Food and drug law journal最新文献

In the United States, genetically modified (GM) foods are labeled no differently from their natural counterparts, leaving consumers with no mechanism for deciphering genetically modified food content. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not formally defined the term "natural," which is frequently used on food labels despite consumer confusion as to what it means. The FDA should initiate a notice and comment rulemaking addressing the narrow issue of whether use of the word "natural" should be permitted oil GM food labels. Prohibition of the use of"natural" on genetically modified foods would mitigate consumer deception regarding genetically modified food content without significantly disadvantaging genetically modified food producers.

Therapies born out of the Hygiene Hypothesis--such as helminthic therapy and fecal bacteriotherapy--provide a compelling example of the FDA's institutional blindness. Unlike the traditional pharmaceutical model of treatment, therapies based in the Hygiene Hypothesis purport to resolve or alleviate conditions by reintroducing organisms once thought to be wholly negative. While questions of negative effects and safety remain in the former, they are largely absent in the latter. Nonetheless, the FDA has chosen to regulate the use of both helminthic therapy and fecal bacteriotherapy. Such restriction of doctor-patient autonomy in the name of efficacy is costly and unethical.

Following a statement released by a multitude of prominent scientists contesting the idea that there is a consensus on the safety of genetically modified organisms ("GMO"), this article addresses the European Union's ("EU") GMO regulatory framework, which has reluctantly permitted France to maintain an illegal ban on. MON8 10 for over a decade now. It notes that while the statement did nothing more than reignite the debate on GMO, much could and should be done to improve the framework to accommodate for the lack of true scientific understanding about the effects of GMO. This article identifies the specific areas of weakness in the EU GMO regulatory framework and recommends specific alterations. It concludes that although France's MON810 ban is illegal under existing law, the country's fears are neither unfounded nor unsupported and that the EU should work to alter its existing legal structure to parallel today's scientific uncertainty regarding GMO safety.

"You Say Tomato, I Say Solanum Lycopersicum Containing Beta-ionone and Phenylacetaldehyde" discusses the importance of requiring labels on products that contain genetically modified organisms, focusing on Connecticut's GMO Labeling statutes, as it is they are the first of their kind in the nation. The article will compare Connecticut's law to the legislation found in Australia, highlighting the positive aspects of Connecticut's bill and identifying its key weaknesses, namely the "trigger clause" found in the statute. Part I will provide an overview of Genetic Modification and provide a brief history of Biotechnology. It will also provide a brief overview of the federal regulatory framework in biotechnology, as well as evaluate the United States Food and Drug Association's role of regulating genetic modification. Part I will conclude by discussing how the American public has shown that labeling GMOs is important, and something that should occur. Part II of this article will explore Connecticut's recent legislation requiring labels on products that contain GMOs. Part III will explore Australia's legislation requiring labels on products containing GMOs, comparing Australia's law to Connecticut's legislation.

The statute and regulations administered by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") do not explicitly prohibit the promotion of drugs and medical devices for unapproved uses, yet the government has collected billions of dollars in penalties for such "off-label" promotion. The statutory interpretations and regulatory provisions relied on by the government to take enforcement action against off-label promotion are the incidental by-products of initiatives undertaken by FDA through administrative action and litigation early in its implementation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The actions were designed to obtain FDA authority over therapeutic claims made in advertising, even though Congress had assigned authority over advertising to the Federal Trade Commission, and to establish a prescription-only drug system, even though FDA lacked statutory authority for such a system. The principal purpose of both efforts was to prevent inappropriate self-medication. This article describes the history of those strategies, including expansion of the definition of the term "labeling" to encompass matter that was initially regarded as advertising; creation of the rule that the labeling of drugs must have adequate directions for all "intended" uses; and construction of the prescription-only drug system in a manner that allowed FDA to use the statutory requirement for labeling to have "adequate directions for use" to prohibit the off-label promotion of prescription drugs.

A number of states have enacted statutes that provide protection to drug manufacturers in product liability actions. Additionally, several of these states have enacted "fraud-on-the-FDA" statutory provisions, which remove statutory protection afforded to drug manufacturers in product liability actions if plaintiffs can provide evidence that the drug manufacturer made misrepresentations to the FDA during the process of obtaining marketing approval for the drug. Currently, the federal circuits are in disagreement over whether these state "fraud-on-the-FDA" statutes should be federally preempted. This issue warrants resolution for drug manufacturers, private citizens, and state legislatures. This Comment will discuss the history and role of the FDA's authority in drug and medical device regulation; federal preemption generally and the Supreme Court's decisions that considered whether state law failure to warn claims are federally preempted in the context of drugs and medical devices; the Supreme Court's decision in Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, where the Court held that claims that a medical device manufacturer made fraudulent representations to the FDA were federally preempted because such claims interfered with the relationship between the FDA and the entities it regulated, state fraud-on-the-FDA statutory provisions, and the existing circuit split regarding whether those statutes should be federally preempted; the potential resolutions to the circuit split; and will conclude and advocate that the Supreme Court's Buckman holding be applied to federally preempt state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes because such statutes involve the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates and thus undermine the FDA's authority.

In response to an apparent decline in global food safety, numerous public and private regulatory initiatives have emerged to restore public confidence. This trend has been particularly marked by the growing influence of private regulators such as multinational food companies, supermarket chains and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who employ private standards, certification protocols, third-party auditing, and transnational contracting practices. This paper explores how the structure and processes of private food safety governance interact with traditional public governance regimes, focusing on Global Good Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP) as a primary example of the former. Due to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public regulation in the face of global problems, private governance in food safety has gradually replaced states' command-and-control regulation with more flexible, market-oriented mechanisms. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of constructive regime interaction instead of institutional boundary building to global food safety governance. Public and private ordering must each play a role as integral parts of a larger, dynamic and evolving governance complex.

Adverse drug events cause significant injuries to consumers. Between half and three-quarters of these injuries are uncompensated under tort law because they are not due to negligence or fraud. This article argues that fundamental fairness and sound economics favor holding manufacturers of pharmaceutical products financially responsible for pharmaceutical injuries unless there is clear fault by another party. It reviews the experience of vaccine and pharmaceutical injury compensation programs internationally. It proposes the creation of an administrative compensation system for the United States that would compensate pharmaceutical injuries.

The Affordable Care Act requires certain restaurants to provide nutritional information on their menus and menu boards, which is referred to as menu labeling. Menu labeling presupposes that providing consumers with the nutritional information about their food will cause them to reconsider their food choices by picking healthier food options over less healthy options, thereby reducing the nation's high obesity rate. However, several studies have shown that consumers do not make healthier food choices even when armed with menu labeling. The issue then becomes whether menu labeling provides a correlative benefit to consumers or whether there are unintended consequences that ultimately harm consumers.

In 2012, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC) broadcast a segment on its evening news show regarding the manufacture of "lean finely textured beef" by Beef Products, Inc. (BPI). The broadcast, as well as follow-up reports and social media communications, repeatedly referred to the product as "pink slime," a term originated by a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) employee for the processed meat. The market backlash against the product was immediate and intense. Ultimately, BPI closed three processing plants, cut hundreds of jobs, and filed for bankruptcy. BPI sued ABC and others for food libel, defamation, and tortious interference. This research analyzes those claims and defenses and discusses the future of such cases.