Pub Date : 2023-08-27DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181
Andrea Bafundi, C. Imperatore
{"title":"Economists’ Political Donations and GDP Forecast Accuracy","authors":"Andrea Bafundi, C. Imperatore","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2248181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85930843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009
Jane Hennig, Sebastian Firk, Michael Wolff
{"title":"Credibility Signals from Soft Information: Evidence from Investor Reactions to Tone in Earnings Conference Calls","authors":"Jane Hennig, Sebastian Firk, Michael Wolff","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2244009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79961721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016
Gianfranco Siciliano, Dan Weiss
AbstractThis study explores the relation between family ownership and cost elasticity. Using a sample of 1746 European firms, we first find that family ownership, a prevalent ownership type with unique characteristics, is associated with greater cost elasticity. Further, we use four empirical settings to increase our confidence that a higher cost elasticity is attributable to family ownership. We also document that family firms achieve greater operating cost elasticity primarily through modifying SG&A costs in response to changing sales, but not by hiring or firing employees. These findings extend prior studies on ownership effects on cost structures, suggesting that family ownership matters in understanding firms’ cost elasticity choices.Keywords: Cost behaviourCost elasticityOwnershipFamily firmsJEL Codes: M41D24L23D10 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge constructive comments from Ashiq Ali, Eli Amir, Dan Amiram, Yakov Amihud, Eli Bartov, Jan Bouwens, Verdan Capkun, Mark DeFond, Shane Dikolli, Shai Levi, Luc Paugam, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Herve Stolowy, and participants of the 2019 Financial and Managerial Accounting Research Conference, 2020 MAS Midyear Meetings, JMAR Online Brownbag, and seminar participants at Bocconi University, HEC Paris, University of Florence. We acknowledge financial support from our respective institutions and from the Raya Strauss Center of Family Business Research. Any errors are entirely our own.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Cost elasticity is the percentage change in costs in response to percentage change in activity level (or volume).2 See Kreps (Citation1990) and Varian (Citation2014).3 Family businesses generate an estimated 70–90% of global GDP annually (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017), while 85% of startups worldwide are established with family money (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017 – Global Data Points).4 The Bvd Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Ownership Database is a source of owner and subsidiary links worldwide.5 Information on proprietary linkages from BvD is collected directly from official bodies, if any, or from national and international providers. In case of conflicting information among providers covering the same country, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available report.6 In these cases, the GUO type is “Industrial Company” (type C), “Foundation/Research Institute” (type J), and “Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee” (type E). Following Faccio et al. (Citation2011), we exclude 69 firms for which the government is the GUO (type S, i.e., public authority, state, government), because governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different from those of private investors (Faccio et al., Citation2011).7 According to DeFond et al. (Citation2017, p. 3630), “CEM is essentially a variation of exact matching, but instead of matching on the exact values of covariates, it matches on a coarsened range
{"title":"Family Ownership Influence on Cost Elasticity","authors":"Gianfranco Siciliano, Dan Weiss","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2244016","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis study explores the relation between family ownership and cost elasticity. Using a sample of 1746 European firms, we first find that family ownership, a prevalent ownership type with unique characteristics, is associated with greater cost elasticity. Further, we use four empirical settings to increase our confidence that a higher cost elasticity is attributable to family ownership. We also document that family firms achieve greater operating cost elasticity primarily through modifying SG&A costs in response to changing sales, but not by hiring or firing employees. These findings extend prior studies on ownership effects on cost structures, suggesting that family ownership matters in understanding firms’ cost elasticity choices.Keywords: Cost behaviourCost elasticityOwnershipFamily firmsJEL Codes: M41D24L23D10 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge constructive comments from Ashiq Ali, Eli Amir, Dan Amiram, Yakov Amihud, Eli Bartov, Jan Bouwens, Verdan Capkun, Mark DeFond, Shane Dikolli, Shai Levi, Luc Paugam, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Herve Stolowy, and participants of the 2019 Financial and Managerial Accounting Research Conference, 2020 MAS Midyear Meetings, JMAR Online Brownbag, and seminar participants at Bocconi University, HEC Paris, University of Florence. We acknowledge financial support from our respective institutions and from the Raya Strauss Center of Family Business Research. Any errors are entirely our own.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Cost elasticity is the percentage change in costs in response to percentage change in activity level (or volume).2 See Kreps (Citation1990) and Varian (Citation2014).3 Family businesses generate an estimated 70–90% of global GDP annually (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017), while 85% of startups worldwide are established with family money (Family Firm Institute, Citation2017 – Global Data Points).4 The Bvd Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Ownership Database is a source of owner and subsidiary links worldwide.5 Information on proprietary linkages from BvD is collected directly from official bodies, if any, or from national and international providers. In case of conflicting information among providers covering the same country, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available report.6 In these cases, the GUO type is “Industrial Company” (type C), “Foundation/Research Institute” (type J), and “Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee” (type E). Following Faccio et al. (Citation2011), we exclude 69 firms for which the government is the GUO (type S, i.e., public authority, state, government), because governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different from those of private investors (Faccio et al., Citation2011).7 According to DeFond et al. (Citation2017, p. 3630), “CEM is essentially a variation of exact matching, but instead of matching on the exact values of covariates, it matches on a coarsened range ","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135876003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-19DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2244990
L. Enache, P. Griffin, Rucsandra Moldovan
{"title":"Clarification or Confusion: A Textual Analysis of ASC 842 Lease Transition Disclosures","authors":"L. Enache, P. Griffin, Rucsandra Moldovan","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2244990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2244990","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76882043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379
Miriam K. Maske, Matthias Sohn
This study investigates the interaction of superior and subordinate manager narcissism on subjective performance evaluation. We build on extant research in the psychology literature and propose that superiors evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. However, based on the homophily effect (i.e., the tendency of like to associate with like), we also hypothesize that narcissistic superiors show greater tolerance toward narcissistic subordinates than non-narcissistic superiors do. We conduct two online experiments and find that superiors, both high and low in narcissism, evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. Our results further show that this effect is mediated by the superiors’ weaker feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates. Finally, we find that superiors high in narcissism show greater feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates and, hence, evaluate them more favorably than non-narcissistic superiors do. Our results provide novel insight into the pivotal role of individual traits in subjective performance evaluation.
