FDIs (Foreign Direct Investment) have gained lot of importance in Indian economy. They provide mutual benefit to both origin as well as host countries. India has been an attractive market for FDI inflows and in specific, for the last two years, there has been an unnerving upsurge in the economic development of country. FDIs in India are allowed in most of the sectors and in this direction a major policy initiative called ‘Make in India’ campaign has been launched in 2014 to promote India as a major investment destination as well as a global hub for manufacturing, design and innovation. Further, the reforms in Indian FDI have aimed at easing, rationalising and simplifying the process of foreign investments and accept the proposals in automatic route. Therefore, this paper initiates to discuss some of the policies and recent trends in Indian FDI sector.
{"title":"Policy Initiatives of FDIs in India","authors":"Venkata Sai Srinivasa Rao Muramalla","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508244","url":null,"abstract":"FDIs (Foreign Direct Investment) have gained lot of importance in Indian economy. They provide mutual benefit to both origin as well as host countries. India has been an attractive market for FDI inflows and in specific, for the last two years, there has been an unnerving upsurge in the economic development of country. FDIs in India are allowed in most of the sectors and in this direction a major policy initiative called ‘Make in India’ campaign has been launched in 2014 to promote India as a major investment destination as well as a global hub for manufacturing, design and innovation. Further, the reforms in Indian FDI have aimed at easing, rationalising and simplifying the process of foreign investments and accept the proposals in automatic route. Therefore, this paper initiates to discuss some of the policies and recent trends in Indian FDI sector.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125874193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang, Jonathan M. Karpoff
In a 2016 paper (Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016), we report that firms exposed to an increase in the prospect of short selling during the Reg SHO pilot program have lower discretionary accruals during the pilot period. Black, Desai, Litvak, Yoo, and Yu (2019, hereafter, BDLYY) argue that this result is not replicable. We show that BDLYY’s claim is incorrect. The accruals result previously was replicated in papers by Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) and Heath, Ringgenberg, Samadi, and Werner (2019), and is easily replicable using data and code that we have shared widely since 2014 – including with the BDLYY team in 2015 – and that we recently posted publicly. The accruals result also is robust to a wide range of specification changes, including those implied by the BDLYY paper, which include: various measures of performance-matched discretionary accruals and total accruals; using our original 2012 Compustat data or currently available 2019 Compustat data; including both firm and year fixed effects; including or excluding other covariates in the difference-in-differences (DiD) tests; and using unbalanced rather than balanced panels. We conjecture that BDLYY’s results are inconsistent with prior results because they rely partly on non-standard accruals measures and/or use samples that differ from those used by Fang et al. (2016), Massa et al. (2015), and Heath et al. (2019). We conclude by discussing two theoretical concerns. First, we reiterate that an observed increase in short selling during the Reg SHO period is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the prospect of short selling has a disciplinary effect on earnings management, as managers’ endogenous adjustments affect short sellers’ opportunities and observed short selling. Second, we discuss a concern that the Reg SHO change appears to be too small to explain a wide range of firm outcomes, as recent empirical findings suggest.
