The COPA authenticated encryption mode was proved to have a birthday-bound security on integrity, and its instantiation AES-COPA (v1/2) was claimed or conjectured to have a full security on tag guessing. The Marble (v1.0/1.1/1.2) authenticated encryption algorithm was claimed to have a full security on authenticity. Both AES-COPA (v1) and Marble (v1.0) were submitted to the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) in 2014, and Marble was revised twice (v1.1/1.2) in the first round of CAESAR, and AES-COPA (v1) was tweaked (v2) for the second round of CAESAR. In this paper, we cryptanalyse the basic cases of COPA, AES-COPA and Marble, that process messages of a multiple of the block size long; we present collision-based almost universal forgery attacks on the basic cases of COPA, AES-COPA (v1/2) and Marble (v1.0/1.1/1.2), and show that the basic cases of COPA and AES-COPA have roughly at most a birthday-bound security on tag guessing and the basic case of Marble has roughly at most a birthday-bound security on authenticity. The attacks on COPA and AES-COPA do not violate their birthday-bound security proof on integrity, but the attack on AES-COPA violates its full security claim or conjecture on tag guessing. Therefore, the full security claim or conjecture on tag guessing of AES-COPA and the full security claim on authenticity of Marble are incorrectly far overestimated in the sense of a general understanding of full security of these security notions. Designers should pay attention to these attacks when designing authenticated encryption algorithms with similar structures in the future, and should be careful when claiming the security of an advanced form of a security notion without making a corresponding proof after proving the security of the security notion only under its most fundamental form.
{"title":"Almost Universal Forgery Attacks on the COPA and Marble Authenticated Encryption Algorithms","authors":"Jiqiang Lu","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3052981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3052981","url":null,"abstract":"The COPA authenticated encryption mode was proved to have a birthday-bound security on integrity, and its instantiation AES-COPA (v1/2) was claimed or conjectured to have a full security on tag guessing. The Marble (v1.0/1.1/1.2) authenticated encryption algorithm was claimed to have a full security on authenticity. Both AES-COPA (v1) and Marble (v1.0) were submitted to the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) in 2014, and Marble was revised twice (v1.1/1.2) in the first round of CAESAR, and AES-COPA (v1) was tweaked (v2) for the second round of CAESAR. In this paper, we cryptanalyse the basic cases of COPA, AES-COPA and Marble, that process messages of a multiple of the block size long; we present collision-based almost universal forgery attacks on the basic cases of COPA, AES-COPA (v1/2) and Marble (v1.0/1.1/1.2), and show that the basic cases of COPA and AES-COPA have roughly at most a birthday-bound security on tag guessing and the basic case of Marble has roughly at most a birthday-bound security on authenticity. The attacks on COPA and AES-COPA do not violate their birthday-bound security proof on integrity, but the attack on AES-COPA violates its full security claim or conjecture on tag guessing. Therefore, the full security claim or conjecture on tag guessing of AES-COPA and the full security claim on authenticity of Marble are incorrectly far overestimated in the sense of a general understanding of full security of these security notions. Designers should pay attention to these attacks when designing authenticated encryption algorithms with similar structures in the future, and should be careful when claiming the security of an advanced form of a security notion without making a corresponding proof after proving the security of the security notion only under its most fundamental form.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73754244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Mobile Apps & Markets","authors":"W. Enck","doi":"10.1145/3248548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3248548","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73829628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Harshal Tupsamudre, Vijayanand Banahatti, S. Lodha, Ketan Vyas
The graphical pattern unlock scheme which requires users to connect a minimum of 4 nodes on 3X3 grid is one of the most popular authentication mechanism on mobile devices. However prior research suggests that users' pattern choices are highly biased and hence vulnerable to guessing attacks. Moreover, 3X3 pattern choices are devoid of features such as longer stroke lengths, direction changes and intersections that are considered to be important in preventing shoulder-surfing attacks. We attribute these insecure practices to the geometry of the grid and its complicated drawing rules which prevent users from realising the full potential of graphical passwords. In this paper, we propose and explore an alternate circular layout referred to as Pass-O which unlike grid layout allows connection between any two nodes, thus simplifying the pattern drawing rules. Consequently, Pass-O produces a theoretical search space of 9,85,824, almost 2.5 times greater than 3X3 grid layout. We compare the security of 3X3 and Pass-O patterns theoretically as well as empirically. Theoretically, Pass-O patterns are uniform and have greater visual complexity due to large number of intersections. To perform empirical analysis, we conduct a large-scale web-based user study and collect more than 1,23,000 patterns from 21,053 users. After examining user-chosen 3X3 and Pass-O patterns across different metrics such as pattern length, stroke length, start point, end point, repetitions, number of direction changes and intersections, we find that Pass-O patterns are much more secure than 3X3 patterns.
