This article presents an original account of the tactical options available to political parties in multi-level settings. It applies that framework to the case of post-devolution Scotland via an analysis of First Minister’s Questions sessions in the Scottish Parliament. It shows how Scottish Labour adopted a less left-leaning justification for its stance on the constitutional issue in the years after the party lost power at Holyrood to the Scottish National Party. Consequently, the party failed to present itself as a clearly left of centre alternative to the SNP and downplayed the progressive case for Scotland remaining in the UK.
本文介绍了政党在多层次设置中可用的战术选择的原始帐户。它通过对苏格兰议会首席部长提问会议的分析，将这一框架应用于权力下放后的苏格兰。它显示了苏格兰工党在苏格兰民族党(Scottish National party)在苏格兰议会(Holyrood)失去权力后，如何在宪法问题上采取了一种不那么左倾的立场。因此，该党未能将自己表现为苏格兰民族党(SNP)的明显中左翼替代方案，并淡化了苏格兰留在英国的进步理由。
{"title":"Whatever Happened to the Progressive Case for the Union? How Scottish Labour’s Failure to Subsume a Clearly Left of Centre Identity with a Pro-Union One Helps to Explain Its Decline","authors":"Kieran Wright","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article presents an original account of the tactical options available to political parties in multi-level settings. It applies that framework to the case of post-devolution Scotland via an analysis of First Minister’s Questions sessions in the Scottish Parliament. It shows how Scottish Labour adopted a less left-leaning justification for its stance on the constitutional issue in the years after the party lost power at Holyrood to the Scottish National Party. Consequently, the party failed to present itself as a clearly left of centre alternative to the SNP and downplayed the progressive case for Scotland remaining in the UK.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAB014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48052383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do populist governments disempower parliaments? If so, which strategies do they employ to do it? The empirical analysis here concerns two legislative periods in Poland: T1 2011–2015 (centre-right coalition, populist actors in the opposition) and T2 2015–2018 (populist government). The article traces changes in formal rules regulating scrutiny and law-making but also how these rules were interpreted and exercised. The article addresses the following explanatory factors: position in government, strength of parliamentary formal provisions and the readiness of political actors to revise institutional competences. The article shows that although changes to formal parliamentary powers were minor, disempowerment of the legislative was profound. The outcome has actually been achieved through radical changes in parliamentary practices regarding both law-making and scrutiny.
{"title":"Disempowerment through the Backdoor: The Impact of Populist Parties on the National Parliament in Poland","authors":"Aleksandra Maatsch","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do populist governments disempower parliaments? If so, which strategies do they employ to do it? The empirical analysis here concerns two legislative periods in Poland: T1 2011–2015 (centre-right coalition, populist actors in the opposition) and T2 2015–2018 (populist government). The article traces changes in formal rules regulating scrutiny and law-making but also how these rules were interpreted and exercised. The article addresses the following explanatory factors: position in government, strength of parliamentary formal provisions and the readiness of political actors to revise institutional competences. The article shows that although changes to formal parliamentary powers were minor, disempowerment of the legislative was profound. The outcome has actually been achieved through radical changes in parliamentary practices regarding both law-making and scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47804583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has become axiomatic that backbench Members of Parliament (MPs) at Westminster have limited the capacity for independent action under the burdens of constituency business and whipped votes. Even the limited avenues available for such MPs to shine, such as select committees, are often illusory because parliamentarians have little time to prepare the materials or brief themselves on any but the highest profile witnesses. The political parties have benefitted from this state of affairs; docile MPs make for reliable votes. The rise of the European Research Group (ERG) as a parliamentary force disrupts this narrative. Galvanised by single-issue opposition to the UK’s involvement in ‘Europe’, encompassing both the European Union (EU) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Group successfully exploited the balance of power in the Commons during the 2017–2019 Parliamentary Session. This article analyses the methods by which the Group’s members magnified their influence over Brexit debates.
