When making a location decision, a firm considers only its own trading costs and ignores trading costs paid by trading partner firms. The exclusion of the latter is the source of locational externalities. We examine this locational externality in the Tokyo metropolitan area, using the actual trade networks. Results show (1) we classify what trade patterns involve locational externalities, (2) the ratio of trades involving locational externalities is about 8%, and (3) the transfer of a randomly-chosen 5% of firms to the center of Tokyo can generate external benefits of 0.13-0.21% in the total industry in terms of value added.
{"title":"External Benefits of Geographical Concentration of Firms with Trade Networks","authors":"Tatsuhito Kono, K. Nakajima, Kosuke Shoda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3265766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265766","url":null,"abstract":"When making a location decision, a firm considers only its own trading costs and ignores trading costs paid by trading partner firms. The exclusion of the latter is the source of locational externalities. We examine this locational externality in the Tokyo metropolitan area, using the actual trade networks. Results show (1) we classify what trade patterns involve locational externalities, (2) the ratio of trades involving locational externalities is about 8%, and (3) the transfer of a randomly-chosen 5% of firms to the center of Tokyo can generate external benefits of 0.13-0.21% in the total industry in terms of value added.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116356066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lorenzo Stanghellini, R. Mokal, C. Paulus, Ignacio Tirado
The general trend away from traditional, formal insolvency proceedings opens up a vast area to private ordering, with all the associated opportunities and risks. The transition can be less costly if the resulting uncertainty is reduced to a minimum. This presents national legislators with a delicate challenge. They should not be overly prescriptive and should effectively delegate decision-making to stakeholders and expert professionals, who are likely to be better informed and better incentivised. At the same time, the law must provide for information to flow where needed and for the creation of optimal incentives. Against this background, guidance on best practices can be of great value. It may assist policymaking in one jurisdiction by drawing attention to successes and failures in others, and it may allow professionals, advisors, debtors, creditors and courts to find common ground in the formulation of high-quality distress resolution plans and in distinguishing viable and non-viable distressed debtors. Based on extensive empirical research in four European Union states, this book takes up the challenge of unearthing and crystallising some of the most critical best practices in the various stages of a distress resolution process. Drawing on these best practices, it provides lawmakers with several ‘Policy Recommendations’, and other key stakeholders with a set of ‘Guidelines’. Of particular interest will be development of a relative priority rule (recently recommended by the European Council for incorporation in the draft directive on preventive restructuring); and discussion of the utility of a duty to file versus one to avoid wrongful trading; crisis events and early warning indicators; fairness in plan formulation, voting, examination, and confirmation; class formation and ‘cram-down’ issues; the goals, contents, and structure of high-quality plans; the role of professional advisors; negotiation best practices; the impact of prudential rules on NPLs on banks’ behaviour in corporate workouts; and plan implementation and monitoring. Special attention is given to the particular needs of micro, small, and medium enterprises.
{"title":"Best Practices in European Restructuring - Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law","authors":"Lorenzo Stanghellini, R. Mokal, C. Paulus, Ignacio Tirado","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3271790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3271790","url":null,"abstract":"The general trend away from traditional, formal insolvency proceedings opens up a vast area to private ordering, with all the associated opportunities and risks. The transition can be less costly if the resulting uncertainty is reduced to a minimum. This presents national legislators with a delicate challenge. They should not be overly prescriptive and should effectively delegate decision-making to stakeholders and expert professionals, who are likely to be better informed and better incentivised. At the same time, the law must provide for information to flow where needed and for the creation of optimal incentives. \u0000Against this background, guidance on best practices can be of great value. It may assist policymaking in one jurisdiction by drawing attention to successes and failures in others, and it may allow professionals, advisors, debtors, creditors and courts to find common ground in the formulation of high-quality distress resolution plans and in distinguishing viable and non-viable distressed debtors. \u0000Based on extensive empirical research in four European Union states, this book takes up the challenge of unearthing and crystallising some of the most critical best practices in the various stages of a distress resolution process. Drawing on these best practices, it provides lawmakers with several ‘Policy Recommendations’, and other key stakeholders with a set of ‘Guidelines’. \u0000Of particular interest will be development of a relative priority rule (recently recommended by the European Council for incorporation in the draft directive on preventive restructuring); and discussion of the utility of a duty to file versus one to avoid wrongful trading; crisis events and early warning indicators; fairness in plan formulation, voting, examination, and confirmation; class formation and ‘cram-down’ issues; the goals, contents, and structure of high-quality plans; the role of professional advisors; negotiation best practices; the impact of prudential rules on NPLs on banks’ behaviour in corporate workouts; and plan implementation and monitoring. Special attention is given to the particular needs of micro, small, and medium enterprises.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123988761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub
In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.
