Our brain is plastic: it changes and adapts in response to our environment. While some circuits in our brain remain plastic during our whole life, others are capable of plasticity only at a certain age, and for a limited amount of time. These confined periods of intense development are called critical periods. Through the example of the visual system, we will explore the concept of critical periods in the brain, how they were discovered, what causes them, and how they contribute to the brain development in health and pathology.
{"title":"Critical Periods in Vision: Why my Friend Was Wearing an\u0000 Eyepatch.","authors":"Kaelyn Brown, Julien Grimaud","doi":"10.7710/2168-0620.0321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2168-0620.0321","url":null,"abstract":"Our brain is plastic: it changes and adapts in response to our environment. While some circuits in our brain remain plastic during our whole life, others are capable of plasticity only at a certain age, and for a limited amount of time. These confined periods of intense development are called critical periods. Through the example of the visual system, we will explore the concept of critical periods in the brain, how they were discovered, what causes them, and how they contribute to the brain development in health and pathology.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130376399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Classroom management is one of the biggest challenges first-, second, and third-year (referred to as novice) teachers face. Research has shown novice teachers feel unequipped to manage their classrooms due to inadequate preservice training. In this study, 96 novice elementary school teachers from school districts throughout South Carolina completed an online survey that addressed preservice classroom management experiences and teachers’ beliefs about classroom management preparation. It was found that although 80% of participants did receive preservice classroom management training, some of these participants felt unprepared to manage their classrooms. Over 90% of participants agreed that a preservice classroom management course in college is beneficial for future teachers. The results indicate a need for strong preservice courses in classroom management that offer both strategies and classroom experiences, as well as inservice professional development opportunities, to provide educators with the tools necessary to successfully manage their classrooms.
{"title":"Preservice Teacher Education Programs, Novice Teachers, and Classroom\u0000 Management Preparation","authors":"Emily Madison Pierson","doi":"10.7710/2168-0620.0285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2168-0620.0285","url":null,"abstract":"Classroom management is one of the biggest challenges first-, second, and third-year (referred to as novice) teachers face. Research has shown novice teachers feel unequipped to manage their classrooms due to inadequate preservice training. In this study, 96 novice elementary school teachers from school districts throughout South Carolina completed an online survey that addressed preservice classroom management experiences and teachers’ beliefs about classroom management preparation. It was found that although 80% of participants did receive preservice classroom management training, some of these participants felt unprepared to manage their classrooms. Over 90% of participants agreed that a preservice classroom management course in college is beneficial for future teachers. The results indicate a need for strong preservice courses in classroom management that offer both strategies and classroom experiences, as well as inservice professional development opportunities, to provide educators with the tools necessary to successfully manage their classrooms.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114986277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford and Supreme Court nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2018 to testify about Ford’s allegation of a previous sexual assault by Kavanaugh. This thesis asks and answers the question of what does this hearing reveal about the relationship between party identity and gender performance in male senators. Structural power and gender performativity built a theoretical context for this question, while pre-existing research on the intersection of nonverbal behavior, gender, and politics outlined a path to answering it. Fifty randomly selected clips from each testimony were coded for facial displays, gestures, and mirroring. Previous research would hypothesize that all men would employ the same behaviors, regardless of political affiliation; however, the results of this coding revealed that Republicans conformed to traditionally masculine behavior, while Democrats did not. These findings demonstrate the way in which party identity influences gender behavior.
