We study a large currency cross-section using asset pricing methods that account for omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. First, we show that the pricing kernel includes at least three latent factors that resemble (but are not identical to) a strong U.S. “dollar” factor and two weak high Sharpe ratio “carry” and “momentum” slope factors. Evidence for an additional “value” factor is weaker. Second, using this pricing kernel, we find that only a small fraction of the over 100 nontradable candidate factors considered have a statistically significant risk premium, mostly relating to volatility, uncertainty, and liquidity conditions, rather than macro variables.
{"title":"Currency Risk Premiums Redux","authors":"Federico Nucera, Lucio Sarno, Gabriele Zinna","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study a large currency cross-section using asset pricing methods that account for omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. First, we show that the pricing kernel includes at least three latent factors that resemble (but are not identical to) a strong U.S. “dollar” factor and two weak high Sharpe ratio “carry” and “momentum” slope factors. Evidence for an additional “value” factor is weaker. Second, using this pricing kernel, we find that only a small fraction of the over 100 nontradable candidate factors considered have a statistically significant risk premium, mostly relating to volatility, uncertainty, and liquidity conditions, rather than macro variables.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43145559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We model the welfare consequences of mandates that restrict investors to hold firms with net-zero carbon emissions. To qualify for these mandates, value-maximizing firms have to accumulate decarbonization capital. Qualification lowers a firm’s required return by its decarbonization investments divided by Tobin’s q, that is, the greenium or the dividend yield shareholders forgo to address the global-warming externality. The welfare-maximizing mandate approximates the first-best solution, yielding welfare gains compared to laissez-faire by mitigating the weather disaster risks resulting from carbon emissions. Our model generates optimal transition paths for decarbonization that we use to evaluate proposed net-zero targets. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"Welfare Consequences of Sustainable Finance","authors":"Harrison Hong, Neng Wang, Jinqiang Yang","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad048","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We model the welfare consequences of mandates that restrict investors to hold firms with net-zero carbon emissions. To qualify for these mandates, value-maximizing firms have to accumulate decarbonization capital. Qualification lowers a firm’s required return by its decarbonization investments divided by Tobin’s q, that is, the greenium or the dividend yield shareholders forgo to address the global-warming externality. The welfare-maximizing mandate approximates the first-best solution, yielding welfare gains compared to laissez-faire by mitigating the weather disaster risks resulting from carbon emissions. Our model generates optimal transition paths for decarbonization that we use to evaluate proposed net-zero targets. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136261483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"ES Risks and Shareholder Voice","authors":"Yazhou Ellen He, Bige Kahraman, Michelle Lowry","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135996325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We identify a novel economic mechanism through which passive ownership positively affects informational efficiency in the cross-section of firms. Passive investors’ inelastic demand lowers a firm’s cost-of-capital, inducing it to take more risk. The higher cash flow variance, in turn, incentivizes active investors to acquire more precise private information, pushing up price informativeness for firms with high passive ownership. High passive ownership also implies higher stock prices and higher stock-return variances. An increase in the aggregate size of passive investors amplifies these cross-sectional differences. We also document complementarities in firms’ real investment and investors’ information choices that can cause information crashes. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"More Risk, More Information: How Passive Ownership Can Improve Informational Efficiency","authors":"Adrian Buss, Savitar Sundaresan","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We identify a novel economic mechanism through which passive ownership positively affects informational efficiency in the cross-section of firms. Passive investors’ inelastic demand lowers a firm’s cost-of-capital, inducing it to take more risk. The higher cash flow variance, in turn, incentivizes active investors to acquire more precise private information, pushing up price informativeness for firms with high passive ownership. High passive ownership also implies higher stock prices and higher stock-return variances. An increase in the aggregate size of passive investors amplifies these cross-sectional differences. We also document complementarities in firms’ real investment and investors’ information choices that can cause information crashes. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135140164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"Inflation and Individual Investors’ Behavior: Evidence from the German Hyperinflation","authors":"Fabio Braggion, Felix von Meyerinck, Nic Schaub","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135287788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tarek A. Hassan, Stephan Hollander, Laurence van Lent, Ahmed Tahoun
Abstract We construct text-based measures of the primary concerns listed firms associated with the spread of COVID-19 and other epidemic diseases. We identify which firms perceive to lose or gain from a given epidemic and textually decompose the epidemic's effect on the firm's demand and supply. We find that the effects of COVID-19 manifest as a simultaneous shock to demand and supply, with both shocks affecting firms’ market valuations in equal measure on average. By contrast, demand-related impacts appear more important in accounting for the observed collapse in firm-level investment during the COVID-19 crisis.
{"title":"Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Diseases: COVID-19, SARS, and H1N1","authors":"Tarek A. Hassan, Stephan Hollander, Laurence van Lent, Ahmed Tahoun","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We construct text-based measures of the primary concerns listed firms associated with the spread of COVID-19 and other epidemic diseases. We identify which firms perceive to lose or gain from a given epidemic and textually decompose the epidemic's effect on the firm's demand and supply. We find that the effects of COVID-19 manifest as a simultaneous shock to demand and supply, with both shocks affecting firms’ market valuations in equal measure on average. By contrast, demand-related impacts appear more important in accounting for the observed collapse in firm-level investment during the COVID-19 crisis.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135813103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender’s willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender’s own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises.
{"title":"Private Renegotiations and Government Interventions in Credit Chains","authors":"Vincent Glode, Christian C Opp","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender’s willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender’s own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135085324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We estimate a narrative factor pricing model from news text of The Wall Street Journal. Our empirical method integrates topic modeling (LDA), latent factor analysis (IPCA), and variable selection (group lasso). Narrative factors achieve higher out-of-sample Sharpe ratios and smaller pricing errors than standard characteristic-based factor models and predict future investment opportunities in a manner consistent with the ICAPM. We derive an interpretation of the estimated risk factors from narratives in the underlying article text. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"Narrative Asset Pricing: Interpretable Systematic Risk Factors from News Text","authors":"Leland Bybee, Bryan Kelly, Yinan Su","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We estimate a narrative factor pricing model from news text of The Wall Street Journal. Our empirical method integrates topic modeling (LDA), latent factor analysis (IPCA), and variable selection (group lasso). Narrative factors achieve higher out-of-sample Sharpe ratios and smaller pricing errors than standard characteristic-based factor models and predict future investment opportunities in a manner consistent with the ICAPM. We derive an interpretation of the estimated risk factors from narratives in the underlying article text. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136216135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"Freeze! Financial Sanctions and Bank Responses","authors":"Stefan Goldbach, Matthias Efing, Volker Nitsch","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135288674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks' portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization, followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008, followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve’s decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.
{"title":"The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests","authors":"Dmitry Orlov, P. Zryumov, Andrzej Skrzypacz","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks' portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization, followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008, followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve’s decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47777359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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