Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231220209
Kentato Fukumoto
When American political scientists conduct get-out-the-vote (GOTV) field experiments, randomized control trials and public voting records are the two pillars of these experiments. However, what if neither is available in other countries? For instance, Japanese election commissions are averse to both. To tackle this problem, I propose a second-best solution. I collaborated with the election commission of a municipality in Japan. The election commission sent direct mail (DM) to all 18-year-olds in the municipality and disclosed voting records at the week-of-birth level. Finally, I estimated the treatment effect of the DM on voter turnout using a regression discontinuity design, where I compared the turnout of 18-year-olds with that of 19-year-olds or 17-year-olds. I cannot find any statistically significant evidence showing that the DM increased 18-year-old voters’ turnout. I hope that my setup enables GOTV field experiments in many countries outside the United States so that we can infer the causal effects of GOTV tactics in various contexts.
{"title":"What if neither randomized control trials nor public voting records are available in a get-out-the-vote field experiment?","authors":"Kentato Fukumoto","doi":"10.1177/20531680231220209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231220209","url":null,"abstract":"When American political scientists conduct get-out-the-vote (GOTV) field experiments, randomized control trials and public voting records are the two pillars of these experiments. However, what if neither is available in other countries? For instance, Japanese election commissions are averse to both. To tackle this problem, I propose a second-best solution. I collaborated with the election commission of a municipality in Japan. The election commission sent direct mail (DM) to all 18-year-olds in the municipality and disclosed voting records at the week-of-birth level. Finally, I estimated the treatment effect of the DM on voter turnout using a regression discontinuity design, where I compared the turnout of 18-year-olds with that of 19-year-olds or 17-year-olds. I cannot find any statistically significant evidence showing that the DM increased 18-year-old voters’ turnout. I hope that my setup enables GOTV field experiments in many countries outside the United States so that we can infer the causal effects of GOTV tactics in various contexts.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"175 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139328034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231197254
Marzia Oceno, Lauren Chojnacki
Although gender-related attitudes have played an increasingly larger role in recent U.S. elections, the implications of feminist identity beyond electoral politics remain largely understudied. This paper examines how the interaction of feminist and party ID impacts political elite evaluations and policy attitudes that are not gender-based by relying on an original survey fielded as part of the 2020 CES and the 2016 ANES. Our analyses show that feminists of both parties give the highest feminist ratings to co-partisan elites. However, while Democratic feminists rate Democratic elites as more feminist than Republican elites, Republican feminists rate the two similarly. Furthermore, within both parties, feminist self-labeling is associated with increased support for policies that advance social equity and inclusion. This gap in policy preferences between feminists and non-feminists largely persists across ideologies—among liberal, moderate, and conservative members of both parties. These findings suggest that feminist identifiers constitute a distinct group within each party, and fostering feminism across political leanings may strengthen public support for more equitable and inclusive policy goals and outcomes.
{"title":"Feminism within parties: Implications for political elite evaluations and policy attitudes","authors":"Marzia Oceno, Lauren Chojnacki","doi":"10.1177/20531680231197254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231197254","url":null,"abstract":"Although gender-related attitudes have played an increasingly larger role in recent U.S. elections, the implications of feminist identity beyond electoral politics remain largely understudied. This paper examines how the interaction of feminist and party ID impacts political elite evaluations and policy attitudes that are not gender-based by relying on an original survey fielded as part of the 2020 CES and the 2016 ANES. Our analyses show that feminists of both parties give the highest feminist ratings to co-partisan elites. However, while Democratic feminists rate Democratic elites as more feminist than Republican elites, Republican feminists rate the two similarly. Furthermore, within both parties, feminist self-labeling is associated with increased support for policies that advance social equity and inclusion. This gap in policy preferences between feminists and non-feminists largely persists across ideologies—among liberal, moderate, and conservative members of both parties. These findings suggest that feminist identifiers constitute a distinct group within each party, and fostering feminism across political leanings may strengthen public support for more equitable and inclusive policy goals and outcomes.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124797389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231193513
Gino Pauselli, Francisco Urdínez, F. Merke
Scholars have long discussed whether the rise of China poses a threat to the Liberal International Order. However, there are methodological challenges to studying the effect of a rising power on established norms. In particular, the participation of rising powers in the established order is not exogenously determined. To make an empirical contribution to this debate, we focus on Beijing’s influence as a member of the Human Rights Council. We exploit the fact that China’s membership in the Council is determined by an exogenous membership rule and implement a matching technique to test whether China has influenced the voting patterns of the other member states on identical recurring resolutions. We find that China’s presence in the Council systematically alters the voting behavior of other states in favor of China’s interest, and that this change is larger when it comes to the enforcement of human rights through international criticism. To delve into the mechanisms underlying these findings, we conduct in-depth interviews with experienced diplomats at the UN Human Rights Council.
