests that the compensation committees of firms with PCAOBinspected auditors infer that the quality of earnings as a performance measure for determining executive compensations improves due to the PCAOB’s inspections of their auditors. We also find that a clean inspection report issued to the firm’s auditor has an incremental effect on increasing earnings pay-for-performance sensitivity. Our findings provide novel evidence on the effectiveness of U.S. regulatory oversight in foreign markets and should interest the PCAOB and local audit regulators around the world.
{"title":"The Spillover of U.S. Regulatory Oversight to Foreign Markets: Evidence from the Effect of PCAOB International Inspections on Executive Compensations","authors":"Chang He, Lixin (Nancy) Su, Zheng Wang, X. Zhu","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2252022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2252022","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the spillover effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on improving the contracting role of accounting numbers in executive compensations in an international setting. For a sample of non-U.S.-listed foreign public firms with PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors, we find a significant increase in the sensitivity of their executive cash compensations to earnings after the release of the first inspection reports on their auditors by the PCAOB, relative to those without PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors. Such a result suggests that the compensation committees of firms with PCAOBinspected auditors infer that the quality of earnings as a performance measure for determining executive compensations improves due to the PCAOB’s inspections of their auditors. We also find that a clean inspection report issued to the firm’s auditor has an incremental effect on increasing earnings pay-for-performance sensitivity. Our findings provide novel evidence on the effectiveness of U.S. regulatory oversight in foreign markets and should interest the PCAOB and local audit regulators around the world.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78425391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620
Tong Lu, Ziyun Yang, Lanyi Yan Zhang
AbstractThis study investigates the effects of accounting bias on the efficiency of a debt-financed investment, which is subject to an interim liquidation/continuation decision based on the accounting report. We decompose the overall effect of accounting bias into a mean effect and a variance effect and transform binary state and report spaces into continuous ones. We derive two main results. (1) The highest investment efficiency is induced by a downward bias for gloomy investment prospects and an upward bias for rosy investment prospects. (2) The optimal covenant tightness is U-shaped and the optimal interest rate is hump-shaped in the degree of bias. In particular, neutral (unbiased) accounting neither minimizes the variance of the report nor maximizes investment efficiency.Keywords: NeutralityBiasInvestment efficiencyCovenant tightnessInterest rate AcknowledgmentsWe wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Göx (the editor) and two anonymous referees whose suggestions led to a much better manuscript. We have also benefitted from helpful comments of participants at the 2022 AAA Midwest Region Meeting and the 2023 AAA FARS Midyear Meeting.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplemental DataSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620.Data AvailabilityAll data are from publicly available sources identified in the study.Notes1 The first approach is adopted by Gigler and Hemmer (Citation2001), Venugopalan (Citation2001), Chen et al. (Citation2007), Suijs (Citation2008), Gigler et al. (Citation2009), Göx and Wagenhofer (Citation2010), Drymiotes and Hemmer (Citation2013), Gao (Citation2013), Li (Citation2013), Nan and Wen (Citation2014), Bertomeu and Cheynel (Citation2015), Armstrong et al. (Citation2016), Callen et al. (Citation2016), Jiang (Citation2016), Bertomeu et al. (Citation2017), Caskey and Laux (Citation2017), Jiang and Yang (Citation2017), Lu et al. (Citation2018), and Dordzhieva et al. (Citation2022), among others. The second approach is adopted by Guay and Verrecchia (Citation2006), Burkhardt and Strausz (Citation2009), Gow (Citation2009), Göx and Wagenhofer (Citation2009), Caskey and Hughes (Citation2012), and Beyer (Citation2013), among others. In a different strand, Kwon et al. (Citation2001), Fan and Zhang (Citation2012), and Jiang and Yang (Citation2021) use a binary partition of a state space to represent the degree of bias.2 See Burkhardt and Strausz (Citation2009), Caskey and Hughes (Citation2012), Beyer (Citation2013), Gao (Citation2013), Li (Citation2013), Callen et al. (Citation2016), Jiang (Citation2016), Bertomeu et al. (Citation2017), and Jiang and Yang (Citation2021), among others.3 We can generalize this assumption as Pr(αθ≥t)×v+Pr(αθ<t)×0>m, where the success/failure threshold is t≤E[αθ]. Our main result (Proposition 3) holds qualitatively in this general case. Results are available on the online appe
摘要本研究探讨了会计偏差对债务融资投资效率的影响，债务融资投资受制于基于会计报告的临时清算/延续决策。我们将会计偏差的整体效应分解为均值效应和方差效应，并将二元状态和报告空间转换为连续状态。我们得到两个主要结果。(1)投资效率最高的原因是对投资前景悲观的向下偏好和对投资前景乐观的向上偏好。(2)最优契约紧度在偏差程度上呈u型，最优利率呈驼峰型。特别是，中性(无偏)会计既不能使报告的差异最小化，也不能使投资效率最大化。关键字:中立性、偏见、投资效率、契约严密性、利率致谢我们要感谢Robert Göx(编辑)和两位匿名审稿人的有益意见，他们的建议使我们的稿件更好。我们还从2022年AAA中西部地区会议和2023年AAA FARS年中会议与会者的有益意见中受益。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。补充数据本文的补充数据可在线访问http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620.Data availability所有数据均来自研究中确定的公开来源。Notes1第一种方法是采用gigl和缝边器(Citation2001) Venugopalan (Citation2001),陈et al。(Citation2007) Suijs (Citation2008) gigl et al . (Citation2009)、气态氧和根霍夫理所应当(Citation2010) Drymiotes和缝边器(Citation2013),高(Citation2013),李(Citation2013),南和温家宝(Citation2014) Bertomeu和Cheynel (Citation2015),阿姆斯特朗et al。(Citation2016) Callen et al . (Citation2016)江(Citation2016) Bertomeu et al . (Citation2017),Caskey and Laux (Citation2017)， Jiang and Yang (Citation2017)， Lu et al. (Citation2018)， Dordzhieva et al. (Citation2022)等。第二种方法由Guay和Verrecchia (Citation2006)、Burkhardt和Strausz (Citation2009)、Gow (Citation2009)、Göx和Wagenhofer (Citation2009)、Caskey和Hughes (Citation2012)以及Beyer (Citation2013)等人采用。在另一种情况下，Kwon等人(Citation2001)、Fan和Zhang (Citation2012)以及Jiang和Yang (Citation2021)使用状态空间的二元划分来表示偏倚程度2 .参见Burkhardt and Strausz (Citation2009)、Caskey and Hughes (Citation2012)、Beyer (Citation2013)、Gao (Citation2013)、Li (Citation2013)、Callen等人(Citation2016)、Jiang (Citation2016)、Bertomeu等人(Citation2017)、Jiang和Yang (Citation2021)等我们可以将这个假设推广为Pr(αθ≥t)×v+Pr(αθm)，其中成功/失败阈值为t≤E[αθ]。我们的主要结论(命题3)在这个一般情况下定性地成立。结果可在在线附录中获得。如果t>E[αθ]，将单个项目聚合成一个大型项目比单独运行单个项目更难成功;也就是说，形成一个大型项目是在破坏价值。因此，我们假设，如果t>E[αθ]，该公司将不会在第一时间形成一个大型项目在上一节介绍的Apple Watch示例中，子项目i(例如蓝牙5.3)的报告yi如果超过技术可行性将为1，否则为0。技术可行性的会计准则将影响子项目状态的表现方式，是保守的还是积极的。汇总报告是Apple Watch 8.5中涉及的四个子项目的单个报告的汇总。根据IFRS和U.S. GAAP，如果满足某些标准，软件开发成本可以资本化，最重要的是建立技术可行性。按照行业规范将此类成本确认为资产是中性会计(在我们的模型中以k = 0表示)。在较晚日期确认导致当期收益向下倾斜(用k>0表示)，而在较早日期确认导致向上倾斜(用k<0表示)当我们放弃每家公司至少有3个贷款工具的要求时，我们的样本由来自2211家公司的13389个观察值组成。回归结果在定性上是相同的作为稳健性检查，我们将Cscore3 (Cscore立方)纳入回归，其系数不显著，表明表2中的主要发现确实是u型关系作为稳健性检查，我们将Cscore3 (Cscore立方)纳入回归，其系数不显著，表明表3中的主要发现确实是驼峰型关系。
{"title":"Accounting Bias and Debt Contracting","authors":"Tong Lu, Ziyun Yang, Lanyi Yan Zhang","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis study investigates the effects of accounting bias on the efficiency of a debt-financed investment, which is subject to an interim liquidation/continuation decision based on the accounting report. We decompose the overall effect of accounting bias into a mean effect and a variance effect and transform binary state and report spaces into continuous ones. We derive two main results. (1) The highest investment efficiency is induced by a downward bias for gloomy investment prospects and an upward bias for rosy investment prospects. (2) The optimal covenant tightness is U-shaped and the optimal interest rate is hump-shaped in the degree of bias. In particular, neutral (unbiased) accounting neither minimizes the variance of the report nor maximizes investment efficiency.Keywords: NeutralityBiasInvestment efficiencyCovenant tightnessInterest rate AcknowledgmentsWe wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Göx (the editor) and two anonymous referees whose suggestions led to a much better manuscript. We have also benefitted from helpful comments of participants at the 2022 AAA Midwest Region Meeting and the 2023 AAA FARS Midyear Meeting.