Marius Berger, Maikel Pellens, Thorsten Doherr, Sandra Gottschalk
We study how much entrepreneurs value being in control over their ventures. Even though control and independence are widely believed to be an important reward to entrepreneurship, and despite the importance of control rights for venture capital contract design, how much entrepreneurs value being in control remains unknown. In this article, we perform a discrete choice experiment with a representative sample of entrepreneurs in Germany to estimate the value of control in the setting of venture capital investment. We find that entrepreneurs highly value control: entrepreneurs are willing to pay an additional 38% of equity to avoid the highest level of control, a voting majority, in a hypothetical VC contract. We also find that entrepreneurs are willing to pay more equity when the VC can offer support in the development in the firm, up to 12% of equity when the investor offers market access support. Our findings hint that control requirements form important entry barriers for entrepreneurs to venture capital financing.
{"title":"The Private Value of Entrepreneurial Control: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment","authors":"Marius Berger, Maikel Pellens, Thorsten Doherr, Sandra Gottschalk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3697311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697311","url":null,"abstract":"We study how much entrepreneurs value being in control over their ventures. Even though control and independence are widely believed to be an important reward to entrepreneurship, and despite the importance of control rights for venture capital contract design, how much entrepreneurs value being in control remains unknown. In this article, we perform a discrete choice experiment with a representative sample of entrepreneurs in Germany to estimate the value of control in the setting of venture capital investment. We find that entrepreneurs highly value control: entrepreneurs are willing to pay an additional 38% of equity to avoid the highest level of control, a voting majority, in a hypothetical VC contract. We also find that entrepreneurs are willing to pay more equity when the VC can offer support in the development in the firm, up to 12% of equity when the investor offers market access support. Our findings hint that control requirements form important entry barriers for entrepreneurs to venture capital financing.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"289 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72912292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Chen, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Micah S. Officer, Yanzhi Wang
Abstract We examine how firms react to their competitors’ highly publicized technology breakthroughs measured by the renowned R&D 100 Award. These awards have been granted to top 100 technological inventions every year since 1965 and have come to be known as the “Oscar of Invention” (e.g., Verhoeven et al., 2016). We find that a firm's propensity to acquire another firm significantly increases after its competitors win these awards. A causal interpretation of our finding is supported by instrumental variable analysis, coarsened exact matched samples, and differential effects of award winners vs. finalists. Such award-driven acquisitiveness is more pronounced among firms with more confident CEOs or in industries with a shorter technology lifecycle and a higher R&D intensity. Moreover, the acquirers with rivals winning awards pursue innovative targets whose products overlap with those rivals, confirming these acquirers’ catch-up purpose.
摘要本文研究了企业对竞争对手的技术突破的反应，这些突破是由著名的R&D 100奖衡量的。自1965年以来，这些奖项每年授予100项技术发明，并被称为“发明奥斯卡”(例如，Verhoeven et al.， 2016)。我们发现，在竞争对手获得这些奖项后，企业收购另一家企业的倾向显著增加。工具变量分析、粗化的精确匹配样本以及获奖者与入围者的差异效应支持了对我们发现的因果解释。这种奖励驱动的收购行为在ceo更自信的公司或技术生命周期更短、研发强度更高的行业中更为明显。此外，竞争对手获奖的收购者追求创新目标，其产品与竞争对手重叠，证实了这些收购者的追赶目的。
{"title":"The Oscar Goes to…: High-tech Firms’ Acquisitions in Response to Rivals’ Technology Breakthroughs","authors":"I. Chen, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Micah S. Officer, Yanzhi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2815148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815148","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine how firms react to their competitors’ highly publicized technology breakthroughs measured by the renowned R&D 100 Award. These awards have been granted to top 100 technological inventions every year since 1965 and have come to be known as the “Oscar of Invention” (e.g., Verhoeven et al., 2016). We find that a firm's propensity to acquire another firm significantly increases after its competitors win these awards. A causal interpretation of our finding is supported by instrumental variable analysis, coarsened exact matched samples, and differential effects of award winners vs. finalists. Such award-driven acquisitiveness is more pronounced among firms with more confident CEOs or in industries with a shorter technology lifecycle and a higher R&D intensity. Moreover, the acquirers with rivals winning awards pursue innovative targets whose products overlap with those rivals, confirming these acquirers’ catch-up purpose.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88113395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In research, public, and policy debate, there is increasing interest in data intensive firms like Google, Facebook, and Amazon. As business models of data firms are often characterized by high scale economies and network externalities, they are expected to have a particularly large incentive to grow, among others through mergers and acqui- sitions (M&A). Adding to the up to now mainly theoretical or anecdotal discussion on data intensive firms, this study empirically analyzes the relationship between firms’ data intensity and M&A activity. Using text-based measures to identify data inten- sive firms, I find that data generators are more likely to become acquirers, whereas data analysis and storage companies are more likely to become targets. Transactions by data firms, on average, do not create value as abnormal announcement returns are zero. There is evidence for pre-emptive merger activity, i.e., data intensive firms acquiring particularly often rather small, non-public companies that are not (yet) on the radar of competition authorities.