{"title":"Shaping the liberal international order from the inside: A natural experiment on China’s influence in the UN human rights council","authors":"Gino Pauselli, Francisco Urdínez, F. Merke","doi":"10.1177/20531680231193513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231193513","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have long discussed whether the rise of China poses a threat to the Liberal International Order. However, there are methodological challenges to studying the effect of a rising power on established norms. In particular, the participation of rising powers in the established order is not exogenously determined. To make an empirical contribution to this debate, we focus on Beijing’s influence as a member of the Human Rights Council. We exploit the fact that China’s membership in the Council is determined by an exogenous membership rule and implement a matching technique to test whether China has influenced the voting patterns of the other member states on identical recurring resolutions. We find that China’s presence in the Council systematically alters the voting behavior of other states in favor of China’s interest, and that this change is larger when it comes to the enforcement of human rights through international criticism. To delve into the mechanisms underlying these findings, we conduct in-depth interviews with experienced diplomats at the UN Human Rights Council.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130930181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231188267
Kenneth M Miller, Tanner Bates
Are members of Congress who receive more of their campaign funding from organized interests more supportive of democratic norms compared to members who receive more of their contributions from individual donors? We analyze the campaign receipts of Republican House members in the 2020 campaign cycle and votes to object to electors for Joe Biden from Arizona and Pennsylvania and find that greater contributions to members’ campaigns from business PACs are associated with a lower probability that members voted to object to electors. Further, members’ own margin of victory in 2020 has no association with these votes when controlling for other factors, but members from districts where Trump performed better are more likely to have objected to counting Electoral College votes for his opponent. Our results demonstrate a positive association between campaign contributions from corporate PACs and support for democratic institutions within the Republican caucus in the U.S. House.
{"title":"PACs and January 6th: Campaign finance and objections to the Electoral College vote count","authors":"Kenneth M Miller, Tanner Bates","doi":"10.1177/20531680231188267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231188267","url":null,"abstract":"Are members of Congress who receive more of their campaign funding from organized interests more supportive of democratic norms compared to members who receive more of their contributions from individual donors? We analyze the campaign receipts of Republican House members in the 2020 campaign cycle and votes to object to electors for Joe Biden from Arizona and Pennsylvania and find that greater contributions to members’ campaigns from business PACs are associated with a lower probability that members voted to object to electors. Further, members’ own margin of victory in 2020 has no association with these votes when controlling for other factors, but members from districts where Trump performed better are more likely to have objected to counting Electoral College votes for his opponent. Our results demonstrate a positive association between campaign contributions from corporate PACs and support for democratic institutions within the Republican caucus in the U.S. House.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117212119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231193514
Christina E. Farhart, Erin B. Fitz, Joanne M. Miller, Kyle L. Saunders
Although a growing body of scholarship examines who believes conspiracy theories (CTs) and why, less is known about why people share CTs. We test the impact of three independent motives on people’s willingness to share CTs on social media: bolstering their or their group’s beliefs (motivated sharing), generating collective action against their political outgroup because of losing (sounding the alarm), and mobilizing others against the political system (need for chaos). Using an original survey of US adults ( N = 3336), we test these three motives together and find strong evidence for motivated sharing and need for chaos, but no evidence for sounding the alarm. Our findings suggest that motivated sharing—when measured directly as belief in the CTs—is the strongest predictor of willingness to share CTs on social media. Need for chaos has less of an effect on sharing than belief but a consistently stronger effect on sharing than partisanship and ideology. Altogether, we demonstrate that sharing CTs on social media can serve both motivated and mobilizing functions, particularly for those who believe the CTs or seek to challenge the political system, rather than impugn their political rivals.
