Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p130-146
Evan Dutmer
In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles (archai) and then causes (aitia) over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.[1] Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not initially available from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and which is clearer by nature.[2] It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for natural science presented to us in 1.1. [1] An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer by nature. [2] Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22).
{"title":"Aristotle’s Methodology for Natural Science in Physics 1-2: a New Interpretation","authors":"Evan Dutmer","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p130-146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p130-146","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles (archai) and then causes (aitia) over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.[1] Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not initially available from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and which is clearer by nature.[2] It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for natural science presented to us in 1.1. \u0000 \u0000[1] An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer by nature. \u0000[2] Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22).","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131160726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p210-232
M. Gardella
I offer here a translation into Spanish of the riddles from the fourteenth book of the Greek Anthology. The translation is accompanied by a brief description of the content of this book and the main devices used for the composition of riddles (metaphor, metonymy, ambiguity, antithesis, and personification). At the end, there is a list of the responses to the riddles.
{"title":"Los enigmas de Antología griega: presentación y traducción","authors":"M. Gardella","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p210-232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p210-232","url":null,"abstract":"I offer here a translation into Spanish of the riddles from the fourteenth book of the Greek Anthology. The translation is accompanied by a brief description of the content of this book and the main devices used for the composition of riddles (metaphor, metonymy, ambiguity, antithesis, and personification). At the end, there is a list of the responses to the riddles.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130607525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p203-209
Bruce Rishel
Charioteering as a metaphor for correct and balanced thinking has been written about since Homer. The Iliad presents the divine charioteering model as exemplified by Hera and Athena and examines how the fate of mortal charioteers including Antilokhos, Patroklos and Achilles is determined based on their ability to adhere to this model. Authors as diverse as Plato, Proclus, Pindar and Euripides build upon the divine charioteering model as they show examples of charioteers who, in varying degrees, follow this model. This paper will demonstrate that heroes who veer from the model of equilibrium and moderation provided by the gods, violate justice [dikē] with their hubris and incur agony [agōn] from the divinity they antagonize.
{"title":"The Divine Charioteering Model - A Guide to Moderation","authors":"Bruce Rishel","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p203-209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p203-209","url":null,"abstract":"Charioteering as a metaphor for correct and balanced thinking has been written about since Homer. The Iliad presents the divine charioteering model as exemplified by Hera and Athena and examines how the fate of mortal charioteers including Antilokhos, Patroklos and Achilles is determined based on their ability to adhere to this model. Authors as diverse as Plato, Proclus, Pindar and Euripides build upon the divine charioteering model as they show examples of charioteers who, in varying degrees, follow this model. This paper will demonstrate that heroes who veer from the model of equilibrium and moderation provided by the gods, violate justice [dikē] with their hubris and incur agony [agōn] from the divinity they antagonize.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"459 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116596960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p172-194
A. Alonso
In this paper I argue that Seneca’s philosophy is a form of therapy and that one of its main concerns is the transformation of one’s life through time control. Aristotelian tradition lies in the idea that philosophy is, in its highest aspect, an abstract form of knowledge. Seneca, on the other hand, is an inheritor of a long tradition that takes philosophy as mind or soul therapy and bases its structure in a practical approach. Epicurus, for instance, goes as far as to declare that “empty is the word of the philosopher by whom no human suffering is treated”. Even if Seneca doesn’t despise the theoretical principles that support the construction of a philosophical system, he builds, in his Letters to Lucilius, a strong therapeutic praxis whose purpose is to heal one’s mind and life. The upmost and fundamental step is providing the pupil with different ways of earning back time deprivation. Time seems to be, in a certain sense, the essential matter of Seneca’s philosophy. Time control, for him, is a kind of self-control that would make it possible to match a simple existence and a meaningful life. Therefore, Seneca’s opening letter to Lucile aims exclusively to identify how one loses time and why it’s essential to take control of it.
