Web pages routinely incorporate JavaScript code from third-party sources. However, all code in a page runs in the same security context, regardless of provenance. When Web pages incorporate third-party JavaScript without any checks, as many do, they open themselves to attack. A third-party can trivially inject malicious JavaScript into such a page, causing all manner of harm. Several such attacks have occurred in the wild on prominent, commercial Web sites.A Web sandbox mitigates the threat of malicious JavaScript. Several Web sandboxes employ closely related language-based techniques to maintain backward-compatibility with old browsers and to provide fine-grained control. Unfortunately, due to the size and complexity of the Web platform and several subtleties of JavaScript, language-based sandboxing is hard and the Web sandboxes currently deployed on major Web sites do not come with any formal guarantees. Instead, they are routinely affected by bugs that violate their intended sandboxing properties.This article presents a type-based approach to verifying Web sandboxes, using a JavaScript type-checker to encode and verify sandboxing properties. We demonstrate our approach by applying it to the ADsafe Web sandbox. Specifically, we verify several key properties of ADsafe, falsify one intended property, and find and fix several vulnerabilities, ultimately providing a proof of ADsafe's safety.
{"title":"Typed-based verification of Web sandboxes","authors":"J. Politz, Arjun Guha, S. Krishnamurthi","doi":"10.3233/JCS-140504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-140504","url":null,"abstract":"Web pages routinely incorporate JavaScript code from third-party sources. However, all code in a page runs in the same security context, regardless of provenance. When Web pages incorporate third-party JavaScript without any checks, as many do, they open themselves to attack. A third-party can trivially inject malicious JavaScript into such a page, causing all manner of harm. Several such attacks have occurred in the wild on prominent, commercial Web sites.A Web sandbox mitigates the threat of malicious JavaScript. Several Web sandboxes employ closely related language-based techniques to maintain backward-compatibility with old browsers and to provide fine-grained control. Unfortunately, due to the size and complexity of the Web platform and several subtleties of JavaScript, language-based sandboxing is hard and the Web sandboxes currently deployed on major Web sites do not come with any formal guarantees. Instead, they are routinely affected by bugs that violate their intended sandboxing properties.This article presents a type-based approach to verifying Web sandboxes, using a JavaScript type-checker to encode and verify sandboxing properties. We demonstrate our approach by applying it to the ADsafe Web sandbox. Specifically, we verify several key properties of ADsafe, falsify one intended property, and find and fix several vulnerabilities, ultimately providing a proof of ADsafe's safety.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126457756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Willem De Groef, Dominique Devriese, Nick Nikiforakis, F. Piessens
Secure Multi-Execution (SME) is a precise and general information flow control mechanism that was claimed to be a good fit for implementing information flow security in browsers. We validate this claim by developing FlowFox, the first fully functional web browser that implements an information flow control mechanism for web scripts based on the technique of secure multi-execution. We provide evidence for the security of FlowFox by proving non-interference for a formal model of the essence of FlowFox, and by showing how it stops real attacks. We provide evidence of usefulness by showing how FlowFox subsumes many ad-hoc script-containment countermeasures developed over the last years. An experimental evaluation on the Alexa top-500 web sites provides evidence for compatibility, and shows that FlowFox is compatible with the current web, even on sites that make intricate use of JavaScript.The performance and memory cost of FlowFox is substantial (a performance cost of around 20% on macro benchmarks for a simple two-level policy), but not prohibitive. Our prototype implementation shows that information flow enforcement based on secure multi-execution can be implemented in full-scale browsers. It can support powerful, yet compatible policies refining the same-origin-policy in a way that is compatible with existing websites.
