Once electronic content has been released it is very difficult to prevent copies of the content from being widely distributed. Such distribution can cause economic harm to the content's copyright owner and others. Our protocol, SPIES, allows one party to sell a secret to second party and provides an economic incentive for two parties to limit sharing of a secret between themselves. We do not use watermarking or traditional DRM mechanisms. We focus on content which is to be shared between two parties only, which is valuable, and which only needs to be protected for a limited amount of time. Examples include passwords to a subscription service, pre-release of media for review, or content shared but bound by a non disclosure agreement. With SPIES, any possesor of the content can receive a portion of the funds placed in escrow by the two legitimate possesors. We analyze this system and show that the best strategy of the content provider and content consumer to maximize their utility is to use SPIES and not share the content further. We deal successfully with a "dummy registration" attack in which multiple false identities are used in an attempt to get a higher payment. We also discuss how to determine the correct escrow amount.
{"title":"Analysis of an incentives-based secrets protection system","authors":"N. B. Margolin, M. Wright, B. Levine","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029153","url":null,"abstract":"Once electronic content has been released it is very difficult to prevent copies of the content from being widely distributed. Such distribution can cause economic harm to the content's copyright owner and others. Our protocol, SPIES, allows one party to sell a secret to second party and provides an economic incentive for two parties to limit sharing of a secret between themselves. We do not use watermarking or traditional DRM mechanisms. We focus on content which is to be shared between two parties only, which is valuable, and which only needs to be protected for a limited amount of time. Examples include passwords to a subscription service, pre-release of media for review, or content shared but bound by a non disclosure agreement. With SPIES, any possesor of the content can receive a portion of the funds placed in escrow by the two legitimate possesors. We analyze this system and show that the best strategy of the content provider and content consumer to maximize their utility is to use SPIES and not share the content further. We deal successfully with a \"dummy registration\" attack in which multiple false identities are used in an attempt to get a higher payment. We also discuss how to determine the correct escrow amount.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115733241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we are focusing on the use of a traitor tracing scheme for distribution models that are based on prerecorded or recordable physical media. When a pirated copy of the protected content is observed, the traitor tracing scheme allows the identification of at least one of the real subscribers who participated in the construction of the pirated copy. We show how we systematically assign the variations to users. We explore under what circumstances traitor tracing technology is applicable for media based distribution and then focus on two challenges specifically related to this form of distribution: We demonstrate a way to encode the variations on the disc that is mostly hidden from the attackers and also remarkably compatible with the existing DVD standard. We also present an efficient key management scheme to significantly reduce the requirement for non-volatile key storage on low-cost CE devices.
{"title":"Traitor tracing for prerecorded and recordable media","authors":"Hongxia Jin, J. Lotspiech, Stefan Nusser","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029160","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we are focusing on the use of a traitor tracing scheme for distribution models that are based on prerecorded or recordable physical media. When a pirated copy of the protected content is observed, the traitor tracing scheme allows the identification of at least one of the real subscribers who participated in the construction of the pirated copy. We show how we systematically assign the variations to users. We explore under what circumstances traitor tracing technology is applicable for media based distribution and then focus on two challenges specifically related to this form of distribution: We demonstrate a way to encode the variations on the disc that is mostly hidden from the attackers and also remarkably compatible with the existing DVD standard. We also present an efficient key management scheme to significantly reduce the requirement for non-volatile key storage on low-cost CE devices.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117066792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Insider attack is one of the most serious cybersecurity threats to corporate America. Among all insider threats, information theft is considered the most damaging in terms of potential financial loss. Moreover, it is also especially difficult to detect and prevent, because in many cases the attacker has the proper authority to access the stolen information. According to the 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, theft of proprietary information was the single largest category of losses in the 2003 survey totaling $70.1 million or 35% of the total financial loss reported in that survey. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation and evaluation of an industrial-strength solution called Display-Only File Server (DOFS), which can transparently and effectively stop information theft by insiders in most cases, even if the insiders have proper authorities to read/write the protected information. The DOFS architecture ensures that bits of a protected file never leave a DOFS server after the file is checked in and users can still interact with the protected files in the same way as if it is stored locally. Essentially, DOFS decouples "display access" from other types of accesses to a protected file by providing users only the "display image" rather than the bits of the files, and applies the thin-client computing model on existing client-server applications.