在2016年的一篇论文中(Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016)，我们报告说，在Reg SHO试点计划期间，面临卖空前景增加的公司在试点期间的可自由支配应计利润较低。Black、Desai、Litvak、Yoo和Yu(2019，以下简称BDLYY)认为这一结果是不可复制的。我们证明BDLYY的索赔是不正确的。之前，masa, Zhang, and Zhang(2015)和Heath, Ringgenberg, Samadi, and Werner(2019)的论文中重复了应提项目的结果，并且使用我们自2014年以来广泛共享的数据和代码(包括2015年与BDLYY团队共享的数据和代码)和我们最近公开发布的数据和代码很容易复制。应计项目结果也适用于广泛的规范变化，包括BDLYY论文所暗示的变化，其中包括:与业绩匹配的可自由支配应计项目和应计项目总额的各种衡量标准;使用原始的2012年Compustat数据或当前可用的2019年Compustat数据;包括公司和年度固定效应;在差异中差异(DiD)检验中包括或排除其他协变量;使用不平衡面板而不是平衡面板。我们推测，BDLYY的结果与先前的结果不一致，因为它们部分依赖于非标准应计指标和/或使用的样本与Fang等人(2016)、Massa等人(2015)和Heath等人(2019)使用的样本不同。最后，我们讨论两个理论问题。首先，我们重申，在Reg SHO期间观察到的卖空增加既不是必要的，也不足以证明卖空的前景对盈余管理具有纪律效应，因为管理者的内生调整影响卖空者的机会和观察到的卖空。其次，正如最近的实证研究结果所表明的那样，我们讨论了一个担忧，即Reg SHO的变化似乎太小，无法解释广泛的企业结果。
{"title":"Reply to 'The Reg SHO Reanalysis Project: Reconsidering Fang, Huang and Karpoff (2016) on Reg SHO and Earnings Management' by Black et al. (2019)","authors":"Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang, Jonathan M. Karpoff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3507033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3507033","url":null,"abstract":"In a 2016 paper (Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016), we report that firms exposed to an increase in the prospect of short selling during the Reg SHO pilot program have lower discretionary accruals during the pilot period. Black, Desai, Litvak, Yoo, and Yu (2019, hereafter, BDLYY) argue that this result is not replicable. We show that BDLYY’s claim is incorrect. The accruals result previously was replicated in papers by Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) and Heath, Ringgenberg, Samadi, and Werner (2019), and is easily replicable using data and code that we have shared widely since 2014 – including with the BDLYY team in 2015 – and that we recently posted publicly. The accruals result also is robust to a wide range of specification changes, including those implied by the BDLYY paper, which include: various measures of performance-matched discretionary accruals and total accruals; using our original 2012 Compustat data or currently available 2019 Compustat data; including both firm and year fixed effects; including or excluding other covariates in the difference-in-differences (DiD) tests; and using unbalanced rather than balanced panels. We conjecture that BDLYY’s results are inconsistent with prior results because they rely partly on non-standard accruals measures and/or use samples that differ from those used by Fang et al. (2016), Massa et al. (2015), and Heath et al. (2019). \u0000 \u0000We conclude by discussing two theoretical concerns. First, we reiterate that an observed increase in short selling during the Reg SHO period is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the prospect of short selling has a disciplinary effect on earnings management, as managers’ endogenous adjustments affect short sellers’ opportunities and observed short selling. Second, we discuss a concern that the Reg SHO change appears to be too small to explain a wide range of firm outcomes, as recent empirical findings suggest.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131427941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) around the world managing equity of over $8 trillion, their impact on the corporate landscape and social welfare is being scrutinized. This study investigates whether and how SWFs incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions in publicly listed corporations, as well as the subsequent evolution of target firms’ ESG performance. We find that SWF funds do consider the level of past ESG performance as well as recent ESG score improvement when taking ownership stakes in listed companies. These results are driven by the SWF funds that do have an explicit or implicit ESG policy and are most transparent, and by SWF originating from developed countries and countries with civil law origins. In relation to engagement, we find by means of two natural experiments with exogenous shocks (the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and Volkwagen diesel scandal) that the ESG scores do not change significantly more for firms in which SWFs have ownership stakes. This potentially suggests that SWFs in general do not actively steer their target firms towards higher levels of ESG.