{"title":"When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India&Apos;S Demonetization","authors":"A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163930","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117122412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El talento humano es la piedra angular en cualquier sistema de salud. Sin personal idóneo no es posible prestar un servicio de calidad a la población necesitada, por lo tanto, se hace indispensable contar con metodologías de trabajo que faciliten y fortalezcan la planeación y la gestión del personal de apoyo de los servicios de salud. Este artículo pretende presentar un modelo de planeación de recursos utilizando la simulación, bajo el paradigma de dinámica de sistemas como herramienta de trabajo, con el objeto de brindar apoyo a aquellas personas encargadas de la elaboración de políticas y planes en instituciones de salud para tomar mejores decisiones, en lo referente a la cantidad de talento humano que deben contratar, para satisfacer la oportunidad, calidad y servicio en la atención.
{"title":"Aproximación sistémica al dimensionamiento de personal en instituciones prestadoras de servicios de salud (A System Thinking Approach to Staff Sizing in Health Care Institutions)","authors":"Julián Alberto Uribe-Gómez","doi":"10.22430/24223182.1047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22430/24223182.1047","url":null,"abstract":"El talento humano es la piedra angular en cualquier sistema de salud. Sin personal idóneo no es posible prestar un servicio de calidad a la población necesitada, por lo tanto, se hace indispensable contar con metodologías de trabajo que faciliten y fortalezcan la planeación y la gestión del personal de apoyo de los servicios de salud. \u0000Este artículo pretende presentar un modelo de planeación de recursos utilizando la simulación, bajo el paradigma de dinámica de sistemas como herramienta de trabajo, con el objeto de brindar apoyo a aquellas personas encargadas de la elaboración de políticas y planes en instituciones de salud para tomar mejores decisiones, en lo referente a la cantidad de talento humano que deben contratar, para satisfacer la oportunidad, calidad y servicio en la atención.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123644109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay I discuss the political economy of data driven platforms in terms of monopolies and monopsonies, arguing that the concentration of buying and selling power builds on and extends a pseudo-omniscient data architecture that feeds on an increasingly seamless data ecosystem. As the mathematical underpinnings of data driven architectures are further extended into the hardware of smart homes, driverless cars and smart cities, they may at some point diminish or eradicate the semantic discontinuity that provides room for dissent and dissonance. Such discontinuity depends on a text driven environment and affordances such as dissonance and adversariality cannot be taken for granted in the pervasive data ecosystem that drives the political economy of platforms. I contend that we need a small set of primitives of legal protection to shoot holes in the semantic continuity that is generated by the backend systems of data driven platforms; competition law, consumer law and tort law cannot contribute to the effective contestability of algorithmic decision-making all by themselves. They require effective and practical rights to data minimisation and purpose limitation and an actionable right not to be subject to automated decisions without a contestable justification. Once these primitives of legal protection are operational both the pseudo-omniscient nature of data architectures and the seamless nature of data ecosystems will be ruptured, thus reinstating the interstices for innovation, and for meaningful individual and political self-determination.