{"title":"Display-only file server: a solution against information theft due to insider attack","authors":"Yang Yu, T. Chiueh","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029154","url":null,"abstract":"Insider attack is one of the most serious cybersecurity threats to corporate America. Among all insider threats, information theft is considered the most damaging in terms of potential financial loss. Moreover, it is also especially difficult to detect and prevent, because in many cases the attacker has the proper authority to access the stolen information. According to the 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, theft of proprietary information was the single largest category of losses in the 2003 survey totaling $70.1 million or 35% of the total financial loss reported in that survey. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation and evaluation of an industrial-strength solution called <i>Display-Only File Server</i> (DOFS), which can transparently and effectively stop information theft by insiders in most cases, even if the insiders have proper authorities to read/write the protected information. The DOFS architecture ensures that bits of a protected file never leave a DOFS server after the file is checked in and users can still interact with the protected files in the same way as if it is stored locally. Essentially, DOFS decouples \"display access\" from other types of accesses to a protected file by providing users only the \"display image\" rather than the bits of the files, and applies the thin-client computing model on existing client-server applications.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"45 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131295714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital media provide higher portability, storage and communication efficiency, and accuracy of data. However digital objects can be easily and accurately copied. This allows unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted objects, hence bypassing the ownership and intellectual property rights of owners, creators and distributors of the object. Protection of media data such as movies, music and multimedia data against illegal copying and re-distribution has been one of the greatest challenges of digital content distribution. Protection becomes exceedingly hard if a group of users combine their privileges to overcome the protection mechanism of the system. A range of techniques have been proposed to "mark" the content, or the player of the content, so that pirate digital objects, or the illegal player, can be traced and at least one of the colluders be identified. We review a range of techniques and constructions that have been proposed in recent years and used in applications such as pay-TV, digital broadcasting and content distribution systems, as well as digital storage systems such as compact disks. We will point out limitations of existing methods and discuss challenges and directions for future research.
{"title":"Tracing traitors: a selective survey","authors":"R. Safavi-Naini","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029148","url":null,"abstract":"Digital media provide higher portability, storage and communication efficiency, and accuracy of data. However digital objects can be easily and accurately copied. This allows unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted objects, hence bypassing the ownership and intellectual property rights of owners, creators and distributors of the object. Protection of media data such as movies, music and multimedia data against illegal copying and re-distribution has been one of the greatest challenges of digital content distribution. Protection becomes exceedingly hard if a group of users combine their privileges to overcome the protection mechanism of the system. A range of techniques have been proposed to \"mark\" the content, or the player of the content, so that pirate digital objects, or the illegal player, can be traced and at least one of the colluders be identified.\u0000 We review a range of techniques and constructions that have been proposed in recent years and used in applications such as pay-TV, digital broadcasting and content distribution systems, as well as digital storage systems such as compact disks. We will point out limitations of existing methods and discuss challenges and directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125202142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The inherently controlled nature of digital rights management systems does little to promote inter-operability of systems provided by different vendors. In this paper, we consider import and export functionality by which multimedia protected by one digital rights management regime can be made available to a multimedia device that supports a different digital rights management regime, without compromising the protection afforded to the content under the original regime. We first identify specific issues to be addressed by developers of digital rights management import/export regimes and outline a variety of methods by which these regimes may be implemented. We then apply our observations to the specific example of import and export of content between the digital rights management regimes defined by the Motion Picture Exports Group and the Open Mobile Alliance.
{"title":"Import/export in digital rights management","authors":"R. Safavi-Naini, N. Sheppard, T. Uehara","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029163","url":null,"abstract":"The inherently controlled nature of digital rights management systems does little to promote inter-operability of systems provided by different vendors. In this paper, we consider import and export functionality by which multimedia protected by one digital rights management regime can be made available to a multimedia device that supports a different digital rights management regime, without compromising the protection afforded to the content under the original regime. We first identify specific issues to be addressed by developers of digital rights management import/export regimes and outline a variety of methods by which these regimes may be implemented. We then apply our observations to the specific example of import and export of content between the digital rights management regimes defined by the Motion Picture Exports Group and the Open Mobile Alliance.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126551720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current landscape for digital rights management(DRM) consists of various ad hoc technologies and platforms that largely focus on copy protection. The fragmented nature of the DRM industry in 2004 is somewhat reminiscent of the telecommunications industry in the late 1980's. At that time various networking technologies were available, and what was needed was a technology that could integrate existing networks and provide various services to users. The OSI layered framework and the TCP/IP communications protocol suite provided a solution to this situation. The OSI model divides the process of digital data communications into layers. Likewise, in this paper we divide the process of DRM into layers in which various services are offered to the users of digital content at each layer. Three blocks of layers have been identified. The upper layers deal with the end-to-end functions of the application, the middle layers deal with rights expression and interpretation, and the lower layers ensure rights enforcement. This paper describes how responsibilities might be distributed among the various layers, and considers where in these layers it would be appropriate to define protocols and standards.