{"title":"Terapia, Diagnóstico e Cura: o Problema do Tempo em Sêneca","authors":"A. Alonso","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p172-194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p172-194","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I argue that Seneca’s philosophy is a form of therapy and that one of its main concerns is the transformation of one’s life through time control. Aristotelian tradition lies in the idea that philosophy is, in its highest aspect, an abstract form of knowledge. Seneca, on the other hand, is an inheritor of a long tradition that takes philosophy as mind or soul therapy and bases its structure in a practical approach. Epicurus, for instance, goes as far as to declare that “empty is the word of the philosopher by whom no human suffering is treated”. Even if Seneca doesn’t despise the theoretical principles that support the construction of a philosophical system, he builds, in his Letters to Lucilius, a strong therapeutic praxis whose purpose is to heal one’s mind and life. The upmost and fundamental step is providing the pupil with different ways of earning back time deprivation. Time seems to be, in a certain sense, the essential matter of Seneca’s philosophy. Time control, for him, is a kind of self-control that would make it possible to match a simple existence and a meaningful life. Therefore, Seneca’s opening letter to Lucile aims exclusively to identify how one loses time and why it’s essential to take control of it.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132062972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p01-52
V. Ricci
The extraordinary overall textual situation of Parmenides’ B1,1-3, due to complex, variegate and polymorphous causes, entailed and still entails diverse sorts of problematic issues so to constitute a true labyrinth of philological, hermeneutical and theoretical instances interwoven each other in almost inextricable way. In this analysis, a first substantial knot of philological type resulted necessary to a preliminary discrimination for making sure the textual reconstruction in order to argue then its most literarily clear and specifiable meaning. In this way it was also possible to make sure its semantic and theoretical relevancies. This research leaded to outline and, hopefully, to demonstrate no textual corruption and following misunderstanding happened before sec. XIII, namely corresponding to the lecture present in the first available manuscript, the so-called cod. N, universally excluded and entirely misevaluated, even discarded; instead it is not only the principle, but the unique reliable codex. The detailed analyse including the autoptic exam is the result of enlightening the absolute goodness of this version and the reasons both philological and hermeneutical comparations, which allow to achieve its complete textual rehabilitation and so to grasp its real conceptual content.
{"title":"Annotazioni su B1,1-3 (B1,4a?) di Parmenide","authors":"V. Ricci","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p01-52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p01-52","url":null,"abstract":"The extraordinary overall textual situation of Parmenides’ B1,1-3, due to complex, variegate and polymorphous causes, entailed and still entails diverse sorts of problematic issues so to constitute a true labyrinth of philological, hermeneutical and theoretical instances interwoven each other in almost inextricable way. In this analysis, a first substantial knot of philological type resulted necessary to a preliminary discrimination for making sure the textual reconstruction in order to argue then its most literarily clear and specifiable meaning. In this way it was also possible to make sure its semantic and theoretical relevancies. This research leaded to outline and, hopefully, to demonstrate no textual corruption and following misunderstanding happened before sec. XIII, namely corresponding to the lecture present in the first available manuscript, the so-called cod. N, universally excluded and entirely misevaluated, even discarded; instead it is not only the principle, but the unique reliable codex. The detailed analyse including the autoptic exam is the result of enlightening the absolute goodness of this version and the reasons both philological and hermeneutical comparations, which allow to achieve its complete textual rehabilitation and so to grasp its real conceptual content. ","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115251703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p76-98
S. Everson
One issue of contention amongst scholars of the Republic is whether Thrasymachus initially espouses a conventionalist account of justice, according to which just actions are merely those which are lawful; required, or at least allowed, by the laws passed by the ruler of the state. A further question is then whether his initial conceptions of rulers and laws are positivist ones, such that to be a ruler or law of a state is simply determined by the state’s constitution (or indeed by the ruler’s ability to enforce obedience). At 340c Thrasymachus effectively rejects such positivism by placing a condition on being a ruler that one should be exercising the art of ruling and on being a law that it should work to the ruler’s interest. Some have maintained that this works to clarify his initial account and so shows that he was never a positivist about rulers and laws. In this paper I argue against such an understanding of Thrasymachus’ argument and explore the problems which beset the position he is, on my reading, forced into by Socrates’ objection to his opening claim that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger and the argument he first gives to support it.
