Pub Date : 2013-11-10DOI: 10.1108/01437721311320672
M. Pellizzari
A large part of the Italian welfare system is designed and implemented at the very local level, leading to a high degree of heterogeneity in the type and the generosity of available programs across the country. As a consequence, studies of welfare use based on standard household surveys may fail to consider a large part of welfare recipients and provisions. In this paper I overcome such a problem by combining the analysis of welfare use in the Italian sample of the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with the investigation of a new administrative archive that contains information on means tests certificates needed for applying to all kind of locally administered welfare programs. Results show that, without controlling for observable characteristics, migrants from outside the EU are more likely to receive or apply for welfare. Once individual and household characteristics are controlled for, such a residual welfare dependency is greatly reduced but does not disappear. Geographical location is a key factor, given that migrants tend to locate in the richest areas of the country, which also happen to be the ones where the local welfare is most generous.
{"title":"The Use of Welfare by Migrants in Italy","authors":"M. Pellizzari","doi":"10.1108/01437721311320672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/01437721311320672","url":null,"abstract":"A large part of the Italian welfare system is designed and implemented at the very local level, leading to a high degree of heterogeneity in the type and the generosity of available programs across the country. As a consequence, studies of welfare use based on standard household surveys may fail to consider a large part of welfare recipients and provisions. In this paper I overcome such a problem by combining the analysis of welfare use in the Italian sample of the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with the investigation of a new administrative archive that contains information on means tests certificates needed for applying to all kind of locally administered welfare programs. Results show that, without controlling for observable characteristics, migrants from outside the EU are more likely to receive or apply for welfare. Once individual and household characteristics are controlled for, such a residual welfare dependency is greatly reduced but does not disappear. Geographical location is a key factor, given that migrants tend to locate in the richest areas of the country, which also happen to be the ones where the local welfare is most generous.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129112070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research investigates the effect of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program) for food insecurity. SNAP provides benefits to qualifying households for purchasing food. Some have suggested that SNAP benefits may be less effective in some areas because of geographic differences in food prices (Leibtag, 2007; Nord and Hopwood, 2007). We include food prices in our analysis to control for price differences. We find that holding food prices constant, an additional SNAP dollar per-capita reduces the probability of food insecurity by about 0.5 percent. However, we find that marginal effects vary with the level of benefit received and that marginal effects are largest at low benefit levels. Furthermore, we find that even though household incomes are higher when benefits are low, the probability of food insecurity is larger than when benefits are higher. Higher food prices decrease the purchasing power of SNAP benefits, reducing food security.
本研究调查了补充营养援助计划(SNAP，以前称为食品券计划)对粮食不安全的影响。SNAP向符合条件的家庭提供购买食品的福利。一些人认为，由于食品价格的地理差异，SNAP的效益在某些地区可能不太有效(Leibtag, 2007;Nord and Hopwood, 2007)。我们在分析中包括了食品价格，以控制价格差异。我们发现，在保持粮食价格不变的情况下，人均额外增加一美元的SNAP，粮食不安全的可能性就会降低约0.5%。然而，我们发现边际效应随着所获得的效益水平而变化，并且在低效益水平下边际效应最大。此外，我们发现，即使在福利较低时家庭收入较高，粮食不安全的可能性也大于福利较高时。食品价格上涨降低了SNAP福利的购买力，从而降低了粮食安全。
{"title":"The Effect of Snap Benefits for Food Insecurity","authors":"David E. Davis, Rui Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2713890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2713890","url":null,"abstract":"This research investigates the effect of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program) for food insecurity. SNAP provides benefits to qualifying households for purchasing food. Some have suggested that SNAP benefits may be less effective in some areas because of geographic differences in food prices (Leibtag, 2007; Nord and Hopwood, 2007). We include food prices in our analysis to control for price differences. We find that holding food prices constant, an additional SNAP dollar per-capita reduces the probability of food insecurity by about 0.5 percent. However, we find that marginal effects vary with the level of benefit received and that marginal effects are largest at low benefit levels. Furthermore, we find that even though household incomes are higher when benefits are low, the probability of food insecurity is larger than when benefits are higher. Higher food prices decrease the purchasing power of SNAP benefits, reducing food security.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117116780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In May 2013, at the meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation, the draft law which assigns the state authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation the right to set the criteria of need of individual categories of people in social support with the principle of target orientation taken into account was discussed among other issues.