{"title":"DRM as a layered system","authors":"Pramod A. Jamkhedkar, G. Heileman","doi":"10.1145/1029146.1029151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029146.1029151","url":null,"abstract":"The current landscape for digital rights management(DRM) consists of various ad hoc technologies and platforms that largely focus on copy protection. The fragmented nature of the DRM industry in 2004 is somewhat reminiscent of the telecommunications industry in the late 1980's. At that time various networking technologies were available, and what was needed was a technology that could integrate existing networks and provide various services to users. The OSI layered framework and the TCP/IP communications protocol suite provided a solution to this situation. The OSI model divides the process of digital data communications into layers. Likewise, in this paper we divide the process of DRM into layers in which various services are offered to the users of digital content at each layer. Three blocks of layers have been identified. The upper layers deal with the end-to-end functions of the application, the middle layers deal with rights expression and interpretation, and the lower layers ensure rights enforcement. This paper describes how responsibilities might be distributed among the various layers, and considers where in these layers it would be appropriate to define protocols and standards.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125528967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Present and Future of DRM - Musings on Emerging Legal Problems","authors":"S. Bechtold","doi":"10.1007/10941270_36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/10941270_36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128014152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We set out to examine whether current, DRM-based online offerings of music and movies accord with consumers' current expectations regarding the personal use of copyrighted works by studying the behavior of six music, and two film online distribution services. We find that, for the most part, the services examined do not accord with expectations of personal use. The DRM-based services studied restrict personal use in a manner inconsistent with the norms and expectations governing the purchase and rental of traditional physical CDs, DVDs, and videocassettes. If adopted by consumers the DRM systems stand to alter the norms governing personal use of copyrighted content and create pitfalls of legal liability for unsuspecting consumers. In conclusion, we present technological and legal considerations which may help current and future DRM system designers better accommodate consumers' expectations of personal use.
{"title":"How DRM-based content delivery systems disrupt expectations of \"personal use\"","authors":"D. Mulligan, John Han, A. Burstein","doi":"10.1145/947380.947391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/947380.947391","url":null,"abstract":"We set out to examine whether current, DRM-based online offerings of music and movies accord with consumers' current expectations regarding the personal use of copyrighted works by studying the behavior of six music, and two film online distribution services. We find that, for the most part, the services examined do not accord with expectations of personal use. The DRM-based services studied restrict personal use in a manner inconsistent with the norms and expectations governing the purchase and rental of traditional physical CDs, DVDs, and videocassettes. If adopted by consumers the DRM systems stand to alter the norms governing personal use of copyrighted content and create pitfalls of legal liability for unsuspecting consumers. In conclusion, we present technological and legal considerations which may help current and future DRM system designers better accommodate consumers' expectations of personal use.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125885898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mitsunari et al [15] presented a new traitor tracing scheme which uses Weil pairing in elliptic curves. To the best of our knowledge this is the first scheme that uses bilinear map. The claimed advantage of the scheme is that the ciphertext size is independent of the number of traitors. It is shown that the problem of constructing a pirate key by k colluders is as hard as the so-called "k-weak Diffie-Hellman problem".In this paper, we show an attack on this scheme in which traitors find a linear combination of their keys to construct a pirate key that can be used to decrypt the ciphertext. We identify a class of schemes, that includes MSK, with the property that correct tracing requires the ciphertext size to depend on the collusion threshold. We derive a lower bound on the size of the ciphertext that depends on the number of colluders.We propose a modification to MSK scheme, Scheme 1, which not only ensures constructing a pirate decoder is hard, but also has a number of significant advantages over the initial proposal. In particular, it is a public key traitor tracing scheme while the original scheme is a secret key traitor tracing scheme; it has a black box tracing algorithm while MSK scheme only has an open box tracing algorithm, and finally its security is provable (semantic secure against passive adversary) while there was no security proof for MSK.We also propose two other schemes based on bilinear pairing. Scheme~2, is a generic scheme and can be used with any linear error correcting code. Scheme~3 uses Shamir's secret sharing scheme and has the added property that the encrypted message can be targeted to a subset of users. This is by including user revocation property and allowing selected users to be revoked from the original set of users. We also give proof of security, similar to Scheme 1, and also a tracing algorithm for the two schemes. Finally we give an efficiency comparison for the three schemes against the most efficient schemes with similar security and traceability properties and show that all three schemes are the most efficient ones of their kind.
