Problem description. We consider a dual channel in which a focal manufacturer (he) sells his output through his online store and an independent brick-and-mortar retailer (she). In this manufacturer-centric dual channel, we study product line, stocking, and pricing decisions in the presence of stochastic demand and inventory constraints. The pricing decisions include choosing whether to give price match guarantees (PMGs), standard in the U.S. retail practice. Methodology/Results. We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a focal manufacturer designs a product line, sets wholesale prices, and decides what products to sell in the dual channel. An independent brick-and-mortar retailer responds to the product line design and the wholesale prices by making stocking decisions in her store. Then, both stores observe demand and independently set retail prices subject to any PMGs that the stores gave to consumers. The brick-and-mortar store (online store) fulfills demand in a make-to-stock (make-to-order) fashion. We find that whenever one of the stores holds a competitive advantage, the manufacturer sells the same product line in both stores. If the brick-and-mortar store holds an advantage, it matches the online store’s retail price to obtain favorable wholesale pricing from the manufacturer. We find no equilibria where the online store price matches the brick-and-mortar store or the stores’ prices match each other. Finally, when neither store has a clear advantage, the manufacturer mitigates price competition by designing a different product for each store. Managerial implications. Our model helps identify optimal stocking and pricing strategies that depend on e-fulfillment cost and demand uncertainty and offers a novel reason for offering PMGs in a supply chain.
{"title":"Pricing, Quality, and Stocking Decisions in a Manufacturer-Centric Dual-Channel","authors":"Xiaomeng Guo, P. Kouvelis, Danko Turcic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3471948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3471948","url":null,"abstract":"Problem description. We consider a dual channel in which a focal manufacturer (he) sells his output through his online store and an independent brick-and-mortar retailer (she). In this manufacturer-centric dual channel, we study product line, stocking, and pricing decisions in the presence of stochastic demand and inventory constraints. The pricing decisions include choosing whether to give price match guarantees (PMGs), standard in the U.S. retail practice. Methodology/Results. We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a focal manufacturer designs a product line, sets wholesale prices, and decides what products to sell in the dual channel. An independent brick-and-mortar retailer responds to the product line design and the wholesale prices by making stocking decisions in her store. Then, both stores observe demand and independently set retail prices subject to any PMGs that the stores gave to consumers. The brick-and-mortar store (online store) fulfills demand in a make-to-stock (make-to-order) fashion. We find that whenever one of the stores holds a competitive advantage, the manufacturer sells the same product line in both stores. If the brick-and-mortar store holds an advantage, it matches the online store’s retail price to obtain favorable wholesale pricing from the manufacturer. We find no equilibria where the online store price matches the brick-and-mortar store or the stores’ prices match each other. Finally, when neither store has a clear advantage, the manufacturer mitigates price competition by designing a different product for each store. Managerial implications. Our model helps identify optimal stocking and pricing strategies that depend on e-fulfillment cost and demand uncertainty and offers a novel reason for offering PMGs in a supply chain.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130486005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W. Boshoff, Luke M. Froeb, Roan Minnie, S. Tschantz
A vertical merger model represents a complex system built on (i) a network of e.g., upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers (ii) who bargain bilaterally in the presence of externalities (iii) created by competition between downstream retailers (iv) facing a consumer demand surface. We simulate the effects of vertical mergers in six different bargaining models and and that how parties bargain, and over what, can almost pre-determine merger effects. This paper is accompanied by an online vertical merger simulator designed to help economists and enforcers simulate vertical mergers, similar to existing horizontal merger simulators. By showing what matters, why it matters, and how much it matters, these tools guide model building. We introduce the rectangular logit demand system for this application, with nests around the same goods sold at different retailers, or around different goods sold at the same retailer.