{"title":"Pass-O: A Proposal to Improve the Security of Pattern Unlock Scheme","authors":"Harshal Tupsamudre, Vijayanand Banahatti, S. Lodha, Ketan Vyas","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3053041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053041","url":null,"abstract":"The graphical pattern unlock scheme which requires users to connect a minimum of 4 nodes on 3X3 grid is one of the most popular authentication mechanism on mobile devices. However prior research suggests that users' pattern choices are highly biased and hence vulnerable to guessing attacks. Moreover, 3X3 pattern choices are devoid of features such as longer stroke lengths, direction changes and intersections that are considered to be important in preventing shoulder-surfing attacks. We attribute these insecure practices to the geometry of the grid and its complicated drawing rules which prevent users from realising the full potential of graphical passwords. In this paper, we propose and explore an alternate circular layout referred to as Pass-O which unlike grid layout allows connection between any two nodes, thus simplifying the pattern drawing rules. Consequently, Pass-O produces a theoretical search space of 9,85,824, almost 2.5 times greater than 3X3 grid layout. We compare the security of 3X3 and Pass-O patterns theoretically as well as empirically. Theoretically, Pass-O patterns are uniform and have greater visual complexity due to large number of intersections. To perform empirical analysis, we conduct a large-scale web-based user study and collect more than 1,23,000 patterns from 21,053 users. After examining user-chosen 3X3 and Pass-O patterns across different metrics such as pattern length, stroke length, start point, end point, repetitions, number of direction changes and intersections, we find that Pass-O patterns are much more secure than 3X3 patterns.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76343637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Beunardeau, Aisling Connolly, R. Géraud, D. Naccache
In several popular standards (e.g. ISO 7816, ISO 14443 or ISO 11898) and IoT applications, a node (transponder, terminal) sends commands and data to another node (transponder, card) to accomplish an applicative task (e.g. a payment or a measurement). Most standards encrypt and authenticate the data. However, as an application of Kerckhoffs' principle, system designers usually consider that commands are part of the system specifications and must hence be transmitted in clear while the data that these commands process is encrypted and signed. While this assumption holds in systems representable by relatively simple state machines, leaking command information is undesirable when the addressed nodes offer the caller a large "toolbox" of commands that the addressing node can activate in many different orders to accomplish different applicative goals. This work proposes protections allowing encrypting and protecting not only the data but also the commands associated to them. The practical implementation of this idea raises a number of difficulties. The first is that of defining a clear adversarial model, a question that we will not address in this paper. The difficulty comes from the application-specific nature of the harm that may possibly stem from leaking the command sequence as well as from the modeling of the observations that the attacker has on the target node's behavior (is a transaction accepted? is a door opened? is a packet routed etc). This paper proposes a collection of empirical protection techniques allowing the sender to hide the sequence of commands sent. We discuss the advantages and the shortcomings of each proposed method. Besides the evident use of nonces (or other internal system states) to render the encryption of identical commands different in time, we also discuss the introduction of random delays between commands (to avoid inferring the next command based on the time elapsed since the previous command), the splitting of a command followed by n data bytes into a collection of encrypted sub-commands conveying the n bytes in chunks of random sizes and the appending of a random number of useless bytes to each packet. Independent commands can be permuted in time or sent ahead of time and buffered. Another practically useful countermeasure consists in masking the number of commands by adding useless "null" command packets. In its best implementation, the flow of commands is sent in packets in which, at times, the sending node addresses several data and command chunks belonging to different successive commands in the sequence.
