Flávio Neves, Rafael Souza, Juliana Sousa, Michel S. Bonfim, Vinícius Garcia
The Internet of Things (IoT) has shown rapid growth in recent years. However, it presents challenges related to the lack of standardization of communication produced by different types of devices. Another problem area is the security and privacy of data generated by IoT devices. Thus, with the focus on grouping, analyzing, and classifying existing data security and privacy methods in IoT, based on data anonymization, we have conducted a Systematic Literature Review (SLR). We have therefore reviewed the history of works developing solutions for security and privacy in the IoT, particularly data anonymization and the leading technologies used by researchers in their work. We also discussed the challenges and future directions for research. The objective of the work is to give order to the main approaches that promise to provide or facilitate data privacy using anonymization in the IoT area. The study’s results can help us understand the best anonymization techniques to provide data security and privacy in IoT environments. In addition, the findings can also help us understand the limitations of existing approaches and identify areas for improvement. The results found in most of the studies analyzed indicate a lack of consensus in the following areas: (i) with regard to a solution with a standardized methodology to be applied in all scenarios that encompass IoT; (ii) the use of different techniques to anonymize the data; and (iii), the resolution of privacy issues. On the other hand, results made available by the k-anonymity technique proved efficient in combination with other techniques. In this context, data privacy presents one of the main challenges for broadening secure domains in applying privacy with anonymity.
{"title":"Data privacy in the Internet of Things based on anonymization: A review","authors":"Flávio Neves, Rafael Souza, Juliana Sousa, Michel S. Bonfim, Vinícius Garcia","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210089","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet of Things (IoT) has shown rapid growth in recent years. However, it presents challenges related to the lack of standardization of communication produced by different types of devices. Another problem area is the security and privacy of data generated by IoT devices. Thus, with the focus on grouping, analyzing, and classifying existing data security and privacy methods in IoT, based on data anonymization, we have conducted a Systematic Literature Review (SLR). We have therefore reviewed the history of works developing solutions for security and privacy in the IoT, particularly data anonymization and the leading technologies used by researchers in their work. We also discussed the challenges and future directions for research. The objective of the work is to give order to the main approaches that promise to provide or facilitate data privacy using anonymization in the IoT area. The study’s results can help us understand the best anonymization techniques to provide data security and privacy in IoT environments. In addition, the findings can also help us understand the limitations of existing approaches and identify areas for improvement. The results found in most of the studies analyzed indicate a lack of consensus in the following areas: (i) with regard to a solution with a standardized methodology to be applied in all scenarios that encompass IoT; (ii) the use of different techniques to anonymize the data; and (iii), the resolution of privacy issues. On the other hand, results made available by the k-anonymity technique proved efficient in combination with other techniques. In this context, data privacy presents one of the main challenges for broadening secure domains in applying privacy with anonymity.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128852368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is an increasing number of cyber-systems (e.g., systems for payment, transportation, voting, critical infrastructures) whose security depends intrinsically on human users. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for the formal and automated analysis of security ceremonies. A security ceremony expands a security protocol to include human nodes alongside computer nodes, with communication links that comprise user interfaces, human-to-human communication and transfers of physical objects that carry data, and thus a ceremony’s security analysis should include, in particular, the mistakes that human users might make when participating actively in the ceremony. Our approach defines mutation rules that model possible behaviors of a human user, automatically generates mutations in the behavior of the other agents of the ceremony to match the human-induced mutations, and automatically propagates these mutations through the whole ceremony. This allows for the analysis of the original ceremony specification and its possible mutations, which may include the way in which the ceremony has actually been implemented or could be implemented. To automate our approach, we have developed the tool X-Men, which is a prototype that builds on top of Tamarin, one of the most common tools for the automatic unbounded verification of security protocols. As a proof of concept, we have applied our approach to three real-life case studies, uncovering a number of concrete vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities were so far unknown, whereas others had so far been discovered only by empirical observation of the actual ceremony execution or by directly formalizing alternative models of the ceremony by hand, but X-Men instead allowed us to find them automatically.