{"title":"The Global Sustainability Footprint of Sovereign Wealth Funds","authors":"Hao Liang, L. Renneboog","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3516985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3516985","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) around the world managing equity of over $8 trillion, their impact on the corporate landscape and social welfare is being scrutinized. This study investigates whether and how SWFs incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions in publicly listed corporations, as well as the subsequent evolution of target firms’ ESG performance. We find that SWF funds do consider the level of past ESG performance as well as recent ESG score improvement when taking ownership stakes in listed companies. These results are driven by the SWF funds that do have an explicit or implicit ESG policy and are most transparent, and by SWF originating from developed countries and countries with civil law origins. In relation to engagement, we find by means of two natural experiments with exogenous shocks (the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and Volkwagen diesel scandal) that the ESG scores do not change significantly more for firms in which SWFs have ownership stakes. This potentially suggests that SWFs in general do not actively steer their target firms towards higher levels of ESG.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114267322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the influence of Corporate Governance (CG) on Cost of Capital (CoC). The study revolves on the hypothesis that optimum capital structure at minimum cost is also an agenda item of CG. Thus this study explores the influence of CG on overall cost of capital as well as at its components level. The main goal is to prove that with improvement in CG performance, leads to reduction in information asymmetry among principal and agents, enabling agency cost to decline resulting in resetting guidance for required returns for equity and debt to a lower level. Main attention was paid to nature of correlation and OLS based econometric modelling of WACC to identify the lead indicators CG should influence to create an impact. This topic was chosen on the assumption that CG has a role to play in enabling financial competitiveness for the firm to fuel its ambitious growth path. The major findings of the paper are, there exist no statistically significant differences existing among the means for CoC among the CG categories, and with rise in CG, and required return on equity and required return on debt are declining by the direction of correlation. However, in CGPI category 1, study finds required return on debt rising as a possible outcome of corporate strategies in those companies. The above findings suggest that the implications on the CoC on the whole is an outcome of the strategy implementation which is a byproduct of CG performance. Overall, study concludes that there is a reduction in CoC with rise in CG performance.
{"title":"Firm Competitiveness: An Examination of the Role of Corporate Governance in Defining Cost of Capital","authors":"Sajit Jacob","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491545","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the influence of Corporate Governance (CG) on Cost of Capital (CoC). The study revolves on the hypothesis that optimum capital structure at minimum cost is also an agenda item of CG. Thus this study explores the influence of CG on overall cost of capital as well as at its components level. The main goal is to prove that with improvement in CG performance, leads to reduction in information asymmetry among principal and agents, enabling agency cost to decline resulting in resetting guidance for required returns for equity and debt to a lower level. Main attention was paid to nature of correlation and OLS based econometric modelling of WACC to identify the lead indicators CG should influence to create an impact. This topic was chosen on the assumption that CG has a role to play in enabling financial competitiveness for the firm to fuel its ambitious growth path. The major findings of the paper are, there exist no statistically significant differences existing among the means for CoC among the CG categories, and with rise in CG, and required return on equity and required return on debt are declining by the direction of correlation. However, in CGPI category 1, study finds required return on debt rising as a possible outcome of corporate strategies in those companies. The above findings suggest that the implications on the CoC on the whole is an outcome of the strategy implementation which is a byproduct of CG performance. Overall, study concludes that there is a reduction in CoC with rise in CG performance.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":" 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120828938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ross P. Buckley, D. Arner, D. Zetzsche, Ēriks K. Selga
Over the past decade a long-term process of digitization of finance has increasingly combined with datafication and new technologies including cloud computing, blockchain, big data and artificial intelligence in a new era of FinTech (“financial technology”). This process of digitization and datafication combined with new technologies is taking place in developed global markets and at times even faster in emerging and developing markets. The result: cybersecurity and technological risks are now evolving into major threats to financial stability and national security. In addition, the entry of major technology firms into finance – TechFins – brings two new issues. The first arises in the context of new forms of potentially systemically important infrastructure (such as data and cloud services providers). The second arises because data – like finance – benefits from economies of scope and scale and from network effects and – even more than finance – tends towards monopolistic or oligopolistic outcomes, resulting in the potential for systemic risk from new forms of “Too Big to Fail” and “Too Connected to Fail” phenomena. To conclude, we suggest some basic principles about how such risks can be monitored and addressed, focusing in particular on the role of regulatory technology (“RegTech”).
