Every day, digital platforms generate, gather, store and analyze a huge amount of data, personal data included: these data can be elaborated to cluster individuals and offer personalized prices and services. Progressively individuals are losing control over their personal data and digital identities and, accordingly, data protection authorities look at the operations of these digital platforms carefully. The paper addresses the issue of a possible commingling between data protection rules and antitrust provisions and the lively global debate between those who call for a strong antitrust intervention to buffer privacy risks and those who would keep antitrust law at bay.
{"title":"Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy Through Competition?","authors":"G. Colangelo, Mariateresa Maggiolino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2945085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2945085","url":null,"abstract":"Every day, digital platforms generate, gather, store and analyze a huge amount of data, personal data included: these data can be elaborated to cluster individuals and offer personalized prices and services. Progressively individuals are losing control over their personal data and digital identities and, accordingly, data protection authorities look at the operations of these digital platforms carefully. The paper addresses the issue of a possible commingling between data protection rules and antitrust provisions and the lively global debate between those who call for a strong antitrust intervention to buffer privacy risks and those who would keep antitrust law at bay.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130809942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research shows that in the data privacy domain, the regulation promoted by front-runner states in federated systems such as the United States or the European Union (EU) generates races to the top, not to the bottom. Institutional dynamics or the willingness of major interstate companies to work with a single standard generally creates opportunities for the federal lawmaker to level up privacy protection. This article uses federalism to explore whether a similar pattern of convergence (toward the higher regulatory standard) emerges when it comes to the international arena, or whether we witness a more nuanced picture. I focus on the interaction of the European Union with the United States, looking at the migration of legal ideas across the (member) state jurisdictions with a focus on breach notification statutes and privacy officers. The article further analyzes recent developments such as the invalidation of the Safe Harbor agreement and the adoption of a Privacy Shield. I argue that instead of a one-way street, usually conceptualized as the EU ratcheting up standards in the United States, the influences between the two blocs are mutual. Such influences are conditioned by the receptivity and ability of domestic actors in both the United States and the EU to translate, and often, adapt the “foreign” to their respective contexts. Instead of converging toward a uniform standard, the different points of entry in the two federated systems contribute to the continuous development of two models of regulating commercial privacy that, thus far, remain distinct.
{"title":"Domesticating The ‘Foreign’ in Making Transatlantic Data Privacy Law","authors":"B. Petkova","doi":"10.1093/ICON/MOX079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ICON/MOX079","url":null,"abstract":"Research shows that in the data privacy domain, the regulation promoted by front-runner states in federated systems such as the United States or the European Union (EU) generates races to the top, not to the bottom. Institutional dynamics or the willingness of major interstate companies to work with a single standard generally creates opportunities for the federal lawmaker to level up privacy protection. This article uses federalism to explore whether a similar pattern of convergence (toward the higher regulatory standard) emerges when it comes to the international arena, or whether we witness a more nuanced picture. I focus on the interaction of the European Union with the United States, looking at the migration of legal ideas across the (member) state jurisdictions with a focus on breach notification statutes and privacy officers. The article further analyzes recent developments such as the invalidation of the Safe Harbor agreement and the adoption of a Privacy Shield. I argue that instead of a one-way street, usually conceptualized as the EU ratcheting up standards in the United States, the influences between the two blocs are mutual. Such influences are conditioned by the receptivity and ability of domestic actors in both the United States and the EU to translate, and often, adapt the “foreign” to their respective contexts. Instead of converging toward a uniform standard, the different points of entry in the two federated systems contribute to the continuous development of two models of regulating commercial privacy that, thus far, remain distinct.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131504081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study appraises the Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria. The study made use of qualitative research method. The researcher consulted secondary sources such as books, journals, and magazines for the collection of data. The study reveals that in Nigeria, Freedom of Information Act contains more exemption sections and clauses than sections that grant access to information. This means that some mischievous public officers can use these sections for unjust and mischievous purposes. Another fundamental issue that affects The Freedom of Information Act is some other media laws that are still fully operational in Nigeria. For example, we have the Official Secrets Act, Evidence Act, the Public Complaints Commission Act, the Statistics Act, and the Criminal Code; all aimed at suppressing the free flow of information. The study recommends that the workability of the law in Nigeria remains a concern. Allaying this concern will be highly predicated on how well strict compliance is made to the relevant provisions of the law. Some of the anti-press laws that adorn or law book should either be expunged or repelled. It is in that, that the FoIA can be beneficial to the Nigerian nation and its citizens alike.
