The authors study the link between export product variety and country productivity based on data from 34 industrial and developing countries, from 1982 to 1997. They measure export product variety by the share of U.S. imports on the set of goods exported by each sampled country relative to the world. It is a theoretically sound index which is consistent with within-country GDP maximization, as well as cross-country comparison. They construct country productivity based on relative endowments and product variety. Increases in output product variety improve country productivity as the new mix of output may better use resources of the economy, and improve allocation efficiency. Such effects depend on the elasticity of substitution in production between the different varieties. The more different the varieties are in terms of production, the more efficient it is to use the endowments of the economy when a new variety is available, which leads to productivity gains. In addition, as suggested in the literature, export product variety depends on trade costs, such as tariffs, distance, and transport costs. Such trade cost variables are used as instruments to help the authors identify the effects of export variety on country productivity. Empirical evidence supports their hypothesis. Overall, while export variety accounts for only 2 percent of cross-country productivity differences, it explains 13 percent of within-country productivity growth. A 10 percent increase in the export variety of all industries leads to a 1.3 percent increase in country productivity, while a 10 percentage point increase in tariffs facing an exporting country leads to a 2 percent fall in country productivity.
{"title":"Export Variety and Country Productivity","authors":"R. Feenstra, H. Kee","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-3412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3412","url":null,"abstract":"The authors study the link between export product variety and country productivity based on data from 34 industrial and developing countries, from 1982 to 1997. They measure export product variety by the share of U.S. imports on the set of goods exported by each sampled country relative to the world. It is a theoretically sound index which is consistent with within-country GDP maximization, as well as cross-country comparison. They construct country productivity based on relative endowments and product variety. Increases in output product variety improve country productivity as the new mix of output may better use resources of the economy, and improve allocation efficiency. Such effects depend on the elasticity of substitution in production between the different varieties. The more different the varieties are in terms of production, the more efficient it is to use the endowments of the economy when a new variety is available, which leads to productivity gains. In addition, as suggested in the literature, export product variety depends on trade costs, such as tariffs, distance, and transport costs. Such trade cost variables are used as instruments to help the authors identify the effects of export variety on country productivity. Empirical evidence supports their hypothesis. Overall, while export variety accounts for only 2 percent of cross-country productivity differences, it explains 13 percent of within-country productivity growth. A 10 percent increase in the export variety of all industries leads to a 1.3 percent increase in country productivity, while a 10 percentage point increase in tariffs facing an exporting country leads to a 2 percent fall in country productivity.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130150050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite recently announced delays, Basel II - the new standard for bank capital - is due to be completed this year for implementation in the 13 Basel Committee member countries by the end of 2006. Should the other 170 plus member countries of the World Bank also adopt Basel II? Basel II was not written with developing countries in mind, but that does not necessarily mean that there is nothing in it for developing countries or that it can be ignored. Basels I and II represent a wide Sea of Standards. This paper suggests five alternative island-standards and five navigational tools to help countries choose their preferred island within the sea. It is suggested that for some developing countries the standardized approach will yield little in terms of linking regulatory capital to risk, but that countries may need many years of work to adopt the more advanced internal rating-based approach. The paper then proposes a centralized rating-based approach as a transition measure. The paper also makes proposals regarding a set of largely unresolved cross-border issues.
{"title":"Basel Ii and Developing Countries: Sailing Through the Sea of Standards","authors":"A. Powell","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-3387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3387","url":null,"abstract":"Despite recently announced delays, Basel II - the new standard for bank capital - is due to be completed this year for implementation in the 13 Basel Committee member countries by the end of 2006. Should the other 170 plus member countries of the World Bank also adopt Basel II? Basel II was not written with developing countries in mind, but that does not necessarily mean that there is nothing in it for developing countries or that it can be ignored. Basels I and II represent a wide Sea of Standards. This paper suggests five alternative island-standards and five navigational tools to help countries choose their preferred island within the sea. It is suggested that for some developing countries the standardized approach will yield little in terms of linking regulatory capital to risk, but that countries may need many years of work to adopt the more advanced internal rating-based approach. The paper then proposes a centralized rating-based approach as a transition measure. The paper also makes proposals regarding a set of largely unresolved cross-border issues.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127146544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors reexamine the role of financial market development in the intersectoral allocation of resources. First, they characterize the assumptions underlying previous work in this area, in particular, that of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The authors argue that Rajan and Zingales (1998) implicitly test whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global shocks to growth opportunities. Second, the authors propose a more efficient alternative test of this hypothesis using statistical techniques developed in the social networks literature. Specifically, they find that countries have more highly correlated growth rates across sectors when they have well-developed financial markets, suggesting that financial markets play an important role in allowing firms to take advantage of global growth opportunities. These results are particularly strong when financial development takes into account both the level and composition of financial development: private banking appears to play a particularly important role in resource allocation. The authors'technique allows them to further distinguish between the"growth opportunities"hypothesis stated above and the alternative"finance and external dependence"hypothesis, which implies that countries with similar levels of financial development should specialize in similar sectors. They do not find evidence to support this alternative view of finance and development.
