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Correction to “An MTL-Based Channel Model for Indoor Broadband MIMO Power Line Communications” 对“用于室内宽带MIMO电力线通信的基于MTL的信道模型”的修正
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2661118
Julio A. Corchado, J. A. Cortés, F. Cañete, L. Díez
This note corrects a recurrent erratum in Section VII of our paper “An MTL-based channel model for indoor broadband mimo power line communications” [1]. Errors are concerned with the quantification of the spatial correlation of MIMO channels by means of the condition number of the channel matrix. According to the definition given in expression (25) of the paper, the higher the condition number, the higher the spatial correlation. However, Section VII is written as if high condition numbers correspond to low spatially correlated channels. Hence, whenever it is said that a given fact reduces the spatial correlation or, equivalently, that it yields lower spatially correlated channels, it should say exactly the opposite, i.e, the referred fact increases the spatial correlation or yields higher spatially correlated channels; and vice versa.
本注释纠正了我们论文“室内宽带mimo电力线通信的基于MTL的信道模型”[1]第七节中反复出现的错误。误差涉及通过信道矩阵的条件数来量化MIMO信道的空间相关性。根据本文表达式(25)中给出的定义,条件数越高,空间相关性越高。然而,第VII节被写成好像高条件数对应于低空间相关信道。因此,每当说给定的事实降低了空间相关性,或者等效地说,它产生了较低的空间相关性信道时,它应该说恰恰相反,即,所提及的事实增加了空间相关性或者产生了较高的空间相关性信道;反之亦然。
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引用次数: 0
Resource Management Games for Distributed Network Localization 分布式网络本地化的资源管理游戏
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659318
Junting Chen, Wenhan Dai, Yuan Shen, V. Lau, M. Win
Resource management in the power and time–frequency domains is an important issue in distributed network localization. Since highly accurate ranging requires a large amount of time–frequency resources, cooperation among nodes without proper link selection may not be feasible. To address this issue, two resource management games are formulated, and Stackelberg equilibrium and link bargaining equilibrium are proposed as the solution concepts for efficient link selection and power allocation. Distributed algorithms are derived and analyzed using game theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that the proposed strategies can achieve a lower mean squared error of position estimation with fewer ranging measurements.
功率域和时频域的资源管理是分布式网络定位中的一个重要问题。由于高度精确的测距需要大量的时频资源,如果没有正确的链路选择,节点之间的合作可能是不可行的。为了解决这一问题,本文提出了两个资源管理博弈,并提出了Stackelberg均衡和链路议价均衡作为有效的链路选择和权力分配的解决概念。采用博弈论方法推导和分析了分布式算法。结果表明,该方法可以在较少的测距量下实现较低的位置估计均方误差。
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引用次数: 26
Guest Editorial Game Theory for Networks, Part I 网络博弈理论,第一部分
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2683048
L. Sanguinetti, T. Alpcan, T. Başar, M. Bennis, R. Berry, Jianwei Huang, W. Saad
Next-generation networks will be characterized by three key features: heterogeneity , in terms of technologies and services, dynamics , in terms of rapidly varying environments and uncertainty, and size , in terms of the numbers of users, nodes, and services. The emergence of such large-scale and decentralized heterogeneous networks operating under dynamic and uncertain environments imposes new challenges in the design, analysis, and optimization of networks. The past decade has witnessed a confluence among the disciplines of networks, games, and economics, which has necessitated novel mathematical tools and designs that can truly remove the boundaries between these disciplines. In this context, advancing game-theoretic models and tailoring them towards the optimization and operation of future networked systems become pressing needs for our research community. The main goal of this IEEE JSAC Special Issue on “Game Theory for Networks” is to collect cutting-edge contributions that address and show the latest developments in game-theoretic models for emerging networking applications. The response of the community to the call has been overwhelming. We received a total of 120 submissions. We want to thank all the authors who submitted their works to this Special Issue. After a strict and selective review process, we accepted 40 papers and decided to publish two issues. Papers were selected based on their appropriateness for and relevance to the Special Issue as well as their technical merits. Unfortunately, a number of interesting papers did not make the cut because of the criteria set forth above and also due to the constraints on the total page count in a JSAC Special Issue. We hope that such interesting papers will find other venues for publication.