{"title":"New traitor tracing schemes using bilinear map","authors":"Vu Dong Tô, R. Safavi-Naini, Fangguo Zhang","doi":"10.1145/947380.947389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/947380.947389","url":null,"abstract":"Mitsunari et al [15] presented a new traitor tracing scheme which uses Weil pairing in elliptic curves. To the best of our knowledge this is the first scheme that uses bilinear map. The claimed advantage of the scheme is that the ciphertext size is independent of the number of traitors. It is shown that the problem of constructing a pirate key by k colluders is as hard as the so-called \"k-weak Diffie-Hellman problem\".In this paper, we show an attack on this scheme in which traitors find a linear combination of their keys to construct a pirate key that can be used to decrypt the ciphertext. We identify a class of schemes, that includes MSK, with the property that correct tracing requires the ciphertext size to depend on the collusion threshold. We derive a lower bound on the size of the ciphertext that depends on the number of colluders.We propose a modification to MSK scheme, Scheme 1, which not only ensures constructing a pirate decoder is hard, but also has a number of significant advantages over the initial proposal. In particular, it is a public key traitor tracing scheme while the original scheme is a secret key traitor tracing scheme; it has a black box tracing algorithm while MSK scheme only has an open box tracing algorithm, and finally its security is provable (semantic secure against passive adversary) while there was no security proof for MSK.We also propose two other schemes based on bilinear pairing. Scheme~2, is a generic scheme and can be used with any linear error correcting code. Scheme~3 uses Shamir's secret sharing scheme and has the added property that the encrypted message can be targeted to a subset of users. This is by including user revocation property and allowing selected users to be revoked from the original set of users. We also give proof of security, similar to Scheme 1, and also a tracing algorithm for the two schemes. Finally we give an efficiency comparison for the three schemes against the most efficient schemes with similar security and traceability properties and show that all three schemes are the most efficient ones of their kind.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126290056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Protection of digital data from unauthorized access is of paramount importance. In the past several years, much research has concentrated on protecting data from the standpoint of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Software is a form of data with unique properties and its protection poses unique challenges. First, software can be reverse engineered, which may result in stolen intellectual property. Second, software can be altered with the intent of performing operations this software must not be allowed to perform.With commercial software increasingly distributed in forms from which source code can be easily extracted, such as Java bytecodes, reverse engineering has become easier than ever. Obfuscation techniques have been proposed to impede illegal reverse engineers. Obfuscations are program transformations that preserve the program functionality while obscuring the code, thereby protecting the program against reverse engineering. Unfortunately, the existing obfuscation techniques are limited to obscuring variable names, transformations of local control flow, and obscuring expressions using variables of primitive types. In this paper, we propose obfuscations of design of object-oriented programs.We describe three techniques for obfuscation of program design. The class coalescing obfuscation replaces several classes with a single class. The class splitting obfuscation replaces a single class with multiple classes, each responsible for a part of the functionality of the original class. The type hiding obfuscation uses the mechanism of interfaces in Java to obscure the types of objects manipulated by the program. We show the results of our initial experiments with a prototype implementation of these techniques. In particular, we shown that the runtime overheads of these obfuscations tend to be small.
{"title":"Obfuscation of design intent in object-oriented applications","authors":"Mikhail Sosonkin, G. Naumovich, N. Memon","doi":"10.1145/947380.947399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/947380.947399","url":null,"abstract":"Protection of digital data from unauthorized access is of paramount importance. In the past several years, much research has concentrated on protecting data from the standpoint of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Software is a form of data with unique properties and its protection poses unique challenges. First, software can be reverse engineered, which may result in stolen intellectual property. Second, software can be altered with the intent of performing operations this software must not be allowed to perform.With commercial software increasingly distributed in forms from which source code can be easily extracted, such as Java bytecodes, reverse engineering has become easier than ever. Obfuscation techniques have been proposed to impede illegal reverse engineers. Obfuscations are program transformations that preserve the program functionality while obscuring the code, thereby protecting the program against reverse engineering. Unfortunately, the existing obfuscation techniques are limited to obscuring variable names, transformations of local control flow, and obscuring expressions using variables of primitive types. In this paper, we propose obfuscations of design of object-oriented programs.We describe three techniques for obfuscation of program design. The class coalescing obfuscation replaces several classes with a single class. The class splitting obfuscation replaces a single class with multiple classes, each responsible for a part of the functionality of the original class. The type hiding obfuscation uses the mechanism of interfaces in Java to obscure the types of objects manipulated by the program. We show the results of our initial experiments with a prototype implementation of these techniques. In particular, we shown that the runtime overheads of these obfuscations tend to be small.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128203749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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