{"title":"Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? The Joint Effects of Manager and Subordinate Narcissism on Performance Evaluation","authors":"Miriam K. Maske, Matthias Sohn","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2235379","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the interaction of superior and subordinate manager narcissism on subjective performance evaluation. We build on extant research in the psychology literature and propose that superiors evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. However, based on the homophily effect (i.e., the tendency of like to associate with like), we also hypothesize that narcissistic superiors show greater tolerance toward narcissistic subordinates than non-narcissistic superiors do. We conduct two online experiments and find that superiors, both high and low in narcissism, evaluate narcissistic subordinates less favorably than non-narcissistic subordinates. Our results further show that this effect is mediated by the superiors’ weaker feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates. Finally, we find that superiors high in narcissism show greater feelings of closeness to narcissistic subordinates and, hence, evaluate them more favorably than non-narcissistic superiors do. Our results provide novel insight into the pivotal role of individual traits in subjective performance evaluation.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135491933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424
Romain Boulland, Andrei Filip, A. Ghio, Luc Paugam
{"title":"Grabbing Investor Attention with Limited Resources: A Study of Small Cap Firms’ Communication Channels","authors":"Romain Boulland, Andrei Filip, A. Ghio, Luc Paugam","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2242424","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78078865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399
Lingmin Xie, Jeong‐Bon Kim, Tao Yuan
{"title":"Political Corruption and Accounting Conservatism","authors":"Lingmin Xie, Jeong‐Bon Kim, Tao Yuan","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2242399","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80985508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2241884
Facundo Mercado, Silvina Rubio, Mariano Scapin
We study the ex ante role of accounting quality in mitigating the undervaluation generated by mutual fund fire sales. Asymmetric information between distressed mutual funds and potential buyers of the securities being fire sold leads to an adverse selection problem resulting in an equilibrium in which buyers only trade at prices below intrinsic value. Sellers accept these lower prices only because they have severe liquidity needs. To the extent that accounting quality helps market participants better estimate the intrinsic value of securities being fire sold, we expect the adverse selection problem to be less severe for firms with better accounting quality. Consistently, we find that high accounting quality is associated with smaller fire sale discounts. This result is explained by two complementary mechanisms. Analysts are more likely to provide price-correcting recommendations and arbitrageurs trade more heavily on high accounting quality firms during mutual fund fire sales. Overall, our results show that accounting quality mitigate stock underpricing caused by non-fundamental reasons.
{"title":"The Role of Accounting Quality During Mutual Fund Fire Sales","authors":"Facundo Mercado, Silvina Rubio, Mariano Scapin","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2241884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2241884","url":null,"abstract":"We study the ex ante role of accounting quality in mitigating the undervaluation generated by mutual fund fire sales. Asymmetric information between distressed mutual funds and potential buyers of the securities being fire sold leads to an adverse selection problem resulting in an equilibrium in which buyers only trade at prices below intrinsic value. Sellers accept these lower prices only because they have severe liquidity needs. To the extent that accounting quality helps market participants better estimate the intrinsic value of securities being fire sold, we expect the adverse selection problem to be less severe for firms with better accounting quality. Consistently, we find that high accounting quality is associated with smaller fire sale discounts. This result is explained by two complementary mechanisms. Analysts are more likely to provide price-correcting recommendations and arbitrageurs trade more heavily on high accounting quality firms during mutual fund fire sales. Overall, our results show that accounting quality mitigate stock underpricing caused by non-fundamental reasons.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72723508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-06DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2239298
T. Bornemann, Anna-Lena Moosmann, Zoltán Novotny-Farkas
{"title":"The Consequences of Abandoning the Quarterly Reporting Mandate in the Prime Market Segment","authors":"T. Bornemann, Anna-Lena Moosmann, Zoltán Novotny-Farkas","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2023.2239298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2239298","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82808921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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