{"title":"Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice","authors":"Willem De Groef, Dominique Devriese, Nick Nikiforakis, F. Piessens","doi":"10.3233/JCS-130495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130495","url":null,"abstract":"Secure Multi-Execution (SME) is a precise and general information flow control mechanism that was claimed to be a good fit for implementing information flow security in browsers. We validate this claim by developing FlowFox, the first fully functional web browser that implements an information flow control mechanism for web scripts based on the technique of secure multi-execution. We provide evidence for the security of FlowFox by proving non-interference for a formal model of the essence of FlowFox, and by showing how it stops real attacks. We provide evidence of usefulness by showing how FlowFox subsumes many ad-hoc script-containment countermeasures developed over the last years. An experimental evaluation on the Alexa top-500 web sites provides evidence for compatibility, and shows that FlowFox is compatible with the current web, even on sites that make intricate use of JavaScript.The performance and memory cost of FlowFox is substantial (a performance cost of around 20% on macro benchmarks for a simple two-level policy), but not prohibitive. Our prototype implementation shows that information flow enforcement based on secure multi-execution can be implemented in full-scale browsers. It can support powerful, yet compatible policies refining the same-origin-policy in a way that is compatible with existing websites.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117045962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yannis Soupionis, R. Koutsiamanis, P. Efraimidis, D. Gritzalis
Spam over Internet Telephony SPIT is a potential source of disruption in Voice over IP VoIP systems. The use of anti-SPIT mechanisms, such as filters and audio CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computer and Humans Apart can prevent unsolicited calls and lead to less unwanted traffic. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model, in which the game is played between SPIT senders and internet telephony users. The game includes call filters and audio CAPTCHA, so as to classify incoming calls as legitimate or malicious. We show how the resulting model can be used to decide upon the trade-offs present in this problem and help us predict the SPIT sender's behavior. We also highlight the advantages in terms of SPIT call reduction of merely introducing CAPTCHA, and provide experimental verification of our results.
{"title":"A game-theoretic analysis of preventing spam over Internet Telephony via audio CAPTCHA-based authentication","authors":"Yannis Soupionis, R. Koutsiamanis, P. Efraimidis, D. Gritzalis","doi":"10.3233/JCS-140496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-140496","url":null,"abstract":"Spam over Internet Telephony SPIT is a potential source of disruption in Voice over IP VoIP systems. The use of anti-SPIT mechanisms, such as filters and audio CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computer and Humans Apart can prevent unsolicited calls and lead to less unwanted traffic. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model, in which the game is played between SPIT senders and internet telephony users. The game includes call filters and audio CAPTCHA, so as to classify incoming calls as legitimate or malicious. We show how the resulting model can be used to decide upon the trade-offs present in this problem and help us predict the SPIT sender's behavior. We also highlight the advantages in terms of SPIT call reduction of merely introducing CAPTCHA, and provide experimental verification of our results.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"420 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123432971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prithvi Bisht, Timothy L. Hinrichs, Nazari Skrupsky, V. Venkatakrishnan
Parameter tampering attacks are dangerous to a web application whose server fails to replicate the validation of user-supplied data that is performed by the client in web forms. Malicious users who circumvent the client can capitalize on the missing server validation. In this paper, we provide a formal description of parameter tampering vulnerabilities and a high level approach for their detection. We specialize this high level approach to develop complementary detection solutions in two interesting settings: blackbox only analyze client-side code in web forms and whitebox also analyze server-side code that processes submitted web forms. This paper presents interesting challenges encountered in realizing the high level approach for each setting and novel technical contributions that address these challenges. We also contrast utility, difficulties and effectiveness issues in both settings and provide a quantitative comparison of results. Our experiments with real world and open source applications demonstrate that parameter tampering vulnerabilities are prolific total 47 in 9 applications, and their exploitation can have serious consequences including unauthorized transactions, account hijacking and financial losses. We conclude this paper with a discussion on countermeasures for parameter tampering attacks and present a detailed survey of existing defenses and their suitability.
