Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P173-189
Paulo Ferreira
According to Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, the Platonic philosopher Claudius Nicostratus (fl. mid-2nd c. A.D.) challenges Aristotle’s claim in the Categories to the effect that statements about future contingents are neither true nor false. I argue that Nicostratus’ charge traces back to Chrysippus’ argument for causal determinism in Cicero’s De Fato and plays a significant role in motivating Ammonius’ and Boethius’ solution to the problem of future contingents.
{"title":"Sobre a tese de que a bivalência implica o determinismo causal, do estoicismo ao aristotelismo","authors":"Paulo Ferreira","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P173-189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P173-189","url":null,"abstract":"According to Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, the Platonic philosopher Claudius Nicostratus (fl. mid-2nd c. A.D.) challenges Aristotle’s claim in the Categories to the effect that statements about future contingents are neither true nor false. I argue that Nicostratus’ charge traces back to Chrysippus’ argument for causal determinism in Cicero’s De Fato and plays a significant role in motivating Ammonius’ and Boethius’ solution to the problem of future contingents.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115793923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P207-260
Marco Zingano
The problem of future contingents is examined here through the vantage point of another controversy, the one over which answer Aristotle should be credited with. Two answers are attributed to Aristotle. According to the first one, which is nowadays often referred to as the traditional answer, Aristotle argued that, to prevent determinism as the valid conclusion of the argument presented at the beginning of De interpretation 9, one has to deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence; according to the other, Aristotle accepted the validity of the principle of bivalence, but averted the conclusion of determinism by introducing the notion of indefinite verum. Both answers are examined with a view to shedding some light on this chapter that has kindled so much discussion.
{"title":"Futuros contingentes: história de uma outra batalha","authors":"Marco Zingano","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P207-260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P207-260","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of future contingents is examined here through the vantage point of another controversy, the one over which answer Aristotle should be credited with. Two answers are attributed to Aristotle. According to the first one, which is nowadays often referred to as the traditional answer, Aristotle argued that, to prevent determinism as the valid conclusion of the argument presented at the beginning of De interpretation 9, one has to deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence; according to the other, Aristotle accepted the validity of the principle of bivalence, but averted the conclusion of determinism by introducing the notion of indefinite verum. Both answers are examined with a view to shedding some light on this chapter that has kindled so much discussion.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123887808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P144-172
Ricardo Santos
In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true.
在《解释》第9章的第一部分，亚里士多德引入了一个宿命论的论点，他显然不赞同。这一章的读者想知道亚里士多德是如何回答这一论点的。在本文中，我声称他的回答的主要基础是1933年提出的等价性原则(“陈述与实际事物一样为真”)。我认为这一原则应该以最直接的方式来解释，即任何陈述为真的情态与陈述中所涉及的实际事物的情态是相同的。这意味着，只有当说某物是(或将是)这样或那样的陈述必然为真时，它才必然是(或将是)这样或那样。通过将这一原则应用于亚里士多德对两种非必要事物的区分——那些偶然发生的事物和那些以一种方式而不是以另一种方式发生的事物(hôs epi to poly)——人们应该得出这样的结论:因为这些事物是偶然的，关于它们的陈述只能是偶然真实的。
{"title":"Equimodalidade e Hôs Epi To Poly no De Interpretatione 9","authors":"Ricardo Santos","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P144-172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P144-172","url":null,"abstract":"In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124157424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P64-143
L. H. Santos
Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.
{"title":"Aristóteles e a Lógica da Contingência: uma interpretação tradicional do argumento da batalha naval","authors":"L. H. Santos","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P64-143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P64-143","url":null,"abstract":"Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133377978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P63
Marco Zingano
{"title":"Apresentação: Os Futuros Contingentes em De Interpretatione 9 – uma discussão","authors":"Marco Zingano","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P63","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115994640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P01-17
N. Cordero
Since the Goddess of Parmenides presents the two ways to explain the reality that must be faced by this who want to become a "man who knows", the truth and the opinions of mortals, she makes clear that the opinions (doxai) are not "reliable". Later, when he describes in detail how the makers of opinions really are, the description is devastating: they are the people who are incapable of judging, who are astonished, who do not know how to use sensations, and who have a misguided intellect. Consequently, when they express their opinions, they present only a "misleading set of words. However, already from Aristotle onwards, this way of conceiving reality is attributed to Parmenides himself, and not to "the mortals". Theophrastus echoes this interpretation of Aristotle and, with him, the totality of the Doxographers. Obviously, in order to attribute the "opinions" to Parmenides himself, any reference to the incapacity of his authors is absent from the comments: no Doxographer mentions it.
{"title":"Le très curieux silence des Doxographes à propos de l'incompétence des auteurs des opinions chez Parménide","authors":"N. Cordero","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P01-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P01-17","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Goddess of Parmenides presents the two ways to explain the reality that must be faced by this who want to become a \"man who knows\", the truth and the opinions of mortals, she makes clear that the opinions (doxai) are not \"reliable\". Later, when he describes in detail how the makers of opinions really are, the description is devastating: they are the people who are incapable of judging, who are astonished, who do not know how to use sensations, and who have a misguided intellect. Consequently, when they express their opinions, they present only a \"misleading set of words. However, already from Aristotle onwards, this way of conceiving reality is attributed to Parmenides himself, and not to \"the mortals\". Theophrastus echoes this interpretation of Aristotle and, with him, the totality of the Doxographers. Obviously, in order to attribute the \"opinions\" to Parmenides himself, any reference to the incapacity of his authors is absent from the comments: no Doxographer mentions it.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125721571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P18-34
M. Marren
This paper uses Aristophanes' Lysistrata to draw out the central violent tension of the weaving paradigm in Plato's Statesman. In the Lysistrata, weaving is offered as a metaphor for a tyrannical refashioning of the polis. In strikingly similar terms, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman proposes weaving as a metaphor for the best form of government. What is laughed off in the play, the characters of Plato's dialogue seem to take seriously. Through a comparative reading, I argue that the interpretations of the Statesman that take weaving as a paradigm for the best government of state, not only miss the comedy in the Stranger's discussion of statesmanship, but also the tragic allusions to tyranny. Furthermore, by drawing out the dialogue’s resonance with comedy, I conclude that the weaving paradigm succeeds in giving us a means for identifying tyranny in the Statesman; even when tyranny appears dressed up in a political science ostensibly formulated with the best of intentions.
