European Accounting Review最新文献

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The Effect of Geographic Diversity on Managerial Earnings Forecasts 地域多样性对管理层盈余预测的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-11-04 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2139738

B. Godigbe, Jared N. Jennings, Hojun Seo, Lloyd Tanlu

引用次数: 0

Product Recalls and Audit Production 产品召回和审核生产

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2130953

Kevin H. Kim, Jonathan Nash, Jongha Park

引用次数: 0

Does Disaster Risk Relate to Banks’ Loan Loss Provisions? 灾害风险与银行贷款损失拨备有关吗?

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-10-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2120513

Lorenzo Dal Maso, K. Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Francesco Mazzi

引用次数: 4

Optimal Revision Rules of Cost-Based Transfer Prices in a Multi-Period Production Setting 多周期生产环境下基于成本的转移价格最优修正规则

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2125420

M. Brunner, Peter Schäfer

引用次数: 0

When Investors Can Talk to Firms, Is It a Meaningful Conversation? Evidence from Investor Postings on Interactive Platforms 当投资者可以与公司对话时，这是一次有意义的对话吗?来自投资者在互动平台上发帖的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118147

Shijun Guo, Xin Yu, Robert Faff

引用次数: 4

Cost Stickiness and Stock Price Delay 成本粘性与股价延迟

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2121739

Nishant Agarwal

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay. Using a sample of U.S. firms in the period of 1984–2019, I find that the stickiness of Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) costs is positively associated with stock price delay. This finding is consistent with the notion that cost stickiness reduces the quality of information available to investors and causes stock price delay (the direct channel). Using a mediation test, I document that cost stickiness reduces the analyst following of the firm, thus increasing stock price delay (the indirect channel). Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay is prominent in firms characterized ex-ante by a relatively poor information environment. Meanwhile, the effect is weak for firms with managers who use less uncertain and more positive words in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures within 10-K filings. This study contributes to the growing literature on cost behavior by documenting the adverse consequences of managers’ cost decisions on the capital market and the role of the information environment in mitigating these negative implications.

摘要本研究探讨成本黏性对股价延迟的影响。使用1984-2019年期间的美国公司样本，我发现销售、一般和行政(SG& a)成本的粘性与股价延迟呈正相关。这一发现与成本粘性降低投资者可获得的信息质量并导致股价延迟(直接渠道)的概念是一致的。通过中介检验，我证明了成本粘性降低了分析师对公司的追随，从而增加了股价延迟(间接渠道)。横断面分析表明，成本粘性对股票价格延迟的影响在事前信息环境相对较差的公司中表现突出。与此同时，对于那些在10-K文件中的管理讨论和分析(MD&A)披露中使用较少不确定性和更多积极词汇的经理人的公司，这种影响较弱。本研究通过记录管理者成本决策对资本市场的不利影响以及信息环境在减轻这些负面影响方面的作用，为成本行为的文献增长做出了贡献。

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引用次数: 0

When do Governments ‘Go Dark'? Evidence on Governments’ Disclosure Choices in Periods of Uncertainty 政府什么时候“黑暗”?不确定时期政府信息披露选择的实证研究

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118146

C. Columbano, Marco Trombetta

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of uncertainty shocks on the level of fiscal guidance – the guidance issued by governments on the expected evolution of the fiscal and economic outlook. Because uncertainty makes governments’ expectations less precise but potentially more valuable to users, we hypothesize that a disclosure dilemma leads governments to balance a higher demand for guidance with a higher probability of issuing inaccurate forecasts. Using natural disasters to randomize uncertainty shocks in our sample, we find that on average, governments issue less guidance in periods of uncertainty. The effect is driven by a reduction in the number of forecasts on the future evolution of balance sheet items, but only when governments have low refinancing needs and face a relatively quiet bond market. Instead, governments that maintain a stable level of guidance in periods of uncertainty appear to cater to coercive isomorphic pressures stemming from creditors. We further document that the relative ‘transparency’ of governments in periods of uncertainty is negatively related to indicators of fiscal reporting quality. Collectively, the evidence indicates that in the public sector, uncertainty leads to a trade-off between disclosure quantity and quality.

摘要本文研究了不确定性冲击对财政指导水平的影响。财政指导是政府对财政和经济前景的预期演变所发布的指导。由于不确定性使政府的预期不那么精确，但对用户来说可能更有价值，我们假设披露困境导致政府在更高的指导需求和更高的发布不准确预测的可能性之间取得平衡。在我们的样本中使用自然灾害随机化不确定性冲击，我们发现平均而言，政府在不确定时期发布的指导较少。这种影响是由对资产负债表项目未来演变的预测数量减少所驱动的，但只有在政府的再融资需求较低、债券市场相对平静的情况下才会出现这种情况。相反，在不确定时期保持稳定指导水平的政府，似乎是在迎合来自债权人的强制性同构压力。我们进一步证明，政府在不确定时期的相对“透明度”与财政报告质量指标呈负相关。总的来说，证据表明，在公共部门，不确定性导致披露数量和质量之间的权衡。

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引用次数: 0

Firm Strategy and CEO−VP Pay Differentials in Equity Compensation 公司战略与股权薪酬中的CEO - VP薪酬差异

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2119153

Margaret A. Abernethy, Yunhe Dong, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin, Xing Yang

We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms’ strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay differential relates to the relative authority that CEOs have in strategic decision-making, and we find that authority allocation based on a firm’s strategic priorities is consistent with the relative ability of the CEO vis-à-vis the VPs. Our results remain consistent after considering alternative explanations including CEO power, risk-taking incentives, and tournament incentives among VPs. Further analyses reveal that a large CEO−VP equity pay differential enhances firm value for prospector-type firms, and that shareholders and proxy advisors tend to incorporate firm strategy in their say-on-pay votes and proxy recommendations.

我们研究了首席执行官(CEO)和副总裁(VPs)之间的薪酬差异是否可以用公司的战略优先级来解释。我们发现，追求探矿型战略的公司在股权薪酬方面有更大的CEO和副总裁差异。我们认为，这种薪酬差异与CEO在战略决策中的相对权威有关，我们发现，基于公司战略优先级的权力分配与CEO相对于-à-vis副总裁的相对能力是一致的。在考虑了CEO权力、冒险激励和副总裁之间的比赛激励等其他解释后，我们的结果仍然一致。进一步的分析表明，较大的CEO和副总裁股权薪酬差异提高了探矿型公司的公司价值，股东和代理顾问倾向于将公司战略纳入他们的薪酬话语权投票和代理建议中。

引用次数: 0

Do women mind the non-GAAP? Board gender diversity and non-GAAP disclosure quality 女性在意非公认会计准则吗?董事会性别多样性和非公认会计准则披露质量

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-10 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2116065

D. Ranasinghe, Luisa A. Unda, S. Wright

引用次数: 0

Language Similarity and M&A Transactions 语言相似性与并购交易

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

European Accounting Review

Pub Date : 2022-09-10 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2117221

Xiaofei Pan, Jin Zhang

引用次数: 1

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