{"title":"An Appraisal of the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) in Nigeria","authors":"Oberiri Destiny Apuke","doi":"10.3968/9077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3968/9077","url":null,"abstract":"This study appraises the Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria. The study made use of qualitative research method. The researcher consulted secondary sources such as books, journals, and magazines for the collection of data. The study reveals that in Nigeria, Freedom of Information Act contains more exemption sections and clauses than sections that grant access to information. This means that some mischievous public officers can use these sections for unjust and mischievous purposes. Another fundamental issue that affects The Freedom of Information Act is some other media laws that are still fully operational in Nigeria. For example, we have the Official Secrets Act, Evidence Act, the Public Complaints Commission Act, the Statistics Act, and the Criminal Code; all aimed at suppressing the free flow of information. The study recommends that the workability of the law in Nigeria remains a concern. Allaying this concern will be highly predicated on how well strict compliance is made to the relevant provisions of the law. Some of the anti-press laws that adorn or law book should either be expunged or repelled. It is in that, that the FoIA can be beneficial to the Nigerian nation and its citizens alike.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127060742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
• Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessments (PIAs/DPIAs) are tools for organisations to manage privacy risks. They emerged in various jurisdictions from the 1980s, initially as a purely voluntary measure. DPIAs are now set to become a mandatory requirement in certain circumstances under the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This article addresses impact assessments from the perspective of regulatory theory. Their transition from a voluntary tool to a mandatory requirement raises questions about their purpose and role, as well as implications for the direction of data protection in Europe more generally. • Previous analyses have tended to assess such impact assessments in relation to a limited set of regulatory categories, namely self-regulation, command-and-control regulation, or some form of 'co-regulation'. Drawing from regulatory theory, this article suggests a more nuanced account of the mandatory impact assessment regime outlined in the GDPR. • It argues that this regime can be understood as a form of 'meta-regulation'. The final section draws on a framework for assessing the prospects of meta-regulation, in order to assess the prospects for a meta-regulatory approach to impact assessments.
{"title":"Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-Regulatory Approach","authors":"Reuben Binns","doi":"10.1093/IDPL/IPW027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IDPL/IPW027","url":null,"abstract":"• Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessments (PIAs/DPIAs) are tools for organisations to manage privacy risks. They emerged in various jurisdictions from the 1980s, initially as a purely voluntary measure. DPIAs are now set to become a mandatory requirement in certain circumstances under the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This article addresses impact assessments from the perspective of regulatory theory. Their transition from a voluntary tool to a mandatory requirement raises questions about their purpose and role, as well as implications for the direction of data protection in Europe more generally. \u0000• Previous analyses have tended to assess such impact assessments in relation to a limited set of regulatory categories, namely self-regulation, command-and-control regulation, or some form of 'co-regulation'. Drawing from regulatory theory, this article suggests a more nuanced account of the mandatory impact assessment regime outlined in the GDPR. \u0000• It argues that this regime can be understood as a form of 'meta-regulation'. The final section draws on a framework for assessing the prospects of meta-regulation, in order to assess the prospects for a meta-regulatory approach to impact assessments.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126102397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Limitations on online tracking are object of a regulatory debate that has shifted to the use of default rules to enhance privacy. The European Union implemented this idea with the Cookies Directive. The Directive aims to change the default system for tracking and move to an opt-in system in which data subjects must agree to it beforehand. This article evaluates the Directive’s implementation across Member States and studies the cases of the Netherlands and the UK. It then draws from the behavioural economics literature on default rules to evaluate these regulations and to consider whether it is possible to implement the policy in a way that avoids some of the problems they faced.
{"title":"The Way the Cookie Crumbles: Online Tracking Meets Behavioral Economics","authors":"Ignacio Cofone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2541215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541215","url":null,"abstract":"Limitations on online tracking are object of a regulatory debate that has shifted to the use of default rules to enhance privacy. The European Union implemented this idea with the Cookies Directive. The Directive aims to change the default system for tracking and move to an opt-in system in which data subjects must agree to it beforehand. This article evaluates the Directive’s implementation across Member States and studies the cases of the Netherlands and the UK. It then draws from the behavioural economics literature on default rules to evaluate these regulations and to consider whether it is possible to implement the policy in a way that avoids some of the problems they faced.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121721481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes the recent data protection reform of the European Union (EU). It introduces the drivers of the reform, in particular by looking at a few seminal judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU. Against this backdrop, the article highlights the key changes that the new General Data Protection Regulation brings about, assesses their implications, and seeks to situate them in the wider context of the digital economy and its governance, in particular with regard to the free cross-border flow of data.