{"title":"Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven Platforms","authors":"M. Hildebrandt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3140594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3140594","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I discuss the political economy of data driven platforms in terms of monopolies and monopsonies, arguing that the concentration of buying and selling power builds on and extends a pseudo-omniscient data architecture that feeds on an increasingly seamless data ecosystem. As the mathematical underpinnings of data driven architectures are further extended into the hardware of smart homes, driverless cars and smart cities, they may at some point diminish or eradicate the semantic discontinuity that provides room for dissent and dissonance. Such discontinuity depends on a text driven environment and affordances such as dissonance and adversariality cannot be taken for granted in the pervasive data ecosystem that drives the political economy of platforms. I contend that we need a small set of primitives of legal protection to shoot holes in the semantic continuity that is generated by the backend systems of data driven platforms; competition law, consumer law and tort law cannot contribute to the effective contestability of algorithmic decision-making all by themselves. They require effective and practical rights to data minimisation and purpose limitation and an actionable right not to be subject to automated decisions without a contestable justification. Once these primitives of legal protection are operational both the pseudo-omniscient nature of data architectures and the seamless nature of data ecosystems will be ruptured, thus reinstating the interstices for innovation, and for meaningful individual and political self-determination.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117007658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A key insight from the open economy literature is that domestic price stability is in general not optimal for countries that exert some market power over their terms of trade. Under commitment, a national benevolent monetary policymaker improves upon the allocation associated with stable domestic prices by manipulating the terms of trade to her own country’s advantage. In this paper, I study optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price small open economy model when the policymaker lacks a commitment device. Without commitment, the benevolent policymaker’s attempt to improve national welfare by manipulating the terms of trade can be self-defeating. By steering international relative prices the discretionary policymaker induces fluctuations in domestic prices, the costs of which she is unable to fully internalize in her decision-making. Society may thus be better off if it appoints an inward-looking policymaker who aims for domestic price stability and resists the temptation to exploit the country’s monopoly power in trade. Accounting for the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates further strengthens the case for the inward-looking policy objective. JEL Classification: E52, F41
{"title":"Time-Consistent Monetary Policy, Terms of Trade Manipulation and Welfare in Open Economies","authors":"Sebastian Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3118957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118957","url":null,"abstract":"A key insight from the open economy literature is that domestic price stability is in general not optimal for countries that exert some market power over their terms of trade. Under commitment, a national benevolent monetary policymaker improves upon the allocation associated with stable domestic prices by manipulating the terms of trade to her own country’s advantage. In this paper, I study optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price small open economy model when the policymaker lacks a commitment device. Without commitment, the benevolent policymaker’s attempt to improve national welfare by manipulating the terms of trade can be self-defeating. By steering international relative prices the discretionary policymaker induces fluctuations in domestic prices, the costs of which she is unable to fully internalize in her decision-making. Society may thus be better off if it appoints an inward-looking policymaker who aims for domestic price stability and resists the temptation to exploit the country’s monopoly power in trade. Accounting for the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates further strengthens the case for the inward-looking policy objective. JEL Classification: E52, F41","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116299614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When algorithms use data generated by human beings, they inherit the errors stemming from human biases, which likely diminishes their performance. We examine the design and value of a bias-aware li...
{"title":"When Algorithmic Predictions Use Human-Generated Data: A Bias-Aware Classification Algorithm for Breast Cancer Diagnosis","authors":"M. Ahsen, M. Ayvaci, Srinivasan Raghunathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3087467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087467","url":null,"abstract":"When algorithms use data generated by human beings, they inherit the errors stemming from human biases, which likely diminishes their performance. We examine the design and value of a bias-aware li...","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"290 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114907955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the threat of earthquakes, long-term policy makers need tools to decide optimally on the economic trajectories that maximize the society welfare. Tools should be flexible and account for the consequences of earthquakes, incorporating the best estimate of their frequency and intensity. In this regard, we propose in this paper a modeling strategy that combines optimal control techniques and Bayesian learning: after an earthquake occurs, policy makers can improve their knowledge and adjust policies optimally. Two numerical examples illustrate the advantages of our modelling strategy along different dimensions. While Japan symbolizes the policy maker who has learned from earthquakes protecting the economy accordingly; Italy helps us illustrate the importance of prevention capital.
{"title":"Longterm Decision Making Under the Threat of Earthquakes","authors":"Carmen Camacho, Yu Sun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3298413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3298413","url":null,"abstract":"Under the threat of earthquakes, long-term policy makers need tools to decide optimally on the economic trajectories that maximize the society welfare. Tools should be flexible and account for the consequences of earthquakes, incorporating the best estimate of their frequency and intensity. In this regard, we propose in this paper a modeling strategy that combines optimal control techniques and Bayesian learning: after an earthquake occurs, policy makers can improve their knowledge and adjust policies optimally. Two numerical examples illustrate the advantages of our modelling strategy along different dimensions. While Japan symbolizes the policy maker who has learned from earthquakes protecting the economy accordingly; Italy helps us illustrate the importance of prevention capital.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126727113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The use of algorithms in pricing strategies has received special attention among competition law scholars. There is an increasing number of scholars who argue that the pricing algorithms, facilitated by increased access to Big Data, could move in the direction of collusive price setting. Though this claim is being made, there are various responses. On the one hand, scholars point out that current artificial intelligence is not yet well-developed to trigger that result. On the other hand, scholars argue that algorithms may have other pricing results rather than collusion. Despite the uncertainty that collusive price could be the result of the use of pricing algorithms, a plethora of scholars are developing views on how to deal with collusive price setting caused by algorithms. The most obvious choice is to work with the legal instruments currently available. Beyond this choice, scholars also suggest constructing a new rule of reason. This rule would allow us to judge whether an algorithm could be used or not. Other scholars focus on developing a test environment. Still other scholars seek solutions outside competition law and elaborate on how privacy regulation or transparency reducing regulation could counteract a collusive outcome. Besides looking at law, there are also scholars arguing that technology will allow us to respond to the excesses of pricing algorithms. It is the purpose of this chapter to give a detailed overview of this debate on algorithms, price setting and competition law.