{"title":"Review of the Meetings of the Government of the RF in May 2013","authors":"M. Goldin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2289814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2289814","url":null,"abstract":"In May 2013, at the meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation, the draft law which assigns the state authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation the right to set the criteria of need of individual categories of people in social support with the principle of target orientation taken into account was discussed among other issues.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117060321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Survey misreporting is known to be pervasive and bias common statistical analyses. In this paper, I first use administrative data on SNAP receipt and amounts linked to American Community Survey data from New York State to show that survey data can misrepresent the program in important ways. For example, more than 1.4 billion dollars received are not reported in New York State alone. 46 percent of dollars received by house- holds with annual income above the poverty line are not reported in the survey data, while only 19 percent are missing below the poverty line. Standard corrections for measurement error cannot remove these biases. I then develop a method to obtain consistent estimates by combining parameter estimates from the linked data with publicly available data. This conditional density method recovers the correct estimates using public use data only, which solves the problem that access to linked administrative data is usually restricted. I examine the degree to which this approach can be used to extrapolate across time and geography, in order to solve the problem that validation data is often based on a convenience sample. I present evidence from within New York State that the extent of heterogeneity is small enough to make extrapolation work well across both time and geography. Extrapolation to the entire U.S. yields substantive differences to survey data and reduces deviations from official aggregates by a factor of 4 to 9 compared to survey aggregates.
{"title":"A Method of Correcting for Misreporting Applied to the Food Stamp Program","authors":"N. Mittag","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2272239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2272239","url":null,"abstract":"Survey misreporting is known to be pervasive and bias common statistical analyses. In this paper, I first use administrative data on SNAP receipt and amounts linked to American Community Survey data from New York State to show that survey data can misrepresent the program in important ways. For example, more than 1.4 billion dollars received are not reported in New York State alone. 46 percent of dollars received by house- holds with annual income above the poverty line are not reported in the survey data, while only 19 percent are missing below the poverty line. Standard corrections for measurement error cannot remove these biases. I then develop a method to obtain consistent estimates by combining parameter estimates from the linked data with publicly available data. This conditional density method recovers the correct estimates using public use data only, which solves the problem that access to linked administrative data is usually restricted. I examine the degree to which this approach can be used to extrapolate across time and geography, in order to solve the problem that validation data is often based on a convenience sample. I present evidence from within New York State that the extent of heterogeneity is small enough to make extrapolation work well across both time and geography. Extrapolation to the entire U.S. yields substantive differences to survey data and reduces deviations from official aggregates by a factor of 4 to 9 compared to survey aggregates.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126117413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The successful development of the welfare state that transpired for three decades after WWII in the developed countries, came to a halt around the end of the 1980s. Since then, the number of articles and books dedicated to the crisis of the welfare state has increased. We can now assert that at the turn of the century, almost all industrialized countries had cut at least “some” entitlements in their welfare program along with other expenditure items, and the trend continued in the first decade of this century. To defend the cuts and possibly to justify continuing cuts, several economic reasons, both theoretical and empirical, have been highlighted. From mention of Baumol’s disease to the fiscal crisis, the support for making such decisions by governments gained momentum, with their political inspiration changing during the same period in favor of more conservative, right-wing positions. The low productivity of the public sector and the high level of tax burden were the substantial arguments used to support cuts. The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation into the impact of retrenchment of the public sector on the performance of 15 European countries. In particular, we aim to empirically test the view that “big government” reduces a country's efficiency. We have found that no such empirical support exists. We have also included analysis of the distribution of income through the Gini index and have found the standard trade-off relation between inequality and efficiency.
