Symbolic models for security protocol verification were pioneered by Dolev and Yao in their seminal work. Since then, although inspired by the same ideas, many variants of the original model were developed. In particular, a common assumption is that the attacker has complete control over the network and can therefore intercept any message. This assumption has been interpreted in slightly different ways depending on the particular models: either any protocol output is directly routed to the adversary, or communications may be among any two participants, including the attacker-the scheduling between which exact parties the communication happens is left to the attacker. This difference may seem unimportant at first glance and, depending on the verification tools, either one or the other semantics is implemented. We show that, unsurprisingly, they indeed coincide for reachability properties. However, for indistinguishability properties, we prove that these two interpretations lead to incomparable semantics. We also introduce and study a new semantics, where internal communications are allowed but messages are always eavesdropped by the attacker. This new semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations. Moreover, we identify two subclasses of protocols for which the three semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented verification of trace equivalence for each of the three semantics in the DeepSec tool and compare their performances on several classical examples.
{"title":"On the semantics of communications when verifying equivalence properties","authors":"Kushal Babel, Vincent Cheval, S. Kremer","doi":"10.3233/jcs-191366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-191366","url":null,"abstract":"Symbolic models for security protocol verification were pioneered by Dolev and Yao in their seminal work. Since then, although inspired by the same ideas, many variants of the original model were developed. In particular, a common assumption is that the attacker has complete control over the network and can therefore intercept any message. This assumption has been interpreted in slightly different ways depending on the particular models: either any protocol output is directly routed to the adversary, or communications may be among any two participants, including the attacker-the scheduling between which exact parties the communication happens is left to the attacker. This difference may seem unimportant at first glance and, depending on the verification tools, either one or the other semantics is implemented. We show that, unsurprisingly, they indeed coincide for reachability properties. However, for indistinguishability properties, we prove that these two interpretations lead to incomparable semantics. We also introduce and study a new semantics, where internal communications are allowed but messages are always eavesdropped by the attacker. This new semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations. Moreover, we identify two subclasses of protocols for which the three semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented verification of trace equivalence for each of the three semantics in the DeepSec tool and compare their performances on several classical examples.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127818416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How persuasive is a phishing email? A phishing game for phishing awareness","authors":"R. Fatima, Affan Yasin, Lin Liu, Jianmin Wang","doi":"10.3233/jcs-181253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-181253","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123334683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Stergiopoulos, Georgia Chronopoulou, Evangelos Bitsikas, Nikolaos Tsalis, D. Gritzalis
{"title":"Using side channel TCP features for real-time detection of malware connections","authors":"G. Stergiopoulos, Georgia Chronopoulou, Evangelos Bitsikas, Nikolaos Tsalis, D. Gritzalis","doi":"10.3233/JCS-191286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-191286","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134325085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nawaf Alhebaishi, Lingyu Wang, S. Jajodia, A. Singhal
{"title":"Mitigating the insider threat of remote administrators in clouds through maintenance task assignments","authors":"Nawaf Alhebaishi, Lingyu Wang, S. Jajodia, A. Singhal","doi":"10.3233/JCS-191306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-191306","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125225802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tobias Urban, Dennis Tatang, Thorsten Holz, N. Pohlmann
{"title":"Analyzing leakage of personal information by malware","authors":"Tobias Urban, Dennis Tatang, Thorsten Holz, N. Pohlmann","doi":"10.3233/JCS-191287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-191287","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128060665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Bitcoin network, the distributed storage of multiple copies of the block chain opens up possibilities for doublespending, i.e., a payer issues two separate transactions to two different payees transferring the same coins. While Bitcoin has inherent security mechanism to prevent double-spending attacks, it requires a certain amount of time to detect the doublespending attacks after the transaction has been initiated. Therefore, it is impractical to protect the payees from suffering in double-spending attacks in fast payment scenarios where the time between the exchange of currency and goods or services is shorten to few seconds. Although we cannot prevent double-spending attacks immediately for fast payments, decentralized non-equivocation contracts have been proposed to penalize the malicious payer after the attacks have been detected. The basic idea of these contracts is that the payer locks some coins in a deposit when he initiates a transaction with the payee. If the payer double-spends, a cryptographic primitive called accountable assertions can be used to reveal his Bitcoin credentials for the deposit. Thus, the malicious payer could be penalized by the loss of deposit coins. However, such decentralized nonequivocation contracts are subjected to collusion attacks where the payer colludes with the beneficiary of the depoist and transfers the Bitcoin deposit back to himself when he double-spends, resulting in no penalties. On the other hand, even if the beneficiary behaves honestly, the victim payee cannot get any compensation directly from the deposit in the original design. To prevent such collusion attacks, we design fair time-locked deposits for Bitcoin transactions to defend against doublespending. The fair deposits ensure that the payer will be penalized by the loss of his deposit coins if he double-spends and the victim payee’s loss will be compensated within a locked time period. We start with the protocols of making a deposit for one transaction. In particular, for the transaction with single input and output and the transaction with multiple inputs and outputs, we provide different designs of the deposits. We analyze the performance of deposits made for one transaction and show how the fair deposits work efficiently in Bitcoin. We also provide protocols of making a deposit for multiple transactions, which can reduce the burdens of a honest payer. In the end, we extend the fair deposits to non-equivocation contracts for other distributed systems.