{"title":"A mutation-based approach for the formal and automated analysis of security ceremonies","authors":"Diego Sempreboni, L. Viganò","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210075","url":null,"abstract":"There is an increasing number of cyber-systems (e.g., systems for payment, transportation, voting, critical infrastructures) whose security depends intrinsically on human users. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for the formal and automated analysis of security ceremonies. A security ceremony expands a security protocol to include human nodes alongside computer nodes, with communication links that comprise user interfaces, human-to-human communication and transfers of physical objects that carry data, and thus a ceremony’s security analysis should include, in particular, the mistakes that human users might make when participating actively in the ceremony. Our approach defines mutation rules that model possible behaviors of a human user, automatically generates mutations in the behavior of the other agents of the ceremony to match the human-induced mutations, and automatically propagates these mutations through the whole ceremony. This allows for the analysis of the original ceremony specification and its possible mutations, which may include the way in which the ceremony has actually been implemented or could be implemented. To automate our approach, we have developed the tool X-Men, which is a prototype that builds on top of Tamarin, one of the most common tools for the automatic unbounded verification of security protocols. As a proof of concept, we have applied our approach to three real-life case studies, uncovering a number of concrete vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities were so far unknown, whereas others had so far been discovered only by empirical observation of the actual ceremony execution or by directly formalizing alternative models of the ceremony by hand, but X-Men instead allowed us to find them automatically.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129022633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Due to the limited capabilities of user devices, such as smart phones, and the Internet of Things (IoT), edge intelligence is being recognized as a promising paradigm to enable effective analysis of the data generated by these devices with complex artificial intelligence (AI) models, and it often entails either fully or partially offloading the computation of neural networks from user devices to edge computing servers. To protect users’ data privacy in the process, most existing researches assume that the private (sensitive) attributes of user data are known in advance when designing privacy-protection measures. This assumption is restrictive in real life, and thus limits the application of these methods. Inspired by the research in image steganography and cyber deception, in this paper, we propose StegEdge, a conceptually novel approach to this challenge. StegEdge takes as input the user-generated image and a randomly selected “cover” image that does not pose any privacy concern (e.g., downloaded from the Internet), and extracts the features such that the utility tasks can still be conducted by the edge computing servers, while potential adversaries seeking to reconstruct/recover the original user data or analyze sensitive attributes from the extracted features sent from users to the server, will largely acquire information of the cover image. Thus, users’ data privacy is protected via a form of deception. Empirical results conducted on the CelebA and ImageNet datasets show that, at the same level of accuracy for utility tasks, StegEdge reduces the adversaries’ accuracy of predicting sensitive attributes by up to 38% compared with other methods, while also defending against adversaries seeking to reconstruct user data from the extracted features.
{"title":"StegEdge: Privacy protection of unknown sensitive attributes in edge intelligence via deception","authors":"Jianfeng Zhang, Wensheng Zhang, Jingdong Xu","doi":"10.3233/jcs-220042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-220042","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the limited capabilities of user devices, such as smart phones, and the Internet of Things (IoT), edge intelligence is being recognized as a promising paradigm to enable effective analysis of the data generated by these devices with complex artificial intelligence (AI) models, and it often entails either fully or partially offloading the computation of neural networks from user devices to edge computing servers. To protect users’ data privacy in the process, most existing researches assume that the private (sensitive) attributes of user data are known in advance when designing privacy-protection measures. This assumption is restrictive in real life, and thus limits the application of these methods. Inspired by the research in image steganography and cyber deception, in this paper, we propose StegEdge, a conceptually novel approach to this challenge. StegEdge takes as input the user-generated image and a randomly selected “cover” image that does not pose any privacy concern (e.g., downloaded from the Internet), and extracts the features such that the utility tasks can still be conducted by the edge computing servers, while potential adversaries seeking to reconstruct/recover the original user data or analyze sensitive attributes from the extracted features sent from users to the server, will largely acquire information of the cover image. Thus, users’ data privacy is protected via a form of deception. Empirical results conducted on the CelebA and ImageNet datasets show that, at the same level of accuracy for utility tasks, StegEdge reduces the adversaries’ accuracy of predicting sensitive attributes by up to 38% compared with other methods, while also defending against adversaries seeking to reconstruct user data from the extracted features.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125081464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Today’s Internet is built on decades-old networking protocols that lack scalability, reliability and security. In response, the networking community has developed path-aware Internet architectures that solve these problems while simultaneously empowering end hosts to exert some control on their packets’ route through the network. In these architectures, autonomous systems authorize forwarding paths in accordance with their routing policies, and protect these paths using cryptographic authenticators. For each packet, the sending end host selects an authorized path and embeds it and its authenticators in the packet header. This allows routers to efficiently determine how to forward the packet. The central security property of the data plane, i.e., of forwarding, is that packets can only travel along authorized paths. This property, which we call path authorization, protects the routing policies of autonomous systems from malicious senders. The fundamental role of packet forwarding in the Internet’s ecosystem and the complexity of the authentication mechanisms employed call for a formal analysis. We develop IsaNet, a parameterized verification framework for data plane protocols in Isabelle/HOL. We first formulate an abstract model without an attacker for which we prove path authorization. We then refine this model by introducing a Dolev–Yao attacker and by protecting authorized paths using (generic) cryptographic validation fields. This model is parametrized by the path authorization mechanism and assumes five simple verification conditions. We propose novel attacker models and different sets of assumptions on the underlying routing protocol. We validate our framework by instantiating it with nine concrete protocols variants and prove that they each satisfy the verification conditions (and hence path authorization). The invariants needed for the security proof are proven in the parametrized model instead of the instance models. Our framework thus supports low-effort security proofs for data plane protocols. In contrast to what could be achieved with state-of-the-art automated protocol verifiers, our results hold for arbitrary network topologies and sets of authorized paths.