{"title":"A Mobile Phone in One Hand and Erskine May in the Other: The European Research Group’s Parliamentary Revolution","authors":"C. Murray, M. A. Armstrong","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It has become axiomatic that backbench Members of Parliament (MPs) at Westminster have limited the capacity for independent action under the burdens of constituency business and whipped votes. Even the limited avenues available for such MPs to shine, such as select committees, are often illusory because parliamentarians have little time to prepare the materials or brief themselves on any but the highest profile witnesses. The political parties have benefitted from this state of affairs; docile MPs make for reliable votes. The rise of the European Research Group (ERG) as a parliamentary force disrupts this narrative. Galvanised by single-issue opposition to the UK’s involvement in ‘Europe’, encompassing both the European Union (EU) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Group successfully exploited the balance of power in the Commons during the 2017–2019 Parliamentary Session. This article analyses the methods by which the Group’s members magnified their influence over Brexit debates.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAB004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46767414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do voters choose between a mainstream party and a populist radical right party (PRRP)? Existing research says that PRRP voters share specific attitudinal characteristics, but many mainstream party voters also have these attitudes. Drawing on spatial theories of party competition, voters make their decision to vote for a mainstream party or a PRRP based on their perceived placement of the mainstream party on immigration. Looking at the case of the 2015 United Kingdom (UK) General Election with the British Election Study Panel Survey, I analyse voters that think immigration is the most important issue facing the UK. These are the voters that prioritise the same issue as UK Independence Party (UKIP). The findings show that those who perceive the Conservative Party will reduce immigration are less likely to vote UKIP than those who perceive the Conservative Party will not reduce immigration. This relationship holds even when the respondent is highly Eurosceptic and anti-immigration.
{"title":"Who Stays and Who Goes: Understanding the Immigration Vote in the 2015 UK General Election","authors":"Julia Maynard","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do voters choose between a mainstream party and a populist radical right party (PRRP)? Existing research says that PRRP voters share specific attitudinal characteristics, but many mainstream party voters also have these attitudes. Drawing on spatial theories of party competition, voters make their decision to vote for a mainstream party or a PRRP based on their perceived placement of the mainstream party on immigration. Looking at the case of the 2015 United Kingdom (UK) General Election with the British Election Study Panel Survey, I analyse voters that think immigration is the most important issue facing the UK. These are the voters that prioritise the same issue as UK Independence Party (UKIP). The findings show that those who perceive the Conservative Party will reduce immigration are less likely to vote UKIP than those who perceive the Conservative Party will not reduce immigration. This relationship holds even when the respondent is highly Eurosceptic and anti-immigration.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAB005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43418497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since coalition governments are formed of at least two different parties with diverging preferences, there is major potential for shirking. Coalition parties can use various institutional mechanisms to keep tabs on their partners and detect ministerial drifts. In this article, we focus on potential interdependencies between monitoring mechanisms and analyse whether the existence of a coalition agreement affects the number of parliamentary questions (PQs) asked by the coalition partner. We argue that parties can hold the coalition partner accountable to the coalition agreement by asking questions. The more detailed the coalition agreement, the more potential targets exist for focused PQs. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more detailed the coalition agreement, the more frequently governing parties use PQs as a monitoring tool. Empirically, we rely on a newly compiled dataset on PQs and a content analysis of coalition agreements in Germany between 1980 and 2017. The results confirm our hypothesis.
