When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the final product, a firm may use proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed and open firms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which type of firm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from its long run equilibrium configuration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated by closed firms in the early history and by open firms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient biases in favor of open firms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed entry. Second, though initially closed firms can offset losses in one component with profits from another and thereby have better survival as compared to open firms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a closed firm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open firms. Finally, entry by an open firm improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open firm, especially when the two complementary sectors differ in size or efficiency.
{"title":"Returns to Specialization, Transaction Costs and the Dynamics of Industry Evolution","authors":"A. Arora, Farasat A. S. Bokhari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4191","url":null,"abstract":"When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the final product, a firm may use proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed and open firms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which type of firm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from its long run equilibrium configuration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated by closed firms in the early history and by open firms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient biases in favor of open firms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed entry. Second, though initially closed firms can offset losses in one component with profits from another and thereby have better survival as compared to open firms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a closed firm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open firms. Finally, entry by an open firm improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open firm, especially when the two complementary sectors differ in size or efficiency.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133079305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We discuss the effects of strategic commitments and of network size in the process of setting interconnection fees across competing networks. We also discuss the importance of the principles of reciprocity and imputation of interconnection charges on market equilibria. Reciprocity means that both networks charge the same for interconnection. Imputation means that a network charges its customers as much as it charges customers of the other network for the same service. Assuming that each consumer cannot subscribe to more than one network, we begin by analyzing a game of strategic symmetry where the two networks choose all prices simultaneously. Second, we allow a dominant network to set the interconnection fee before the opponent network can set its prices. This results in a price-squeeze on the rival network. Third, we show that the imposition of a reciprocity rule eliminates the strategic power of the first mover. Under reciprocity, one network sets the common interconnection fee at cost, and the equilibrium prices for final services are lower than in the two previous games without reciprocity. Moreover, prices under reciprocity obey the principle of imputation. In the long run, consumers subscribe to one of the two networks. Typically, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, including corner equilibria, where all consumers subscribe to the same network. However, under reciprocity, there are no corner equilibria.
{"title":"Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing","authors":"N. Economides, Giuseppe Lopomo, Glenn Woroch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the effects of strategic commitments and of network size in the process of setting interconnection fees across competing networks. We also discuss the importance of the principles of reciprocity and imputation of interconnection charges on market equilibria. Reciprocity means that both networks charge the same for interconnection. Imputation means that a network charges its customers as much as it charges customers of the other network for the same service. Assuming that each consumer cannot subscribe to more than one network, we begin by analyzing a game of strategic symmetry where the two networks choose all prices simultaneously. Second, we allow a dominant network to set the interconnection fee before the opponent network can set its prices. This results in a price-squeeze on the rival network. Third, we show that the imposition of a reciprocity rule eliminates the strategic power of the first mover. Under reciprocity, one network sets the common interconnection fee at cost, and the equilibrium prices for final services are lower than in the two previous games without reciprocity. Moreover, prices under reciprocity obey the principle of imputation. In the long run, consumers subscribe to one of the two networks. Typically, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, including corner equilibria, where all consumers subscribe to the same network. However, under reciprocity, there are no corner equilibria.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115586875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the seventies and eighties, the theory of exhaustible natural resources developed a branch, which was called the cartel-versus-fringe model, to characterize markets with one large coherent cartel and a big number of small suppliers named the fringe.It was considered appropriate to use the von Stackelberg solution concept but because solutions could only be derived in an open-loop framework time-inconsistency resulted.This paper solves time-inconsistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model and provides the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium for all cost configurations. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
{"title":"Strong Time-Consistency in the Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model","authors":"A. de Zeeuw, F. Groot, C. Withagen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1552","url":null,"abstract":"In the seventies and eighties, the theory of exhaustible natural resources developed a branch, which was called the cartel-versus-fringe model, to characterize markets with one large coherent cartel and a big number of small suppliers named the fringe.It was considered appropriate to use the von Stackelberg solution concept but because solutions could only be derived in an open-loop framework time-inconsistency resulted.This paper solves time-inconsistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model and provides the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium for all cost configurations. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132918131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the interaction of financing and output market decisions in a duopoly in which one firm is financially constrained and can borrow funds to finance production costs. Two ideas have been separately analyzed in previous work: Some authors argue that debt strategically affects a firm’s output market decisions, typically making it more aggressive; others argue that the threat of bankruptcy makes debt financing costly, typically making a firm less aggressive. Our model integrates both ideas; moreover, unlike most previous work, we derive debt as an optimal contract. Compared with a situation in which both firms are unconstrained, the constrained firm produces less, while its unconstrained rival produces more; prices are higher for both firms. Both firms’ outputs depend on the constrained firm’s internal funds; the relationship is U-shaped for the constrained firm and inversely U-shaped for its unconstrained rival. The unconstrained rival has a higher market share, not because of predation but because of the cost disadvantage of the financially constrained firm. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
{"title":"Financial Constraints and Product Market Competition: Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Incentives","authors":"Paul Povel, Michael Raith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.246992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.246992","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the interaction of financing and output market decisions in a duopoly in which one firm is financially constrained and can borrow funds to finance production costs. Two ideas have been separately analyzed in previous work: Some authors argue that debt strategically affects a firm’s output market decisions, typically making it more aggressive; others argue that the threat of bankruptcy makes debt financing costly, typically making a firm less aggressive. Our model integrates both ideas; moreover, unlike most previous work, we derive debt as an optimal contract. Compared with a situation in which both firms are unconstrained, the constrained firm produces less, while its unconstrained rival produces more; prices are higher for both firms. Both firms’ outputs depend on the constrained firm’s internal funds; the relationship is U-shaped for the constrained firm and inversely U-shaped for its unconstrained rival. The unconstrained rival has a higher market share, not because of predation but because of the cost disadvantage of the financially constrained firm. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116631108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.
