An availability cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception of increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse. The driving mechanism involves a combination of informational and reputational motives: Individuals endorse the perception partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance. Availability entrepreneurs - activists who manipulate the content of public discourse - strive to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their agendas. Their availability campaigns may yield social benefits, but sometimes they bring harm, which suggests a need for safeguards. Focusing on the role of mass pressures in the regulation of risks associated with production, consumption, and the environment, Professor Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein analyze availability cascades and suggest reforms to alleviate their potential hazards. Their proposals include new governmental structures designed to give civil servants better insulation against mass demands for regulatory change and an easily accessible scientific database to reduce people's dependence on popular (mis)perceptions.
可得性级联是一种自我强化的集体信念形成过程，通过这种过程，一种表达出来的感知会引发连锁反应，通过在公共话语中不断增加的可得性，让人觉得这种感知越来越可信。驱动机制包括信息动机和声誉动机的结合:个人认可这种感知，部分是通过学习他人的明显信念，部分是通过扭曲自己的公开反应来维持社会接受。可用性企业家——操纵公共话语内容的活动家——努力触发可能推进其议程的可用性级联。它们的可用性活动可能会产生社会效益，但有时也会带来危害，这表明需要采取保障措施。Timur Kuran教授和Cass R. Sunstein教授着眼于大规模压力在监管与生产、消费和环境相关的风险中的作用，分析了可用性级联，并提出了减轻其潜在危害的改革建议。他们的建议包括新的政府结构，旨在使公务员更好地与群众要求监管改革的要求隔离开来，以及一个易于访问的科学数据库，以减少人们对流行(错误)观念的依赖。
{"title":"Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation","authors":"T. Kuran, C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2307/1229439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229439","url":null,"abstract":"An availability cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception of increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse. The driving mechanism involves a combination of informational and reputational motives: Individuals endorse the perception partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance. Availability entrepreneurs - activists who manipulate the content of public discourse - strive to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their agendas. Their availability campaigns may yield social benefits, but sometimes they bring harm, which suggests a need for safeguards. Focusing on the role of mass pressures in the regulation of risks associated with production, consumption, and the environment, Professor Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein analyze availability cascades and suggest reforms to alleviate their potential hazards. Their proposals include new governmental structures designed to give civil servants better insulation against mass demands for regulatory change and an easily accessible scientific database to reduce people's dependence on popular (mis)perceptions.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"03 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127180973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presented to solve the model together with computational experience.
{"title":"Competitive Location and Pricing on Networks","authors":"D. Serra, C. Revelle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.54871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.54871","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presented to solve the model together with computational experience.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127366302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that there are benefits from the sharing of specialized capital because rental contracts are less costly than sole-ownership-use contracts when using specialized capital. We show that the benefits from the sharing of specialized capital come from the fact that a specialized capital is a quasi-public good - rivalrous if used at the same time but non-rivalrous if used at different times. We also show that rental contracts tend to be localized within cities in order to minimize the costs of transportation and density.
{"title":"Specialized Capital, Rental Contracts, and Localization","authors":"Louis M. Chan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.190418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190418","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that there are benefits from the sharing of specialized capital because rental contracts are less costly than sole-ownership-use contracts when using specialized capital. We show that the benefits from the sharing of specialized capital come from the fact that a specialized capital is a quasi-public good - rivalrous if used at the same time but non-rivalrous if used at different times. We also show that rental contracts tend to be localized within cities in order to minimize the costs of transportation and density.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128052087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper studies the effect of scale economies on the optimal capacity adjustment of a multiplant firm. It is shown that with increasing economies of scale plants are ranked in decreasing order, after which the optimal choice is to scrap the largest one. On the contrary, if there are decreasing economies of scale the optimal policy would be to wait before abandoning intermediate plants. That is, decreasing economies of scale amplify the effect of uncertainty on disinvestment and tend to increase the plant's life.
{"title":"Optimal Capacity Adjustment by a Multiplant Firm: Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital","authors":"M. Moretto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.159609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159609","url":null,"abstract":"The paper studies the effect of scale economies on the optimal capacity adjustment of a multiplant firm. It is shown that with increasing economies of scale plants are ranked in decreasing order, after which the optimal choice is to scrap the largest one. On the contrary, if there are decreasing economies of scale the optimal policy would be to wait before abandoning intermediate plants. That is, decreasing economies of scale amplify the effect of uncertainty on disinvestment and tend to increase the plant's life.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130926464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article describes B.S.N's vain attempt from December 1968 to January 1969 to takeover Saint-Gobain . The hostile bid was unprecedented in French Economical history, not only for the size of the offer but also for the use of Convertible Bonds. B.S.N.'s bid stemmed from the diversity of Saint-Gobain's shareholders and the poor performance of its share price. However, Saint-Gobain's reaction was equally unprecedented. A vigorous campaign was undertaken in the business press to rectify its tarnished image and shareholders were invited to visit the company in order to consolidate their cultural identity. B.S.N.'s own communication policy failed and the use of convertible bonds was not appreciated. Indeed, Saint Gobain's share price did not fall sufficiently during the bid to entice shareholders to take advantage of B.S.N's proposals.