{"title":"Bargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers","authors":"W. Boshoff, Luke M. Froeb, Roan Minnie, S. Tschantz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3760634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3760634","url":null,"abstract":"A vertical merger model represents a complex system built on (i) a network of e.g., upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers (ii) who bargain bilaterally in the presence of externalities (iii) created by competition between downstream retailers (iv) facing a consumer demand surface. We simulate the effects of vertical mergers in six different bargaining models and and that how parties bargain, and over what, can almost pre-determine merger effects. This paper is accompanied by an online vertical merger simulator designed to help economists and enforcers simulate vertical mergers, similar to existing horizontal merger simulators. By showing what matters, why it matters, and how much it matters, these tools guide model building. We introduce the rectangular logit demand system for this application, with nests around the same goods sold at different retailers, or around different goods sold at the same retailer.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122123216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss economic and social sources of inequality and elaborate on the role of social networks in inequality, economic immobility, and economic inefficiencies. The lens of social networks clarifies how the entanglement of people's information, opportunities, and behaviors with those of their peers and communities leads to persistent differences in outcomes across groups in education, employment, health, income and wealth. The key role of homophily in dividing groups within the network is highlighted. A network perspective's policy implications differ substantially from a strictly economic perspective. I discuss the importance of ``policy cocktails'' that include aspects that are aimed at both the economic and social forces driving inequality.
{"title":"Inequality's Economic and Social Roots: The Role of Social Networks and Homophily","authors":"M. Jackson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3795626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3795626","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss economic and social sources of inequality and elaborate on the role of social networks in inequality, economic immobility, and economic inefficiencies. The lens of social networks clarifies how the entanglement of people's information, opportunities, and behaviors with those of their peers and communities leads to persistent differences in outcomes across groups in education, employment, health, income and wealth. The key role of homophily in dividing groups within the network is highlighted. A network perspective's policy implications differ substantially from a strictly economic perspective. I discuss the importance of ``policy cocktails'' that include aspects that are aimed at both the economic and social forces driving inequality.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129525796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The dynamic response of prices and mark-ups to economic shocks play a crucial role in macroeconomics. We explore the role that market concentration plays in determining the responsiveness to different shocks. Using a model of oligopolistic competition we show that the sensitivity of prices and mark-ups depend on the type of shocks and the degree of implicit collusion formed in a market. We test these predictions in laboratory price setting games and find that in smaller markets collusive behavior is formed more readily and this has an important impact on the response of prices and mark-ups to the different shocks, consistent with our theoretical predictions. We compare various features of price setting behavior in our lab experiments to those found in retail data.
{"title":"Market concentration and the dynamics of prices and mark-ups","authors":"Curtis J. Kephart, David R. Munro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3801886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801886","url":null,"abstract":"The dynamic response of prices and mark-ups to economic shocks play a crucial role in macroeconomics. We explore the role that market concentration plays in determining the responsiveness to different shocks. Using a model of oligopolistic competition we show that the sensitivity of prices and mark-ups depend on the type of shocks and the degree of implicit collusion formed in a market. We test these predictions in laboratory price setting games and find that in smaller markets collusive behavior is formed more readily and this has an important impact on the response of prices and mark-ups to the different shocks, consistent with our theoretical predictions. We compare various features of price setting behavior in our lab experiments to those found in retail data.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"32 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120876826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I identify a novel interconnection that forms between banks that engage in home lending in the same geographic region and show that it facilitates bank-to-bank spillovers. Exploiting home price changes initiated by the shock of the Great Recession and heterogeneity in such changes across markets to capture variations in negative shocks to banks via market exposure, I find that a bank contracts lending more if its linkages are more shocked. Results suggest investor-runs as the underlying spillover mechanism: Because similar banks lend in similar markets, investors lose confidence on the quality of banks that are geographically linked with shocked banks and run on them, thus resulting in banks to contract lending.
