International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities最新文献

{"title":"Does Art Have A Truth-Seeking Project?","authors":"S. Schlassa","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1174","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123740863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Belief Revision in the Context of Hume’s Treatise and Contemporary Psychology","authors":"Sarah Paquette","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1173","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the emotional and social motivations of belief and belief correction. As beliefs motivate one’s actions, one must examine how one revises an erroneous or harmful belief and what methodology one can employ in order to best facilitate this revision, resulting in more conscientious action. This paper examines belief formation and revision in the context of David Hume’s 1739-1740 work A Treatise of Human Nature, with particular attention to not only Hume’s account of belief and belief revision, but also the interaction of passions, the mechanism of sympathy, reason, and probability judgments. It is hypothesized Hume’s theory of belief will be reflected in contemporary psychology and cognitive science, with individuals more likely to revise their beliefs based emotional and social factors and experiences proposed by Hume. Sarah Paquette Portland State University s.a.paquette@icloud.com https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1173 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1173 Res Cogitans Introduction David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature maintains a uniquely prescient outlook in philosophy, as well as contemporary cognitive research. As Hume recognized, not only the relationship between philosophy and science, but that science can be used to examine human nature,1 he set his sights on uncovering the science of the mind, posited as discoverable using a framework established by the sciences of the time: observation and experimentation. We must first understand the mind in order to understand other sciences, as the mind is the foundation upon which all other sciences rest.2 Hume hypothesized that this new science of the mind is deciphered through “cautious observation of human life,” best conducted in their natural environments as they occur, and in all manner of states.3 Considering Hume’s empirical framework and dedication to uncovering the natural operations of the mind, he may well have been one of the first psychologists in the contemporary sense of the word, fitting cognitive research into his philosophical objectives rather neatly. It is my intention to assess Hume’s account of belief and to further analyze the contributions the Treatise may have granted contemporary psychology. In order to explore the subject, it becomes imperative to examine Hume’s account of belief, probability, passions, and the mechanism of sympathy. I therefore aim to establish Hume’s outlined theory will be reflected in contemporary research, with individuals being more likely to revise beliefs based on emotions, as proposed by Hume. Hume’s Treatise Examined Belief & Probability Belief, defined by Hume, is any opinion or recollection that is “a lively idea related with a present impression”.4 This proposes that beliefs are informed by conceptions of past experiences captured with sensory, cognitive, and passionate faculties. An 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), T Intr","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"306 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114589585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Camus and Levinas: Embracing the Absurd While Finding Meaning","authors":"Susana Camacho Plascencia","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1176","url":null,"abstract":"Albert Camus’ idea of the absurd lands one in nihilism and the danger of rationally justified suicide. His attempt to solve this problem fails because it requires that one make an arbitrary choice to live without having good reasons to do so. By using Levinas’ ethics of an infinite responsibility and distinguishing between two types of meaning (cosmic and terrestrial), I propose that one can accept the condition of the absurd—where no cosmic meaning exists—and escape the problem of suicide by finding terrestrial meaning in our relations to others. Susana Camacho Plascencia Central Washington University camachopls@cwu.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1176 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1176 Res Cogitans Should people live or commit suicide? This is what Camus considers the most important question in philosophy, and he sets out to answer it by discussing the absurd. The absurd is the desire to find meaning in a world that does not have any; but Camus tries to answer the basic question of life or suicide in favor of life by proposing that people choose to live despite the lack of meaning. His solution is not very convincing; the absurd leaves people without meaning or the possibility for ethics. By considering Levinas’ ethical relation of the one and the other, one can embrace the absurd and still have meaning in their lives. This way, there is a convincing answer that people should live. From the individualistic view he adopts, Camus focuses on cosmic meaning, which is meaning within the world. His rational approach prevents him from recognizing terrestrial meaning, which is found in people’s lives and is independent of the world. What Levinas describes as meaning in the relation of the one to the other is a type of terrestrial meaning, and one that is significant without being arbitrary. Camus’ claim that people can be happy living with the absurd fails to avoid suicide because the arbitrary choice that would bring someone happiness is inconsistent with the passivity of the absurd. Since meaning is necessary for life and happiness, one cannot genuinely live happily by accepting Camus’ idea of the absurd without any meaning. In addition to a lack of meaning, Camus’ idea of the absurd has no possibility for a valid ethics. I propose that instead of arbitrarily choosing to be happy while living without any meaning, people should embrace the absurd in relation to the world and recognize the possibility to find meaning in the ethical relation to others. In The Myth of Sisyphus (MS), Albert Camus introduces the idea of the absurd, which is the contrast between the reality of the meaninglessness of the world and the human desire to find meaning in it. He says that the world is not rational in a way that coincides with human reason, and “What is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart” (MS 455). The world is indifferent to human beings, who are just another species