{"title":"The politics of pointing fingers: Party identification, gender performance, and the Kavanaugh sexual assault hearing","authors":"Gina Kaye Kelley, Jim Moore","doi":"10.7710/2168-0620.0297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2168-0620.0297","url":null,"abstract":"Dr. Christine Blasey Ford and Supreme Court nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2018 to testify about Ford’s allegation of a previous sexual assault by Kavanaugh. This thesis asks and answers the question of what does this hearing reveal about the relationship between party identity and gender performance in male senators. Structural power and gender performativity built a theoretical context for this question, while pre-existing research on the intersection of nonverbal behavior, gender, and politics outlined a path to answering it. Fifty randomly selected clips from each testimony were coded for facial displays, gestures, and mirroring. Previous research would hypothesize that all men would employ the same behaviors, regardless of political affiliation; however, the results of this coding revealed that Republicans conformed to traditionally masculine behavior, while Democrats did not. These findings demonstrate the way in which party identity influences gender behavior.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134125472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Universities are designing informal learning spaces as open, collaborative environments; while there is a need for collaborative spaces, the majority of students in both spaces are working independently. This article compares the usage and design features of informal learning spaces within the main library and union of a “university.” Frequently referred to as the “heart” or “living room,” this architectural study employs mixed-method, explanatory sequential design. Quantitative data was collected through unobtrusive observations and random-sample surveys, followed by qualitative data collection via focus groups. Students visit the library more frequently and stay for longer periods of time than the union. Certain design features found to be more desired than others included standard-height tables and chairs that are comfortable; areas with natural lighting; and large, individual tables to spread out users’ belongings. Overall, it was found that the “heart” and “living room” of campus are serving their intended purposes. It is important for designers to remember that a variety of users have different needs and preferences that are served by a variety of spaces. This study builds on the limited literature regarding informal learning spaces and is the first to compare a university campus’s library to their union. Results will help shape the future of informal learning space design and guide future research in this field.
{"title":"The heart and living room of campus: A mixed-methods comparison of two informal learning spaces at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln","authors":"Tiffany Schweer, Erica DeFrain","doi":"10.7710/2168-0620.0272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2168-0620.0272","url":null,"abstract":"Universities are designing informal learning spaces as open, collaborative environments; while there is a need for collaborative spaces, the majority of students in both spaces are working independently. This article compares the usage and design features of informal learning spaces within the main library and union of a “university.” Frequently referred to as the “heart” or “living room,” this architectural study employs mixed-method, explanatory sequential design. Quantitative data was collected through unobtrusive observations and random-sample surveys, followed by qualitative data collection via focus groups. Students visit the library more frequently and stay for longer periods of time than the union. Certain design features found to be more desired than others included standard-height tables and chairs that are comfortable; areas with natural lighting; and large, individual tables to spread out users’ belongings. Overall, it was found that the “heart” and “living room” of campus are serving their intended purposes. It is important for designers to remember that a variety of users have different needs and preferences that are served by a variety of spaces. This study builds on the limited literature regarding informal learning spaces and is the first to compare a university campus’s library to their union. Results will help shape the future of informal learning space design and guide future research in this field.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116107725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What could be the value of a story so short that it would be called “microfiction”? According to Marc Botha, short fiction mirrors “the short attention span of modern readers,” as well as “the gaps and fragmented-ness of modern consciousness.” While microfiction is not necessarily the only form of fiction that engages with cognitive processes, as there is a rich history of describing literary studies such as poetry through the lens of cognitive science. This article explores microfiction’s structure and its relation to cognitive processes. Using 2013 Man Booker Prize-awardee Lydia Davis’s microfiction as a sample oeuvre, applied are a range of cognitive science methodologies—an interdisciplinary approach encompassing psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, artificial intelligence, anthropology, and linguistics—to consider how certain genres of literature mimic and even refract the ways in which the human brain processes information. Putting microfiction as a literary work in dialogue with cognitive processing demonstrates seemingly disparate fields can provide insight into both literature and cognitive science.