{"title":"Geographic Networks and Spillovers between Banks","authors":"S. Shakya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561591","url":null,"abstract":"I identify a novel interconnection that forms between banks that engage in home lending in the same geographic region and show that it facilitates bank-to-bank spillovers. Exploiting home price changes initiated by the shock of the Great Recession and heterogeneity in such changes across markets to capture variations in negative shocks to banks via market exposure, I find that a bank contracts lending more if its linkages are more shocked. Results suggest investor-runs as the underlying spillover mechanism: Because similar banks lend in similar markets, investors lose confidence on the quality of banks that are geographically linked with shocked banks and run on them, thus resulting in banks to contract lending.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128651542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In contrast to industries of other types of information goods, the video game industry still has a sizable secondhand market for games. This is particularly notable because some of the major gaming-console companies (e.g., Sony and Microsoft) actually possess the ability to annihilate the secondhand market altogether; it appears that those companies have given tacit approval to buying and selling used games. Naturally, the question is, what is the special ingredient in the gaming industry that gives a manufacturer incentive to keep a healthy secondhand market even when it has the technological means to shut it down? In this study, leveraging a game-theoretic model, we investigate the effect of gaming console on a manufacturer’s strategy in the presence of a secondhand market for games. We find that when the manufacturer offers a valuable console that provides utilities in addition to playing games, the secondhand market increases the manufacturer’s profit, and that is not at the cost of consumers; the consumers—as well as the society as a whole—also benefit from the secondhand market. This is in stark contrast with settings where there are no consoles involved or the consoles do not offer any intrinsic value; in such settings, the manufacturer would opt to shut down the secondhand market. In the case with a valuable console, however, the increasing appeal of the secondhand market to consumers may improve the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, all at the same time. We discuss our findings along with managerial and welfare implications.
{"title":"Manufacturer’s \"1-Up\" from Used Games: Insights from the Secondhand Market for Video Games","authors":"Antino Kim, Rajib L. Saha, Warut Khern-am-nuai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3487397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3487397","url":null,"abstract":"In contrast to industries of other types of information goods, the video game industry still has a sizable secondhand market for games. This is particularly notable because some of the major gaming-console companies (e.g., Sony and Microsoft) actually possess the ability to annihilate the secondhand market altogether; it appears that those companies have given tacit approval to buying and selling used games. Naturally, the question is, what is the special ingredient in the gaming industry that gives a manufacturer incentive to keep a healthy secondhand market even when it has the technological means to shut it down? In this study, leveraging a game-theoretic model, we investigate the effect of gaming console on a manufacturer’s strategy in the presence of a secondhand market for games. We find that when the manufacturer offers a valuable console that provides utilities in addition to playing games, the secondhand market increases the manufacturer’s profit, and that is not at the cost of consumers; the consumers—as well as the society as a whole—also benefit from the secondhand market. This is in stark contrast with settings where there are no consoles involved or the consoles do not offer any intrinsic value; in such settings, the manufacturer would opt to shut down the secondhand market. In the case with a valuable console, however, the increasing appeal of the secondhand market to consumers may improve the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, all at the same time. We discuss our findings along with managerial and welfare implications.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122862193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.
{"title":"Personalised Pricing: The Demise of the Fixed Price?","authors":"J. Poort, Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3792842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3792842","url":null,"abstract":"An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114673544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been rapid growth in on-demand ride-hailing platforms that serve as an intermediary to match individual service providers (drivers) with consumer demand (riders). Several major players of this market have introduced carpool services that allow passengers heading towards the same direction to share a ride at a discounted fare. In this paper, we develop an analytical model to study the pricing issues of ride-sharing platforms in the presence of carpool services, and their economical and social implications. We show that the carpool service should be provided when its quality and/or the pooling efficiency is high. Adopting carpool services enables the platform to achieve a larger market coverage and allows the customers to enjoy more affordable rides without any sacrifice in service quality. Our analysis reveals that the provision of carpool services benefits the platform and the riders in general, but may hurt the drivers. Our extensive numerical studies suggest that the carpool service and surge pricing, which are two operational levers to match supply with demand, are strategic complements when the demand-supply imbalance is severe, and they become strategic substitutes with balanced demand and supply.