{"title":"The Dark Side of Digital Financial Transformation: The New Risks of FinTech and the Rise of TechRisk","authors":"Ross P. Buckley, D. Arner, D. Zetzsche, Ēriks K. Selga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478640","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade a long-term process of digitization of finance has increasingly combined with datafication and new technologies including cloud computing, blockchain, big data and artificial intelligence in a new era of FinTech (“financial technology”). This process of digitization and datafication combined with new technologies is taking place in developed global markets and at times even faster in emerging and developing markets. The result: cybersecurity and technological risks are now evolving into major threats to financial stability and national security. In addition, the entry of major technology firms into finance – TechFins – brings two new issues. The first arises in the context of new forms of potentially systemically important infrastructure (such as data and cloud services providers). The second arises because data – like finance – benefits from economies of scope and scale and from network effects and – even more than finance – tends towards monopolistic or oligopolistic outcomes, resulting in the potential for systemic risk from new forms of “Too Big to Fail” and “Too Connected to Fail” phenomena. To conclude, we suggest some basic principles about how such risks can be monitored and addressed, focusing in particular on the role of regulatory technology (“RegTech”).","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125061172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В работе вводится понятие новой меры риска VaR в квадрате ( ), которая является теоретическим осмыслением применяемых на практике подходов оценки стрессовой VaR (sVaR) и выводится формула ее вычисления для случаев равномерного или треугольного распределений денежного потока по активу (проекту). Оказывается, что намного консервативнее оценивает риски, чем мера риска VaR, во многих случаях может составить в применении конкуренцию другим мерам риска, например, таким, как ES.
English Abstract: The paper introduces the concept of a new risk measure VaR squared ( ), which is a theoretical understanding of the practical approaches to assessing stress VaR (sVaR) and derives a formula for calculating it for cases of uniform or triangular distribution of cash flow over an asset (project). It turns out that it is much more conservative in assessing risks than the VaR risk measure, in many cases it can compete with other risk measures, for example, such as ES.
{"title":"Новая Мера Риска VAR в Квадрате ( ) и Ее Вычисление Часть I: Случай Равномерного и Треугольного Распределений Вероятностей Убытков (New Risk Measure VAR Squared ( ) and its Calculation Part I: The Case of Uniform and Triangular Probability Distributions)","authors":"V. Minasyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477127","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В работе вводится понятие новой меры риска VaR в квадрате ( ), которая является теоретическим осмыслением применяемых на практике подходов оценки стрессовой VaR (sVaR) и выводится формула ее вычисления для случаев равномерного или треугольного распределений денежного потока по активу (проекту). Оказывается, что намного консервативнее оценивает риски, чем мера риска VaR, во многих случаях может составить в применении конкуренцию другим мерам риска, например, таким, как ES.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The paper introduces the concept of a new risk measure VaR squared ( ), which is a theoretical understanding of the practical approaches to assessing stress VaR (sVaR) and derives a formula for calculating it for cases of uniform or triangular distribution of cash flow over an asset (project). It turns out that it is much more conservative in assessing risks than the VaR risk measure, in many cases it can compete with other risk measures, for example, such as ES.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"404 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115610418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Managers appear to inflate non-investment accruals and then adjust financing decisions to capitalize on such inflation. Using a large sample of corporate seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for the period 1972 - 2017, we find that firms which adjust non-investment accruals to inflate pre-issue earnings have lower stock returns in the following years. Our evidence is consistent with investors being overly optimistic at the time of the issue, while in the long run revaluing the firm downwards because high reported earnings are not justified by fundamentals. Quantile analysis indicate that SEO-firms which aggressively inflate non-investment accruals have a 12% stock return under-performance in the post-issue year compared to their conservative counterparts. We find that managers are more aggressive with the pre-issue inflation of their non-investment accruals when the firm is highly dependent on equity financing.