在一些流行的标准(例如ISO 7816, ISO 14443或ISO 11898)和物联网应用中，节点(转发器，终端)向另一个节点(转发器，卡)发送命令和数据以完成应用任务(例如支付或测量)。大多数标准对数据进行加密和身份验证。然而，作为Kerckhoffs原理的应用，系统设计者通常认为命令是系统规范的一部分，因此必须明确传输，而这些命令处理的数据是加密和签名的。虽然这种假设在可以用相对简单的状态机表示的系统中成立，但是当寻址节点为调用者提供大量命令“工具箱”时，命令信息泄漏是不希望出现的，寻址节点可以以许多不同的顺序激活这些命令以实现不同的应用程序目标。这项工作提出的保护措施不仅允许加密和保护数据，还允许加密和保护与数据相关的命令。这一想法的实际实施提出了一些困难。首先是定义一个明确的对抗性模型，这是我们在本文中不会讨论的问题。困难来自于特定于应用程序的危害，这种危害可能源于命令序列的泄露，以及攻击者对目标节点行为的观察的建模(是否接受事务?有门开着吗?是一个数据包路由等)。本文提出了一套经验保护技术，允许发送方隐藏发送的命令序列。我们讨论了每种方法的优点和缺点。除了明显使用nonce(或其他内部系统状态)使相同命令的加密在时间上不同之外，我们还讨论了命令之间引入的随机延迟(以避免根据自上一个命令以来经过的时间来推断下一个命令)。将后跟n个数据字节的命令拆分为加密的子命令集合，以随机大小的块传输n个字节，并向每个数据包附加随机数量的无用字节。独立的命令可以及时排列，也可以提前发送并进行缓冲。另一个实际有用的对策是通过添加无用的“null”命令包来掩盖命令的数量。在其最佳实现中，命令流以数据包的形式发送，在数据包中，发送节点有时会处理序列中属于不同连续命令的几个数据和命令块。
{"title":"The Case for System Command Encryption","authors":"M. Beunardeau, Aisling Connolly, R. Géraud, D. Naccache","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3056129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3056129","url":null,"abstract":"In several popular standards (e.g. ISO 7816, ISO 14443 or ISO 11898) and IoT applications, a node (transponder, terminal) sends commands and data to another node (transponder, card) to accomplish an applicative task (e.g. a payment or a measurement). Most standards encrypt and authenticate the data. However, as an application of Kerckhoffs' principle, system designers usually consider that commands are part of the system specifications and must hence be transmitted in clear while the data that these commands process is encrypted and signed. While this assumption holds in systems representable by relatively simple state machines, leaking command information is undesirable when the addressed nodes offer the caller a large \"toolbox\" of commands that the addressing node can activate in many different orders to accomplish different applicative goals. This work proposes protections allowing encrypting and protecting not only the data but also the commands associated to them. The practical implementation of this idea raises a number of difficulties. The first is that of defining a clear adversarial model, a question that we will not address in this paper. The difficulty comes from the application-specific nature of the harm that may possibly stem from leaking the command sequence as well as from the modeling of the observations that the attacker has on the target node's behavior (is a transaction accepted? is a door opened? is a packet routed etc). This paper proposes a collection of empirical protection techniques allowing the sender to hide the sequence of commands sent. We discuss the advantages and the shortcomings of each proposed method. Besides the evident use of nonces (or other internal system states) to render the encryption of identical commands different in time, we also discuss the introduction of random delays between commands (to avoid inferring the next command based on the time elapsed since the previous command), the splitting of a command followed by n data bytes into a collection of encrypted sub-commands conveying the n bytes in chunks of random sizes and the appending of a random number of useless bytes to each packet. Independent commands can be permuted in time or sent ahead of time and buffered. Another practically useful countermeasure consists in masking the number of commands by adding useless \"null\" command packets. In its best implementation, the flow of commands is sent in packets in which, at times, the sending node addresses several data and command chunks belonging to different successive commands in the sequence.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90592965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Storage Security","authors":"Long Lu","doi":"10.1145/3248556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3248556","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76160995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cross-VM attacks have emerged as a major threat on commercial clouds. These attacks commonly exploit hardware level leakages on shared physical servers. A co-located machine can readily feel the presence of a co-located instance with a heavy computational load through performance degradation due to contention on shared resources. Shared cache architectures such as the last level cache (LLC) have become a popular leakage source to mount cross-VM attack. By exploiting LLC leakages, researchers have already shown that it is possible to recover fine grain information such as cryptographic keys from popular software libraries. This makes it essential to verify implementations that handle sensitive data across the many versions and numerous target platforms, a task too complicated, error prone and costly to be