下一代网络将以三个关键特征为特征:异质性(就技术和服务而言)、动态性(就快速变化的环境和不确定性而言)和规模(就用户、节点和服务的数量而言)。这种在动态和不确定环境下运行的大规模和分散的异构网络的出现,对网络的设计、分析和优化提出了新的挑战。过去十年见证了网络、游戏和经济学学科之间的融合,这就需要新颖的数学工具和设计来真正消除这些学科之间的界限。在这种背景下,推进博弈论模型,并使其适应未来网络系统的优化和运行,成为我们研究界的迫切需要。本次IEEE JSAC“网络博弈论”特刊的主要目标是收集解决和展示新兴网络应用的博弈论模型的最新发展的前沿贡献。社区对这一呼吁的反应非常热烈。我们共收到120份意见书。我们要感谢所有向本期特刊投稿的作者。经过严格的筛选,我们接受了40篇论文,并决定出版两期。论文的选择是根据它们对特刊的适当性和相关性以及它们的技术优点。不幸的是,由于上述标准以及JSAC特刊中总页数的限制,许多有趣的论文没有入选。我们希望这些有趣的论文能在其他地方发表。
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引用次数: 1
Countermeasures Against False-Name Attacks on Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing 针对众包真实激励机制的假名攻击对策
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659229
Xiang Zhang, G. Xue, Ruozhou Yu, Dejun Yang, Jian Tang
The proliferation of crowdsourcing brings both opportunities and challenges in various fields, such as environmental monitoring, healthcare, and so on. Often, the collaborative efforts from a large crowd of users are needed in order to complete crowdsourcing jobs. In recent years, the design of crowdsourcing incentive mechanisms has drawn much interest from the research community, where auction is one of the commonly adopted mechanisms. However, few of these auctions consider the robustness against false-name attacks (a.k.a. sybil attacks), where dishonest users generate fake identities to increase their utilities without devoting more efforts. To provide countermeasures against such attacks, we have designed a Truthful Auction with countermeasures against False-name Attacks (TAFA) as an auction-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing. We prove that TAFA is truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced, and computationally efficient. We also prove that TAFA provides countermeasures against false-name attacks, such that each user is better off not generating any false name. Extensive performance evaluations are conducted and the results further confirm our theoretical analysis.
众包的激增在环境监测、医疗保健等各个领域带来了机遇和挑战。通常,需要大量用户的合作才能完成众包工作。近年来,众包激励机制的设计引起了研究界的极大兴趣,拍卖是研究界普遍采用的机制之一。然而,这些拍卖中很少有人考虑对假名攻击(也称为sybil攻击)的鲁棒性,在这种攻击中,不诚实的用户生成虚假身份来增加他们的效用,而不付出更多的努力。为了提供针对此类攻击的对策,我们设计了一个针对假名攻击的真实拍卖(TAFA),作为一种基于拍卖的众包激励机制。我们证明了TAFA是真实的、个体理性的、预算平衡的和计算高效的。我们还证明了TAFA提供了对抗假名攻击的对策,因此每个用户最好不要生成任何假名。进行了广泛的性能评估,结果进一步证实了我们的理论分析。
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引用次数: 16
Online Stochastic Buy-Sell Mechanism for VNF Chains in the NFV Market NFV市场中VNF链的在线随机买卖机制
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659259
Xiaoxi Zhang, Zhiyi Huang, Chuan Wu, Zongpeng Li, F. Lau
With the recent advent of network functions virtualization (NFV), enterprises and businesses are looking into network service provisioning through the service chains of virtual network functions (VNFs), instead of relying on dedicated hardware middleboxes. Accompanying this trend, an NFV market is emerging, where NFV service providers create VNF instances, assemble VNF service chains, and sell them for the use of customers, using resources (computing, bandwidth) that they own or rent from other resource suppliers. Efficient service chain provisioning and pricing mechanisms are still missing, to charge assembled service chains according to demand and the supply of resources at any time. We propose an online stochastic auction mechanism for on-demand service chain provisioning and pricing at an NFV provider. Our auction takes in buy bids for service chains from multiple customers and sell bids from various resource suppliers to supplement the NFV provider’s geo-distributed resource pool, with resource occupation/contribution durations. We extend online primal-dual optimization framework for handling both buyers and sellers, with a new competitive analysis. The online mechanism maximizes the expected social welfare of the NFV ecosystem (the NFV provider, customers and resource suppliers) with a good competitive ratio as compared with the expected offline optimal social welfare, while guaranteeing truthfulness in bidding, individual rationality for both buyers and sellers, and polynomial time for computation. We evaluate our mechanism through trace-driven simulation studies, and demonstrate a close-to-offline-optimal performance in expected social welfare under realistic settings.