{"title":"Earnings Management around Seasoned Equity Offerings: Evidence from Non-Investment Accruals.","authors":"Loreta Rapushi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3479163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3479163","url":null,"abstract":"Managers appear to inflate non-investment accruals and then adjust financing decisions to capitalize on such inflation. Using a large sample of corporate seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for the period 1972 - 2017, we find that firms which adjust non-investment accruals to inflate pre-issue earnings have lower stock returns in the following years. Our evidence is consistent with investors being overly optimistic at the time of the issue, while in the long run revaluing the firm downwards because high reported earnings are not justified by fundamentals. Quantile analysis indicate that SEO-firms which aggressively inflate non-investment accruals have a 12% stock return under-performance in the post-issue year compared to their conservative counterparts. We find that managers are more aggressive with the pre-issue inflation of their non-investment accruals when the firm is highly dependent on equity financing.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121224818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Banker, M. Darrough, Shaopeng Li, Lucas Threinen
We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort — namely, the pay-performance sensitivity — must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal's expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, while the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.
{"title":"The Value of Pre-contract Information about an Agent's Ability in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection","authors":"R. Banker, M. Darrough, Shaopeng Li, Lucas Threinen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3472106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3472106","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort — namely, the pay-performance sensitivity — must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal's expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, while the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114718366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) attributes economic, legal, social, and philanthropic responsibilities within the corporate sector. Sustainable financial social responsibility is primarily addressed by socially responsible investment (SRI). This chapter addresses the concepts of CSR and SRI in emerging markets and the developing world with special attention to top-down and bottom-up approaches. Theoretical descriptions discuss the human constituents of responsibility and the international emergence of CSR, with special attention to multi-stakeholder partnerships. The rise of SRI in the international arena in the wake of stakeholder activism and intrinsic socio-psychological motives are outlined. Recommendations target ingraining social responsibility in economic systems by global governance, multi-stakeholder management, and governmental assistance of the implementation and administration of corporate and financial social responsibility.
{"title":"Corporate and Financial Social Leadership in Emerging Markets and the Developing World","authors":"Julia M. Puaschunder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464915","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate social responsibility (CSR) attributes economic, legal, social, and philanthropic responsibilities within the corporate sector. Sustainable financial social responsibility is primarily addressed by socially responsible investment (SRI). This chapter addresses the concepts of CSR and SRI in emerging markets and the developing world with special attention to top-down and bottom-up approaches. Theoretical descriptions discuss the human constituents of responsibility and the international emergence of CSR, with special attention to multi-stakeholder partnerships. The rise of SRI in the international arena in the wake of stakeholder activism and intrinsic socio-psychological motives are outlined. Recommendations target ingraining social responsibility in economic systems by global governance, multi-stakeholder management, and governmental assistance of the implementation and administration of corporate and financial social responsibility.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125540196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures increase stock price crash risk. Consistent with non-GAAP disclosures allowing managers to inflate investors’ perceptions about firm performance, our results indicate that income-increasing non-GAAP reporting increases crash risk. We also find that managers can use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for withholding bad news in GAAP earnings, which is the traditional explanation for crashes. Finally, we find a positive association between firms’ non-GAAP reporting and the likelihood of subsequent events that can trigger a crash. Overall, our evidence is consistent with certain non-GAAP disclosures exposing investors to risks of large and sudden price declines.
{"title":"Non-GAAP Earnings and Stock Price Crash Risk","authors":"Charles Hsu, Rencheng Wang, Benjamin C. Whipple","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3454799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454799","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures increase stock price crash risk. Consistent with non-GAAP disclosures allowing managers to inflate investors’ perceptions about firm performance, our results indicate that income-increasing non-GAAP reporting increases crash risk. We also find that managers can use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for withholding bad news in GAAP earnings, which is the traditional explanation for crashes. Finally, we find a positive association between firms’ non-GAAP reporting and the likelihood of subsequent events that can trigger a crash. Overall, our evidence is consistent with certain non-GAAP disclosures exposing investors to risks of large and sudden price declines.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114706974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：