handled by human beings. Here we propose a machine learning based technique to classify applications according to their cache access profiles. We show that with minimal and simple manual processing steps feature vectors can be used to train models using support vector machines to classify the applications with a high degree of success. The profiling and training steps are completely automated and do not require any inspection or study of the code to be classified. In native execution, we achieve a successful classification rate as high as 98% (L1 cache) and 78% (LLC) over 40 benchmark applications in the Phoronix suite with mild training. In the cross-VM setting on the noisy Amazon EC2 the success rate drops to 60% for a suite of 25 applications. With this initial study we demonstrate that it is possible to train meaningful models to successfully predict applications running in co-located instances.
{"title":"Cache-Based Application Detection in the Cloud Using Machine Learning","authors":"Berk Gülmezoglu, T. Eisenbarth, B. Sunar","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3053036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053036","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-VM attacks have emerged as a major threat on commercial clouds. These attacks commonly exploit hardware level leakages on shared physical servers. A co-located machine can readily feel the presence of a co-located instance with a heavy computational load through performance degradation due to contention on shared resources. Shared cache architectures such as the last level cache (LLC) have become a popular leakage source to mount cross-VM attack. By exploiting LLC leakages, researchers have already shown that it is possible to recover fine grain information such as cryptographic keys from popular software libraries. This makes it essential to verify implementations that handle sensitive data across the many versions and numerous target platforms, a task too complicated, error prone and costly to be handled by human beings. Here we propose a machine learning based technique to classify applications according to their cache access profiles. We show that with minimal and simple manual processing steps feature vectors can be used to train models using support vector machines to classify the applications with a high degree of success. The profiling and training steps are completely automated and do not require any inspection or study of the code to be classified. In native execution, we achieve a successful classification rate as high as 98% (L1 cache) and 78% (LLC) over 40 benchmark applications in the Phoronix suite with mild training. In the cross-VM setting on the noisy Amazon EC2 the success rate drops to 60% for a suite of 25 applications. With this initial study we demonstrate that it is possible to train meaningful models to successfully predict applications running in co-located instances.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77224571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xavier Carpent, Karim M. El Defrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, G. Tsudik
In the last decade, Remote Attestation (RA) emerged as a distinct security service for detecting attacks on embedded devices, cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. RA involves verification of current internal state of an untrusted remote hardware platform (prover) by a trusted entity (verifier). RA can help the latter establish a static or dynamic root of trust in the prover and can also be used to construct other security services, such as software updates and secure deletion. Various RA techniques with different assumptions, security features and complexities, have been proposed for the single-prover scenario. However, the advent of IoT brought about the paradigm of many interconnected devices, thus triggering the need for efficient collective attestation of a (possibly mobile) group or swarm of provers. Though recent work has yielded some initial concepts for swarm attestation, several key issues remain unaddressed, and practical realizations have not been explored. This paper's main goal is to advance swarm attestation by bringing it closer to reality. To this end, it makes two contributions: (1) a new metric, called QoSA: Quality of Swarm Attestation, that captures the information offered by a swarm attestation technique; this allows comparing efficacy of multiple protocols, and (2) two practical attestation protocols -- called LISAa and LISAs -- for mobile swarms, with different QoSA features and communication and computation complexities. Security of proposed protocols is analyzed and their performance is assessed based on experiments with prototype implementations.
