Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-29
J. Carter
Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is always ‘held fixed’ when we go out to nearby possible worlds to assess whether the target belief is lucky in a way that is incompatible with knowledge. However, for those inclined to replace cognitive internalism with the extended mind thesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998), a very different, ‘active externalist’ version of the cognitive fixedness thesis becomes the relevant one for the purposes of assessing a belief’s safety. The aim here will be to develop this point in a way that draws out some of the important ramifications it has for how we think about safety, luck and knowledge.
{"title":"Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind","authors":"J. Carter","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-29","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is always ‘held fixed’ when we go out to nearby possible worlds to assess whether the target belief is lucky in a way that is incompatible with knowledge. However, for those inclined to replace cognitive internalism with the extended mind thesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998), a very different, ‘active externalist’ version of the cognitive fixedness thesis becomes the relevant one for the purposes of assessing a belief’s safety. The aim here will be to develop this point in a way that draws out some of the important ramifications it has for how we think about safety, luck and knowledge.","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128079955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-13
N. Rescher
{"title":"The Probability Account of Luck","authors":"N. Rescher","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115929686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-31
K. Teigen
{"title":"Luck And Risk","authors":"K. Teigen","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134534900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-17
Rachel McKinnon
{"title":"Luck and Norms","authors":"Rachel McKinnon","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114352472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-35
J. Trout
{"title":"Luck In Science 1","authors":"J. Trout","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-35","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124544809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-10
Andrew Latus
{"title":"Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams on Moral Luck","authors":"Andrew Latus","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122010940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-01DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-14
R. Peels
On two earlier occasions, I have spelled out and defended what, henceforth, I call a Mixed Account of luck. 1 It is mixed because it combines the conditions of two main rival accounts of luck: the control condition and the modal condition. Moreover, it also has a significance condition (see Peels 2015: 77–79; 2017: 200–207). Since my account had to be sketchy on those earlier occasions, I am glad that the editors have invited me to spell out my view in more detail, contrast it with various other accounts, and defend it against objections.
{"title":"The Mixed Account of Luck","authors":"R. Peels","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-14","url":null,"abstract":"On two earlier occasions, I have spelled out and defended what, henceforth, I call a Mixed Account of luck. 1 It is mixed because it combines the conditions of two main rival accounts of luck: the control condition and the modal condition. Moreover, it also has a significance condition (see Peels 2015: 77–79; 2017: 200–207). Since my account had to be sketchy on those earlier occasions, I am glad that the editors have invited me to spell out my view in more detail, contrast it with various other accounts, and defend it against objections.","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115402195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Plato’s Theaetetus, we are asked to consider the difference between knowledge and mere opinion. Knowledge, we learn, must be about something that is true. While you might have a false opinion, you cannot be said to properly know something when it’s false. And drawing from imagery in the Meno, we might add that knowledge is “tied down” in a way that a mere opinion is not—if you know that p then you have reason or justification for believing p. Mere opinions are fragile in a way that knowledge is not. Mere opinions might be swayed via rhetoric or persuasion. Knowledge, it’s thought, is gained via education and is far less fragile. In sum, then, mere opinions are beliefs that are supported by little or at least insufficient justification and may or may not be true. And knowledge, in contrast, is a belief that is true and sufficiently justified. Belief, sufficient justification, and truth were considered, since time immemorial (or so the story goes), to be necessary conditions on knowledge. In his seminal 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Edmund Gettier argued that, while justification, truth, and belief may be necessary for knowledge, such conditions are not (when taken together) sufficient for knowledge. In other words, Gettier argued that a belief could be justified and true and yet fail to be an instance of knowledge.
{"title":"The Gettier Problem","authors":"Ian M. Church","doi":"10.1017/9781316827413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316827413","url":null,"abstract":"In Plato’s Theaetetus, we are asked to consider the difference between knowledge and mere opinion. Knowledge, we learn, must be about something that is true. While you might have a false opinion, you cannot be said to properly know something when it’s false. And drawing from imagery in the Meno, we might add that knowledge is “tied down” in a way that a mere opinion is not—if you know that p then you have reason or justification for believing p. Mere opinions are fragile in a way that knowledge is not. Mere opinions might be swayed via rhetoric or persuasion. Knowledge, it’s thought, is gained via education and is far less fragile. In sum, then, mere opinions are beliefs that are supported by little or at least insufficient justification and may or may not be true. And knowledge, in contrast, is a belief that is true and sufficiently justified. Belief, sufficient justification, and truth were considered, since time immemorial (or so the story goes), to be necessary conditions on knowledge. In his seminal 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Edmund Gettier argued that, while justification, truth, and belief may be necessary for knowledge, such conditions are not (when taken together) sufficient for knowledge. In other words, Gettier argued that a belief could be justified and true and yet fail to be an instance of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121342190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-38
C. McLeod, Jody Tomchishen
{"title":"Feminist Approaches To Moral Luck","authors":"C. McLeod, Jody Tomchishen","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-38","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"72 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132055775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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