{"title":"Mergers and Acquisitions in the Data Economy","authors":"D. Schoch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3686247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686247","url":null,"abstract":"In research, public, and policy debate, there is increasing interest in data intensive firms like Google, Facebook, and Amazon. As business models of data firms are often characterized by high scale economies and network externalities, they are expected to have a particularly large incentive to grow, among others through mergers and acqui- sitions (M&A). Adding to the up to now mainly theoretical or anecdotal discussion on data intensive firms, this study empirically analyzes the relationship between firms’ data intensity and M&A activity. Using text-based measures to identify data inten- sive firms, I find that data generators are more likely to become acquirers, whereas data analysis and storage companies are more likely to become targets. Transactions by data firms, on average, do not create value as abnormal announcement returns are zero. There is evidence for pre-emptive merger activity, i.e., data intensive firms acquiring particularly often rather small, non-public companies that are not (yet) on the radar of competition authorities.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90679883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 8 July 2020, the Council published the last version of the European crowdfunding regulation (‘CFR’), as well as a related directive to amend MiFID II. Although both the regulation and related directive now need to be adopted by the European parliament before it can be published in the Offical Journal and enter into force, it is expected that this version will be unanimously adopted. Given that no substantial changes are to be expected, it makes it worthwhile to explore the CFR and the impact it is likely going to have already in this stage. The CFR seeks to facilitate the scaling up of crowdfunding services across the internal market to increase access to finance for entrepreneurs, start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in general. Till now, crowdfunding services have not been subject to EU action. Crowdfunding service providers (‘CSP’) were therefore subject to the different national frameworks implementing existing EU law that hindered the emergence of a European market for crowdfunding. The EU regime seeks to create a level playing field by introducing a harmonized EU legal framework for these service providers. Correspondingly, the CFR introduces a European passport for CSPs. This contribution seeks to assess whether and to what extent the CFR will lead to harmonization of (equity- and lending-based) crowdfunding in Europe. To that end, this contribution evaluates several relevant aspects of the CFR, including its scope, ‘platform’, sales and marketing regulation that target CSPs.
{"title":"The European Crowdfunding Regulation – Towards Harmonization of (Equity- and Lending-Based) Crowdfunding in Europe?","authors":"Sebastiaan Niels Hooghiemstra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679142","url":null,"abstract":"On 8 July 2020, the Council published the last version of the European crowdfunding regulation (‘CFR’), as well as a related directive to amend MiFID II. Although both the regulation and related directive now need to be adopted by the European parliament before it can be published in the Offical Journal and enter into force, it is expected that this version will be unanimously adopted. Given that no substantial changes are to be expected, it makes it worthwhile to explore the CFR and the impact it is likely going to have already in this stage. \u0000 \u0000The CFR seeks to facilitate the scaling up of crowdfunding services across the internal market to increase access to finance for entrepreneurs, start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in general. Till now, crowdfunding services have not been subject to EU action. Crowdfunding service providers (‘CSP’) were therefore subject to the different national frameworks implementing existing EU law that hindered the emergence of a European market for crowdfunding. The EU regime seeks to create a level playing field by introducing a harmonized EU legal framework for these service providers. Correspondingly, the CFR introduces a European passport for CSPs. \u0000 \u0000This contribution seeks to assess whether and to what extent the CFR will lead to harmonization of (equity- and lending-based) crowdfunding in Europe. To that end, this contribution evaluates several relevant aspects of the CFR, including its scope, ‘platform’, sales and marketing regulation that target CSPs.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73791087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze a unique dataset that separately reports research and development expenditures for a large panel of public and private firms. Definitions of “research” and “development” in this dataset, respectively, correspond to definitions of knowledge “exploration” and “exploitation” in the innovation theory literature. We can thus test theories of how equity ownership status relates to innovation strategy. We find that public firms have greater research intensity than private firms, inconsistent with theories asserting private ownership is more conducive to exploration. We also find public firms invest more intensely in innovation of all sorts. These results suggest relaxed financing constraints enjoyed by public firms, as well as their diversified shareholder bases, make them more conducive to investing in all types of innovation. Reconciling several seemingly conflicting results in prior research, we find private-equity-owned firms, though not less innovative overall than other private firms, skew their innovation strategies toward development and away from research.