{"title":"Patterns of Industrial Development Revisited: The Role of Finance","authors":"Raymond J. Fisman, Inessa Love","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2877","url":null,"abstract":"The authors reexamine the role of financial market development in the intersectoral allocation of resources. First, they characterize the assumptions underlying previous work in this area, in particular, that of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The authors argue that Rajan and Zingales (1998) implicitly test whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global shocks to growth opportunities. Second, the authors propose a more efficient alternative test of this hypothesis using statistical techniques developed in the social networks literature. Specifically, they find that countries have more highly correlated growth rates across sectors when they have well-developed financial markets, suggesting that financial markets play an important role in allowing firms to take advantage of global growth opportunities. These results are particularly strong when financial development takes into account both the level and composition of financial development: private banking appears to play a particularly important role in resource allocation. The authors'technique allows them to further distinguish between the\"growth opportunities\"hypothesis stated above and the alternative\"finance and external dependence\"hypothesis, which implies that countries with similar levels of financial development should specialize in similar sectors. They do not find evidence to support this alternative view of finance and development.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127693511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors examine regional cooperation among neighboring countries in the area of regional public goods. These public goods include water basins (such as lakes, rivers, and underground water), infrastructure (such as roads, railways, and dams), energy, and the environment. Their analysis focuses on developing countries and the potentially beneficial role that international organizations and regional integration may play in bringing the relevant countries to a cooperative equilibrium. A major problem in reaching a cooperative solution is likely to be the lack of trust. If neighboring countries do not trust each other because of past problems, they may fail to reach a cooperative solution as each tries to maximize its gain from the regional public good. These strategies typically do not account for spillover effects and ultimately leads to losses for all parties. Other constraints on reaching a cooperative solution are its complexity and the financial requirements. Two types of institutions may help resolve some or all of these problems. International organizations can help with trust, expertise, and financing. The United Nations and the World Bank have been involved in a number of such projects in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, and have been successful in helping parties reach cooperative solutions. Regional integration agreements, though not necessary for regional cooperation, may also be helpful by embedding the negotiations on regional cooperation in a broader institutional framework. The authors examine these issues with the support of both analysis and a number of case studies.
{"title":"Regional Cooperation, and the Role of International Organizations and Regional Integration","authors":"M. Schiff, L. Winters","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2872","url":null,"abstract":"The authors examine regional cooperation among neighboring countries in the area of regional public goods. These public goods include water basins (such as lakes, rivers, and underground water), infrastructure (such as roads, railways, and dams), energy, and the environment. Their analysis focuses on developing countries and the potentially beneficial role that international organizations and regional integration may play in bringing the relevant countries to a cooperative equilibrium. A major problem in reaching a cooperative solution is likely to be the lack of trust. If neighboring countries do not trust each other because of past problems, they may fail to reach a cooperative solution as each tries to maximize its gain from the regional public good. These strategies typically do not account for spillover effects and ultimately leads to losses for all parties. Other constraints on reaching a cooperative solution are its complexity and the financial requirements. Two types of institutions may help resolve some or all of these problems. International organizations can help with trust, expertise, and financing. The United Nations and the World Bank have been involved in a number of such projects in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, and have been successful in helping parties reach cooperative solutions. Regional integration agreements, though not necessary for regional cooperation, may also be helpful by embedding the negotiations on regional cooperation in a broader institutional framework. The authors examine these issues with the support of both analysis and a number of case studies.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"14 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128796102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors explorethe labor dynamics of Russian enterprise restructuring, empirically assessing how patterns of job creation and destruction are related to various aspects of enterprise restructuring across firms in different sectors and regions, and to different forms, sizes, vintages, and performance characteristics of ownership. Evidence from case studies - based on more than 50 site visits in 2000 - suggests that jobs have been destroyed, but only to a limited degree in some sectors and regions, largely because of institutional and incentive constraints and a still-widespread"socialist"corporate culture. Jobs have been created - particularly in sectors where devaluation had the most pronounced effect on important substitution and export promotion - but only slowly, mostly for lack of skilled workers and because regional mobility is limited. Labor turnover appears higher within regions than across regions. Newly available data for 1996 - 99 (provided by Goskomstat) for about 128,000 enterprises in 24 industrial sectors in Russia's 89 regions indicates that the typical firm has experienced only modest downsizing - about 12 percent - in number of employees. Smaller firms have entered, and larger, mature businesses have exited some sectors. Except for a lull in 1998, the rate of job creation has steadily increased and the rate of job destruction has declined, dropping substantially in 1998 - 99."Voluntary"worker separations remain the main - and growing - form of layoff, and the proportion of layoffs through redundancies is shrinking (now about 4 percent of total separations). Firm size and net employment growth are not statistically related, but form of ownership seems to matter. Firm size is also statistically correlated (positively) with profitability, but restructuring through changes in net employment growth appears not to be. It seems Russian restructuring needs to become more efficient.