{"title":"“His stethoscope, his beard, her breasts”: Narrative Gaps, Automaticity, and the Microfiction of Lydia Davis","authors":"Uma Kanth, P. Dunn","doi":"10.7710/2168-0620.0269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2168-0620.0269","url":null,"abstract":"What could be the value of a story so short that it would be called “microfiction”? According to Marc Botha, short fiction mirrors “the short attention span of modern readers,” as well as “the gaps and fragmented-ness of modern consciousness.” While microfiction is not necessarily the only form of fiction that engages with cognitive processes, as there is a rich history of describing literary studies such as poetry through the lens of cognitive science. This article explores microfiction’s structure and its relation to cognitive processes. Using 2013 Man Booker Prize-awardee Lydia Davis’s microfiction as a sample oeuvre, applied are a range of cognitive science methodologies—an interdisciplinary approach encompassing psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, artificial intelligence, anthropology, and linguistics—to consider how certain genres of literature mimic and even refract the ways in which the human brain processes information. Putting microfiction as a literary work in dialogue with cognitive processing demonstrates seemingly disparate fields can provide insight into both literature and cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129808539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fight or Flyte: Pride and Masculinity in Medieval England","authors":"Elizabeth Tavares","doi":"10.7710/263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/263","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127932658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Writing the Future: The Circular and the Transformative in Revolutionary Politics","authors":"Qian Huang","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1187","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114729415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is commonly believed that democracies are freedom preserving. In a limited, consequentialist sense, this presumption may be correct. However, if someone were to look critically at an application of liberal democracy, she would discover that democracy is not as consistent with freedom as it appears to be. This paper argues that democracy is incompatible with equal freedom as realistic applications of democracy undermine liberty on both a practical and structural level. To accomplish this task, this paper discusses the role of group agents in a democratic political system. While voting allows citizens to express their opinions, voting cannot—in practical or theoretical terms—preserve equal freedom as a result of an individual vote’s lack of efficacy. By forcing individuals to act as groups, democracy undermines equal freedom. Volume 10, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1188 Res Cogitans People frequently assume that the most popular opinion must be the one they ought to hold. It is often said that democratic governments best protect the interest and freedom of their people. The question of whether idealized democracy— defined as theoretical form of government that requires the unanimous consent of each constituent to create and legitimate the rule of law—is compatible with liberty is almost vacuous. In its ideal form, there is no concept of democratic coercion as every citizen consents to every law that is created. But the purpose of any government structure is not to be an ivory tower ideal. Instead, political theories must be applied and tested. In the case that a single citizen did not consent to either democratic rule or a specific policy option determined via a democratic procedure and was forced to obey the law, it seems as though the law would undermine liberty. While theoretically democracy could be compatible with liberty, modern governments that embody democratic structures are incompatible with both political and personal liberty. At best, realistic applications of democracy do not provide as much liberty as its proponents believe it does— democracies provide an illusion of free choice to individual citizens and afford limited liberty to group agents. Although democracy seems simple to define, in reality it is quite difficult to define it comprehensively. In the context of this paper, a proponent of democracy could argue that because a democracy is defined by a government’s adherence to democratic ideals—fairness, equality, free speech, or free expression—democracy most obviously prioritizes freedom. Procedural or structural accounts of democracy (i.e. the methods of electing individuals to govern a constituency) are more useful to discuss in the context of freedom because any type of government could, hypothetically, embody most democratic ideals— a dictatorship could allow for each citizen to be equal to every other citizen, provide for a fair criminal justice system, and ingrain freedoms of speech and expression into its legal code. The