{"title":"Brief History of the B.S.N. / Saint-Gobain Takeover Attempt (December 1968-January 1969)","authors":"Gérard Hirigoyen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.144768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.144768","url":null,"abstract":"This article describes B.S.N's vain attempt from December 1968 to January 1969 to takeover Saint-Gobain . The hostile bid was unprecedented in French Economical history, not only for the size of the offer but also for the use of Convertible Bonds. B.S.N.'s bid stemmed from the diversity of Saint-Gobain's shareholders and the poor performance of its share price. However, Saint-Gobain's reaction was equally unprecedented. A vigorous campaign was undertaken in the business press to rectify its tarnished image and shareholders were invited to visit the company in order to consolidate their cultural identity. B.S.N.'s own communication policy failed and the use of convertible bonds was not appreciated. Indeed, Saint Gobain's share price did not fall sufficiently during the bid to entice shareholders to take advantage of B.S.N's proposals.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115620742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write bindinglong-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertically separated monopolist is vulnerable tohold-up. Without integration, we demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has anincentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a puremonopoly. Having more firms mitigates the hold-up power of any one. This, however,distorts the cost structure of the industry toward greater industry output and, hence,lowers final good prices. Vertical integration mitigates the hold-up problem faced by themonopolist. It allows it to generate and appropriate a greater share of monopoly profits.Horizontal competition mitigates the anti-competitive effects of integration
{"title":"Extending Market Power Through Vertical Integration","authors":"Catherine de Fontenay, J. Gans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.152252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.152252","url":null,"abstract":"This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write bindinglong-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertically separated monopolist is vulnerable tohold-up. Without integration, we demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has anincentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a puremonopoly. Having more firms mitigates the hold-up power of any one. This, however,distorts the cost structure of the industry toward greater industry output and, hence,lowers final good prices. Vertical integration mitigates the hold-up problem faced by themonopolist. It allows it to generate and appropriate a greater share of monopoly profits.Horizontal competition mitigates the anti-competitive effects of integration","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121418693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm that wishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achieved in order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate its outlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.
{"title":"Surviving in a Competitive Spatial Market: The Threshold Capture Model","authors":"D. Serra, C. Revelle, K. Rosing","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.159227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159227","url":null,"abstract":"Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm that wishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achieved in order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate its outlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"53 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127431215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper describes the current state of restructuring in the electricity industry in Ukraine, arguing that the aim of any restructuring must be to increase efficiency, whether managerial, economic or technical. In the case of the Ukrainian power industry there is scope for all three. The current remedies proposed for this problem are competition and privatisation. The paper also shows how multi-donor teams of consultants have tried to quickly implement a complex restructuring within the industry, without a clear strategy, sequence, or adequate resources, at a time when the priorities for the industry itself have been to deal with the disturbances caused by the external political and economic environment.
{"title":"Electricity Restructuring in Ukraine: Illusions of Power in the Power Industry?","authors":"H. Ryding","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.142269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.142269","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the current state of restructuring in the electricity industry in Ukraine, arguing that the aim of any restructuring must be to increase efficiency, whether managerial, economic or technical. In the case of the Ukrainian power industry there is scope for all three. The current remedies proposed for this problem are competition and privatisation. The paper also shows how multi-donor teams of consultants have tried to quickly implement a complex restructuring within the industry, without a clear strategy, sequence, or adequate resources, at a time when the priorities for the industry itself have been to deal with the disturbances caused by the external political and economic environment.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125797159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a unique data-set collected in a consistent way over a number of different auctions to investigate how empirical regularities in sequential auctions depend on the number of lots sold in those auctions. It is shown that prices tend to decline faster in auctions in which a small number of lots were sold. Starting prices tend to be higher in auctions with fewer lots, while average prices are higher in auctions with more lots. Price declines do not appear to be localized at the end of the auctions. Finally, there is no evidence of (i) serial correlation in prices, (ii) changes in price volatility over the course of each auction, and (iii) a systematic relationship between price volatility and number of lots sold.
{"title":"Auction Size and Price Dynamics in Sequential Auctions","authors":"G. Deltas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.150602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.150602","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a unique data-set collected in a consistent way over a number of different auctions to investigate how empirical regularities in sequential auctions depend on the number of lots sold in those auctions. It is shown that prices tend to decline faster in auctions in which a small number of lots were sold. Starting prices tend to be higher in auctions with fewer lots, while average prices are higher in auctions with more lots. Price declines do not appear to be localized at the end of the auctions. Finally, there is no evidence of (i) serial correlation in prices, (ii) changes in price volatility over the course of each auction, and (iii) a systematic relationship between price volatility and number of lots sold.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124552752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we examine the effects of the services provided by public infrastructure on the cost structure, private input demands, and productivity performance of twenty two-digit Greek manufacturing industries. The model of the paper is the dual cost function. Although the effects of public infrastructure varies across different industries our results provide evidence in favour of a productive public infrastructure. In addition, public infrastructure is found to be complement to private capital stock and substitute to labour. Specifically, the cost-saving impact of public infrastructure ranges from 0.02 percent in food manufacturing industry to 0.78 percent in wood and cork. Moreover, empirical evidence is provided in favour of the argument that the productivity growth of the majority of the twenty Greek manufacturing industries has been depressed by the observed shortage in public infrastructure in the eighties.
{"title":"Public Infrastructure, Private Input Demand, and Economic Performance of the Greek Industry","authors":"E. Mamatzakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.185635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.185635","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we examine the effects of the services provided by public infrastructure on the cost structure, private input demands, and productivity performance of twenty two-digit Greek manufacturing industries. The model of the paper is the dual cost function. Although the effects of public infrastructure varies across different industries our results provide evidence in favour of a productive public infrastructure. In addition, public infrastructure is found to be complement to private capital stock and substitute to labour. Specifically, the cost-saving impact of public infrastructure ranges from 0.02 percent in food manufacturing industry to 0.78 percent in wood and cork. Moreover, empirical evidence is provided in favour of the argument that the productivity growth of the majority of the twenty Greek manufacturing industries has been depressed by the observed shortage in public infrastructure in the eighties.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124960645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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