{"title":"Does Cutting Back the Public Sector Improve Efficiency? Some Evidence from 15 European Countries","authors":"S. Auci, L. Castellucci, M. Coromaldi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2254056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2254056","url":null,"abstract":"The successful development of the welfare state that transpired for three decades after WWII in the developed countries, came to a halt around the end of the 1980s. Since then, the number of articles and books dedicated to the crisis of the welfare state has increased. We can now assert that at the turn of the century, almost all industrialized countries had cut at least “some” entitlements in their welfare program along with other expenditure items, and the trend continued in the first decade of this century. To defend the cuts and possibly to justify continuing cuts, several economic reasons, both theoretical and empirical, have been highlighted. From mention of Baumol’s disease to the fiscal crisis, the support for making such decisions by governments gained momentum, with their political inspiration changing during the same period in favor of more conservative, right-wing positions. The low productivity of the public sector and the high level of tax burden were the substantial arguments used to support cuts. The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation into the impact of retrenchment of the public sector on the performance of 15 European countries. In particular, we aim to empirically test the view that “big government” reduces a country's efficiency. We have found that no such empirical support exists. We have also included analysis of the distribution of income through the Gini index and have found the standard trade-off relation between inequality and efficiency.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131806632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federal spending increases for what used to be known as “anti-poverty” programs — food, health insurance, housing, and income support — have become staggering. These programs grew by $100 billion during the eight years of the Bush administration (adjusting for inflation), but they grew by another $150 billion in just the first two years of the Obama administration. Total spending for these four safety net programs stood at $666 billion in 2010, a total larger than Medicare and just slightly smaller than Social Security and national defense. Some of these increases are justified by the deep recession that began in late 2007, due to higher rates of unemployment and poverty. But average benefits per person in poverty increased from $7500 during the early 1990s recession compared to $14,600 for the recent one (correcting for inflation). If all these monies and services were going to the poor, our question would be why the safety net became more costly. Most remarkable, however, and rarely discussed, is that much of the cost increase is explained by benefits going to persons who are above the official poverty line. Today, at least half of the benefits for food programs, Medicaid, and most income assistance programs are going to people who are above the poverty line as defined by the U.S. Census. Federal food program expenditures for 2010 totaled $95 billion, up from just $57 billion in 2007. Most of these expenditures were for food stamps ($68 billion). Of the 40.3 million persons receiving food stamps in 2010, slightly more than half, or 20.4 million, were above the official poverty line as measured by the U.S. Census. Of the 43.8 million non-disabled persons receiving Medicaid and CHIP benefits, fully 25 million are above the official poverty line. More than half of the recipients of Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) and traditional welfare (TANF) are above the official poverty line. Of the major programs we reviewed, only the federal housing assistance program did not have a majority of recipients above the poverty line. Nevertheless, four out of ten persons receiving housing subsidies are over the line. The debate over federal budget deficits focuses unduly on Medicare and Social Security. The combined spending on anti-poverty programs, and their rate of growth, offers an alternative for reduced federal spending. While anti-poverty programs should clearly help those who are poor, the general public (and perhaps many in Congress) may not be aware that we are giving billions in benefits to persons above the poverty line. By bringing these programs into line with their original purposes, a safety net for the poor, we can save up to $200 billion per year — without reducing benefits for the truly needy.