{"title":"Complements or Substitutes? The Interdependence between Coalition Agreements and Parliamentary Questions as Monitoring Mechanisms in Coalition Governments","authors":"Daniel Höhmann, S. Krauss","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since coalition governments are formed of at least two different parties with diverging preferences, there is major potential for shirking. Coalition parties can use various institutional mechanisms to keep tabs on their partners and detect ministerial drifts. In this article, we focus on potential interdependencies between monitoring mechanisms and analyse whether the existence of a coalition agreement affects the number of parliamentary questions (PQs) asked by the coalition partner. We argue that parties can hold the coalition partner accountable to the coalition agreement by asking questions. The more detailed the coalition agreement, the more potential targets exist for focused PQs. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more detailed the coalition agreement, the more frequently governing parties use PQs as a monitoring tool. Empirically, we rely on a newly compiled dataset on PQs and a content analysis of coalition agreements in Germany between 1980 and 2017. The results confirm our hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47170661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article asks whether Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision to bypass the House of Commons and order military action in Syria in 2018 killed the UK’s nascent War Powers Convention, established most visibly when MPs vetoed an essentially similar operation under Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013. It finds that the War Powers Convention survives, but in a weakened state, subject to new caveats that significantly narrow its scope. What happens next depends on the dynamic, unpredictable interaction between what future prime ministers believe, what strategic questions arise and what MPs will accept.
{"title":"Did Theresa May Kill the War Powers Convention? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on UK Intervention in Syria in 2013 and 2018","authors":"J. Strong","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAB001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article asks whether Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision to bypass the House of Commons and order military action in Syria in 2018 killed the UK’s nascent War Powers Convention, established most visibly when MPs vetoed an essentially similar operation under Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013. It finds that the War Powers Convention survives, but in a weakened state, subject to new caveats that significantly narrow its scope. What happens next depends on the dynamic, unpredictable interaction between what future prime ministers believe, what strategic questions arise and what MPs will accept.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAB001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61219043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the choices made by revising chambers in bicameral congresses. It analyses how bill characteristics, chamber congruence, impatience and institutional context influence the decisions made by revising chambers regarding executive bills sent by the chamber of origin. The analysis focuses on the case of Chile, a presidential country in which the executive has substantial proposal power. The findings show that the probability of a bill passing with amendments is higher when it receives a presidential urgency and when the revising chamber is the Senate. Executive bills coming out of the Finance Committee are more likely than others to pass unamended. However, those bills are more likely to die in committee when the revising chamber is the Senate (i.e. the chamber whose membership has a longer time horizon).
{"title":"Bicameral Lawmaking: Analysing the Choices of Revising Chambers","authors":"Eduardo Alemán, Nicolás Mimica, Patricio D. Navia","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAA067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAA067","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the choices made by revising chambers in bicameral congresses. It analyses how bill characteristics, chamber congruence, impatience and institutional context influence the decisions made by revising chambers regarding executive bills sent by the chamber of origin. The analysis focuses on the case of Chile, a presidential country in which the executive has substantial proposal power. The findings show that the probability of a bill passing with amendments is higher when it receives a presidential urgency and when the revising chamber is the Senate. Executive bills coming out of the Finance Committee are more likely than others to pass unamended. However, those bills are more likely to die in committee when the revising chamber is the Senate (i.e. the chamber whose membership has a longer time horizon).","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAA067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49004463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policy problems are typically framed through a representation of those who have been harmed, and those who are to blame, with parliamentary inquiries playing a key role in setting the agenda by mediating between competing problematisations. In order to reveal the politics behind policy-making through inquiries, it is necessary to examine both the aspects of the issue that are problematised and those aspects that remain unproblematised. Adopting modern slavery policy in Australia as a case study, this article utilises Bacchi’s ‘what is the problem represented to be?’ framework for analysing discourse in parliamentary inquiries on modern slavery between 2003 and 2018. I argue that across three clear phases of policy-making, problematisation has shifted and evolved, though blame has consistently been deflected away from the role of the state in contributing to the conditions that cause modern slavery.