{"title":"Collusion attacks and fair time-locked deposits for fast-payment transactions in Bitcoin","authors":"Xingjie Yu, M. Shiwen, Yingjiu Li, R. Deng","doi":"10.3233/JCS-191274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-191274","url":null,"abstract":"In Bitcoin network, the distributed storage of multiple copies of the block chain opens up possibilities for doublespending, i.e., a payer issues two separate transactions to two different payees transferring the same coins. While Bitcoin has inherent security mechanism to prevent double-spending attacks, it requires a certain amount of time to detect the doublespending attacks after the transaction has been initiated. Therefore, it is impractical to protect the payees from suffering in double-spending attacks in fast payment scenarios where the time between the exchange of currency and goods or services is shorten to few seconds. Although we cannot prevent double-spending attacks immediately for fast payments, decentralized non-equivocation contracts have been proposed to penalize the malicious payer after the attacks have been detected. The basic idea of these contracts is that the payer locks some coins in a deposit when he initiates a transaction with the payee. If the payer double-spends, a cryptographic primitive called accountable assertions can be used to reveal his Bitcoin credentials for the deposit. Thus, the malicious payer could be penalized by the loss of deposit coins. However, such decentralized nonequivocation contracts are subjected to collusion attacks where the payer colludes with the beneficiary of the depoist and transfers the Bitcoin deposit back to himself when he double-spends, resulting in no penalties. On the other hand, even if the beneficiary behaves honestly, the victim payee cannot get any compensation directly from the deposit in the original design. To prevent such collusion attacks, we design fair time-locked deposits for Bitcoin transactions to defend against doublespending. The fair deposits ensure that the payer will be penalized by the loss of his deposit coins if he double-spends and the victim payee’s loss will be compensated within a locked time period. We start with the protocols of making a deposit for one transaction. In particular, for the transaction with single input and output and the transaction with multiple inputs and outputs, we provide different designs of the deposits. We analyze the performance of deposits made for one transaction and show how the fair deposits work efficiently in Bitcoin. We also provide protocols of making a deposit for multiple transactions, which can reduce the burdens of a honest payer. In the end, we extend the fair deposits to non-equivocation contracts for other distributed systems.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127343922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The workflow satisfiability problem is the problem of finding an assignment of users to tasks (i.e., a plan) so that all authorization constraints are satisfied. The workflow resiliency problem is a dynamic workflow satisfiability problem coping with the absence of users. If a workflow is resilient, it is of course satisfiable, but the vice versa does not hold. There are three levels of resiliency: in static resiliency, up to k users might be absent before the execution starts and never become available for that execution; in decremental resiliency, up to k users might be absent before or during execution and, again, they never become available for that execution; in dynamic resiliency, up to k users might be absent before executing any task and they may in general turn absent and available continuously, before or during the execution. Much work has been carried out to address static resiliency, little for decremental resiliency and, to the best of our knowledge, for dynamic resiliency no exact approach that returns a dynamic execution plan if and only if a workflow is resilient has been provided so far. In this paper, we tackle workflow resiliency via extended game automata . We provide three encodings (having polynomial-time complexity) from workflows to extended game automata to model each kind of resiliency as an instantaneous game and we use Uppaal-TIGA to synthesize a winning strategy (i.e., a controller) for such a game. If a controller exists, then the workflow is resilient (as the controller’s strategy corresponds to a dynamic plan). If it doesn’t, then the workflow is breakable . The approach that we propose is correct because it corresponds to a reachability problem for extended game automata (TCTL model checking). Moreover, we have developed Erre , the first tool for workflow resiliency that relies on a controller synthesis approach for the three kinds of resiliency. Thanks to Erre , our approach is thus also fully-automated from analysis to simulation.