{"title":"IsaNet: A framework for verifying secure data plane protocols","authors":"Tobias Klenze, C. Sprenger, D. Basin","doi":"10.3233/jcs-220021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-220021","url":null,"abstract":"Today’s Internet is built on decades-old networking protocols that lack scalability, reliability and security. In response, the networking community has developed path-aware Internet architectures that solve these problems while simultaneously empowering end hosts to exert some control on their packets’ route through the network. In these architectures, autonomous systems authorize forwarding paths in accordance with their routing policies, and protect these paths using cryptographic authenticators. For each packet, the sending end host selects an authorized path and embeds it and its authenticators in the packet header. This allows routers to efficiently determine how to forward the packet. The central security property of the data plane, i.e., of forwarding, is that packets can only travel along authorized paths. This property, which we call path authorization, protects the routing policies of autonomous systems from malicious senders. The fundamental role of packet forwarding in the Internet’s ecosystem and the complexity of the authentication mechanisms employed call for a formal analysis. We develop IsaNet, a parameterized verification framework for data plane protocols in Isabelle/HOL. We first formulate an abstract model without an attacker for which we prove path authorization. We then refine this model by introducing a Dolev–Yao attacker and by protecting authorized paths using (generic) cryptographic validation fields. This model is parametrized by the path authorization mechanism and assumes five simple verification conditions. We propose novel attacker models and different sets of assumptions on the underlying routing protocol. We validate our framework by instantiating it with nine concrete protocols variants and prove that they each satisfy the verification conditions (and hence path authorization). The invariants needed for the security proof are proven in the parametrized model instead of the instance models. Our framework thus supports low-effort security proofs for data plane protocols. In contrast to what could be achieved with state-of-the-art automated protocol verifiers, our results hold for arbitrary network topologies and sets of authorized paths.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132950224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cloud computing provides computing resources, platforms, and applications as a service in a flexible, cost-effective, and efficient way. Cloud computing has integrated with industry and many other fields in recent years, which prompted researchers to look into new technologies. Cloud users have moved their applications, data and services to the Cloud storage due to the availability and scalability of Cloud services. Cloud services and applications are provided through the Internet-based on a pay-per-use model. Plenty of security issues are created due to the migration from local to remote computing for both Cloud users and providers. This paper discusses an overview of Cloud computing, as well as a study of security issues at various levels of Cloud computing. The article also provides a complete review of security issues with their existing solutions for a better understanding of specific open research issues.
{"title":"A review on cloud security issues and solutions","authors":"Ashish R. Chaudhari, Bhavesh N. Gohil, U. P. Rao","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210140","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud computing provides computing resources, platforms, and applications as a service in a flexible, cost-effective, and efficient way. Cloud computing has integrated with industry and many other fields in recent years, which prompted researchers to look into new technologies. Cloud users have moved their applications, data and services to the Cloud storage due to the availability and scalability of Cloud services. Cloud services and applications are provided through the Internet-based on a pay-per-use model. Plenty of security issues are created due to the migration from local to remote computing for both Cloud users and providers. This paper discusses an overview of Cloud computing, as well as a study of security issues at various levels of Cloud computing. The article also provides a complete review of security issues with their existing solutions for a better understanding of specific open research issues.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122851117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antonio Nappa, Aaron Úbeda-Portugués, P. Papadopoulos, Matteo Varvello, J. Tapiador, A. Lanzi
Online malware scanners are one of the best weapons in the arsenal of cybersecurity companies and researchers. A fundamental part of such systems is the sandbox that provides an instrumented and isolated environment (virtualized or emulated) for any user to upload and run unknown artifacts and identify potentially malicious behaviors. The provided API and the wealth of information in the reports produced by these services have also helped attackers test the efficacy of numerous techniques to make malware hard to detect. The most common technique used by malware for evading the analysis system is to monitor the execution environment, detect the presence of any debugging artifacts, and hide its malicious behavior if needed. This is usually achieved by looking for signals suggesting that the execution environment does not belong to a native machine, such as specific memory patterns or behavioral traits of certain CPU instructions. In this paper, we show how an attacker can evade detection on such analysis services by incorporating a Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm into a malware sample. Specifically, we leverage the asymptotic behavior of the computational cost of PoW algorithms when they run on some classes of hardware platforms to effectively detect a non bare-metal environment of the malware sandbox analyzer. To prove the validity of this intuition, we design and implement Scramblesuit, a framework to automatically (i) implement sandbox detection strategies, and (ii) embed a test evasion program into an arbitrary malware sample. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of Scramblesuit across a wide range of: 1) COTS architectures (ARM, Apple M1, i9, i7 and Xeon), 2) malware families, and 3) online sandboxes (JoeSandbox, Sysinternals, C2AE, Zenbox, Dr.Web VX Cube, Tencent HABO, YOMI Hunter). Our empirical evaluation shows that a PoW-based evasion technique is hard to fingerprint, and reduces existing malware detection rate by a factor of 10. The only plausible counter-measure to Scramblesuit is to rely on bare-metal online malware scanners, which is unrealistic given they currently handle millions of daily submissions.
