Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-16
F. Broncano-Berrocal
The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted events whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. I turn to evaluating the modal and probabilistic views and argue, firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly, that they also fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. Finally, I defend the lack of control view. In particular, I argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic and modal accounts and that it can explain how degrees of luck and risk covary. 4th of July of 1943, 11:07 pm. A Consolidated B-24 Liberator takes off from Gibraltar Airport. It carries Władysław Sikorski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile. Sixteen seconds after takeoff the aircraft crashes into the sea. Sikorski dies along with ten other people. The pilot, Flight Lieutenant Eduard Prchal, survives. Later investigations of this World War II event failed to pin down the specific cause of the accident, but it is believed that the elevator system of the aircraft was jammed. Prchal’s efforts to move the stick of the steering mechanism were all in vain. He could not pull up and the plane lost height quickly. Inevitably, it ended in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar. Prchal’s lucky survival and events alike suggest that there is a close connection between luck and risk. For a lot of risk is involved in taking off in an aircraft whose elevator system is jammed, and a lot of luck is involved if that risk is materialized, the aircraft crashes and yet one survives against all odds. Indeed, cases of this sort give prima facie reason to think that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. In this paper, I aim to explore this hypothesis. Here is the plan. In §1, I will take a closer look at the luck as risk hypothesis in the light of the parallelisms between both phenomena and introduce three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic
{"title":"Luck As Risk","authors":"F. Broncano-Berrocal","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-16","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted events whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. I turn to evaluating the modal and probabilistic views and argue, firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly, that they also fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. Finally, I defend the lack of control view. In particular, I argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic and modal accounts and that it can explain how degrees of luck and risk covary. 4th of July of 1943, 11:07 pm. A Consolidated B-24 Liberator takes off from Gibraltar Airport. It carries Władysław Sikorski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile. Sixteen seconds after takeoff the aircraft crashes into the sea. Sikorski dies along with ten other people. The pilot, Flight Lieutenant Eduard Prchal, survives. Later investigations of this World War II event failed to pin down the specific cause of the accident, but it is believed that the elevator system of the aircraft was jammed. Prchal’s efforts to move the stick of the steering mechanism were all in vain. He could not pull up and the plane lost height quickly. Inevitably, it ended in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar. Prchal’s lucky survival and events alike suggest that there is a close connection between luck and risk. For a lot of risk is involved in taking off in an aircraft whose elevator system is jammed, and a lot of luck is involved if that risk is materialized, the aircraft crashes and yet one survives against all odds. Indeed, cases of this sort give prima facie reason to think that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. In this paper, I aim to explore this hypothesis. Here is the plan. In §1, I will take a closer look at the luck as risk hypothesis in the light of the parallelisms between both phenomena and introduce three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121149962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-34
M. Smith, Piers Worth
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{"title":"Luck","authors":"Ian M. Church, R. J. Hartman","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133805015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-26
Tim Black
{"title":"Anti-Luck Epistemology","authors":"Tim Black","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-26","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124400584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-20
M. J. Zimmerman
{"title":"Denying Moral Luck","authors":"M. J. Zimmerman","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-20","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"372 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120863023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-28
J. Greco
{"title":"Luck and Skepticism","authors":"J. Greco","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-28","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127551206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-11
D. Pritchard
{"title":"Modal Accounts of Luck","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115839360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-40
J. Wessling
{"title":"Theology And Luck","authors":"J. Wessling","doi":"10.4324/9781351258760-40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-40","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158662,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127601390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-22
L. Ekstrom
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When and why are inequalities unjust? Luck egalitarians have argued that, as a matter of distributive justice, the focus should be on eliminating inequalities resulting from bad brute luck rather than those resulting from personal choice. G.A. Cohen, for instance, writes that his “animating conviction” with respect to distributive justice is that “an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust” (Cohen 2008: 7).1 Luck egalitarianism makes personal responsibility the key factor affecting the justice or injustice of an unequal distribution of goods. It recognizes that in the course of pursuing our life plans, we may voluntarily choose to work more or less to earn certain goods, and we may benefit more or less from taking calculated risks. But it also emphasizes that a great many inequalities are traceable to factors beyond even our partial control, such as the wealth of one’s parents or one’s natural endowments, and that the influence of these factors on our opportunities and outcomes should be eliminated. Luck egalitarianism has come under fire from relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson (1999; 2010) and Samuel Scheffler (2003; 2005) who argue that, by focusing on responsibility and luck, it loses sight of the core egalitarian justice concern. This core concern, as Anderson puts it, is to resist oppression and to establish a community of social equals (Anderson 1999: 288-289). Because luck egalitarianism, as a matter of distributive justice, allows in principle both extreme poverty and invasive or stigmatizing judgments of personal responsibility for those who have made bad choices, it threatens those individuals’ ability to function as free and equal members of the moral community. The point is not just that ne’er-do-wells and criminals retain their basic moral rights. It is that honest, hardworking people who find themselves unable to provide for themselves (e.g., simply because their reasonable calculated risks did not work out) may then be publicly scrutinized for their failures before being provided aid. Relational egalitarians argue that whatever inequalities we allow, they must not undermine people’s social dignity.2
什么时候，为什么不平等是不公正的?运气平等主义者认为，从分配正义的角度来看，重点应该放在消除由糟糕的运气造成的不平等，而不是由个人选择造成的不平等。例如，G.A.科恩(G.A. Cohen)写道，他关于分配正义的“令人振奋的信念”是，“一个不平等的分配，其不平等不能通过(某些)相关受影响主体的某些选择、错误或放弃来证明是不公平的，因此，从本质上讲，是不公平的”(Cohen 2008: 7)运气平均主义使个人责任成为影响商品分配不平等的公正与否的关键因素。它承认，在追求我们的人生计划的过程中，我们可以自愿选择或多或少地工作来赚取某些商品，我们可以或多或少地从经过计算的风险中获益。但它也强调，许多不平等可以追溯到我们无法部分控制的因素，比如父母的财富或一个人的天赋，这些因素对我们的机会和结果的影响应该消除。运气平均主义受到了关系平均主义者的抨击，比如Elizabeth Anderson (1999;塞缪尔·舍弗勒(2003;2005)，他们认为，通过关注责任和运气，它忽略了核心的平等正义问题。正如安德森所说，这个核心问题是抵制压迫，建立一个社会平等的社区(Anderson 1999: 288-289)。因为运气平均主义，作为一个分配正义的问题，原则上允许极端贫困和对那些做出错误选择的人的个人责任进行侵入性或污名化的判断，它威胁到这些个人作为道德社区自由和平等成员的能力。问题的关键不仅在于不法者和罪犯保留了他们的基本道德权利。诚实、勤奋的人发现自己无法养活自己(例如，仅仅因为他们合理计算的风险没有实现)，那么在获得援助之前，他们的失败可能会受到公众的审查。关系平等主义者认为，无论我们允许怎样的不平等，都不能损害人们的社会尊严
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