Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0004
Julio F. Carrión
This chapter chronicles the populist candidate’s rise to power, which follows a pattern resembling exponential growth: it starts slowly and grows steadily until it reaches an inflection point that marks an unstoppable moment. The term tsunami describes the first moment in the dynamic theory of populism in power, when insurgent populist candidates are able to tap into the existing mass dissatisfaction with political institutions and take advantage of growing elite disarray. As they become significant contenders, their momentum increases; seen as potential winners by others, they generate bandwagon effects and fascinate the media. These aspiring populist leaders expand their appeal through different ways. Some politicians associated with the old order bet on them and offer their support. Populist candidates expand the electorate by politically activating new actors or social forces, or by mobilizing previously apathetic voters.
{"title":"The Tsunami Moment","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter chronicles the populist candidate’s rise to power, which follows a pattern resembling exponential growth: it starts slowly and grows steadily until it reaches an inflection point that marks an unstoppable moment. The term tsunami describes the first moment in the dynamic theory of populism in power, when insurgent populist candidates are able to tap into the existing mass dissatisfaction with political institutions and take advantage of growing elite disarray. As they become significant contenders, their momentum increases; seen as potential winners by others, they generate bandwagon effects and fascinate the media. These aspiring populist leaders expand their appeal through different ways. Some politicians associated with the old order bet on them and offer their support. Populist candidates expand the electorate by politically activating new actors or social forces, or by mobilizing previously apathetic voters.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"74 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116248777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0008
Julio F. Carrión
The chapter shows that the impact of populism on democracy depends on the variety of populism in power: the worst outcomes in democratic performance are found under unconstrained populism. By contrast, when populism in power is constrained, democracy will largely survive. To support this claim, the chapter traces two democracy indices under populism in power in the Andes, which as expected, show a marked deterioration of democracy under unconstrained populist governments, while remaining largely unchanged under contained populism. The central proposition of the theory—unconstrained populism in power leads to regime change whereas constrained populism does not—is then explored in cases beyond the Andes. The chapter finds examples of unconstrained populism in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega and Hungary under Viktor Orbán, their governments having transitioned away from democracy. In other cases where populism was constrained, that was not the case.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter shows that the impact of populism on democracy depends on the variety of populism in power: the worst outcomes in democratic performance are found under unconstrained populism. By contrast, when populism in power is constrained, democracy will largely survive. To support this claim, the chapter traces two democracy indices under populism in power in the Andes, which as expected, show a marked deterioration of democracy under unconstrained populist governments, while remaining largely unchanged under contained populism. The central proposition of the theory—unconstrained populism in power leads to regime change whereas constrained populism does not—is then explored in cases beyond the Andes. The chapter finds examples of unconstrained populism in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega and Hungary under Viktor Orbán, their governments having transitioned away from democracy. In other cases where populism was constrained, that was not the case.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134174137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0003
Julio F. Carrión
Under “normal” circumstances, people unhappy with their personal or national conditions turn their attention to traditional opposition parties. Only when there is widespread political dissatisfaction with all existing political choices does the potential for populism coming to power arise. This chapter focuses on two critical antecedents that make populism in power possible: mass discontent with existing political arrangements/institutions and elite disarray. It shows that, in all the cases discussed in the book, they provide the critical antecedents in which populist candidacies thrive. These two antecedents are not the only possible causes of populism but, when jointly present, they are sufficient conditions for the election of a populist leader.
{"title":"The Critical Antecedents of Populism","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Under “normal” circumstances, people unhappy with their personal or national conditions turn their attention to traditional opposition parties. Only when there is widespread political dissatisfaction with all existing political choices does the potential for populism coming to power arise. This chapter focuses on two critical antecedents that make populism in power possible: mass discontent with existing political arrangements/institutions and elite disarray. It shows that, in all the cases discussed in the book, they provide the critical antecedents in which populist candidacies thrive. These two antecedents are not the only possible causes of populism but, when jointly present, they are sufficient conditions for the election of a populist leader.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128573827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0006
Julio F. Carrión
This chapter unpacks the populist moment by paying close attention to two main mechanisms that explain the reproduction of populism in power: electoral validation and the aggrandizement of executive power by eliminating institutional checks and balances and reducing societal accountability. The chapter shows how populist presidents found electoral validation for their radical institutional change by winning key referendums and immediate reelection. All these legitimizing elections have one important commonality: despite valid complaints about the lack of a level playing field, contenders did not dispute their outcome. The chapter also examines the different mechanisms populist presidents use to transfer political power in their favor: the gaining of new presidential powers; the subordination of state institutions, in particular the judiciary and the legislature; and the reduction of societal accountability by curtailing freedom of expression and association. These processes are examined in four cases of unconstrained populism in power.