{"title":"By any memes necessary: Belief- and chaos-driven motives for sharing conspiracy theories on social media","authors":"Christina E. Farhart, Erin B. Fitz, Joanne M. Miller, Kyle L. Saunders","doi":"10.1177/20531680231193514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231193514","url":null,"abstract":"Although a growing body of scholarship examines who believes conspiracy theories (CTs) and why, less is known about why people share CTs. We test the impact of three independent motives on people’s willingness to share CTs on social media: bolstering their or their group’s beliefs (motivated sharing), generating collective action against their political outgroup because of losing (sounding the alarm), and mobilizing others against the political system (need for chaos). Using an original survey of US adults ( N = 3336), we test these three motives together and find strong evidence for motivated sharing and need for chaos, but no evidence for sounding the alarm. Our findings suggest that motivated sharing—when measured directly as belief in the CTs—is the strongest predictor of willingness to share CTs on social media. Need for chaos has less of an effect on sharing than belief but a consistently stronger effect on sharing than partisanship and ideology. Altogether, we demonstrate that sharing CTs on social media can serve both motivated and mobilizing functions, particularly for those who believe the CTs or seek to challenge the political system, rather than impugn their political rivals.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115735237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231191833
S. Hellmeier
The Covid-19 pandemic changed contentious politics worldwide. After causing a short-lived decline in global protest activities in early 2020, it has led to the emergence of a variety of pandemic-related protests. While previous work has mostly looked at how event frequencies have changed over time, this paper focuses on changes in protest issues. It applies quantitative text analysis to protest event descriptions and makes the following contributions. First, it traces the rise and fall of pandemic-related protests globally between 2020 and mid-2022, showing that, on average, more than 15% of protest events were pandemic-related. Second, it identifies the most dominant pandemic-related protest issues—masks and vaccination, the economy, business restrictions, health care, education, mismanagement, and crime—and their salience over time. Third, the paper explores potential explanations for differences in the prevalence of pandemic-related protest issues between countries. Multivariate regression analyses suggest a global divide. Protests in developed countries and liberal democracies were more likely about government restrictions. In contrast, citizens in less developed countries took to the streets to demand better healthcare provision.
{"title":"From masks to mismanagement: A global assessment of the rise and fall of pandemic-related protests","authors":"S. Hellmeier","doi":"10.1177/20531680231191833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231191833","url":null,"abstract":"The Covid-19 pandemic changed contentious politics worldwide. After causing a short-lived decline in global protest activities in early 2020, it has led to the emergence of a variety of pandemic-related protests. While previous work has mostly looked at how event frequencies have changed over time, this paper focuses on changes in protest issues. It applies quantitative text analysis to protest event descriptions and makes the following contributions. First, it traces the rise and fall of pandemic-related protests globally between 2020 and mid-2022, showing that, on average, more than 15% of protest events were pandemic-related. Second, it identifies the most dominant pandemic-related protest issues—masks and vaccination, the economy, business restrictions, health care, education, mismanagement, and crime—and their salience over time. Third, the paper explores potential explanations for differences in the prevalence of pandemic-related protest issues between countries. Multivariate regression analyses suggest a global divide. Protests in developed countries and liberal democracies were more likely about government restrictions. In contrast, citizens in less developed countries took to the streets to demand better healthcare provision.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114850371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231197456
Kohei Watanabe, Marius Sältzer
Temporality is an important aspect of political discourse. Politicians and policymakers attempt to construct the past and the future to gain power, legitimize their policies, claim success for themselves and blame others. To make computational analysis of temporality more accessible, we develop a new methodology using a semisupervised machine-learning algorithm called Latent Semantic Scaling. Only with a set of common verbs in the past perfect and future tense as seed words, the algorithm estimates the temporality of all other words. We demonstrate that it can identify temporal orientation of English and German sentences from election manifestos around 60–70% accurately, which is comparable to the results from a recent study based on supervised machine-learning algorithms. We also apply it to Twitter posts by German political parties to reveal temporal orientation of policy issues.
{"title":"Semantic temporality analysis: A computational approach to time in English and German texts","authors":"Kohei Watanabe, Marius Sältzer","doi":"10.1177/20531680231197456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231197456","url":null,"abstract":"Temporality is an important aspect of political discourse. Politicians and policymakers attempt to construct the past and the future to gain power, legitimize their policies, claim success for themselves and blame others. To make computational analysis of temporality more accessible, we develop a new methodology using a semisupervised machine-learning algorithm called Latent Semantic Scaling. Only with a set of common verbs in the past perfect and future tense as seed words, the algorithm estimates the temporality of all other words. We demonstrate that it can identify temporal orientation of English and German sentences from election manifestos around 60–70% accurately, which is comparable to the results from a recent study based on supervised machine-learning algorithms. We also apply it to Twitter posts by German political parties to reveal temporal orientation of policy issues.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134445413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231188302
A. Driscoll, M. J. Nelson
U.S. courts have long been thought to be held in special regard by the American public, and public support is theorized to protect institutions from interbranch aggression. At the same time, recent research underscores that institutional fealty and public reaction to court curbing is shaped by partisan concerns. Drawing on a survey experiment fielded in the U.S., we evaluate whether (1) the public is uniquely punitive toward incumbents who seek to undermine a court rather than an agency and (2) the extent to which these penalties are dependent upon shared partisanship with the proposer. We demonstrate that the public is less supportive of efforts to strip judicial power than analogous efforts to strip power from an executive agency, but that this penalty for court curbing dissipates in the face of copartisanship. This substantiates previous claims regarding the role of partisanship on shaping public attitudes about high courts but underscores that the American public may still hold the courts in unique regard.