{"title":"The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy","authors":"Mira Burri, Rahel Schär","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2792222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2792222","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes the recent data protection reform of the European Union (EU). It introduces the drivers of the reform, in particular by looking at a few seminal judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU. Against this backdrop, the article highlights the key changes that the new General Data Protection Regulation brings about, assesses their implications, and seeks to situate them in the wider context of the digital economy and its governance, in particular with regard to the free cross-border flow of data.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114203765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the Internet’s origins and development as a ‘freedom-enhancing’ tool, alongside the contemporaneous evolution of EU law and regulation governing private economic power. The concept linking these two streams of discussion is that of ‘user autonomy’, which is implicated by the Internet’s affordances for individuals, and which, it is argued, should also be the legal and regulatory framework’s goal when governing Internet matters. However, the trends influencing EU law and regulation from the 1980s, especially neoliberalism, have resulted in these frameworks - competition law, sector-specific regulation, data protection and fundamental rights - not being well-equipped to advance user autonomy in the Internet sphere.
{"title":"The Internet, User Autonomy and EU Law","authors":"A. Daly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2780789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2780789","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the Internet’s origins and development as a ‘freedom-enhancing’ tool, alongside the contemporaneous evolution of EU law and regulation governing private economic power. The concept linking these two streams of discussion is that of ‘user autonomy’, which is implicated by the Internet’s affordances for individuals, and which, it is argued, should also be the legal and regulatory framework’s goal when governing Internet matters. However, the trends influencing EU law and regulation from the 1980s, especially neoliberalism, have resulted in these frameworks - competition law, sector-specific regulation, data protection and fundamental rights - not being well-equipped to advance user autonomy in the Internet sphere.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"54 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128936348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The frame "Beyond IP" is gradually becoming a key term in the political economy of intellectual property. It captures the social costs of legal ordering through intellectual property and offers alternative institutions and regulatory options. "Beyond IP" is not just a frame for mobilization but also a descriptive term that summarizes a growing number of contemporary information and cultural institutions, which rest upon concepts of free content and free access as their building blocks. The purpose of this essay is to question the conventional wisdom of critical copyright scholarship which tends to pair proprietary intellectual property protection with informational capitalism and the commodification of culture. I argue that tensions and dichotomies that we are accustomed to attribute to "IP-centric" regimes are tensions and dichotomies which may appear, or even be stimulated, also by copyright's negative spaces and certain beyond IP legal regimes. Beyond IP market realms tend to conflict with the values of cultural democracy, informational privacy and creative diversity. This essay offers the first novel critical examination of the political economy of information markets that operate beyond the boundaries of IP. This analysis bears significant normative implications on the desirability of contemporary approaches, which support mobilization towards beyond IP legal regimes.
{"title":"Beyond IP — The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era","authors":"Guy Pessach","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2761403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2761403","url":null,"abstract":"The frame \"Beyond IP\" is gradually becoming a key term in the political economy of intellectual property. It captures the social costs of legal ordering through intellectual property and offers alternative institutions and regulatory options. \"Beyond IP\" is not just a frame for mobilization but also a descriptive term that summarizes a growing number of contemporary information and cultural institutions, which rest upon concepts of free content and free access as their building blocks. The purpose of this essay is to question the conventional wisdom of critical copyright scholarship which tends to pair proprietary intellectual property protection with informational capitalism and the commodification of culture. I argue that tensions and dichotomies that we are accustomed to attribute to \"IP-centric\" regimes are tensions and dichotomies which may appear, or even be stimulated, also by copyright's negative spaces and certain beyond IP legal regimes. Beyond IP market realms tend to conflict with the values of cultural democracy, informational privacy and creative diversity. This essay offers the first novel critical examination of the political economy of information markets that operate beyond the boundaries of IP. This analysis bears significant normative implications on the desirability of contemporary approaches, which support mobilization towards beyond IP legal regimes.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122263120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of increasingly complex algorithms calls for critical thought about how best to prevent, deter, and compensate for the harms that they cause. This paper argues that the criminal law and tort regulatory systems will prove no match for the difficult regulatory puzzles algorithms pose. Algorithmic regulation will require federal uniformity, expert judgment, political independence, and pre-market review to prevent - without stifling innovation - the introduction of unacceptably dangerous algorithms into the market. This paper proposes that a new specialist regulatory agency should be created to regulate algorithmic safety. An FDA for algorithms.Such a federal consumer protection agency should have three powers. First, it should have the power to organize and classify algorithms into regulatory categories by their design, complexity, and potential for harm (in both ordinary use and through misuse). Second, it should have the power to prevent the introduction of algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy has been proven through evidence-based pre-market trials. Third, the agency should have broad authority to impose disclosure requirements and usage restrictions to prevent algorithms’ harmful misuse.To explain why a federal agency will be necessary, this paper proceeds in three parts. First, it explains the diversity of algorithms that already exist and that are soon to come. In the future many algorithms will be “trained,” not “designed.” That means that the operation of many