{"title":"The Incompatibility of Democracy and Equal Freedom","authors":"Samantha. M. Koreman","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1188","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly believed that democracies are freedom preserving. In a limited, consequentialist sense, this presumption may be correct. However, if someone were to look critically at an application of liberal democracy, she would discover that democracy is not as consistent with freedom as it appears to be. This paper argues that democracy is incompatible with equal freedom as realistic applications of democracy undermine liberty on both a practical and structural level. To accomplish this task, this paper discusses the role of group agents in a democratic political system. While voting allows citizens to express their opinions, voting cannot—in practical or theoretical terms—preserve equal freedom as a result of an individual vote’s lack of efficacy. By forcing individuals to act as groups, democracy undermines equal freedom. Volume 10, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1188 Res Cogitans People frequently assume that the most popular opinion must be the one they ought to hold. It is often said that democratic governments best protect the interest and freedom of their people. The question of whether idealized democracy— defined as theoretical form of government that requires the unanimous consent of each constituent to create and legitimate the rule of law—is compatible with liberty is almost vacuous. In its ideal form, there is no concept of democratic coercion as every citizen consents to every law that is created. But the purpose of any government structure is not to be an ivory tower ideal. Instead, political theories must be applied and tested. In the case that a single citizen did not consent to either democratic rule or a specific policy option determined via a democratic procedure and was forced to obey the law, it seems as though the law would undermine liberty. While theoretically democracy could be compatible with liberty, modern governments that embody democratic structures are incompatible with both political and personal liberty. At best, realistic applications of democracy do not provide as much liberty as its proponents believe it does— democracies provide an illusion of free choice to individual citizens and afford limited liberty to group agents. Although democracy seems simple to define, in reality it is quite difficult to define it comprehensively. In the context of this paper, a proponent of democracy could argue that because a democracy is defined by a government’s adherence to democratic ideals—fairness, equality, free speech, or free expression—democracy most obviously prioritizes freedom. Procedural or structural accounts of democracy (i.e. the methods of electing individuals to govern a constituency) are more useful to discuss in the context of freedom because any type of government could, hypothetically, embody most democratic ideals— a dictatorship could allow for each citizen to be equal to every other citizen, provide for a fair criminal justice system, and ingrain freedoms of speech and expression into its legal code. The ","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132423969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that Thomas Reid’s theory of perception can be defended against the charges of inconsistency levied against it by Nicholas Wolterstorff. The challenge to be met is roughly that of showing how the Reidian account of perception can avoid being hampered by a descriptive theory of mental reference for perceptual states. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. Wolterstorff maintains that Reid is committed to an account of perceptual reference according to which mental representations are conceptual intermediaries between the perceiver and the objects of perception. I hope in section III to show that the theory attributed to Reid is unworkable. In the remainder of the paper I will argue that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of perceptual content. J. W. Waldrop Calvin College jww24@students.calvin.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1183 Volume 10, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1183 Res Cogitans According to Nicholas Wolterstorff,1 Thomas Reid’s theory of perception faces a problem of perceptual reference. Reid disavows the representational paradigm in the philosophy of mind and perception—the so-called Way of Ideas that he associates with modern authors including Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume. According to proponents of the Way of Ideas, no one is ever in any sort of intimate, mental congress with the external world; the only things to which we bear any direct cognitive relation are ideas—an agent’s mental representations. A theory of de re perceptual states must include an account of perceptual reference—how a perceiver gets a mental or semantic grip on objects perceived. Wolterstorff claims that Reid’s theory of perception is insufficiently antirepresentational, owing to its reliance on phenomenal states to mediate perceptual reference.2 Wolterstorff’s claim is that Reid’s theory is not a theory of direct perception since, according to Wolterstorff, Reid is committed to a view of perceptual reference that is not conceptually immediate. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. I hope in section III to show that the theory Wolterstorff attributes to Reid is unworkable and in the remainder of the paper to show that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of per
我认为托马斯·里德的知觉理论可以反驳尼古拉斯·沃特斯托夫对其不一致的指责。我们所面临的挑战大致是，如何证明里德的知觉解释能够避免被知觉状态的心理参照的描述性理论所阻碍。首先，我将回顾里德的感知理论和Wolterstorff对它的反对。Wolterstorff认为Reid致力于知觉指称的解释，根据该解释，心理表征是知觉者和知觉对象之间的概念中介。我希望在第三节中表明里德的理论是行不通的。在本文的剩余部分，我将论证里德不需要致力于任何这样的观点。在第五节到第九节中，我将概述另一种关于知觉参考的描述，这种描述在必要的意义上是直接的，并且可以被纳入里德的知觉描述。我的建议将主要依赖于大卫·卡普兰对指示语的解释，以及将卡普兰的语义学应用于感知意旨的情况。J. W. Waldrop Calvin College jww24@students.calvin.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1183第10卷第1期Res Cogitans 2 | eP1183 Res Cogitans Nicholas Wolterstorff认为，1 Thomas Reid的知觉理论面临着一个知觉参照的问题。里德否认心理和感知哲学中的表征范式——即他与笛卡尔、洛克、马勒布兰奇、伯克利和休谟等现代作家联系在一起的所谓的观念之路。思想之道的支持者认为，没有人会与外部世界进行某种亲密的精神交流;与我们有直接认知关系的唯一事物是观念——一个主体的心理表征。再知觉状态理论必须包括对知觉参照的解释，即感知者如何在心理上或语义上对被感知的对象进行把握。Wolterstorff认为Reid的知觉理论是不够反表征的，因为它依赖于现象状态来中介知觉参照Wolterstorff的观点是Reid的理论不是直接感知理论，因为根据Wolterstorff的观点，Reid致力于一种概念上不是直接的感知参照的观点。首先，我将回顾里德的感知理论和Wolterstorff对它的反对。我希望在第三节中表明Wolterstorff赋予Reid的理论是不可行的，并在论文的其余部分中表明Reid不需要致力于任何这样的观点。在第五节到第九节中，我将概述另一种关于知觉参考的描述，这种描述在必要的意义上是直接的，并且可以被纳入里德的知觉描述。我的建议将主要依赖于大卫·卡普兰对指示语的解释，以及将卡普兰的语义学应用于感知意旨的情况。