res","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126398122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Salvation or Damnation, and where Ethics Fits in to all That","authors":"S. Zepf","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1179","url":null,"abstract":"Ignazio Silone’s novel Bread and Wine explores the complex nature of ethical decision-making in the context of Fascist Italy, a world in which lofty concerns of moral conduct seem the fodder of fools and idealists. Silone uses his central character, firebrand and part-time philosopher Pietro Spina, to plunge his readers into one man’s quest for goodness within the debauchery and despair of war-torn Italy. Pietro’s moral development through the context of his adventures illustrates the challenge of crafting any sound ethical code, and the ease with which one might be lost to cynicism or indifference. The road marks of Pietro’s philosophical evolution are explored through comparisons with Iris Murdoch’s work on moral vision, Elizabeth Anderson’s non-ideal theory, and the three crusaders of Samantha Vice, Ryan Preston-Roedder, and Vanessa Carbonell in their campaign for faith in humanity over cynicism. Sophie Zepf University of Portland zepf19@up.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1179 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1179 Res Cogitans Ignazio Silone’s novel Bread and Wine takes the readers on a wild ride through fascist Italy, as seen through the eyes of Pietro Spina, a one-man revolution in a world of pessimists. One could present Pietro as a less romantic version of James Bond, in his travels as a secret Communist revolutionary, complete with a priest disguise, clandestine meetings, and lots of secret note-passing. Throw in a bunch of worldweary Italian peasants, and Silone has himself a novel! Unconventional as it may be, Pietro’s search for justice in the harsh climate of fascist Italy strikes a familiar chord within anyone who has tried looking for light in what seems to be the darkest hour. Throughout his adventures, Pietro’s own philosophical evolution sheds light on the real life complexities of exercising moral judgment. This complexity can be usefully unpacked by drawing on Iris Murdoch’s work on moral vision, Elizabeth Anderson’s non-ideal theory, and recent work urging the need for faith in humanity to combat the threat of cynicism. Through Pietro, Silone illustrates the challenge of crafting any sound ethical code, while still providing a ray of hope in the tale of a good man’s fight for justice and truth. Both Pietro Spina and Iris Murdoch are connected through their particular and unique sense of moral vision. Pietro Spina first enters the reader’s awareness as a sort of ghostly rumor, floating above the mundane chatter of the other characters’ lives. The novel begins with two men named Nunzio and Concettino visiting Don Benedetto, a wizened and world-weary priest who was once their childhood teacher. Their conversation quickly turns to Pietro, another former student. Pietro is given a larger-thanlife reputation as an exiled firebrand and proponent of revolutionary communism. As it turns out, Nunzio runs into Pietro on his way back home, and quickly learns that Pietro has returned, hell-bent on turning Italy away from its fasc","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125493091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Emotions, Practical Rationality, and the Self","authors":"Tyler J. Flanagan","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1180","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I examine the relationship between emotions and practical rationality, arguing that emotions are incredibly useful in assisting us in making practical choices. However, this enthusiasm needs to be met with some caution as it not the case that every one of our emotions give us reasons we should be considering in order to make a rational choice, and there are times where if we did follow our hearts we would end up feeling ashamed or displeased with ourselves afterward. At the same time, we can feel guilty about a decision we made while purposefully ignoring our emotions when they tell us otherwise. It is ultimately those instances of reflexive shame or displeasure that tell us something about our agency. Our reflexive emotions show us what we should really care about and when we are failing to do so. And, since the purpose of making rational decisions is to properly attend to our goals and aspirations, part of being rational is to purse what we care about. Our reflexive emotions act as a guide to how well or how poorly we are doing just that. Tyler Flanagan University of Wisconsin Osh Kosh flanat23@uwosh.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1180 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1180 Res Cogitans In recent years research concerning emotions and rationality has revealed that our abilities to reason and deliberate are not as opposed to our emotions as was once thought.1 Because our emotions are evaluations about the world rather than baseless feelings, they are subject to correctness conditions and justification conditions. We ask for reasons as to why we experienced this or that emotion, so that emotions are not simply passive irrational or arational phenomena but rather one of the ways in which we examine and make sense of the world around us through our own eyes (Deonna & Teroni, 2012).2 We would never accuse someone of being irrational if they feared losing their job in itself because of how important it is to have a job in order to survive and be happy. However, we may tell the worker that their fear is misguided and false if their fear comes from being paranoid that their boss does not like them, when it turns out their boss likes them very much. Part of developing a more positive outlook on the relationship between emotions and rationality includes recent reflections on the role emotions play in our practical reasoning. In this paper I argue that our emotions can in fact positively contribute to our practical reasoning, but only a particular set of emotions actually assist us in making rational decisions. These are emotions that are authentic to ourselves as agents, and I posit that the only way to reliably tell if an emotional experience is authentically ours is through our reflexive emotions. As our emotions are thought to give us privileged access to values as we examine the world, they make salient important reasons for our making one choice over another given what we care about. It is then argued that it is not at all ir","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129761386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analytic vs. Synthetic, Distinction or Myth?: Kant’s Kantribution, Quine’s Inquisition, Grice and Strawson’s Salvation","authors":"M. Castillo","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1175","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have relied heavily on the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic ones for various philosophical pursuits. In this paper I explore Immanuel Kant’s explanation of the distinction, W.V.O. Quine’s qualms with it, and the attempt of H.P. Grice and Strawson at saving synonymy in order to salvage analyticity from doubts. I conclude that although valiant, the efforts put forth by Grice and Strawson fall short. I argue that this is so because they attack a weak interpretation of Quine’s contention. Maité Castillo Humboldt State University mgc188@humboldt.