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplemental DataSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248620.Data AvailabilityAll data are from publicly available sources identified in the study.Notes1 The first approach is adopted by Gigler and Hemmer (Citation2001), Venugopalan (Citation2001), Chen et al. (Citation2007), Suijs (Citation2008), Gigler et al. (Citation2009), Göx and Wagenhofer (Citation2010), Drymiotes and Hemmer (Citation2013), Gao (Citation2013), Li (Citation2013), Nan and Wen (Citation2014), Bertomeu and Cheynel (Citation2015), Armstrong et al. (Citation2016), Callen et al. (Citation2016), Jiang (Citation2016), Bertomeu et al. (Citation2017), Caskey and Laux (Citation2017), Jiang and Yang (Citation2017), Lu et al. (Citation2018), and Dordzhieva et al. (Citation2022), among others. The second approach is adopted by Guay and Verrecchia (Citation2006), Burkhardt and Strausz (Citation2009), Gow (Citation2009), Göx and Wagenhofer (Citation2009), Caskey and Hughes (Citation2012), and Beyer (Citation2013), among others. In a different strand, Kwon et al. (Citation2001), Fan and Zhang (Citation2012), and Jiang and Yang (Citation2021) use a binary partition of a state space to represent the degree of bias.2 See Burkhardt and Strausz (Citation2009), Caskey and Hughes (Citation2012), Beyer (Citation2013), Gao (Citation2013), Li (Citation2013), Callen et al. (Citation2016), Jiang (Citation2016), Bertomeu et al. (Citation2017), and Jiang and Yang (Citation2021), among others.3 We can generalize this assumption as Pr(αθ≥t)×v+Pr(αθ<t)×0>m, where the success/failure threshold is t≤E[αθ]. Our main result (Proposition 3) holds qualitatively in this general case. Results are available on the online appe","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136118687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-27DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181
Andrea Bafundi, C. Imperatore
{"title":"Economists’ Political Donations and GDP Forecast Accuracy","authors":"Andrea Bafundi, C. Imperatore","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85930843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009
Jane Hennig, Sebastian Firk, Michael Wolff
{"title":"Credibility Signals from Soft Information: Evidence from Investor Reactions to Tone in Earnings Conference Calls","authors":"Jane Hennig, Sebastian Firk, Michael Wolff","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79961721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016
Gianfranco Siciliano, Dan Weiss
AbstractThis study explores the relation between family ownership and cost elasticity. Using a sample of 1746 European firms, we first find that family ownership, a prevalent ownership type with unique characteristics, is associated with greater cost elasticity. Further, we use four empirical settings to increase our confidence that a higher cost elasticity is attributable to family ownership. We also document that family firms achieve greater operating cost elasticity primarily through modifying SG&A costs in response to changing sales, but not by hiring or firing employees. These findings extend prior studies on ownership effects on cost structures, suggesting that family ownership matters in understanding firms’ cost elasticity choices.Keywords: Cost behaviourCost elasticityOwnershipFamily firmsJEL Codes: M41D24L23D10 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge constructive comments from Ashiq Ali, Eli Amir, Dan Amiram, Yakov Amihud, Eli Bartov, Jan Bouwens, Verdan Capkun, Mark DeFond, Shane Dikolli, Shai Levi, Luc Paugam, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Herve Stolowy, and participants of the 2019 Financial and Managerial Accounting Research Conference, 2020 MAS Midyear Meetings, JMAR Online Brownbag, and seminar participants at Bocconi University, HEC Paris, University of Florence. We acknowledge financial support from our respective institutions and from the Raya Strauss Center of Family Business Research. Any errors are entirely our own.