{"title":"Is Russia Restructuring? New Evidence on Job Creation and Destruction","authors":"H. Broadman, F. Recanatini","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2641","url":null,"abstract":"The authors explorethe labor dynamics of Russian enterprise restructuring, empirically assessing how patterns of job creation and destruction are related to various aspects of enterprise restructuring across firms in different sectors and regions, and to different forms, sizes, vintages, and performance characteristics of ownership. Evidence from case studies - based on more than 50 site visits in 2000 - suggests that jobs have been destroyed, but only to a limited degree in some sectors and regions, largely because of institutional and incentive constraints and a still-widespread\"socialist\"corporate culture. Jobs have been created - particularly in sectors where devaluation had the most pronounced effect on important substitution and export promotion - but only slowly, mostly for lack of skilled workers and because regional mobility is limited. Labor turnover appears higher within regions than across regions. Newly available data for 1996 - 99 (provided by Goskomstat) for about 128,000 enterprises in 24 industrial sectors in Russia's 89 regions indicates that the typical firm has experienced only modest downsizing - about 12 percent - in number of employees. Smaller firms have entered, and larger, mature businesses have exited some sectors. Except for a lull in 1998, the rate of job creation has steadily increased and the rate of job destruction has declined, dropping substantially in 1998 - 99.\"Voluntary\"worker separations remain the main - and growing - form of layoff, and the proportion of layoffs through redundancies is shrinking (now about 4 percent of total separations). Firm size and net employment growth are not statistically related, but form of ownership seems to matter. Firm size is also statistically correlated (positively) with profitability, but restructuring through changes in net employment growth appears not to be. It seems Russian restructuring needs to become more efficient.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122487232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Uganda's commercial debt buy-back operation was financed by the International Development Association's Debt Reduction Facility (IDA Facility), with cofinancing from the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and the European Union. Commercial debt service is a serious burden to many low-income economies. Yet, although the IDA Facility has existed since 1989, only a handful of countries have been able to avail themselves of its resources. That is not altogether surprising: commercial debt buy-backs can be extremely complex, requiring substantial preparation for a well-articulated external debt strategy based on comprehensive data. One objective in describing Uganda's operation is to discuss the requirements of the IDA Facility and to shed light on how Uganda satisfied them and on which areas needed special attention. Uganda's offer to buy back its uninsured commercial debt at a discout of 88 percent of face value was extremely successful. Of the total eligible debt of US $188 million, Uganda bought back debt worth US $153 million, reflecting a participation rate by creditors of 80 percent. As a result, most of Uganda's commercial debt has been eliminated. The remaining commercial obligations accrue to creditors that either have work in progress or that hold some form of security or collateral for their claims. Uganda's debt problems are far from resolved. Much of the country's Paris Club debt is ineligible for rescheduling because it was contracted after the cutoff date. Arrears owed to non-OECD bilateral creditors have continued to mount, as these creditors have resisted restructuring Uganda's obligations to them. And servicing that part of multilateral debt that is nonconcessional or less concessional also is a burden. Resolving Uganda's external debt problem will require concerted action on several fronts: 1) continued economic reform; 2) vigorous pursuit of export diversification and growth; and 3) no letup in seeking creative ways to restructure the debt portfolio. Uganda must find grant funding wherever possible, or contract only the most concessional debt.