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1175 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1175 Res Cogitans The following paper is an evaluative assessment of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. To do this I have examined Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”1 and Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason2 to contrast the views that Quine and Kant had of this distinction. Whereas Kant was proud to make this distinction in an effort to revive the study of metaphysics, Quine eventually, after a long period of accepting the distinction, followed with a rejection of analyticity as it was used in metaphysics for establishing necessary truths; claiming that all explanations of analytic truths in that way are circular, “or something like a closed curve in space.”3 Quine asserts that ‘necessity’ in the case of analytic statements does not do the work that past philosophers, such as Kant, wanted it to. I have also explored the criticisms of Quine put forth by Grice and Strawson in “In Defense of a Dogma”4 to see if they restore the analytic and synthetic distinction. I have mainly been concerned with the philosophical problem of establishing the possibility of objective necessary truths through the lenses of Kant, Quine, Grice, and Strawson. I intend to defend Quine by showing where Grice and Strawson fall short in their endeavor. Let us begin with Kant. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to answer the question of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. I will begin by explaining the distinctions between ways of conceptualizing or making theoretical judgments of the world, according to Kant, then I will explain his view of metaphysics by way of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant distinguishes between a priori judgments that occur unconnected of all outside experiences and pure a priori judgments that happen completely free of experience without anything empirical intermixed. To highlight this distinction he uses an example of a man whose house has a faulty foundation. Given a flaw in infrastructure one can expect without waiting to experience it that the house will fall in on itself, i.e., one can predict it a priori. Reasoning is done a priori by modus ponens to arrive at the conclusion: “If there’s a faulty foundation, then the house will collapse. I see that there is no foundation, therefore the house will collapse.” The sentences themselves that ma","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131622214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Social Epistemology of Anthropology: Insights from Judgment Aggregation","authors":"Dagan Douglas","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1177","url":null,"abstract":"Anthropological writings have, at times, been vague in the approach used to gather evidence of cultural and social beliefs of the peoples studied, and the method of representing the data to the reading public. This paper employs the theory of judgment aggregation in critiquing anthropological theory and practice. It will be structured in three parts: first, I will present the theory of judgment aggregation as constructed by Christian List and Philip Pettit; second, I will sketch some epistemological methods used by anthropologists, and assess their attitude toward the notions of judgment aggregation and group agency; and finally, I will apply List and Pettit’s arguments about effective group organization to anthropological practice of representing its studied peoples’ beliefs and judgments by proposing three possible changes in method that will allow for more accurate and faithful interpretations and descriptions. Dagan Douglas Reed College douglasd@reed.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1177 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1177 Res Cogitans Judgment Aggregation An emerging subfield of epistemology, social epistemology has sought to uncover the social element inherent in certain forms of knowledge.1 It expands from epistemology’s exclusive focus on individuals into “investigating the epistemic effects of social interactions and social systems.” The field of judgment aggregation2 investigates “the epistemic quality of group doxastic attitudes (whatever their provenance may be),” and “the epistemic consequences of adopting certain institutional arrangements or systemic relations as opposed to alternatives” as well.3 List called this the “radical form” of social epistemology, wherein “certain multi-member groups themselves are taken to be epistemic agents capable of acquiring beliefs and knowledge.”4 Judgment aggregation, where judgments are binary expressions of attitudes,5 is concerned with the establishment of group doxastic attitudes (judgments and beliefs) out of individual doxastic attitudes.6 Juries determining defendants’ guilt or innocence, expert panels of scientists recommending policy, and bank committees forecasting future opportunities are just the sort of groups List and Pettit want to explore.7 Much of their work on judgment aggregation since their famous 2002 article “Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result” has been clarification of the aggregation procedure, defense of the existence of group agents, and suggestion for certain configurations of groups using certain aggregation procedures to produce certain results. I will now briefly sketch their views on each of these first two matters, 1 Alvin I. Goldman and Thomas Blanchard, “Social Epistemology,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), section 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-social. The authors place its formal beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 One of the many types of s","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131687920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Introduction","authors":"Ian O'Loughlin","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114462964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}