{"title":"Carpool Services for Ride-sharing Platforms: Price and Welfare Implications","authors":"Xuan Wang, Renyu (Philip) Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709645","url":null,"abstract":"There has been rapid growth in on-demand ride-hailing platforms that serve as an intermediary to match individual service providers (drivers) with consumer demand (riders). Several major players of this market have introduced carpool services that allow passengers heading towards the same direction to share a ride at a discounted fare. In this paper, we develop an analytical model to study the pricing issues of ride-sharing platforms in the presence of carpool services, and their economical and social implications. We show that the carpool service should be provided when its quality and/or the pooling efficiency is high. Adopting carpool services enables the platform to achieve a larger market coverage and allows the customers to enjoy more affordable rides without any sacrifice in service quality. Our analysis reveals that the provision of carpool services benefits the platform and the riders in general, but may hurt the drivers. Our extensive numerical studies suggest that the carpool service and surge pricing, which are two operational levers to match supply with demand, are strategic complements when the demand-supply imbalance is severe, and they become strategic substitutes with balanced demand and supply.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124736806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present paper shows relative price competition with constant cost production for three or more countries and goods can lead to a wide variety of complex trade patterns. The universal McKenzie-Jones efficiency in the global unit input matrix reduces to relative prices of efficient goods. Specialization requires the unlikely condition of global comparative advantage involving relative prices of all goods. Relative price competition can lead countries to diversify exports, import and export the same good, not trade, and form separate trade groups. The analysis extends restrictions on trade patterns due to inconsistent relative wages.
{"title":"Relative Prices, Comparative Advantage, and Trade Patterns with Three or More Countries and Goods","authors":"H. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3786753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3786753","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper shows relative price competition with constant cost production for three or more countries and goods can lead to a wide variety of complex trade patterns. The universal McKenzie-Jones efficiency in the global unit input matrix reduces to relative prices of efficient goods. Specialization requires the unlikely condition of global comparative advantage involving relative prices of all goods. Relative price competition can lead countries to diversify exports, import and export the same good, not trade, and form separate trade groups. The analysis extends restrictions on trade patterns due to inconsistent relative wages.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129572491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, I analytically examine the optimal disclosure policies for relative performance indicators in product market competition with asymmetric marginal cost. I demonstrate that under equilibrium, depending on the economic environment, asymmetric equilibrium holds (a cost-efficient firm discloses, while a cost-inefficient firm does not) or firms disclose their relative performance indicator in quantity competition, whereas, in price competition, firms disclose their relative performance indicators. In addition, I analyze welfare effects in considering disclosure regulation policy. When price competition occurs in a product market, voluntary disclosure should be managed to regulate implicit cartels. In contrast, when quantity competition occurs, the government should not regulate voluntary disclosure in large markets but should require mandatory disclosure for firms in small markets. My result suggests that the government must consider the situation of competition in a product market.
{"title":"Disclosure Policy for Relative Performance Indicators under Product Market Competition","authors":"Jumpei Hamamura","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3779116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779116","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I analytically examine the optimal disclosure policies for relative performance indicators in product market competition with asymmetric marginal cost. I demonstrate that under equilibrium, depending on the economic environment, asymmetric equilibrium holds (a cost-efficient firm discloses, while a cost-inefficient firm does not) or firms disclose their relative performance indicator in quantity competition, whereas, in price competition, firms disclose their relative performance indicators. In addition, I analyze welfare effects in considering disclosure regulation policy. When price competition occurs in a product market, voluntary disclosure should be managed to regulate implicit cartels. In contrast, when quantity competition occurs, the government should not regulate voluntary disclosure in large markets but should require mandatory disclosure for firms in small markets. My result suggests that the government must consider the situation of competition in a product market.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"70 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114475956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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