{"title":"Restructuring Uganda's Debt: The Commercial Debt Buy-Back Operation","authors":"K. Kapoor","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-1409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1409","url":null,"abstract":"Uganda's commercial debt buy-back operation was financed by the International Development Association's Debt Reduction Facility (IDA Facility), with cofinancing from the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and the European Union. Commercial debt service is a serious burden to many low-income economies. Yet, although the IDA Facility has existed since 1989, only a handful of countries have been able to avail themselves of its resources. That is not altogether surprising: commercial debt buy-backs can be extremely complex, requiring substantial preparation for a well-articulated external debt strategy based on comprehensive data. One objective in describing Uganda's operation is to discuss the requirements of the IDA Facility and to shed light on how Uganda satisfied them and on which areas needed special attention. Uganda's offer to buy back its uninsured commercial debt at a discout of 88 percent of face value was extremely successful. Of the total eligible debt of US $188 million, Uganda bought back debt worth US $153 million, reflecting a participation rate by creditors of 80 percent. As a result, most of Uganda's commercial debt has been eliminated. The remaining commercial obligations accrue to creditors that either have work in progress or that hold some form of security or collateral for their claims. Uganda's debt problems are far from resolved. Much of the country's Paris Club debt is ineligible for rescheduling because it was contracted after the cutoff date. Arrears owed to non-OECD bilateral creditors have continued to mount, as these creditors have resisted restructuring Uganda's obligations to them. And servicing that part of multilateral debt that is nonconcessional or less concessional also is a burden. Resolving Uganda's external debt problem will require concerted action on several fronts: 1) continued economic reform; 2) vigorous pursuit of export diversification and growth; and 3) no letup in seeking creative ways to restructure the debt portfolio. Uganda must find grant funding wherever possible, or contract only the most concessional debt.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133144509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Exports respond unpredictably to a change in real exchange rates, suggests evidence from the 1980s. Recent theoretical work explains this as a consequence of the sunk costs associated with breaking into foreign markets. Sunk costs include the cost of packaging, upgrading product quality, establishing marketing channels, and accumulating information on demand sources. The authors use micro panel data to estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of participation in export markets, a model derived from the Krugman-Baldwin sunk-cost hysteresis framework. Applying the model to data on manufacturing plants in Colombia (1981-89), they test for the presence of sunk entry costs and quantify the importance of those costs in explaining export patterns. The econometric results reject the hypothesis that sunk costs are zero. The results, which control for both observed and unobserved sources of plant heterogeneity, indicate that prior export market experience has a substantial effect on the probability of exporting, but its effect depreciates fairly quickly. The reentry costs of plants that have been out of the export market for a year are substantially lower than the costs of a first-time exporter. After a year out of the export market, however, the reentry costs are not significantly different from the entry costs. Plant characteristics are also associated with export behavior: large old plants owned by corporations are more likely to export than other plants. Variations in plant-level cost and demand conditions have much less effect on the profitability of exporting than variations in macroeconomic conditions and sunk costs do. It appears especially difficult to break into foreign markets during periods of world recession.
{"title":"An Empirical Model of Sunk Costs and the Decision to Export","authors":"Mark J. Roberts, J. Tybout","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-1436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1436","url":null,"abstract":"Exports respond unpredictably to a change in real exchange rates, suggests evidence from the 1980s. Recent theoretical work explains this as a consequence of the sunk costs associated with breaking into foreign markets. Sunk costs include the cost of packaging, upgrading product quality, establishing marketing channels, and accumulating information on demand sources. The authors use micro panel data to estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of participation in export markets, a model derived from the Krugman-Baldwin sunk-cost hysteresis framework. Applying the model to data on manufacturing plants in Colombia (1981-89), they test for the presence of sunk entry costs and quantify the importance of those costs in explaining export patterns. The econometric results reject the hypothesis that sunk costs are zero. The results, which control for both observed and unobserved sources of plant heterogeneity, indicate that prior export market experience has a substantial effect on the probability of exporting, but its effect depreciates fairly quickly. The reentry costs of plants that have been out of the export market for a year are substantially lower than the costs of a first-time exporter. After a year out of the export market, however, the reentry costs are not significantly different from the entry costs. Plant characteristics are also associated with export behavior: large old plants owned by corporations are more likely to export than other plants. Variations in plant-level cost and demand conditions have much less effect on the profitability of exporting than variations in macroeconomic conditions and sunk costs do. It appears especially difficult to break into foreign markets during periods of world recession.