{"title":"Are courts “different?” Experimental evidence on the unique costs of attacking courts","authors":"A. Driscoll, M. J. Nelson","doi":"10.1177/20531680231188302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231188302","url":null,"abstract":"U.S. courts have long been thought to be held in special regard by the American public, and public support is theorized to protect institutions from interbranch aggression. At the same time, recent research underscores that institutional fealty and public reaction to court curbing is shaped by partisan concerns. Drawing on a survey experiment fielded in the U.S., we evaluate whether (1) the public is uniquely punitive toward incumbents who seek to undermine a court rather than an agency and (2) the extent to which these penalties are dependent upon shared partisanship with the proposer. We demonstrate that the public is less supportive of efforts to strip judicial power than analogous efforts to strip power from an executive agency, but that this penalty for court curbing dissipates in the face of copartisanship. This substantiates previous claims regarding the role of partisanship on shaping public attitudes about high courts but underscores that the American public may still hold the courts in unique regard.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114409128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231183512
Cornelius Erfort, Lukas F. Stoetzer, H. Klüver
We present the PARTYPRESS Database, which compiles more than 250,000 published press releases from 68 parties in 9 European countries. The database covers the press releases of the most relevant political parties in these countries from 2010 onward. It provides a supervised machine learning classification of press releases into 21 unique issue categories according to a general codebook. The PARTYPRESS Database can be used to study parties’ issue agendas comparatively and over time. We extend a recent analysis in Gessler and Hunger (2022) to illustrate the usefulness of the database in studying dynamic party competition, communication, and behavior.
{"title":"The PARTYPRESS Database: A new comparative database of parties’ press releases","authors":"Cornelius Erfort, Lukas F. Stoetzer, H. Klüver","doi":"10.1177/20531680231183512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231183512","url":null,"abstract":"We present the PARTYPRESS Database, which compiles more than 250,000 published press releases from 68 parties in 9 European countries. The database covers the press releases of the most relevant political parties in these countries from 2010 onward. It provides a supervised machine learning classification of press releases into 21 unique issue categories according to a general codebook. The PARTYPRESS Database can be used to study parties’ issue agendas comparatively and over time. We extend a recent analysis in Gessler and Hunger (2022) to illustrate the usefulness of the database in studying dynamic party competition, communication, and behavior.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"16 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127745868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231188258
Trent Ollerenshaw
Research in the wake of the contentious 2016 presidential primaries contends both Democrats and Republicans were internally divided along psychological lines. Specifically, MacWilliams (2016) finds authoritarian personality was strongly related to Trump support among Republican primary voters, and Wronski et al. (2018) finds authoritarianism was strongly related to Clinton support among Democratic primary voters. In this paper, I reassess the relationships between authoritarianism and 2016 primary candidate preferences for both Republicans and Democrats. I analyze two new large, probability-based surveys and generate random effects estimates using these surveys and two national surveys from Wronski et al. (2018) . Overall, I find authoritarianism was moderately associated with support for Clinton over Sanders among Democratic primary voters, but weakly associated with support for Trump among Republican primary voters. My findings indicate authoritarianism may have played a more limited role in shaping Americans’ candidate preferences in the 2016 presidential primary elections than past studies have suggested.
{"title":"Authoritarianism and support for Trump and Clinton in the 2016 primaries","authors":"Trent Ollerenshaw","doi":"10.1177/20531680231188258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231188258","url":null,"abstract":"Research in the wake of the contentious 2016 presidential primaries contends both Democrats and Republicans were internally divided along psychological lines. Specifically, MacWilliams (2016) finds authoritarian personality was strongly related to Trump support among Republican primary voters, and Wronski et al. (2018) finds authoritarianism was strongly related to Clinton support among Democratic primary voters. In this paper, I reassess the relationships between authoritarianism and 2016 primary candidate preferences for both Republicans and Democrats. I analyze two new large, probability-based surveys and generate random effects estimates using these surveys and two national surveys from Wronski et al. (2018) . Overall, I find authoritarianism was moderately associated with support for Clinton over Sanders among Democratic primary voters, but weakly associated with support for Trump among Republican primary voters. My findings indicate authoritarianism may have played a more limited role in shaping Americans’ candidate preferences in the 2016 presidential primary elections than past studies have suggested.","PeriodicalId":125693,"journal":{"name":"Research & Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126630465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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