{"title":"From Mobsters to Magnates: Shifting Blame for Modern Slavery in Australian Parliamentary Inquiries","authors":"Erin O’Brien","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSAA070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSAA070","url":null,"abstract":"Policy problems are typically framed through a representation of those who have been harmed, and those who are to blame, with parliamentary inquiries playing a key role in setting the agenda by mediating between competing problematisations. In order to reveal the politics behind policy-making through inquiries, it is necessary to examine both the aspects of the issue that are problematised and those aspects that remain unproblematised. Adopting modern slavery policy in Australia as a case study, this article utilises Bacchi’s ‘what is the problem represented to be?’ framework for analysing discourse in parliamentary inquiries on modern slavery between 2003 and 2018. I argue that across three clear phases of policy-making, problematisation has shifted and evolved, though blame has consistently been deflected away from the role of the state in contributing to the conditions that cause modern slavery.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PA/GSAA070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44425408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2014, the Constitutional Court of Uganda nullified the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014. Since that time, homosexuality has remained a key issue of debate in the Ugandan Parliament and there have been consistent calls from parliamentarians for the enactment of new anti-gay law. In this article, which is based on an analysis of the Official Report (Hansard), we provide a critical consideration of activity in the Ugandan Parliament relating to the issue of homosexuality since 2014. We examine how parliamentarians conceptualize the ‘problem’ of homosexuality and the claims they make about homosexuals. We show that calls for the increased regulation of homosexuality largely depend on problematic assertions about two related issues: the so-called ‘promotion’ of homosexuality in Uganda, and the imagined ‘recruitment’ of Ugandan children into homosexuality. We conclude by arguing that if the current level of support in the Parliament for anti-gay legislation is to be diminished, and the enactment of new anti-gay law is to be avoided, then it is crucial that some Ugandan parliamentarians speak out against homophobia and, importantly, are given support to do so.
{"title":"Beyond the Anti-Homosexuality Act : homosexuality and the Parliament of Uganda","authors":"Paul Johnson, S. Falcetta","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSZ025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSZ025","url":null,"abstract":"In 2014, the Constitutional Court of Uganda nullified the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014. Since that time, homosexuality has remained a key issue of debate in the Ugandan Parliament and there have been consistent calls from parliamentarians for the enactment of new anti-gay law. In this article, which is based on an analysis of the Official Report (Hansard), we provide a critical consideration of activity in the Ugandan Parliament relating to the issue of homosexuality since 2014. We examine how parliamentarians conceptualize the ‘problem’ of homosexuality and the claims they make about homosexuals. We show that calls for the increased regulation of homosexuality largely depend on problematic assertions about two related issues: the so-called ‘promotion’ of homosexuality in Uganda, and the imagined ‘recruitment’ of Ugandan children into homosexuality. We conclude by arguing that if the current level of support in the Parliament for anti-gay legislation is to be diminished, and the enactment of new anti-gay law is to be avoided, then it is crucial that some Ugandan parliamentarians speak out against homophobia and, importantly, are given support to do so.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":"74 1","pages":"52-78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48033256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Taking advantage of the new data available from the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, I examine whether members of the House of Commons can craft a reputation for constituency service with how they allocate their office allowances and the types of Early Day Motions (EDMs) they sponsor. Combining information on the costs of holding surgeries and the sponsorship of constituency service EDMs with the fourth wave of the 2015 British Election Study, I find that increased attention to constituency service through more spending on surgeries and sponsoring constituency EDMs helps MPs build positive reputations among citizens as constituent servants.
{"title":"Looking after Constituency Interests: The Utilisation of MP Expenses and Early Day Motions to Craft Constituency Service Home Styles","authors":"David C. W. Parker","doi":"10.1093/PA/GSZ042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PA/GSZ042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Taking advantage of the new data available from the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, I examine whether members of the House of Commons can craft a reputation for constituency service with how they allocate their office allowances and the types of Early Day Motions (EDMs) they sponsor. Combining information on the costs of holding surgeries and the sponsorship of constituency service EDMs with the fourth wave of the 2015 British Election Study, I find that increased attention to constituency service through more spending on surgeries and sponsoring constituency EDMs helps MPs build positive reputations among citizens as constituent servants.","PeriodicalId":19790,"journal":{"name":"Parliamentary Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43104420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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