{"title":"Thrasymachus on Justice, Rulers, and Laws in Republic I","authors":"S. Everson","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p76-98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p76-98","url":null,"abstract":"One issue of contention amongst scholars of the Republic is whether Thrasymachus initially espouses a conventionalist account of justice, according to which just actions are merely those which are lawful; required, or at least allowed, by the laws passed by the ruler of the state. A further question is then whether his initial conceptions of rulers and laws are positivist ones, such that to be a ruler or law of a state is simply determined by the state’s constitution (or indeed by the ruler’s ability to enforce obedience). At 340c Thrasymachus effectively rejects such positivism by placing a condition on being a ruler that one should be exercising the art of ruling and on being a law that it should work to the ruler’s interest. Some have maintained that this works to clarify his initial account and so shows that he was never a positivist about rulers and laws. In this paper I argue against such an understanding of Thrasymachus’ argument and explore the problems which beset the position he is, on my reading, forced into by Socrates’ objection to his opening claim that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger and the argument he first gives to support it.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"745 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115132131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i02p147-171
Rodrigo Romão de Carvalho
The present paper aims at examining the characteristics that determine the essential nature of the homogeneous bodies in Aristotle, from an analysis of Meteorology IV.12, which would at the same time establish a certain relationship with other treatises of natural philosophy and also in particular with books VII and VIII of Metaphysics. With this investigation, I will delineate a certain line of argument that goes against a reading perspective considered as traditional, with certain interpretive variants, according to which Aristotle would have adopted the idea of a universal teleology, in the general sense that all natural bodies would be generated for a specific goal, or for a natural purpose. According to a certain view, linked to this perspective, the teleological character of functional type of vital activities, notably expressed by the compositional arrangement of the non-homogeneous parts in the living being's complexion, would be somehow involved in the constitution of the homogeneous bodies considered in themselves and for themselves. In contrast to such a view, I will examine, in a precise way, to what extent the homogeneous bodies would comprise a certain formal factor directly involved in the characterization of their constitutional particularities, taking into account a comparative examination with other kinds of natural compositions, namely, elemental aggregates and living organisms. Thus, through this examination, I will explore the question of whether, in function of this formal factor, such bodies could present some teleological character trait, distinct from the functional type, characteristic of organic-animate constitutions.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-11DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p53-75
Thomas A. Blackson
In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated into their doctrine of practice.
{"title":"Before and After Philosophy takes Possession of the Soul","authors":"Thomas A. Blackson","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p53-75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p53-75","url":null,"abstract":"In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated into their doctrine of practice.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134382299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-22DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p161-170
M. Witty
Very early experiments described in ancient literature usually have no detailed explanation of the methods used let alone the explicit Control expected by modern scientists for comparison with Treatments. Athenaeus describes a rarely recorded exception in The Deipnosophistae which has been briefly noted in scientific literature but not sufficiently contextualized. The experiment described has one treatment, a control and Athenaeus cites the desirability of replication, making this passage read like a modern text rather than an ancient one. Because technical processes were invented in ancient times I assume that experiments were also practiced, even though they are not described in ancient literature. This passage in Athenaeus exemplifies, by rare contrast, the general lack of description for ancient scientific methods. This lack may be because the ancient practitioners of technical processes did not have the reason modern scientists use for disclosure of all methods and results. Moderns achieve monetization that is protected by Intellectual Property Law or by acquisition of authority followed by salaried teaching in the academy. Ancient experimenters protected their discoveries by secrecy and maintained monopolies by concealment, an inconvenience for modern scholars. The form of ancient literature is important for this subject: it is not like modern scientific literature. When the ancients mention scientific subjects in writing it is in the form of literary discourse and debate where the aim is cerebral. There is no description of technical details where the aim is to allow replication of the experiment. Comfortable logic not experiment is described and intellectual improvement was usually the aim of ancient literature, rather than practical outcomes. The only reason we have knowledge of ancient practitioners of something similar to modern scientific methods from literature is that their kind of technical antics were briefly mentioned by ancient authors, because of their surprising and amusing nature.
{"title":"Athenaeus and the Control","authors":"M. Witty","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p161-170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p161-170","url":null,"abstract":"Very early experiments described in ancient literature usually have no detailed explanation of the methods used let alone the explicit Control expected by modern scientists for comparison with Treatments. Athenaeus describes a rarely recorded exception in The Deipnosophistae which has been briefly noted in scientific literature but not sufficiently contextualized. The experiment described has one treatment, a control and Athenaeus cites the desirability of replication, making this passage read like a modern text rather than an ancient one. Because technical processes were invented in ancient times I assume that experiments were also practiced, even though they are not described in ancient literature. This passage in Athenaeus exemplifies, by rare contrast, the general lack of description for ancient scientific methods. This lack may be because the ancient practitioners of technical processes did not have the reason modern scientists use for disclosure of all methods and results. Moderns achieve monetization that is protected by Intellectual Property Law or by acquisition of authority followed by salaried teaching in the academy. Ancient experimenters protected their discoveries by secrecy and maintained monopolies by concealment, an inconvenience for modern scholars. The form of ancient literature is important for this subject: it is not like modern scientific literature. When the ancients mention scientific subjects in writing it is in the form of literary discourse and debate where the aim is cerebral. There is no description of technical details where the aim is to allow replication of the experiment. Comfortable logic not experiment is described and intellectual improvement was usually the aim of ancient literature, rather than practical outcomes. The only reason we have knowledge of ancient practitioners of something similar to modern scientific methods from literature is that their kind of technical antics were briefly mentioned by ancient authors, because of their surprising and amusing nature.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125185000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-22DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p91-115
Brian G. Lightbody
Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.
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