{"title":"Scramblesuit: An effective timing side-channels framework for malware sandbox evasion","authors":"Antonio Nappa, Aaron Úbeda-Portugués, P. Papadopoulos, Matteo Varvello, J. Tapiador, A. Lanzi","doi":"10.3233/jcs-220005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-220005","url":null,"abstract":"Online malware scanners are one of the best weapons in the arsenal of cybersecurity companies and researchers. A fundamental part of such systems is the sandbox that provides an instrumented and isolated environment (virtualized or emulated) for any user to upload and run unknown artifacts and identify potentially malicious behaviors. The provided API and the wealth of information in the reports produced by these services have also helped attackers test the efficacy of numerous techniques to make malware hard to detect. The most common technique used by malware for evading the analysis system is to monitor the execution environment, detect the presence of any debugging artifacts, and hide its malicious behavior if needed. This is usually achieved by looking for signals suggesting that the execution environment does not belong to a native machine, such as specific memory patterns or behavioral traits of certain CPU instructions. In this paper, we show how an attacker can evade detection on such analysis services by incorporating a Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm into a malware sample. Specifically, we leverage the asymptotic behavior of the computational cost of PoW algorithms when they run on some classes of hardware platforms to effectively detect a non bare-metal environment of the malware sandbox analyzer. To prove the validity of this intuition, we design and implement Scramblesuit, a framework to automatically (i) implement sandbox detection strategies, and (ii) embed a test evasion program into an arbitrary malware sample. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of Scramblesuit across a wide range of: 1) COTS architectures (ARM, Apple M1, i9, i7 and Xeon), 2) malware families, and 3) online sandboxes (JoeSandbox, Sysinternals, C2AE, Zenbox, Dr.Web VX Cube, Tencent HABO, YOMI Hunter). Our empirical evaluation shows that a PoW-based evasion technique is hard to fingerprint, and reduces existing malware detection rate by a factor of 10. The only plausible counter-measure to Scramblesuit is to rely on bare-metal online malware scanners, which is unrealistic given they currently handle millions of daily submissions.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"283 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122955928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nowadays, people become more connected to the internet using their mobile devices. They tend to use their critical and sensitive data among many applications. These applications provide security via user authentication. Authentication by passwords is a reliable and efficient access control procedure, but it is not sufficient. Additional procedures are needed to enhance the security of these applications. Keystroke dynamics (KSD) is one of the common behavioral based systems. KSD rhythm uses combinations of timing and non-timing features that are extracted and processed from several devices. This work presents a novel authentication approach based on two factors: password and KSD. Also, it presents extensive comparative analysis conducted between authentication systems based on KSDs. It proposes a prototype for a keyboard in order to collect timing and non-timing information from KSDs. Hence, the proposed approach uses timing and several non-timing features. These features have a demonstrated significant role for improving the performance measures of KSD behavioral authentication systems. Several experiments have been done and show acceptable level in performance measures as a second authentication factor. The approach has been tested using multiple classifiers. When Random Forest classifier has been used, the approach reached 0% error rate with 100% accuracy for classification.