随着网络功能虚拟化(NFV)的出现,企业和企业正在通过虚拟网络功能(VNFs)服务链来提供网络服务,而不是依赖于专用的硬件中间体。伴随着这一趋势,一个NFV市场正在出现,NFV服务提供商创建VNF实例,组装VNF服务链,并将其出售给客户使用,使用他们拥有的或从其他资源供应商那里租用的资源(计算、带宽)。缺乏有效的服务链供给和定价机制,能够随时根据需求和资源供给对已组装的服务链进行收费。我们提出了一种在线随机拍卖机制,用于NFV提供商的按需服务链供应和定价。我们的拍卖接受来自多个客户的服务链购买投标和来自各种资源供应商的出售投标,以补充NFV提供商的地理分布资源池,包括资源占用/贡献持续时间。我们扩展了在线原始-对偶优化框架来处理买家和卖家,并进行了新的竞争分析。在线机制使NFV生态系统(NFV提供商、客户和资源供应商)的预期社会福利最大化,与线下预期最优社会福利相比具有良好的竞争比,同时保证了竞价的真实性、买卖双方的个体合理性和计算时间的多项式性。我们通过跟踪驱动的模拟研究来评估我们的机制,并在现实环境下展示了在预期社会福利下接近离线最优的性能。
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引用次数: 35
Incentive Mechanisms for Fairness Among Strategic Agents 战略代理人公平的激励机制
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659061
Abhinav Sinha, A. Anastasopoulos
Mechanism design for incentivizing strategic agents to maximize their sum of utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem in the context of resource allocation in networks. There are, however, a number of network resource allocation problems of interest where a designer may have a different objective than maximization of the SoU. The obvious reason for seeking a different objective is that this notion of efficiency does not account for fairness of allocation. A second, more subtle, reason for demanding fairer allocation is that it indirectly implies less variation in taxes paid by agents. This is desirable in a situation where implicit individual agent budgetary constraints make payment of large taxes unrealistic. In this paper, we study a family of social utilities that provide fair allocation (with SoU being subsumed as an extreme case) and derive conditions under which Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation is possible. Furthermore, it is shown how a modification of the above-mentioned mechanism by adding just one message per agent can guarantee full Bayesian implementation, i.e., no extraneous equilibria. We consider the problem of demand-side management in smart grids as a specific motivating application, and through numerical analysis, it is demonstrated that in this application, the proposed method can result in significant gains in fairness of allocation and a reduction in tax variation among agents.
在网络资源配置的背景下,激励战略主体实现效用总和最大化的机制设计是一个被广泛研究的问题。然而,存在许多感兴趣的网络资源分配问题,在这些问题中,设计人员的目标可能与SoU最大化不同。寻求不同目标的明显原因是,这种效率概念没有考虑到分配的公平性。要求更公平分配的第二个更微妙的原因是,它间接地意味着代理人支付的税收变化更小。在隐性的个体代理人预算约束使得支付大笔税款不现实的情况下,这是可取的。在本文中,我们研究了一系列提供公平分配的社会效用(其中SoU被纳入为极端情况),并推导了贝叶斯和优势策略实施的条件。此外,本文还展示了对上述机制的修改,即每个代理只添加一条消息,就可以保证完全的贝叶斯实现,即没有多余的均衡。我们将智能电网中的需求侧管理问题作为一个具体的激励应用,并通过数值分析表明,在该应用中,所提出的方法可以显著提高分配的公平性,并减少代理之间的税收差异。
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引用次数: 12
Incentive Mechanism Design to Meet Task Criteria in Crowdsourcing: How to Determine Your Budget 满足众包任务标准的激励机制设计:如何确定预算
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659278
Weiwei Wu, Wanyuan Wang, Minming Li, Jianping Wang, Xiaolin Fang, Yichuan Jiang, Junzhou Luo
In crowdsourcing markets, a requester announces a task and calls for contribution from potential participants. With strategic participants, the requester needs to reward the participants to introduce the incentives of participation. However, it is natural to ask whether it is worth introducing incentives if the total payment for eliciting incentives is too high. This paper addresses such a fundamental concern by designing a frugal mechanism with minimum payment used to procure the total amount of service contributions demanded. We design two mechanisms to provide the incentives of participation while minimizing the payment used by the requester. We first propose a frugal auction-based mechanism, which stimulates participants to truthfully report their information. We theoretically prove that the payment used is not more than the optimal cost (with no incentive considered) plus a bounded additive. We then design a Stackelberg-game-based mechanism, in which the requester fixes a certain total payment at the very beginning so as to encourage the participants to compete for it and participate in the task. We verify the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and develop a novel algorithm to find the NE, as well as the optimal payment to extract the NE. Our simulation results show that the payment used in these mechanisms is close to the optimal solution with no incentive considered, while the extra payment caused by introducing truthfulness in auction-based mechanism is about twice that of the NE in Stakelberg-game-based mechanism.