{"title":"Spending for 'Anti-Poverty' Programs: Restoring a True Safety Net","authors":"D. Armor, S. Sousa","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2152475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2152475","url":null,"abstract":"Federal spending increases for what used to be known as “anti-poverty” programs — food, health insurance, housing, and income support — have become staggering. These programs grew by $100 billion during the eight years of the Bush administration (adjusting for inflation), but they grew by another $150 billion in just the first two years of the Obama administration. Total spending for these four safety net programs stood at $666 billion in 2010, a total larger than Medicare and just slightly smaller than Social Security and national defense. Some of these increases are justified by the deep recession that began in late 2007, due to higher rates of unemployment and poverty. But average benefits per person in poverty increased from $7500 during the early 1990s recession compared to $14,600 for the recent one (correcting for inflation). If all these monies and services were going to the poor, our question would be why the safety net became more costly. Most remarkable, however, and rarely discussed, is that much of the cost increase is explained by benefits going to persons who are above the official poverty line. Today, at least half of the benefits for food programs, Medicaid, and most income assistance programs are going to people who are above the poverty line as defined by the U.S. Census. Federal food program expenditures for 2010 totaled $95 billion, up from just $57 billion in 2007. Most of these expenditures were for food stamps ($68 billion). Of the 40.3 million persons receiving food stamps in 2010, slightly more than half, or 20.4 million, were above the official poverty line as measured by the U.S. Census. Of the 43.8 million non-disabled persons receiving Medicaid and CHIP benefits, fully 25 million are above the official poverty line. More than half of the recipients of Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) and traditional welfare (TANF) are above the official poverty line. Of the major programs we reviewed, only the federal housing assistance program did not have a majority of recipients above the poverty line. Nevertheless, four out of ten persons receiving housing subsidies are over the line. The debate over federal budget deficits focuses unduly on Medicare and Social Security. The combined spending on anti-poverty programs, and their rate of growth, offers an alternative for reduced federal spending. While anti-poverty programs should clearly help those who are poor, the general public (and perhaps many in Congress) may not be aware that we are giving billions in benefits to persons above the poverty line. By bringing these programs into line with their original purposes, a safety net for the poor, we can save up to $200 billion per year — without reducing benefits for the truly needy.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128370045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs link public transfers to human capital investment in hopes of alleviating current poverty and reducing its intergenerational transmission. Whereas nearly all studies of their impacts have focused on youth, these CCT programs may also have an impact on aging adults, by increasing household resources or inducing changes in allocations of time of various household members, that may be of substantial interest, particularly given the rapid aging of most populations. This paper contributes to this under-researched area by examining health and work impacts on the aging for the best known and most influential of these programs, the Mexican PROGRESA/Oportunidades program. For a number of health indicators, the program appears to significantly improve health, with impacts that are larger with a greater time receiving the program. However, most of these health impacts are concentrated on women.
{"title":"The Impact of the Progresa/Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Health and Related Outcomes for the Aging in Mexico","authors":"Jere r. Behrman, S. Parker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1941850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941850","url":null,"abstract":"Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs link public transfers to human capital investment in hopes of alleviating current poverty and reducing its intergenerational transmission. Whereas nearly all studies of their impacts have focused on youth, these CCT programs may also have an impact on aging adults, by increasing household resources or inducing changes in allocations of time of various household members, that may be of substantial interest, particularly given the rapid aging of most populations. This paper contributes to this under-researched area by examining health and work impacts on the aging for the best known and most influential of these programs, the Mexican PROGRESA/Oportunidades program. For a number of health indicators, the program appears to significantly improve health, with impacts that are larger with a greater time receiving the program. However, most of these health impacts are concentrated on women.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125165038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-06-01DOI: 10.4067/S0718-52862011000100006
Fernando Hoces de la Guardia, Andrés Hojman, O. Larrañaga
This paper presents the results of a three-year evaluation performed on the first cohorts of Chile Solidario, the most important anti-poverty program in Chile. The paper presents a description of the program, emphasizing the mechanism by which people were admitted into the program. We then propose evaluation strategies and discuss their validity. The final evaluation is conducted using a Matching estimator, and we discuss the principles surrounding the potential for this to be a valid evaluation method. The initial results using the Chile Solidario Panel suggest that the program had positive effects on psychosocial welfare and on take-up of subsidies and social programs. However, it is not possible to obtain reliable results due to data shortcomings, particularly the lack of baseline data. In order to solve the problem, we generated a database using six years of administrative data, including around 1,000,000 family records per year. A method for overcoming the treatment substitution problem is discussed and implemented. Results are much more robust than those of the Chile Solidario Panel and show small, but clearly positive effects for several variables, especially the number of workers in the family, the percentage of workers in the family and the employment of the head of the family.