{"title":"R&D or R vs. D? Firm Innovation Strategy and Equity Ownership","authors":"James Driver, Adam Kolasinski, J. Stanfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489616","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a unique dataset that separately reports research and development expenditures for a large panel of public and private firms. Definitions of “research” and “development” in this dataset, respectively, correspond to definitions of knowledge “exploration” and “exploitation” in the innovation theory literature. We can thus test theories of how equity ownership status relates to innovation strategy. We find that public firms have greater research intensity than private firms, inconsistent with theories asserting private ownership is more conducive to exploration. We also find public firms invest more intensely in innovation of all sorts. These results suggest relaxed financing constraints enjoyed by public firms, as well as their diversified shareholder bases, make them more conducive to investing in all types of innovation. Reconciling several seemingly conflicting results in prior research, we find private-equity-owned firms, though not less innovative overall than other private firms, skew their innovation strategies toward development and away from research.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79624800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We examine the bidding behavior of institutional investors in initial public offering (IPO) auctions using a hand-collected dataset of limit bids. We find that the majority of institutional investors in our sample are “occasional bidders,” who rarely get a share allocation. “Regular bidders” are in a minority but account for the bulk of the demand. They bid conservatively, and only a few of them can be classified as “well-informed bidders,” who place more aggressive bids in hotter IPOs than in colder ones. Our findings suggest that “dirty” auctions that are restricted to institutional investors work as an information extraction mechanism.
{"title":"Bidding Styles of Institutional Investors in IPO Auctions","authors":"Ufuk Güçbilmez, Tomás Ó Briain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3617312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine the bidding behavior of institutional investors in initial public offering (IPO) auctions using a hand-collected dataset of limit bids. We find that the majority of institutional investors in our sample are “occasional bidders,” who rarely get a share allocation. “Regular bidders” are in a minority but account for the bulk of the demand. They bid conservatively, and only a few of them can be classified as “well-informed bidders,” who place more aggressive bids in hotter IPOs than in colder ones. Our findings suggest that “dirty” auctions that are restricted to institutional investors work as an information extraction mechanism.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"5 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91189051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although merger and acquisitions (M&As) are acknowledged as an important means to access innovative assets and know-how, firms’ inventive output often declines in the post-M&A period. Financial, managerial and organizational constraints related to the M&A event contribute to inventive output declines and inventors’ departure. Prior literature treats the acquiring firm as a passive observer of invention declines. This study argues that acquiring firms can take measures by hiring new key inventors. We show that the hiring of new key inventors in the post-M&A period can counteract invention declines in two ways. First, these newly hired inventors are associated with an increase of corporate inventive output after the M&A. Second, they are also associated with an improved inventive output of inventors already working for the acquiring firm. These results suggest that an appropriate hiring policy can counteract declining inventive output of firms in the aftermath of M&As.
{"title":"Hiring New Key Inventors to Improve Firms’ Post‐M&A Inventive Output","authors":"Marta F. Arroyabe, K. Hussinger, J. Hagedoorn","doi":"10.1111/radm.12400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12400","url":null,"abstract":"Although merger and acquisitions (M&As) are acknowledged as an important means to access innovative assets and know-how, firms’ inventive output often declines in the post-M&A period. Financial, managerial and organizational constraints related to the M&A event contribute to inventive output declines and inventors’ departure. Prior literature treats the acquiring firm as a passive observer of invention declines. This study argues that acquiring firms can take measures by hiring new key inventors. We show that the hiring of new key inventors in the post-M&A period can counteract invention declines in two ways. First, these newly hired inventors are associated with an increase of corporate inventive output after the M&A. Second, they are also associated with an improved inventive output of inventors already working for the acquiring firm. These results suggest that an appropriate hiring policy can counteract declining inventive output of firms in the aftermath of M&As.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"255 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74936316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper advances a new technique for identifying, delineating, and analyzing microgeographies. It applies this technique to locate and measure agglomerations of high-growth, high-tech (HGHT) startup activity within 205 U.S. cities. Using data from 1995 to 2018 on venture-backed companies, I estimate the effect of startup agglomeration economies on ecosystem growth. I find that a one standard deviation increase in measures of startup agglomeration is associated with around a 12% increase in the next period's venture investment, and that optimal HGHT startup density appears to be around one every 2.5 hectares. I also simulate innovation districts for Houston, Texas. I find that an optimally sized and centrally located innovation district could increase Houston's venture investment by as much 15%, while the currently proposed 'Innovation Corridor' could reduce it by as much as 5%.