{"title":"Last man standing: Static, decremental and dynamic resiliency via controller synthesis","authors":"Matteo Zavatteri, L. Viganò","doi":"10.3233/JCS-181244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-181244","url":null,"abstract":"The workflow satisfiability problem is the problem of finding an assignment of users to tasks (i.e., a plan) so that all authorization constraints are satisfied. The workflow resiliency problem is a dynamic workflow satisfiability problem coping with the absence of users. If a workflow is resilient, it is of course satisfiable, but the vice versa does not hold. There are three levels of resiliency: in static resiliency, up to k users might be absent before the execution starts and never become available for that execution; in decremental resiliency, up to k users might be absent before or during execution and, again, they never become available for that execution; in dynamic resiliency, up to k users might be absent before executing any task and they may in general turn absent and available continuously, before or during the execution. Much work has been carried out to address static resiliency, little for decremental resiliency and, to the best of our knowledge, for dynamic resiliency no exact approach that returns a dynamic execution plan if and only if a workflow is resilient has been provided so far. In this paper, we tackle workflow resiliency via extended game automata . We provide three encodings (having polynomial-time complexity) from workflows to extended game automata to model each kind of resiliency as an instantaneous game and we use Uppaal-TIGA to synthesize a winning strategy (i.e., a controller) for such a game. If a controller exists, then the workflow is resilient (as the controller’s strategy corresponds to a dynamic plan). If it doesn’t, then the workflow is breakable . The approach that we propose is correct because it corresponds to a reachability problem for extended game automata (TCTL model checking). Moreover, we have developed Erre , the first tool for workflow resiliency that relies on a controller synthesis approach for the three kinds of resiliency. Thanks to Erre , our approach is thus also fully-automated from analysis to simulation.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127035739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yangguang Tian, Yingjiu Li, Guomin Yang, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, Hui Cui, Yinghui Zhang
We introduce the first deniable attribute-based key exchange (DABKE) framework that is resilient to impersonation attacks. We define the formal security models for DABKE framework, and propose a generic compiler that converts any attribute-based key exchanges into deniable ones. We prove that it can achieve session key security and user privacy in the standard model, and strong deniability in the simulation-based paradigm. In particular, the proposed generic compiler ensures: 1) a dishonest user cannot impersonate other user’s session participation in conversations since implicit authentication is used among authorized users; 2) an authorized user can plausibly deny his/her participation after secure conversations with others; 3) the strongest form of deniability is achieved using one-round communication between two authorized users.
{"title":"DABKE: Secure deniable attribute-based key exchange framework","authors":"Yangguang Tian, Yingjiu Li, Guomin Yang, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, Hui Cui, Yinghui Zhang","doi":"10.3233/JCS-181201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-181201","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the first deniable attribute-based key exchange (DABKE) framework that is resilient to impersonation attacks. We define the formal security models for DABKE framework, and propose a generic compiler that converts any attribute-based key exchanges into deniable ones. We prove that it can achieve session key security and user privacy in the standard model, and strong deniability in the simulation-based paradigm. In particular, the proposed generic compiler ensures: 1) a dishonest user cannot impersonate other user’s session participation in conversations since implicit authentication is used among authorized users; 2) an authorized user can plausibly deny his/her participation after secure conversations with others; 3) the strongest form of deniability is achieved using one-round communication between two authorized users.","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116328809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matteo Maffei, Giulio Malavolta, M. Reinert, Dominique Schröder
{"title":"Group ORAM for privacy and access control in outsourced personal records","authors":"Matteo Maffei, Giulio Malavolta, M. Reinert, Dominique Schröder","doi":"10.3233/JCS-171030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-171030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142580,"journal":{"name":"J. Comput. Secur.","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116607119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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