{"title":"Evaluating the Chile Solidario Program: Results Using the Chile Solidario Panel and the Administrative Databases","authors":"Fernando Hoces de la Guardia, Andrés Hojman, O. Larrañaga","doi":"10.4067/S0718-52862011000100006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862011000100006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of a three-year evaluation performed on the first cohorts of Chile Solidario, the most important anti-poverty program in Chile. The paper presents a description of the program, emphasizing the mechanism by which people were admitted into the program. We then propose evaluation strategies and discuss their validity. The final evaluation is conducted using a Matching estimator, and we discuss the principles surrounding the potential for this to be a valid evaluation method. The initial results using the Chile Solidario Panel suggest that the program had positive effects on psychosocial welfare and on take-up of subsidies and social programs. However, it is not possible to obtain reliable results due to data shortcomings, particularly the lack of baseline data. In order to solve the problem, we generated a database using six years of administrative data, including around 1,000,000 family records per year. A method for overcoming the treatment substitution problem is discussed and implemented. Results are much more robust than those of the Chile Solidario Panel and show small, but clearly positive effects for several variables, especially the number of workers in the family, the percentage of workers in the family and the employment of the head of the family.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130640573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.
{"title":"The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants","authors":"Covadonga Meseguer, F. Aparicio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1475215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1475215","url":null,"abstract":"The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122909087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I examine the extent to which the link between public preferences and government policy is biased toward the preferences of high-income Americans. Using an original data set of almost 2,000 survey questions on proposed policy changes between 1981 and 2002, I find a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, albeit with a strong bias toward the status quo. But I also find that when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear little relationship to the preferences of poor or middle income Americans. After documenting these inequalities, I examine the role of interest groups in shaping policy responsiveness to the preferences of the public. I show that neither the direction of interest group alignments nor the extent of interest group engagement significantly alters the patters of policy responsiveness to Americans at different income levels. Interest groups do influence federal policy, but they do so independently of the preferences of the public. Affluent Americans are more likely to see their preferences reflected in policy outcomes if the balance of interest groups on an issue share those preferences, but the extent to which the affluent move policy in one direction or another is independent of the influence of interest groups. Interest groups do sometimes move policy in a direction more consistent with the preferences of the poor, but these are offset by other instances in which interest groups are more aligned with the affluent. Moreover, the instances on which interest groups align more closely with the preferences of the less well off often reflect idiosyncratic circumstances - either interest groups that share the preferences of the poor by "happy coincidence" or the unique case of the AARP which cannot serve as a general model of interest group advocacy for the needs of the less advantaged. Consequently, interest groups do not appear to hold much promise for reformers who seek to equalize the voice of less affluent Americans in shaping government policy.
{"title":"Interest Groups and Inequality in Democratic Responsiveness in the U.S.","authors":"Martin Gilens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1465059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1465059","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I examine the extent to which the link between public preferences and government policy is biased toward the preferences of high-income Americans. Using an original data set of almost 2,000 survey questions on proposed policy changes between 1981 and 2002, I find a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, albeit with a strong bias toward the status quo. But I also find that when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear little relationship to the preferences of poor or middle income Americans. After documenting these inequalities, I examine the role of interest groups in shaping policy responsiveness to the preferences of the public. I show that neither the direction of interest group alignments nor the extent of interest group engagement significantly alters the patters of policy responsiveness to Americans at different income levels. Interest groups do influence federal policy, but they do so independently of the preferences of the public. Affluent Americans are more likely to see their preferences reflected in policy outcomes if the balance of interest groups on an issue share those preferences, but the extent to which the affluent move policy in one direction or another is independent of the influence of interest groups. Interest groups do sometimes move policy in a direction more consistent with the preferences of the poor, but these are offset by other instances in which interest groups are more aligned with the affluent. Moreover, the instances on which interest groups align more closely with the preferences of the less well off often reflect idiosyncratic circumstances - either interest groups that share the preferences of the poor by \"happy coincidence\" or the unique case of the AARP which cannot serve as a general model of interest group advocacy for the needs of the less advantaged. Consequently, interest groups do not appear to hold much promise for reformers who seek to equalize the voice of less affluent Americans in shaping government policy.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115473292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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