在众包市场中,请求者宣布一项任务,并要求潜在参与者做出贡献。对于战略性参与者,请求者需要奖励参与者,以引入参与的激励措施。然而,如果获得激励的总报酬太高,人们自然会问是否值得引入激励。本文通过设计一种节约机制来解决这一根本问题,该机制使用最低支付额来获取所需的服务缴款总额。我们设计了两种机制来提供参与的激励,同时最大限度地减少请求者使用的付款。我们首先提出了一种基于节俭拍卖的机制,激励参与者真实地报告他们的信息。我们从理论上证明了所使用的支付不超过最优成本(不考虑激励)加上有界添加剂。然后,我们设计了一个基于Stackelberg游戏的机制,在该机制中,请求者在一开始就固定一定的总付款,以鼓励参与者竞争并参与任务。我们验证了唯一纳什均衡(NE)的存在性,并开发了一种新的算法来寻找NE,以及提取NE的最优支付。我们的仿真结果表明,在不考虑激励的情况下,这些机制中使用的支付接近最优解,而在基于拍卖的机制中引入真实性所导致的额外支付大约是基于Stakelberg游戏机制中NE的两倍。
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引用次数: 24
Trading Data in the Crowd: Profit-Driven Data Acquisition for Mobile Crowdsensing 人群中的交易数据:移动人群感知的利润驱动数据获取
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659258
Zhenzhe Zheng, Yanqing Peng, Fan Wu, Shaojie Tang, Guihai Chen
As a significant business paradigm, data trading has attracted increasing attention. However, the study of data acquisition in data markets is still in its infancy. Mobile crowdsensing has been recognized as an efficient and scalable way to acquire large-scale data. Designing a practical data acquisition scheme for crowd-sensed data markets has to consider three major challenges: crowd-sensed data trading format determination, profit maximization with polynomial computational complexity, and payment minimization in strategic environments. In this paper, we jointly consider these design challenges, and propose VENUS, which is the first profit-driVEN data acqUiSition framework for crowd-sensed data markets. Specifically, VENUS consists of two complementary mechanisms: VENUS-PRO for profit maximization and VENUS-PAY for payment minimization. Given the expected payment for each of the data acquisition points, VENUS-PRO greedily selects the most “cost-efficient” data acquisition points to achieve a sub-optimal profit. To determine the minimum payment for each data acquisition point, we further design VENUS-PAY, which is a data procurement auction in Bayesian setting. Our theoretical analysis shows that VENUS-PAY can achieve both strategy-proofness and optimal expected payment. We evaluate VENUS on a public sensory data set, collected by Intel Research, Berkeley Laboratory. Our evaluation results show that VENUS-PRO approaches the optimal profit, and VENUS-PAY outperforms the canonical second-price reverse auction, in terms of total payment.
数据交易作为一种重要的商业模式,越来越受到人们的关注。然而,对数据市场中数据获取的研究仍处于初级阶段。移动众包感知已被公认为获取大规模数据的一种高效且可扩展的方式。为众感数据市场设计一个实用的数据采集方案必须考虑三个主要挑战:众感数据交易格式的确定、多项式计算复杂性的利润最大化和战略环境中的支付最小化。在本文中,我们共同考虑了这些设计挑战,并提出了VENUS,这是第一个用于人群感知数据市场的利润驱动VEN数据acqUiSition框架。具体而言,VENUS由两个互补机制组成:实现利润最大化的VENUS-PRO和实现支付最小化的VENUS-PAY。考虑到每个数据采集点的预期付款,VENUS-PRO贪婪地选择最“成本效益”的数据采集点,以实现次优利润。为了确定每个数据采集点的最低付款额,我们进一步设计了VENUS-PAY,这是一种贝叶斯环境下的数据采购拍卖。我们的理论分析表明,VENUS-PAY可以同时实现策略验证和最优预期支付。我们在英特尔研究所伯克利实验室收集的公共感官数据集上评估VENUS。我们的评估结果表明,VENUS-PRO接近最优利润,并且在总付款方面,VENUS-PAY优于规范的第二价格反向拍卖。
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引用次数: 60
Incentivizing Device-to-Device Load Balancing for Cellular Networks: An Online Auction Design 蜂窝网络激励设备间负载平衡的在线拍卖设计
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659558
M. Hajiesmaili, Lei Deng, Minghua Chen, Zongpeng Li
The device-to-device load balancing (D2D-LB) paradigm has been advocated in recent small-cell architecture design for cellular networks. The idea is to exploit inter-cell D2D communication and dynamically relay traffic of a busy cell to adjacent under-utilized cells to improve spectrum temporal efficiency, addressing a fundamental drawback of small-cell architecture. Technical challenges of D2D-LB have been studied in previous works. The potential of D2D-LB, however, cannot be fully realized without providing proper incentive mechanism for device participation. In this paper, we address this economical challenge using an online procurement auction framework. In our design, multiple sellers (devices) submit bids to participate in D2D-LB and the auctioneer (cellular service provider) evaluates all the bids and decides to purchase a subset of them to fulfill load balancing requirement with the minimum social cost. Different from similar auction design studies for cellular offloading, battery limit of relaying devices imposes a time-coupled capacity constraint that turns the underlying problem into a challenging multi-slot one. Furthermore, the dynamics in the input to the multi-slot auction problem emphasize the need for online algorithm design. We first tackle the single-slot version of the problem, show that it is NP-hard, and design a polynomial-time offline algorithm with a small approximation ratio. Building upon the single-slot results, we design an online algorithm for the multi-slot problem with sound competitive ratio. Our auction algorithm design ensures that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for devices. Extensive experiments using real-world traces demonstrate that our proposed solution achieves near offline-optimum and reduces the cost by 45% compared with an alternative heuristic.