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Cost elasticity is the percentage change in costs in response to percentage change in activity level (or volume).2 See Kreps (Citation1990) and Varian (Citation2014).3 Family businesses generate an estimated 70–90% of global GDP annually (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017), while 85% of startups worldwide are established with family money (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017 – Global Data Points).4 The Bvd Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Ownership Database is a source of owner and subsidiary links worldwide.5 Information on proprietary linkages from BvD is collected directly from official bodies, if any, or from national and international providers. In case of conflicting information among providers covering the same country, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available report.6 In these cases, the GUO type is “Industrial Company” (type C), “Foundation/Research Institute” (type J), and “Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee” (type E). Following Faccio et al. (Citation2011), we exclude 69 firms for which the government is the GUO (type S, i.e., public authority, state, government), because governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different from those of private investors (Faccio et al., Citation2011).7 According to DeFond et al. (Citation2017, p. 3630), “CEM is essentially a variation of exact matching, but instead of matching on the exact values of covariates, it matches on a coarsened range
{"title":"Family Ownership Influence on Cost Elasticity","authors":"Gianfranco Siciliano, Dan Weiss","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis study explores the relation between family ownership and cost elasticity. Using a sample of 1746 European firms, we first find that family ownership, a prevalent ownership type with unique characteristics, is associated with greater cost elasticity. Further, we use four empirical settings to increase our confidence that a higher cost elasticity is attributable to family ownership. We also document that family firms achieve greater operating cost elasticity primarily through modifying SG&A costs in response to changing sales, but not by hiring or firing employees. These findings extend prior studies on ownership effects on cost structures, suggesting that family ownership matters in understanding firms’ cost elasticity choices.Keywords: Cost behaviourCost elasticityOwnershipFamily firmsJEL Codes: M41D24L23D10 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge constructive comments from Ashiq Ali, Eli Amir, Dan Amiram, Yakov Amihud, Eli Bartov, Jan Bouwens, Verdan Capkun, Mark DeFond, Shane Dikolli, Shai Levi, Luc Paugam, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Herve Stolowy, and participants of the 2019 Financial and Managerial Accounting Research Conference, 2020 MAS Midyear Meetings, JMAR Online Brownbag, and seminar participants at Bocconi University, HEC Paris, University of Florence. We acknowledge financial support from our respective institutions and from the Raya Strauss Center of Family Business Research. Any errors are entirely our own.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Cost elasticity is the percentage change in costs in response to percentage change in activity level (or volume).2 See Kreps (Citation1990) and Varian (Citation2014).3 Family businesses generate an estimated 70–90% of global GDP annually (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017), while 85% of startups worldwide are established with family money (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017 – Global Data Points).4 The Bvd Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Ownership Database is a source of owner and subsidiary links worldwide.5 Information on proprietary linkages from BvD is collected directly from official bodies, if any, or from national and international providers. In case of conflicting information among providers covering the same country, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available report.6 In these cases, the GUO type is “Industrial Company” (type C), “Foundation/Research Institute” (type J), and “Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee” (type E). Following Faccio et al. (Citation2011), we exclude 69 firms for which the government is the GUO (type S, i.e., public authority, state, government), because governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different from those of private investors (Faccio et al., Citation2011).7 According to DeFond et al. (Citation2017, p. 3630), “CEM is essentially a variation of exact matching, but instead of matching on the exact values of covariates, it matches on a coarsened range ","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135876003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379
Miriam K. Maske, Matthias Sohn