algorithms will be opaque and difficult to predict in border cases, and responsibility for their harms will be diffuse and difficult to assign. Moreover, although “designed” algorithms already play important roles in many life-or-death situations (from emergency landings to automated braking systems), increasingly “trained” algorithms will be deployed in these mission-critical applications.Second, this paper explains why other possible regulatory schemes - such as state tort and criminal law or regulation through subject-matter regulatory agencies - will not be as desirable as the creation of a centralized federal regulatory agency for the administration of algorithms as a category. For consumers, tort and criminal law are unlikely to efficiently counter the harms from algorithms. Harms traceable to algorithms may frequently be diffuse and difficult to detect. Human responsibility and liability for such harms will be difficult to establish. And narrowly tailored usage restrictions may be difficult to enforce through indirect regulation. For innovators, the availability of federal preemption from local and ex-post liability is likely to be desired. Third, this paper explains that the concerns driving the regulation of food, drugs, and cosmetics closely resemble the concerns that should drive the regulation of algorithms. With respect to the operation of many drugs, the precise mechanisms by which they produce their benefits and harms are not well understoo
{"title":"An FDA for Algorithms","authors":"A. Tutt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2747994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2747994","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of increasingly complex algorithms calls for critical thought about how best to prevent, deter, and compensate for the harms that they cause. This paper argues that the criminal law and tort regulatory systems will prove no match for the difficult regulatory puzzles algorithms pose. Algorithmic regulation will require federal uniformity, expert judgment, political independence, and pre-market review to prevent - without stifling innovation - the introduction of unacceptably dangerous algorithms into the market. This paper proposes that a new specialist regulatory agency should be created to regulate algorithmic safety. An FDA for algorithms.Such a federal consumer protection agency should have three powers. First, it should have the power to organize and classify algorithms into regulatory categories by their design, complexity, and potential for harm (in both ordinary use and through misuse). Second, it should have the power to prevent the introduction of algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy has been proven through evidence-based pre-market trials. Third, the agency should have broad authority to impose disclosure requirements and usage restrictions to prevent algorithms’ harmful misuse.To explain why a federal agency will be necessary, this paper proceeds in three parts. First, it explains the diversity of algorithms that already exist and that are soon to come. In the future many algorithms will be “trained,” not “designed.” That means that the operation of many algorithms will be opaque and difficult to predict in border cases, and responsibility for their harms will be diffuse and difficult to assign. Moreover, although “designed” algorithms already play important roles in many life-or-death situations (from emergency landings to automated braking systems), increasingly “trained” algorithms will be deployed in these mission-critical applications.Second, this paper explains why other possible regulatory schemes - such as state tort and criminal law or regulation through subject-matter regulatory agencies - will not be as desirable as the creation of a centralized federal regulatory agency for the administration of algorithms as a category. For consumers, tort and criminal law are unlikely to efficiently counter the harms from algorithms. Harms traceable to algorithms may frequently be diffuse and difficult to detect. Human responsibility and liability for such harms will be difficult to establish. And narrowly tailored usage restrictions may be difficult to enforce through indirect regulation. For innovators, the availability of federal preemption from local and ex-post liability is likely to be desired. Third, this paper explains that the concerns driving the regulation of food, drugs, and cosmetics closely resemble the concerns that should drive the regulation of algorithms. With respect to the operation of many drugs, the precise mechanisms by which they produce their benefits and harms are not well understoo","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132734051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers' understanding and decisions regarding the trade-offs associated with the privacy and the sharing of personal data. We highlight how the economic analysis of privacy evolved over time, as advancements in information technology raised increasingly nuanced and complex issues. We find and highlight three themes that connect diverse insights from the literature. First, characterizing a single unifying economic theory of privacy is hard, because privacy issues of economic relevance arise in widely diverse contexts. Second, there are theoretical and empirical situations where the protection of privacy can both enhance and detract from individual and societal welfare. Third, in digital economies, consumers' ability to make informed decisions about their privacy is severely hindered because consumers are often in a position of imperfect or asymmetric information regarding when their data is collected, for what purposes, and with what consequences. We conclude the article by highlighting some of the ongoing issues in the privacy debate of interest to economists.
{"title":"The Economics of Privacy","authors":"A. Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor, Liad Wagman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2580411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580411","url":null,"abstract":"This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers' understanding and decisions regarding the trade-offs associated with the privacy and the sharing of personal data. We highlight how the economic analysis of privacy evolved over time, as advancements in information technology raised increasingly nuanced and complex issues. We find and highlight three themes that connect diverse insights from the literature. First, characterizing a single unifying economic theory of privacy is hard, because privacy issues of economic relevance arise in widely diverse contexts. Second, there are theoretical and empirical situations where the protection of privacy can both enhance and detract from individual and societal welfare. Third, in digital economies, consumers' ability to make informed decisions about their privacy is severely hindered because consumers are often in a position of imperfect or asymmetric information regarding when their data is collected, for what purposes, and with what consequences. We conclude the article by highlighting some of the ongoing issues in the privacy debate of interest to economists.","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127266088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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