{"title":"Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics","authors":"R. Albuquerque, Hugo Hopenhayn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.273255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.273255","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123359662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper formulates the inter-temporal R&D investment decision problem of private firms using an optimal stochastic control framework. The paper explicitly derives the R&D investment decision rule and the cross equations parameter restrictions imposed by the hypothesis of rational expectations, using only the Riccati equation, and not requiring the Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formula. Identification and estimation of the structural parameters are essential for evaluating policies to be free from Lucas critique. The paper finds conditions for identification of structural parameters, and discusses econometric procedures for estimation of structural parameters, and testing of the model.
{"title":"Firm's R&D Behavior Under Rational Expectations","authors":"Lakshmi K. Raut","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.41100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.41100","url":null,"abstract":"This paper formulates the inter-temporal R&D investment decision problem of private firms using an optimal stochastic control framework. The paper explicitly derives the R&D investment decision rule and the cross equations parameter restrictions imposed by the hypothesis of rational expectations, using only the Riccati equation, and not requiring the Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formula. Identification and estimation of the structural parameters are essential for evaluating policies to be free from Lucas critique. The paper finds conditions for identification of structural parameters, and discusses econometric procedures for estimation of structural parameters, and testing of the model.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125470074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.
{"title":"Imperfect Contract Enforcement","authors":"James E. Anderson, L. Young","doi":"10.3386/W8847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W8847","url":null,"abstract":"We model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"24 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122117938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides firm- and industry-level evidence on the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a large cross-section of industries. The analysis uses shocks to aggregate demand as surrogates for exogenous changes in the product market environment, dealing with concerns about the endogenous nature of the relation between financial structure and competitive performance. I find that debt financing has a negative impact on firm (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries where rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. In contrast, no such effects are observed for firms competing in high-debt industries. At the industry level, I find that markups are more countercyclical when industry debt is high. The cyclical dynamics I find for firm sales growth and for industry markups are consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) prediction that firms that rely more heavily on external financing are more prone to boost short-term profits at the expense of future sales in response to negative shocks to demand, and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions depend on the financial structures of their industry rivals.
{"title":"Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycles","authors":"Murillo Campello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.198228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.198228","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides firm- and industry-level evidence on the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a large cross-section of industries. The analysis uses shocks to aggregate demand as surrogates for exogenous changes in the product market environment, dealing with concerns about the endogenous nature of the relation between financial structure and competitive performance. I find that debt financing has a negative impact on firm (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries where rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. In contrast, no such effects are observed for firms competing in high-debt industries. At the industry level, I find that markups are more countercyclical when industry debt is high. The cyclical dynamics I find for firm sales growth and for industry markups are consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) prediction that firms that rely more heavily on external financing are more prone to boost short-term profits at the expense of future sales in response to negative shocks to demand, and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions depend on the financial structures of their industry rivals.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122502725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a simple model of 'four party' payment systems designed to consider recent moves to regulate interchange fees and other rules of credit card associations. In contrast to recent formal analyses emphasising the role of network effects in the decisions of customer and merchants to use credit cards, we provide a model without such effects. In so doing, we identify the key role played by customers who determine the choice of payment instrument and hence, impose costs and benefits on other parties to a payment system. This model yields new insights regarding the role played by card association rules as well as confirming results derived elsewhere. In particular, we demonstrate that 'no surcharge' rules can encourage transaction efficiency by eliminating payment instrument choice as a means of price discrimination. We also demonstrate that, even in the absence of network effects, a desire for balance drives both the socially optimal and privately profit maximising choice of interchange fees. The role of the interchange fee is to ensure that the customer internalises the impact of its decisions on other participants to a payment system rather than from a need to account for network effects alone. Thus, the presence or otherwise of network effects should not be the focus of regulatory attention.
{"title":"Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment Systems","authors":"J. Gans, Stephen P. King","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.286535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286535","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a simple model of 'four party' payment systems designed to consider recent moves to regulate interchange fees and other rules of credit card associations. In contrast to recent formal analyses emphasising the role of network effects in the decisions of customer and merchants to use credit cards, we provide a model without such effects. In so doing, we identify the key role played by customers who determine the choice of payment instrument and hence, impose costs and benefits on other parties to a payment system. This model yields new insights regarding the role played by card association rules as well as confirming results derived elsewhere. In particular, we demonstrate that 'no surcharge' rules can encourage transaction efficiency by eliminating payment instrument choice as a means of price discrimination. We also demonstrate that, even in the absence of network effects, a desire for balance drives both the socially optimal and privately profit maximising choice of interchange fees. The role of the interchange fee is to ensure that the customer internalises the impact of its decisions on other participants to a payment system rather than from a need to account for network effects alone. Thus, the presence or otherwise of network effects should not be the focus of regulatory attention.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133136156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state-owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state-owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.
{"title":"The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations","authors":"R. Nash, Jeffry Netter, W. Megginson, A. Poulsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.289882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289882","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state-owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state-owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124146567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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