This study investigates the interaction of superior and subordinate manager narcissism on subjective performance evaluation. We build on extant research in the psychology literature and propose that superiors evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. However, based on the homophily effect (i.e., the tendency of like to associate with like), we also hypothesize that narcissistic superiors show greater tolerance toward narcissistic subordinates than non-narcissistic superiors do. We conduct two online experiments and find that superiors, both high and low in narcissism, evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. Our results further show that this effect is mediated by the superiors’ weaker feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates. Finally, we find that superiors high in narcissism show greater feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates and, hence, evaluate them more favorably than non-narcissistic superiors do. Our results provide novel insight into the pivotal role of individual traits in subjective performance evaluation.
{"title":"Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? The Joint Effects of Manager and Subordinate Narcissism on Performance Evaluation","authors":"Miriam K. Maske, Matthias Sohn","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the interaction of superior and subordinate manager narcissism on subjective performance evaluation. We build on extant research in the psychology literature and propose that superiors evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. However, based on the homophily effect (i.e., the tendency of like to associate with like), we also hypothesize that narcissistic superiors show greater tolerance toward narcissistic subordinates than non-narcissistic superiors do. We conduct two online experiments and find that superiors, both high and low in narcissism, evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. Our results further show that this effect is mediated by the superiors’ weaker feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates. Finally, we find that superiors high in narcissism show greater feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates and, hence, evaluate them more favorably than non-narcissistic superiors do. Our results provide novel insight into the pivotal role of individual traits in subjective performance evaluation.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"222 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135491933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424
Romain Boulland, Andrei Filip, A. Ghio, Luc Paugam
{"title":"Grabbing Investor Attention with Limited Resources: A Study of Small Cap Firms’ Communication Channels","authors":"Romain Boulland, Andrei Filip, A. Ghio, Luc Paugam","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78078865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399
Lingmin Xie, Jeong‐Bon Kim, Tao Yuan
{"title":"Political Corruption and Accounting Conservatism","authors":"Lingmin Xie, Jeong‐Bon Kim, Tao Yuan","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80985508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2241884
Facundo Mercado, Silvina Rubio, Mariano Scapin
We study the ex ante role of accounting quality in mitigating the undervaluation generated by mutual fund fire sales. Asymmetric information between distressed mutual funds and potential buyers of the securities being fire sold leads to an adverse selection problem resulting in an equilibrium in which buyers only trade at prices below intrinsic value. Sellers accept these lower prices only because they have severe liquidity needs. To the extent that accounting quality helps market participants better estimate the intrinsic value of securities being fire sold, we expect the adverse selection problem to be less severe for firms with better accounting quality. Consistently, we find that high accounting quality is associated with smaller fire sale discounts. This result is explained by two complementary mechanisms. Analysts are more likely to provide price-correcting recommendations and arbitrageurs trade more heavily on high accounting quality firms during mutual fund fire sales. Overall, our results show that accounting quality mitigate stock underpricing caused by non-fundamental reasons.
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