{"title":"Automated detection of parameter tampering opportunities and vulnerabilities in web applications","authors":"Prithvi Bisht, Timothy L. Hinrichs, Nazari Skrupsky, V. Venkatakrishnan","doi":"10.3233/JCS-140498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-140498","url":null,"abstract":"Parameter tampering attacks are dangerous to a web application whose server fails to replicate the validation of user-supplied data that is performed by the client in web forms. Malicious users who circumvent the client can capitalize on the missing server validation. In this paper, we provide a formal description of parameter tampering vulnerabilities and a high level approach for their detection. We specialize this high level approach to develop complementary detection solutions in two interesting settings: blackbox only analyze client-side code in web forms and whitebox also analyze server-side code that processes submitted web forms. This paper presents interesting challenges encountered in realizing the high level approach for each setting and novel technical contributions that address these challenges. We also contrast utility, difficulties and effectiveness issues in both settings and provide a quantitative comparison of results. Our experiments with real world and open source applications demonstrate that parameter tampering vulnerabilities are prolific total 47 in 9 applications, and their exploitation can have serious consequences including unauthorized transactions, account hijacking and financial losses. We conclude this paper with a discussion on countermeasures for parameter tampering attacks and present a detailed survey of existing defenses and their suitability.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127129840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a new type system for verifying the security of reference implementations of cryptographic protocols written in a core functional programming language. The type system combines prior work on refinement types, with union, intersection, and polymorphic types, and with the novel ability to reason statically about the disjointness of types. The increased expressivity enables the analysis of important protocol classes that were previously out of scope for the type-based analyses of reference protocol implementations. In particular, our types can statically characterize: i more usages of asymmetric cryptography, such as signatures of private data and encryptions of authenticated data; ii authenticity and integrity properties achieved by showing knowledge of secret data; iii applications based on zero-knowledge proofs. The type system comes with a mechanized proof of correctness and an efficient type-checker.
{"title":"Union, intersection and refinement types and reasoning about type disjointness for secure protocol implementations","authors":"M. Backes, Catalin Hritcu, Matteo Maffei","doi":"10.3233/JCS-130493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130493","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new type system for verifying the security of reference implementations of cryptographic protocols written in a core functional programming language. The type system combines prior work on refinement types, with union, intersection, and polymorphic types, and with the novel ability to reason statically about the disjointness of types. The increased expressivity enables the analysis of important protocol classes that were previously out of scope for the type-based analyses of reference protocol implementations. In particular, our types can statically characterize: i more usages of asymmetric cryptography, such as signatures of private data and encryptions of authenticated data; ii authenticity and integrity properties achieved by showing knowledge of secret data; iii applications based on zero-knowledge proofs. The type system comes with a mechanized proof of correctness and an efficient type-checker.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130230625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We take a model-theoretic viewpoint on security goals and how to establish them. The models are possibly fragmentary executions. Security goals such as authentication and confidentiality are geometric sequents, i.e. implications Φ→Ψ where Φ and Ψ are built from atomic formulas without negations, implications, or universal quantifiers.Security goals are then statements about homomorphisms, where the source is a minimal fragmentary model of the antecedent Φ. If every homomorphism to a non-fragmentary, complete execution factors through a model in which Ψ is satisfied, then the goal is achieved. One can validate security goals via a process of information enrichment. We call this approach enrich-by-need protocol analysis.This idea also clarifies protocol transformation. A protocol transformation preserves security goals when it preserves the form of the information enrichment process. We formalize this idea using simulation relations between labeled transition systems. These labeled transition systems formalize the analysis of the protocols, i.e. the information enrichment process, not the execution behavior of the protocols.