{"title":"Lightweight Swarm Attestation: A Tale of Two LISA-s","authors":"Xavier Carpent, Karim M. El Defrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3053010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053010","url":null,"abstract":"In the last decade, Remote Attestation (RA) emerged as a distinct security service for detecting attacks on embedded devices, cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. RA involves verification of current internal state of an untrusted remote hardware platform (prover) by a trusted entity (verifier). RA can help the latter establish a static or dynamic root of trust in the prover and can also be used to construct other security services, such as software updates and secure deletion. Various RA techniques with different assumptions, security features and complexities, have been proposed for the single-prover scenario. However, the advent of IoT brought about the paradigm of many interconnected devices, thus triggering the need for efficient collective attestation of a (possibly mobile) group or swarm of provers. Though recent work has yielded some initial concepts for swarm attestation, several key issues remain unaddressed, and practical realizations have not been explored. This paper's main goal is to advance swarm attestation by bringing it closer to reality. To this end, it makes two contributions: (1) a new metric, called QoSA: Quality of Swarm Attestation, that captures the information offered by a swarm attestation technique; this allows comparing efficacy of multiple protocols, and (2) two practical attestation protocols -- called LISAa and LISAs -- for mobile swarms, with different QoSA features and communication and computation complexities. Security of proposed protocols is analyzed and their performance is assessed based on experiments with prototype implementations.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81843710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Networks are vulnerable to disruptions caused by malicious forwarding devices. The situation is likely to worsen in Software Defined Networks (SDNs) with the incompatibility of existing solutions, use of programmable soft switches and the potential of bringing down an entire network through compromised forwarding devices. In this paper, we present WedgeTail, an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) designed to secure the SDN data plane. WedgeTail regards forwarding devices as points within a geometric space and stores the path packets take when traversing the network as trajectories. To be efficient, it prioritizes forwarding devices before inspection using an unsupervised trajectory-based sampling mechanism. For each of the forwarding device, WedgeTail computes the expected and actual trajectories of packets and 'hunts' for any forwarding device not processing packets as expected. Compared to related work, WedgeTail is also capable of distinguishing between malicious actions such as packet drop and generation. Moreover, WedgeTail employs a radically different methodology that enables detecting threats autonomously. In fact, it has no reliance on pre-defined rules by an administrator and may be easily imported to protect SDN networks with different setups, forwarding devices, and controllers. We have evaluated WedgeTail in simulated environments, and it has been capable of detecting and responding to all implanted malicious forwarding devices within a reasonable time-frame. We report on the design, implementation, and evaluation of WedgeTail in this manuscript.
{"title":"WedgeTail: An Intrusion Prevention System for the Data Plane of Software Defined Networks","authors":"Arash Shaghaghi, M. Kâafar, Sanjay Jha","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3053039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053039","url":null,"abstract":"Networks are vulnerable to disruptions caused by malicious forwarding devices. The situation is likely to worsen in Software Defined Networks (SDNs) with the incompatibility of existing solutions, use of programmable soft switches and the potential of bringing down an entire network through compromised forwarding devices. In this paper, we present WedgeTail, an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) designed to secure the SDN data plane. WedgeTail regards forwarding devices as points within a geometric space and stores the path packets take when traversing the network as trajectories. To be efficient, it prioritizes forwarding devices before inspection using an unsupervised trajectory-based sampling mechanism. For each of the forwarding device, WedgeTail computes the expected and actual trajectories of packets and 'hunts' for any forwarding device not processing packets as expected. Compared to related work, WedgeTail is also capable of distinguishing between malicious actions such as packet drop and generation. Moreover, WedgeTail employs a radically different methodology that enables detecting threats autonomously. In fact, it has no reliance on pre-defined rules by an administrator and may be easily imported to protect SDN networks with different setups, forwarding devices, and controllers. We have evaluated WedgeTail in simulated environments, and it has been capable of detecting and responding to all implanted malicious forwarding devices within a reasonable time-frame. We report on the design, implementation, and evaluation of WedgeTail in this manuscript.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83969174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ruan de Clercq, Ronald De Keulenaer, Pieter Maene, B. Preneel, B. D. Sutter, I. Verbauwhede
An increasing number of applications implemented on a SoC (System-on-chip) require security features. This work addresses the issue of protecting the integrity of code and read-only data that is stored in memory. To this end, we propose a new architecture called SCM, which works as a standalone IP core in a SoC. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no architectural elements similar to SCM that offer the same strict security guarantees while, at the same time, not requiring any modifications to other IP cores in its SoC design. In addition, SCM has the flexibility to select the parts of the software to be protected, which eases the integration of our solution with existing software. The evaluation of SCM was done on the Zynq platform which features an ARM processor and an FPGA. The design was evaluated by executing a number of different benchmarks from memory protected by SCM, and we found that it introduces minimal overhead to the system.