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125222811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International mutual funds are one of the main channels for capital flows to emerging economies. Although mutual funds have become important contributors to financial market integration, little is known about their investment allocation, and strategies. The authors provide an overview of mutual fund activity in emerging markets. First, they describe international mutual funds' relative size, asset allocation, and country allocation. Second, they focus on fund behavior during crises, by analyzing data at the level of both investors, and fund managers. Among their findings: Equity investment in emerging markets has grown rapidly in the 1990s, much of it flowing through mutual funds. Collectively, these funds hold a sizable share of market capitalization in emerging economies. Asian, and Latin American funds achieved the fastest growth, but are smaller than domestic U.S. funds and world funds. When investigating abroad, U.S. mutual funds invest more in equity than in bonds. World funds invest mainly in developed nations (Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States). Ten percent of their investment is in Asia, and Latin America. Mutual funds usually invest in a few countries within each region. Mutual fund investment was very responsive to the crises of the 1990s. Withdrawals from emerging markets during recent crises were large, which squares with existing evidence of financial contagion. Investments in Asian, and Latin American mutual funds are volatile. Because redemptions, and injections are large, relative to total funds under management, fund's flows are not stable. The cash held by managers during injections, and redemptions does not fluctuate significantly, so investors' actions are typically reflected in emerging market inflows, and outflows.
{"title":"Mutual Fund Investment in Emerging Markets: An Overview","authors":"G. Kaminsky, R. Lyons, S. Schmukler","doi":"10.1093/WBER/15.2.315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/WBER/15.2.315","url":null,"abstract":"International mutual funds are one of the main channels for capital flows to emerging economies. Although mutual funds have become important contributors to financial market integration, little is known about their investment allocation, and strategies. The authors provide an overview of mutual fund activity in emerging markets. First, they describe international mutual funds' relative size, asset allocation, and country allocation. Second, they focus on fund behavior during crises, by analyzing data at the level of both investors, and fund managers. Among their findings: Equity investment in emerging markets has grown rapidly in the 1990s, much of it flowing through mutual funds. Collectively, these funds hold a sizable share of market capitalization in emerging economies. Asian, and Latin American funds achieved the fastest growth, but are smaller than domestic U.S. funds and world funds. When investigating abroad, U.S. mutual funds invest more in equity than in bonds. World funds invest mainly in developed nations (Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States). Ten percent of their investment is in Asia, and Latin America. Mutual funds usually invest in a few countries within each region. Mutual fund investment was very responsive to the crises of the 1990s. Withdrawals from emerging markets during recent crises were large, which squares with existing evidence of financial contagion. Investments in Asian, and Latin American mutual funds are volatile. Because redemptions, and injections are large, relative to total funds under management, fund's flows are not stable. The cash held by managers during injections, and redemptions does not fluctuate significantly, so investors' actions are typically reflected in emerging market inflows, and outflows.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122432014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intellectual property rights affect international trade flows when protected goods move across national boundaries. And intellectual property rights have grown in importance as the share of knowledge-intensive or high-technology products in international trade has doubled (from 12 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1994). The authors report new evidence about how protecting intellectual property rights affects international trade flows of nonfuel trade products. Employing a gravity model of bilateral trade, they estimate the effects of increased protection on a cross-section of 89 x 88 countries. To address estimation problems associated with zero trade flows between countries, they adopt a bivariate distributed probit regression mode. Their results confirm previous findings: stronger protection of intellectual property rights increase bilateral trade flows of manufactured nonfuel imports. But the results do not hold for trade flows in high technology, where the effect of protection intellectual property rights was found to be insignificant.
