Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-13
Corazzini Luca, Cotton Christopher, Longo Enrico, Reggiani Tommaso
Experiments involving multiple public goods with contribution thresholds capture many features of charitable giving environments in which donors try to coordinate their contributions across various potential recipients. We present results from a laboratory experiment that introduces endowment and preference differences into such a framework to explore the impact of donor heterogeneity on public good success and payoffs. We observe that wealthier donors tend to provide larger contributions to the public goods, and that the contributions of all other donors are most likely directed to the public good preferred by the wealthiest donor as other group members try to coordinate their donations to ensure public good success. We refer to this collective focus on the preferred good of the wealthiest as the Gates Effect. The Gates Effect can reduce inequality among donors groups that succeed in funding a public good; however, it also affects the philanthropic agenda, reducing the variety of public goods that receive funding.
{"title":"The Gates Effect in Public Goods Experiments: How Donations Flow to the Recipients Favored by the Wealthy","authors":"Corazzini Luca, Cotton Christopher, Longo Enrico, Reggiani Tommaso","doi":"10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-13","url":null,"abstract":"Experiments involving multiple public goods with contribution thresholds capture many features of charitable giving environments in which donors try to coordinate their contributions across various potential recipients. We present results from a laboratory experiment that introduces endowment and preference differences into such a framework to explore the impact of donor heterogeneity on public good success and payoffs. We observe that wealthier donors tend to provide larger contributions to the public goods, and that the contributions of all other donors are most likely directed to the public good preferred by the wealthiest donor as other group members try to coordinate their donations to ensure public good success. We refer to this collective focus on the preferred good of the wealthiest as the Gates Effect. The Gates Effect can reduce inequality among donors groups that succeed in funding a public good; however, it also affects the philanthropic agenda, reducing the variety of public goods that receive funding.","PeriodicalId":188529,"journal":{"name":"MUNI ECON Working Papers","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122844679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2023-02
Clò Stefano, Regiani Tommaso, Ruberto Sabrina
This paper questions whether informative feedback on consumption can nudge water saving behavioral change. For this purpose, we launched a five-month online information campaign which involved equipping around 1,000 households located in the province of Milan (Italy) with a smart meter. Treated households received monthly reports via email on their per capita daily average water consumption, which included a social comparison component (consumption class size). The difference-in-differences analysis showed that, compared to the control group, treated units reduced their daily per capita water consumption by more than 10 % (22 liters or 5.8 gallons). This additional water saving increased with the number of monthly reports, though it did not persist two months after the campaign expired. The impact of the campaign was heterogeneous across consumption classes, while a Regression Discontinuity Design analysis showed that different feedback on consumption class size differentially affected water saving at the margin. Finally, being able to observe the email opening rate, we complemented the ITT analysis by developing a Per Protocol (PP) analysis, where non-adherent units were excluded from the treated group. Both ITT and PP provide consistent conclusions, thus augmenting the level of confidence in the study results.
{"title":"Consumption feedback and water saving: An experiment in the metropolitan area of Milan","authors":"Clò Stefano, Regiani Tommaso, Ruberto Sabrina","doi":"10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2023-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2023-02","url":null,"abstract":"This paper questions whether informative feedback on consumption can nudge water saving behavioral change. For this purpose, we launched a five-month online information campaign which involved equipping around 1,000 households located in the province of Milan (Italy) with a smart meter. Treated households received monthly reports via email on their per capita daily average water consumption, which included a social comparison component (consumption class size). The difference-in-differences analysis showed that, compared to the control group, treated units reduced their daily per capita water consumption by more than 10 % (22 liters or 5.8 gallons). This additional water saving increased with the number of monthly reports, though it did not persist two months after the campaign expired. The impact of the campaign was heterogeneous across consumption classes, while a Regression Discontinuity Design analysis showed that different feedback on consumption class size differentially affected water saving at the margin. Finally, being able to observe the email opening rate, we complemented the ITT analysis by developing a Per Protocol (PP) analysis, where non-adherent units were excluded from the treated group. Both ITT and PP provide consistent conclusions, thus augmenting the level of confidence in the study results.","PeriodicalId":188529,"journal":{"name":"MUNI ECON Working Papers","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127611534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2020-01
Fišar Miloš, Reggiani Tommaso, Sabatini Fabio, Špalek Jiří
We study the impact of media bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are significantly more compliant than the control group. The exposure to negative news, instead, does not prompt any significant reaction in respect to the neutral condition, suggesting that participants perceive the media negativity bias in the selection and tonality of news as the norm rather than the exception. Overall, our results suggest that biased news act as a constant source of psychological priming and play a vital role in taxpayers’ compliance decisions.
{"title":"Media Bias and Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Fišar Miloš, Reggiani Tommaso, Sabatini Fabio, Špalek Jiří","doi":"10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2020-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2020-01","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of media bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are significantly more compliant than the control group. The exposure to negative news, instead, does not prompt any significant reaction in respect to the neutral condition, suggesting that participants perceive the media negativity bias in the selection and tonality of news as the norm rather than the exception. Overall, our results suggest that biased news act as a constant source of psychological priming and play a vital role in taxpayers’ compliance decisions.","PeriodicalId":188529,"journal":{"name":"MUNI ECON Working Papers","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132245348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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