设备到设备负载平衡(D2D-LB)模式在最近的蜂窝网络的小蜂窝架构设计中得到了提倡。其思想是利用小区间D2D通信,并将繁忙小区的业务动态中继到相邻利用不足的小区,以提高频谱时间效率,解决小小区架构的基本缺点。D2D-LB的技术挑战已经在以前的工作中进行了研究。然而,如果不为设备参与提供适当的激励机制,D2D-LB的潜力就无法完全实现。在本文中,我们使用在线采购拍卖框架来解决这一经济挑战。在我们的设计中,多个卖家(设备)提交投标以参与D2D-LB,拍卖商(蜂窝服务提供商)评估所有投标,并决定购买其中的一个子集,以最低的社会成本满足负载平衡要求。与蜂窝卸载的类似拍卖设计研究不同,中继设备的电池限制施加了时间耦合容量约束,将潜在问题变成了一个具有挑战性的多时隙问题。此外,多时隙拍卖问题的输入动态强调了在线算法设计的必要性。我们首先解决了该问题的单槽版本,证明了它是NP难的,并设计了一个具有小近似比的多项式时间离线算法。在单槽结果的基础上,我们设计了一个在线算法来求解具有良好竞争比的多槽问题。我们的拍卖算法设计确保了真实出价是设备的主要策略。使用真实世界轨迹的大量实验表明,与替代启发式算法相比,我们提出的解决方案实现了近乎离线的优化,并将成本降低了45%。
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引用次数: 50
Pay or Perish: The Economics of Premium Peering 付费或消亡:付费对等经济
IF 16.4 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659038
Richard T. B. Ma
As the Internet continues to evolve, traditional peering agreements cannot accommodate the changing market conditions. Premium peering has emerged where access providers (APs) charge content providers (CPs) for premium services beyond best-effort connectivity. Although prioritized peering raises concerns about net neutrality, the U.S. FCC exempted peering agreements from its recent ruling, as it falls short of background in the Internet peering context. In this paper, we consider the premium peering options provided by APs and study whether CPs will choose to peer. Based on a novel choice model of complementary services, we characterize the market shares and utilities of the providers under various peering decisions and identify the value of premium peering for the CPs that fundamentally determine CPs’ peering decisions. We find that high-value CPs have peer pressure when low-value CPs peer; however, low-value CPs behave oppositely. The peering decisions of the high-value and low-value CPs are substantially influenced by their baseline market shares and user stickiness, respectively, but not vice versa.
随着互联网的不断发展,传统的对等协议无法适应不断变化的市场条件。在这种情况下,接入提供商(ap)向内容提供商(cp)收取超出最佳连接的优质服务费用。尽管优先对等网络引发了对网络中立性的担忧,但美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)在最近的裁决中豁免了对等网络协议,因为它缺乏互联网对等网络背景。本文考虑ap提供的优质对等选项,并研究cp是否会选择对等。基于一种新的互补服务选择模型,我们描述了提供商在各种对等决策下的市场份额和效用,并确定了从根本上决定CPs对等决策的溢价对等价值。我们发现,当低价值的CPs存在同伴压力时,高价值的CPs存在同伴压力;然而,低价值cp的行为恰恰相反。高价值和低价值cp的对等决策分别受到其基准市场份额和用户粘性的显著影响,反之则不然。
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引用次数: 24
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