{"title":"The Populist Moment","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter unpacks the populist moment by paying close attention to two main mechanisms that explain the reproduction of populism in power: electoral validation and the aggrandizement of executive power by eliminating institutional checks and balances and reducing societal accountability. The chapter shows how populist presidents found electoral validation for their radical institutional change by winning key referendums and immediate reelection. All these legitimizing elections have one important commonality: despite valid complaints about the lack of a level playing field, contenders did not dispute their outcome. The chapter also examines the different mechanisms populist presidents use to transfer political power in their favor: the gaining of new presidential powers; the subordination of state institutions, in particular the judiciary and the legislature; and the reduction of societal accountability by curtailing freedom of expression and association. These processes are examined in four cases of unconstrained populism in power.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"78 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128090314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0002
Julio F. Carrión
This chapter considers how populism in power leads to regime change in some cases, but not in others and shows how the difference is explained by the ability of populist leaders to navigate a key moment of confrontation with the opposition and the courts. This ability is determined by the strength of permissive conditions (public opinion support for institutional change). The necessary productive conditions are given by their decision to use the state’s repressive apparatus to prevail against the opposition. In some cases, another productive condition is present: the mobilization of civil society. Once the opposition is severely weakened, populist leaders find it much easier to accumulate greater power and to create an uneven playing field that reproduces their hold on power. By contrast, if the courts and other institutional actors defeat populist leaders in a key moment of confrontation, they will also constrain populist rule and avoid regime change.
{"title":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers how populism in power leads to regime change in some cases, but not in others and shows how the difference is explained by the ability of populist leaders to navigate a key moment of confrontation with the opposition and the courts. This ability is determined by the strength of permissive conditions (public opinion support for institutional change). The necessary productive conditions are given by their decision to use the state’s repressive apparatus to prevail against the opposition. In some cases, another productive condition is present: the mobilization of civil society. Once the opposition is severely weakened, populist leaders find it much easier to accumulate greater power and to create an uneven playing field that reproduces their hold on power. By contrast, if the courts and other institutional actors defeat populist leaders in a key moment of confrontation, they will also constrain populist rule and avoid regime change.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"181 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134191727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0007
Julio F. Carrión
This chapter discusses the third mechanism populist presidents use to reproduce their power: the tilting of the electoral playing field. The chapter shows the centrality of free and fair elections in defining democracy. It then identifies and discusses the main characteristics of democratic elections. The remainder of the chapter shows how unconstrained populist presidents violate four central conditions of free and fair elections: the free formation of alternatives, the free formation of preferences, the freedom to express these preferences, and the neutral management of elections. The chapter argues that the illegal enabling of reelection and the elimination of term limits violate the free formation of alternatives; the restriction of political and civil liberties and unfair access to media undermine the free formation of preferences; voter intimidations and vote buying violate the freedom to express those preferences; and electoral fraud and institutional biases negate the neutral management of elections.
{"title":"Reproducing Populism","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the third mechanism populist presidents use to reproduce their power: the tilting of the electoral playing field. The chapter shows the centrality of free and fair elections in defining democracy. It then identifies and discusses the main characteristics of democratic elections. The remainder of the chapter shows how unconstrained populist presidents violate four central conditions of free and fair elections: the free formation of alternatives, the free formation of preferences, the freedom to express these preferences, and the neutral management of elections. The chapter argues that the illegal enabling of reelection and the elimination of term limits violate the free formation of alternatives; the restriction of political and civil liberties and unfair access to media undermine the free formation of preferences; voter intimidations and vote buying violate the freedom to express those preferences; and electoral fraud and institutional biases negate the neutral management of elections.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125188908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0005
Julio F. Carrión
This chapter reviews how once in power, populist leaders try to assert their political dominance, which is invariably contested by some societal and institutional actors, and shows how this moment of decisive political confrontation determines the ulterior trajectory of the populist government. If populist chief executives succeed during this moment, an aggrandized executive emerges and electoral democracy will transition to a hybrid regime; if they are defeated or constrained, the possibility of regime change is averted. The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that explain the failure or success of populist leaders in emerging victorious from this inflection point. The key permissive condition is voters’ support for radical institutional change. The key productive condition is the ability of populist leaders to use the state’s repressive apparatus to impose their political will. An additional productive condition is sometimes present: the organization and mobilization of low-income voters to support the populist project.
{"title":"The Hobbesian Moment","authors":"Julio F. Carrión","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews how once in power, populist leaders try to assert their political dominance, which is invariably contested by some societal and institutional actors, and shows how this moment of decisive political confrontation determines the ulterior trajectory of the populist government. If populist chief executives succeed during this moment, an aggrandized executive emerges and electoral democracy will transition to a hybrid regime; if they are defeated or constrained, the possibility of regime change is averted. The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that explain the failure or success of populist leaders in emerging victorious from this inflection point. The key permissive condition is voters’ support for radical institutional change. The key productive condition is the ability of populist leaders to use the state’s repressive apparatus to impose their political will. An additional productive condition is sometimes present: the organization and mobilization of low-income voters to support the populist project.","PeriodicalId":137202,"journal":{"name":"A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power","volume":"251 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121126427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：