{"title":"Establishing and preserving protocol security goals","authors":"J. Guttman","doi":"10.3233/JCS-140499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-140499","url":null,"abstract":"We take a model-theoretic viewpoint on security goals and how to establish them. The models are possibly fragmentary executions. Security goals such as authentication and confidentiality are geometric sequents, i.e. implications Φ→Ψ where Φ and Ψ are built from atomic formulas without negations, implications, or universal quantifiers.Security goals are then statements about homomorphisms, where the source is a minimal fragmentary model of the antecedent Φ. If every homomorphism to a non-fragmentary, complete execution factors through a model in which Ψ is satisfied, then the goal is achieved. One can validate security goals via a process of information enrichment. We call this approach enrich-by-need protocol analysis.This idea also clarifies protocol transformation. A protocol transformation preserves security goals when it preserves the form of the information enrichment process. We formalize this idea using simulation relations between labeled transition systems. These labeled transition systems formalize the analysis of the protocols, i.e. the information enrichment process, not the execution behavior of the protocols.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116010806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how confidentiality properties of multi-threaded programs can be verified efficiently by a combination of newly developed and existing model checking algorithms. In particular, we study the verification of scheduler-specific observational determinism SSOD, a property that characterizes secure information flow for multi-threaded programs under a given scheduler. Scheduler-specificness allows us to reason about refinement attacks, an important and tricky class of attacks that are notorious in practice. SSOD imposes two conditions: SSOD-1 all individual public variables have to evolve deterministically, expressed by requiring stuttering equivalence between the traces of each individual public variable, and SSOD-2 the relative order of updates of public variables is coincidental, i.e., there always exists a matching trace.We verify the first condition by reducing it to the question whether all traces of each public variable are stuttering equivalent. To verify the second condition, we show how the condition can be translated, via a series of steps, into a standard strong bisimulation problem. Our verification techniques can be easily adapted to verify other formalizations of similar information flow properties.We also exploit counter example generation techniques to synthesize attacks for insecure programs that fail either SSOD-1 or SSOD-2, i.e., showing how confidentiality of programs can be broken.
{"title":"Effective verification of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs","authors":"T. Ngo, M. Stoelinga, M. Huisman","doi":"10.3233/JCS-130492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130492","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how confidentiality properties of multi-threaded programs can be verified efficiently by a combination of newly developed and existing model checking algorithms. In particular, we study the verification of scheduler-specific observational determinism SSOD, a property that characterizes secure information flow for multi-threaded programs under a given scheduler. Scheduler-specificness allows us to reason about refinement attacks, an important and tricky class of attacks that are notorious in practice. SSOD imposes two conditions: SSOD-1 all individual public variables have to evolve deterministically, expressed by requiring stuttering equivalence between the traces of each individual public variable, and SSOD-2 the relative order of updates of public variables is coincidental, i.e., there always exists a matching trace.We verify the first condition by reducing it to the question whether all traces of each public variable are stuttering equivalent. To verify the second condition, we show how the condition can be translated, via a series of steps, into a standard strong bisimulation problem. Our verification techniques can be easily adapted to verify other formalizations of similar information flow properties.We also exploit counter example generation techniques to synthesize attacks for insecure programs that fail either SSOD-1 or SSOD-2, i.e., showing how confidentiality of programs can be broken.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122559722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ioana Boureanu, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, S. Vaudenay
From contactless payments to remote car unlocking, many applications are vulnerable to relay attacks. Distance bounding protocols are the main practical countermeasure against these attacks. At FSEi¾ź2013, we presented SKI as the first family of provably secure distance bounding protocols. At LIGHTSECi¾ź2013, we presented the best attacks against SKI. In this paper, we present the security proofs. More precisely, we explicate a general formalism for distance-bounding protocols. Then, we prove that SKI and its variants is provably secure, even under the real-life setting of noisy communications, against the main types of relay attacks: distance-fraud and generalised versions of mafia- and terrorist-fraud. For this, we reinforce the idea of using secret sharing, combined with the new notion of a leakage scheme. In view of resistance to mafia-frauds and terrorist-frauds, we present the notion of circular-keying for pseudorandom functions PRFs; this notion models the employment of a PRF, with possible linear reuse of the key. We also use PRF masking to fix common mistakes in existing security proofs/claims.