{"title":"SCM: Secure Code Memory Architecture","authors":"Ruan de Clercq, Ronald De Keulenaer, Pieter Maene, B. Preneel, B. D. Sutter, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3053044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053044","url":null,"abstract":"An increasing number of applications implemented on a SoC (System-on-chip) require security features. This work addresses the issue of protecting the integrity of code and read-only data that is stored in memory. To this end, we propose a new architecture called SCM, which works as a standalone IP core in a SoC. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no architectural elements similar to SCM that offer the same strict security guarantees while, at the same time, not requiring any modifications to other IP cores in its SoC design. In addition, SCM has the flexibility to select the parts of the software to be protected, which eases the integration of our solution with existing software. The evaluation of SCM was done on the Zynq platform which features an ARM processor and an FPGA. The design was evaluated by executing a number of different benchmarks from memory protected by SCM, and we found that it introduces minimal overhead to the system.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"362 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89299692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To protect smartphones from unauthorized access, the user has the option to activate authentication mechanisms : PIN, Password, or Pattern. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing, smudge and snooping attacks. Even the traditional biometric based systems such as fingerprint or face, also could be bypassed. In order to protect smartphones data against these sort of attacks, we propose a behavioral biometric authentication framework that leverages the user's behavioral patterns such as touchscreen actions, keystroke, application used and sensor data to authenticate smartphone users. To evaluate the framework, we conducted a field study in which we instrumented the Android OS and collected data from 52 participants during 30-day period. We present the prototype of our framework and we are working on its components to select the best features set that can be used to build different modalities to authenticate users on different contexts. To this end, we developed only one modality, a gesture authentication modality, which authenticate smartphone users based on touch gesture. We evaluated this authentication modality on about 3 million gesture samples based on two schemes, classification scheme with EER~0.004, and anomaly detection scheme with EER~0.10.
{"title":"A Behavioral Biometric Authentication Framework on Smartphones","authors":"Ahmed M. Mahfouz, Tarek M. Mahmoud, A. Eldin","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3055160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3055160","url":null,"abstract":"To protect smartphones from unauthorized access, the user has the option to activate authentication mechanisms : PIN, Password, or Pattern. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing, smudge and snooping attacks. Even the traditional biometric based systems such as fingerprint or face, also could be bypassed. In order to protect smartphones data against these sort of attacks, we propose a behavioral biometric authentication framework that leverages the user's behavioral patterns such as touchscreen actions, keystroke, application used and sensor data to authenticate smartphone users. To evaluate the framework, we conducted a field study in which we instrumented the Android OS and collected data from 52 participants during 30-day period. We present the prototype of our framework and we are working on its components to select the best features set that can be used to build different modalities to authenticate users on different contexts. To this end, we developed only one modality, a gesture authentication modality, which authenticate smartphone users based on touch gesture. We evaluated this authentication modality on about 3 million gesture samples based on two schemes, classification scheme with EER~0.004, and anomaly detection scheme with EER~0.10.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77230442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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