{"title":"Identifying Microgeographies Using Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Startup Agglomeration and Venture Investment In U.S. Cities","authors":"Edward J. Egan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3537162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537162","url":null,"abstract":"This paper advances a new technique for identifying, delineating, and analyzing microgeographies. It applies this technique to locate and measure agglomerations of high-growth, high-tech (HGHT) startup activity within 205 U.S. cities. Using data from 1995 to 2018 on venture-backed companies, I estimate the effect of startup agglomeration economies on ecosystem growth. I find that a one standard deviation increase in measures of startup agglomeration is associated with around a 12% increase in the next period's venture investment, and that optimal HGHT startup density appears to be around one every 2.5 hectares. I also simulate innovation districts for Houston, Texas. I find that an optimally sized and centrally located innovation district could increase Houston's venture investment by as much 15%, while the currently proposed 'Innovation Corridor' could reduce it by as much as 5%.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87558452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Colorado Division of Securities has issued a waiver and has considered amendments to its rules to make the Small Offering Exemption under Colorado's Crowdfunding Act more accessible to small businesses. Perhaps now crowdfunding will fulfill the 2015 legislative declaration to ease capital formation rules, "thereby promoting the formation and growth of local companies and the accompanying job creation."
{"title":"Colorado's Small Crowdfunding Offering Exemption - Perhaps Now It will be the Game-Changer We Hoped","authors":"Andrea Welter, Herrick K. Lidstone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3479184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3479184","url":null,"abstract":"The Colorado Division of Securities has issued a waiver and has considered amendments to its rules to make the Small Offering Exemption under Colorado's Crowdfunding Act more accessible to small businesses. Perhaps now crowdfunding will fulfill the 2015 legislative declaration to ease capital formation rules, \"thereby promoting the formation and growth of local companies and the accompanying job creation.\"","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86723643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SME (Small & Medium Enterprises) IPOs formally debuted in India in 2012 when BSE and NSE introduced SME Platform on their exchanges along with Main Board Platform (for non-SMEs). SEBI has eased the listing criteria for SMEs to make it more attractive. The focus of this study is to assess and compare efficiency of SME IPOs with respect to Main Board IPOs in terms of price discovery using underpricing analysis. The study is based on sample of 1110 IPOs which comprises 526 SME IPOs and 584 Main Board IPOs that got listed on BSE, NSE and on their SME Platform during the period 2000 to 2019. Outcome of this analysis suggests that SME IPOs are more efficient in terms of underpricing. Further, the demand levels in case of SMEIPOs are lower compared with their counterparts, even though the probability of listing day gains is high. This study will provide insight to the policymakers, investing community, issuers and also add to the body of the knowledge on SME IPOs which is still at the nascent stage amongst the research community.
{"title":"Comparative Analysis of Underpricing and Subscription of SME IPOs and Main Board IPOs in India","authors":"Dr. Sudesh Kumar Sharma, Makarand S. Wazal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547863","url":null,"abstract":"SME (Small & Medium Enterprises) IPOs formally debuted in India in 2012 when BSE and NSE introduced SME Platform on their exchanges along with Main Board Platform (for non-SMEs). SEBI has eased the listing criteria for SMEs to make it more attractive. The focus of this study is to assess and compare efficiency of SME IPOs with respect to Main Board IPOs in terms of price discovery using underpricing analysis. The study is based on sample of 1110 IPOs which comprises 526 SME IPOs and 584 Main Board IPOs that got listed on BSE, NSE and on their SME Platform during the period 2000 to 2019. Outcome of this analysis suggests that SME IPOs are more efficient in terms of underpricing. Further, the demand levels in case of SMEIPOs are lower compared with their counterparts, even though the probability of listing day gains is high. This study will provide insight to the policymakers, investing community, issuers and also add to the body of the knowledge on SME IPOs which is still at the nascent stage amongst the research community.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"10 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91427402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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