{"title":"Online User Authentication System Using Keystroke Dynamics","authors":"Asma Salem, A. Sharieh, R. Jabri","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210081","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, people become more connected to the internet using their mobile devices. They tend to use their critical and sensitive data among many applications. These applications provide security via user authentication. Authentication by passwords is a reliable and efficient access control procedure, but it is not sufficient. Additional procedures are needed to enhance the security of these applications. Keystroke dynamics (KSD) is one of the common behavioral based systems. KSD rhythm uses combinations of timing and non-timing features that are extracted and processed from several devices. This work presents a novel authentication approach based on two factors: password and KSD. Also, it presents extensive comparative analysis conducted between authentication systems based on KSDs. It proposes a prototype for a keyboard in order to collect timing and non-timing information from KSDs. Hence, the proposed approach uses timing and several non-timing features. These features have a demonstrated significant role for improving the performance measures of KSD behavioral authentication systems. Several experiments have been done and show acceptable level in performance measures as a second authentication factor. The approach has been tested using multiple classifiers. When Random Forest classifier has been used, the approach reached 0% error rate with 100% accuracy for classification.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114166960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hammad Afzali, Santiago Torres-Arias, Reza Curtmola, Justin Cappos
Although code review is an essential step for ensuring the quality of software, it is surprising that current code review systems do not have mechanisms to protect the integrity of the code review process. We uncover multiple attacks against the code review infrastructure which are easy to execute, stealthy in nature, and can have a significant impact, such as allowing malicious or buggy code to be merged and propagated to future releases. To improve this status quo, in this work we lay the foundations for securing the code review process. Towards this end, we first identify a set of key design principles necessary to secure the code review process. We then use these principles to propose SecureReview, a security mechanism that can be applied on top of a Git-based code review system to ensure the integrity of the code review process and provide verifiable guarantees that the code review process followed the intended review policy. We implement SecureReview as a Chrome browser extension for GitHub and Gerrit. Our security analysis shows that SecureReview is effective in mitigating the aforementioned attacks. An experimental evaluation shows that the SecureReview implementation only adds a slight storage overhead (i.e., less than 0.0006 of the repository size).
{"title":"Towards verifiable web-based code review systems","authors":"Hammad Afzali, Santiago Torres-Arias, Reza Curtmola, Justin Cappos","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210098","url":null,"abstract":"Although code review is an essential step for ensuring the quality of software, it is surprising that current code review systems do not have mechanisms to protect the integrity of the code review process. We uncover multiple attacks against the code review infrastructure which are easy to execute, stealthy in nature, and can have a significant impact, such as allowing malicious or buggy code to be merged and propagated to future releases. To improve this status quo, in this work we lay the foundations for securing the code review process. Towards this end, we first identify a set of key design principles necessary to secure the code review process. We then use these principles to propose SecureReview, a security mechanism that can be applied on top of a Git-based code review system to ensure the integrity of the code review process and provide verifiable guarantees that the code review process followed the intended review policy. We implement SecureReview as a Chrome browser extension for GitHub and Gerrit. Our security analysis shows that SecureReview is effective in mitigating the aforementioned attacks. An experimental evaluation shows that the SecureReview implementation only adds a slight storage overhead (i.e., less than 0.0006 of the repository size).","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115101969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many breakthroughs on security and privacy-preserving techniques have emerged to mitigate the trust loss of cloud hosting environment caused by various types of attacks. To enhance memory-level security of multi-keyword fuzzy search, a widely occurred query request, we take the initiative to apply Trusted Execution Environment (a.k.a TEE) technology to our protocol design which provides hardware-based tamper-proof enclaves. Then we propose the Edit Distance-based Obfuscation Mechanism to further protect the query process executed outside TEE against access pattern leakage. With concerns of practicality and performance, we also propose the two-layer fuzzy index structure and Trend-aware Cache. The former addresses the space limitation of TEE memory for searching large datasets, while the latter optimizes the cache utility of TEE with trend-aware coordinator to effectively reduce the communication overhead.
{"title":"OTKI-F: An efficient memory-secure multi-keyword fuzzy search protocol","authors":"Ziyang Han, Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu","doi":"10.3233/jcs-210145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-210145","url":null,"abstract":"Many breakthroughs on security and privacy-preserving techniques have emerged to mitigate the trust loss of cloud hosting environment caused by various types of attacks. To enhance memory-level security of multi-keyword fuzzy search, a widely occurred query request, we take the initiative to apply Trusted Execution Environment (a.k.a TEE) technology to our protocol design which provides hardware-based tamper-proof enclaves. Then we propose the Edit Distance-based Obfuscation Mechanism to further protect the query process executed outside TEE against access pattern leakage. With concerns of practicality and performance, we also propose the two-layer fuzzy index structure and Trend-aware Cache. The former addresses the space limitation of TEE memory for searching large datasets, while the latter optimizes the cache utility of TEE with trend-aware coordinator to effectively reduce the communication overhead.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115357886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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