{"title":"Artificial Intelligence and Collusion: A Literature Overview","authors":"Steven Van Uytsel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3656822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656822","url":null,"abstract":"The use of algorithms in pricing strategies has received special attention among competition law scholars. There is an increasing number of scholars who argue that the pricing algorithms, facilitated by increased access to Big Data, could move in the direction of collusive price setting. Though this claim is being made, there are various responses. On the one hand, scholars point out that current artificial intelligence is not yet well-developed to trigger that result. On the other hand, scholars argue that algorithms may have other pricing results rather than collusion. Despite the uncertainty that collusive price could be the result of the use of pricing algorithms, a plethora of scholars are developing views on how to deal with collusive price setting caused by algorithms. The most obvious choice is to work with the legal instruments currently available. Beyond this choice, scholars also suggest constructing a new rule of reason. This rule would allow us to judge whether an algorithm could be used or not. Other scholars focus on developing a test environment. Still other scholars seek solutions outside competition law and elaborate on how privacy regulation or transparency reducing regulation could counteract a collusive outcome. Besides looking at law, there are also scholars arguing that technology will allow us to respond to the excesses of pricing algorithms. It is the purpose of this chapter to give a detailed overview of this debate on algorithms, price setting and competition law.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129010311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ecological vulnerability of the regions within the Silk Road Economic Belt requires environmental protection. The infrastructure-pillared structure of the Belt and legal procedures on environmental impact assessment (EIA) of various infrastructures inform the article’s approach to environment protection along the Belt through the right to information about and involvement in environmental decision-making (the right to information and involvement). How to protect this right along the Belt? The rights-approach to environment, as the paper first examines, lead to an exploration of the social and historical background of the adoption of the Convention on Access TO Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). Parties to the Aarhus Convention largely overlap with the countries within the Belt. Critical analysis of the EIA legislation and it in practice, and the contradiction within the principle of “public participation” reveal the inadequacy of formal legislation in protecting the right to information and involvement. A case study on informal participation in environmental decision-making in China illustrates the value of informal participation in protecting this right. Informal participation is forming a communicative form of environment governance in Singapore, in which the right to information and involvement is protected. This article argues that informal participation can facilitate the protection of the right to information and involvement along the Belt.
{"title":"Right to Information About, and Involvement in, Environmental Decision Making Along the Silk Road Economic Belt","authors":"Kangle Zhang","doi":"10.1093/CJCL/CXX004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CJCL/CXX004","url":null,"abstract":"The ecological vulnerability of the regions within the Silk Road Economic Belt requires environmental protection. The infrastructure-pillared structure of the Belt and legal procedures on environmental impact assessment (EIA) of various infrastructures inform the article’s approach to environment protection along the Belt through the right to information about and involvement in environmental decision-making (the right to information and involvement). How to protect this right along the Belt? The rights-approach to environment, as the paper first examines, lead to an exploration of the social and historical background of the adoption of the Convention on Access TO Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). Parties to the Aarhus Convention largely overlap with the countries within the Belt. Critical analysis of the EIA legislation and it in practice, and the contradiction within the principle of “public participation” reveal the inadequacy of formal legislation in protecting the right to information and involvement. A case study on informal participation in environmental decision-making in China illustrates the value of informal participation in protecting this right. Informal participation is forming a communicative form of environment governance in Singapore, in which the right to information and involvement is protected. This article argues that informal participation can facilitate the protection of the right to information and involvement along the Belt.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127697575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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