{"title":"State Violence and Weaving: implications of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata for Plato’s Statesman","authors":"M. Marren","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P18-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P18-34","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses Aristophanes' Lysistrata to draw out the central violent tension of the weaving paradigm in Plato's Statesman. In the Lysistrata, weaving is offered as a metaphor for a tyrannical refashioning of the polis. In strikingly similar terms, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman proposes weaving as a metaphor for the best form of government. What is laughed off in the play, the characters of Plato's dialogue seem to take seriously. Through a comparative reading, I argue that the interpretations of the Statesman that take weaving as a paradigm for the best government of state, not only miss the comedy in the Stranger's discussion of statesmanship, but also the tragic allusions to tyranny. Furthermore, by drawing out the dialogue’s resonance with comedy, I conclude that the weaving paradigm succeeds in giving us a means for identifying tyranny in the Statesman; even when tyranny appears dressed up in a political science ostensibly formulated with the best of intentions.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124539938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P35-62
Coleen P. Zoller
This essay will marshal evidence for Plato’s extension of equal education and professional opportunity to all women, including artisan women who are not his ideal city’s philosopher-queens. I examine the explicit commentary in the Republic, Timaeus, and Laws about women in artisan professions, and I link it together with the three of the core principles advanced in the Republic, particularly (1) the principle of specialization (R. 369b-370c), (2) the principle of irrelevant reproductive differences (R. 454b-e, 456b), and (3) the principle of children’s potential (R. 415a-c, 423c-d) that arises from the myth of metals. Plato uses his Socrates and the Athenian to argue against gender discrimination because it violates these principles. Plato offering a theory of equal opportunity for women across all classes ought to be highlighted as one of the central achievements of the Republic.
{"title":"Plato and Equality for Women across Social Class","authors":"Coleen P. Zoller","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P35-62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.1981-9471.V15I1P35-62","url":null,"abstract":"This essay will marshal evidence for Plato’s extension of equal education and professional opportunity to all women, including artisan women who are not his ideal city’s philosopher-queens. I examine the explicit commentary in the Republic, Timaeus, and Laws about women in artisan professions, and I link it together with the three of the core principles advanced in the Republic, particularly (1) the principle of specialization (R. 369b-370c), (2) the principle of irrelevant reproductive differences (R. 454b-e, 456b), and (3) the principle of children’s potential (R. 415a-c, 423c-d) that arises from the myth of metals. Plato uses his Socrates and the Athenian to argue against gender discrimination because it violates these principles. Plato offering a theory of equal opportunity for women across all classes ought to be highlighted as one of the central achievements of the Republic.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129959883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p99-129
L. Menezes
Plato’s division of goods performed by Glaucon in the Republic involves three kinds of goods: the first kind would be desirable for their own sake; the second, desirable in themselves and in their consequences, and the third kind, only desirable in their consequences. The problem to understand it is thus presented: in which of these kinds is justice observed, and which one provides happiness to men. According to Socrates, justice should be placed on the second kind of good if men want to be happy. However, it is not in this way that the many (polloi) hold justice, for they include it in the third kind. Having this difference under perspective, Glaucon defends this point of view, willing afterwards to listen to Socrates’ refutation of his argument and the defence of justice as being a good desirable in themselves and their consequences. The aim of our work is to present an interpretation that can justly adapt to what Glaucon understands as 'in themselves' and as a 'consequence' of the goods in this division
{"title":"O Problema da Classificação dos Bens na República de Platão","authors":"L. Menezes","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p99-129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p99-129","url":null,"abstract":"Plato’s division of goods performed by Glaucon in the Republic involves three kinds of goods: the first kind would be desirable for their own sake; the second, desirable in themselves and in their consequences, and the third kind, only desirable in their consequences. The problem to understand it is thus presented: in which of these kinds is justice observed, and which one provides happiness to men. According to Socrates, justice should be placed on the second kind of good if men want to be happy. However, it is not in this way that the many (polloi) hold justice, for they include it in the third kind. Having this difference under perspective, Glaucon defends this point of view, willing afterwards to listen to Socrates’ refutation of his argument and the defence of justice as being a good desirable in themselves and their consequences. The aim of our work is to present an interpretation that can justly adapt to what Glaucon understands as 'in themselves' and as a 'consequence' of the goods in this division","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130703595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p195-202
Sebastiano Molinelli
Dissoi Logoi 4.6 presents a beautiful self-refutation argument, which I analyse here, offering a different assessment of its relation to self-contradiction and the Liar paradox from the only one available in the literature.
{"title":"The Logic of the Self-Refutation Argument in Dissoi Logoi 4.6","authors":"Sebastiano Molinelli","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p195-202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p195-202","url":null,"abstract":"Dissoi Logoi 4.6 presents a beautiful self-refutation argument, which I analyse here, offering a different assessment of its relation to self-contradiction and the Liar paradox from the only one available in the literature.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121331169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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