{"title":"Practical and provably secure distance-bounding","authors":"Ioana Boureanu, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, S. Vaudenay","doi":"10.3233/JCS-140518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-140518","url":null,"abstract":"From contactless payments to remote car unlocking, many applications are vulnerable to relay attacks. Distance bounding protocols are the main practical countermeasure against these attacks. At FSEi¾ź2013, we presented SKI as the first family of provably secure distance bounding protocols. At LIGHTSECi¾ź2013, we presented the best attacks against SKI. In this paper, we present the security proofs. More precisely, we explicate a general formalism for distance-bounding protocols. Then, we prove that SKI and its variants is provably secure, even under the real-life setting of noisy communications, against the main types of relay attacks: distance-fraud and generalised versions of mafia- and terrorist-fraud. For this, we reinforce the idea of using secret sharing, combined with the new notion of a leakage scheme. In view of resistance to mafia-frauds and terrorist-frauds, we present the notion of circular-keying for pseudorandom functions PRFs; this notion models the employment of a PRF, with possible linear reuse of the key. We also use PRF masking to fix common mistakes in existing security proofs/claims.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124256983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PKCS#11, is a security API for cryptographic tokens. It is known to be vulnerable to attacks which can directly extract, as cleartext, the value of sensitive keys. In particular, the API does not impose any limitation on the different roles a key can assume, and it permits to perform conflicting operations such as asking the token to wrap a key with another one and then to decrypt it. Fixes proposed in the literature, or implemented in real devices, impose policies restricting key roles and token functionalities. In this paper we define a simple imperative programming language, suitable to code PKCS#11 symmetric key management, and we develop a type-based analysis to prove that the secrecy of sensitive keys is preserved under a certain policy. We formally analyse existing fixes for PKCS#11 and we propose a new one, which is type-checkable and prevents conflicting roles by deriving different keys for different roles. We develop a prototype type-checker for a software token emulator written in C and we experiment on various working configurations.
{"title":"Type-based analysis of key management in PKCS#11 cryptographic devices","authors":"Matteo Centenaro, R. Focardi, F. Luccio","doi":"10.3233/JCS-130479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130479","url":null,"abstract":"PKCS#11, is a security API for cryptographic tokens. It is known to be vulnerable to attacks which can directly extract, as cleartext, the value of sensitive keys. In particular, the API does not impose any limitation on the different roles a key can assume, and it permits to perform conflicting operations such as asking the token to wrap a key with another one and then to decrypt it. Fixes proposed in the literature, or implemented in real devices, impose policies restricting key roles and token functionalities. In this paper we define a simple imperative programming language, suitable to code PKCS#11 symmetric key management, and we develop a type-based analysis to prove that the secrecy of sensitive keys is preserved under a certain policy. We formally analyse existing fixes for PKCS#11 and we propose a new one, which is type-checkable and prevents conflicting roles by deriving different keys for different roles. We develop a prototype type-checker for a software token emulator written in C and we experiment on various working configurations.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129610897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cloud computing means entrusting data to information systems that are managed by external parties on remote servers, in the “cloud”, raising new privacy and confidentiality concerns. We propose a general technique for designing cloud services that allows the cloud to see only encrypted data, while still facilitating some data-dependent computations. The technique is based on key translations and mixes in web browsers.We focus on a particular kind of software-as-a-service, namely, services that support applications, evaluations and decisions. Such services include job application management, public tender management e.g., for civil construction, and conference management. We identify the specific security and privacy risks that existing systems pose. We propose a protocol that addresses them, and forms the basis of a system that offers strong security and privacy guarantees.We express the protocol and its properties in the language of ProVerif, and prove that it does provide the intended properties. We describe an implementation of a particular instance of the protocol called ConfiChair, which is geared to the evaluation of papers submitted to conferences.
{"title":"Privacy-supporting cloud computing by in-browser key translation","authors":"Myrto Arapinis, Sergiu Bursuc, M. Ryan","doi":"10.3233/JCS-130489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130489","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud computing means entrusting data to information systems that are managed by external parties on remote servers, in the “cloud”, raising new privacy and confidentiality concerns. We propose a general technique for designing cloud services that allows the cloud to see only encrypted data, while still facilitating some data-dependent computations. The technique is based on key translations and mixes in web browsers.We focus on a particular kind of software-as-a-service, namely, services that support applications, evaluations and decisions. Such services include job application management, public tender management e.g., for civil construction, and conference management. We identify the specific security and privacy risks that existing systems pose. We propose a protocol that addresses them, and forms the basis of a system that offers strong security and privacy guarantees.We express the protocol and its properties in the language of ProVerif, and prove that it does provide the intended properties. We describe an implementation of a particular instance of the protocol called ConfiChair, which is geared to the evaluation of papers submitted to conferences.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125565101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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