{"title":"Critical Remarks on an Interpretation of Reid on Perceptual Apprehension","authors":"J. Waldrop","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1183","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that Thomas Reid’s theory of perception can be defended against the charges of inconsistency levied against it by Nicholas Wolterstorff. The challenge to be met is roughly that of showing how the Reidian account of perception can avoid being hampered by a descriptive theory of mental reference for perceptual states. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. Wolterstorff maintains that Reid is committed to an account of perceptual reference according to which mental representations are conceptual intermediaries between the perceiver and the objects of perception. I hope in section III to show that the theory attributed to Reid is unworkable. In the remainder of the paper I will argue that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of perceptual content. J. W. Waldrop Calvin College jww24@students.calvin.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1183 Volume 10, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1183 Res Cogitans According to Nicholas Wolterstorff,1 Thomas Reid’s theory of perception faces a problem of perceptual reference. Reid disavows the representational paradigm in the philosophy of mind and perception—the so-called Way of Ideas that he associates with modern authors including Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume. According to proponents of the Way of Ideas, no one is ever in any sort of intimate, mental congress with the external world; the only things to which we bear any direct cognitive relation are ideas—an agent’s mental representations. A theory of de re perceptual states must include an account of perceptual reference—how a perceiver gets a mental or semantic grip on objects perceived. Wolterstorff claims that Reid’s theory of perception is insufficiently antirepresentational, owing to its reliance on phenomenal states to mediate perceptual reference.2 Wolterstorff’s claim is that Reid’s theory is not a theory of direct perception since, according to Wolterstorff, Reid is committed to a view of perceptual reference that is not conceptually immediate. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. I hope in section III to show that the theory Wolterstorff attributes to Reid is unworkable and in the remainder of the paper to show that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of per","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128738041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Skillful Coping: Intentional Arc and Maximal Grip Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc is “the tight connection between the agent and the world, viz. that as the agent acquires skills, these skills are ‘stored,’ not as representations in the mind, but as more and more refined disposition to respond to more and more refined perceptions of the current situation” (2002, p.1). This connection between the learner and his environment culminates in “more Abstract Language, when considered as part of the lived experience of human beings, fails to be reduced to mere representation. Purposiveness in skill acquisition and second language acquisition may be understood through Dreyfus’s skillful coping, based in Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc and maximal grip. Such an approach to second language acquisition decentralizes rule-based representationalist understandings of the process, such as universal grammar (Chomsky 1977), and instead sees language and communication as responsive, dynamic and dyadic.
{"title":"Response through the Intentional Arc: Merleau- Ponty, Dreyfus and Second Language Acquisition","authors":"Mia Burnett","doi":"10.7710/2155-4838.1186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1186","url":null,"abstract":"Skillful Coping: Intentional Arc and Maximal Grip Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc is “the tight connection between the agent and the world, viz. that as the agent acquires skills, these skills are ‘stored,’ not as representations in the mind, but as more and more refined disposition to respond to more and more refined perceptions of the current situation” (2002, p.1). This connection between the learner and his environment culminates in “more Abstract Language, when considered as part of the lived experience of human beings, fails to be reduced to mere representation. Purposiveness in skill acquisition and second language acquisition may be understood through Dreyfus’s skillful coping, based in Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc and maximal grip. Such an approach to second language acquisition decentralizes rule-based representationalist understandings of the process, such as universal grammar (Chomsky 1977), and instead sees language and communication as responsive, dynamic and dyadic.","PeriodicalId":167127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129990535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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