{"title":"How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows","authors":"C. Braga, C. Fink","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2051","url":null,"abstract":"Intellectual property rights affect international trade flows when protected goods move across national boundaries. And intellectual property rights have grown in importance as the share of knowledge-intensive or high-technology products in international trade has doubled (from 12 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1994). The authors report new evidence about how protecting intellectual property rights affects international trade flows of nonfuel trade products. Employing a gravity model of bilateral trade, they estimate the effects of increased protection on a cross-section of 89 x 88 countries. To address estimation problems associated with zero trade flows between countries, they adopt a bivariate distributed probit regression mode. Their results confirm previous findings: stronger protection of intellectual property rights increase bilateral trade flows of manufactured nonfuel imports. But the results do not hold for trade flows in high technology, where the effect of protection intellectual property rights was found to be insignificant.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129054628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nearly 100 countries have experienced bank insolvencies in the past 20 years. Weakness in the financial sectors of many countries is reflected in the size of the insolvencies -in many cases, the cost of bailout exceeded 15 percent of GDP- and the fact that these crises often recur. Because a strong financial sector is important for economic growth, the World Bank has increasingly granted loans with conditions attached to achieve specific financial sector reforms. The Bank often employs financial sector adjustment loans (FSALs) or, in poorer countries, credits (FSACs). FSALs are generally more comprehensive than other types of interventions and tend to concentrate on the reform areas most closely linked to the operations of deposit banks. Since 1990, their main focus has shifted from improving prudential regulations and correcting interest rate distortions to privatizing and recapitalizing banks. The author examines whether 1) initial conditions in a recipient country explain a substantial amount of the variation in intervention outcomes (as measured by post-intervention financial deepening) and 2) whether the changing nature of interventions has had implications for their success. He finds that: 1) the decline in post-intervention performance since 1990 cannot be attributed solely toinitial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions in the recipient country. 2) When initial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions were controlled for, certain types of reform, especially those dealing with prudential regulations, were associated with relatively large increases in the ration of money supply (M2) to GDP. Those dealing with recapitalization have also been relatively successful, especially when they also tackled prudential regulation or banking supervision. Those that focused on supervision did not, on average, substantially outperform those that did not, on average, focus on supervision. And reform focused on bank privatization was associated with much less financial deepening three years after the intervention. 3) In addition to reform aimed at institutional strengthening, the reform environment itself had a substantial impact on intervention outcomes. Financial deepening was positively associated with macroeconomic stability (low inflation) and an initially underdeveloped financial sector. 4) As the Bank's operational directives suggest, some macroeconomic stability is important for the success of financial sector interventions, especialy those that incorporate interest rate liberalization. While it may be best to move more aggressively on financial reform when macroeconomic circumstances are favorable,"visible"reform (such as privatization or interest rate deregulation) should be slowed down rather than abandoned in less fortunate circumstances. By contrast, less visible institution-building efforts should be continued regardless of macroeconomic conditions.
{"title":"Financial Sector Adjustment Lending: A Mid-Course Analysis","authors":"Robert J. Cull","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-1804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1804","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly 100 countries have experienced bank insolvencies in the past 20 years. Weakness in the financial sectors of many countries is reflected in the size of the insolvencies -in many cases, the cost of bailout exceeded 15 percent of GDP- and the fact that these crises often recur. Because a strong financial sector is important for economic growth, the World Bank has increasingly granted loans with conditions attached to achieve specific financial sector reforms. The Bank often employs financial sector adjustment loans (FSALs) or, in poorer countries, credits (FSACs). FSALs are generally more comprehensive than other types of interventions and tend to concentrate on the reform areas most closely linked to the operations of deposit banks. Since 1990, their main focus has shifted from improving prudential regulations and correcting interest rate distortions to privatizing and recapitalizing banks. The author examines whether 1) initial conditions in a recipient country explain a substantial amount of the variation in intervention outcomes (as measured by post-intervention financial deepening) and 2) whether the changing nature of interventions has had implications for their success. He finds that: 1) the decline in post-intervention performance since 1990 cannot be attributed solely toinitial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions in the recipient country. 2) When initial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions were controlled for, certain types of reform, especially those dealing with prudential regulations, were associated with relatively large increases in the ration of money supply (M2) to GDP. Those dealing with recapitalization have also been relatively successful, especially when they also tackled prudential regulation or banking supervision. Those that focused on supervision did not, on average, substantially outperform those that did not, on average, focus on supervision. And reform focused on bank privatization was associated with much less financial deepening three years after the intervention. 3) In addition to reform aimed at institutional strengthening, the reform environment itself had a substantial impact on intervention outcomes. Financial deepening was positively associated with macroeconomic stability (low inflation) and an initially underdeveloped financial sector. 4) As the Bank's operational directives suggest, some macroeconomic stability is important for the success of financial sector interventions, especialy those that incorporate interest rate liberalization. While it may be best to move more aggressively on financial reform when macroeconomic circumstances are favorable,\"visible\"reform (such as privatization or interest rate deregulation) should be slowed down rather than abandoned in less fortunate circumstances. By contrast, less visible institution-building efforts should be continued regardless of macroeconomic conditions.","PeriodicalId":166412,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: International Economics (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117050174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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