Abstract Going public by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) is much more expensive than conducting a traditional IPO. We rationalize why some companies merge with a SPAC by listing the potential benefits. We analyze the agency problems that certain SPAC features address. SPAC IPO investors and deal sponsors have earned remarkably high annualized average returns, although we warn that recent deals are likely to disappoint. Public investors in the merged companies have earned very low market-adjusted returns on an equally weighted basis, although high redemptions on the worst deals have limited the amount of money that they lost. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"SPACs","authors":"Minmo Gahng, Jay R Ritter, Donghang Zhang","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Going public by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) is much more expensive than conducting a traditional IPO. We rationalize why some companies merge with a SPAC by listing the potential benefits. We analyze the agency problems that certain SPAC features address. SPAC IPO investors and deal sponsors have earned remarkably high annualized average returns, although we warn that recent deals are likely to disappoint. Public investors in the merged companies have earned very low market-adjusted returns on an equally weighted basis, although high redemptions on the worst deals have limited the amount of money that they lost. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135339941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets","authors":"Yan Xiong, Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135424200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study the impact of the refinancing channel of monetary policy on very small and medium-sized businesses. Using data covering the near universe of these businesses, we find that increased household refinancing reduces the probability that a business exits or exhausts its debt capacity in the calendar year, as well as 6 years after the first exposure. It also helps younger businesses maintain credit relationships. Financial factors, like business liquidity, as well as local demand dependence, amplify these effects, especially for very small businesses. These results suggest that the refinancing channel of monetary policy can have large long-run effects on local economies. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"Monetary Policy, Business Liquidity and Survival: Evidence from the Refinancing Channel","authors":"Haoyang Liu, Rodney Ramcharan, Dean Parker","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the impact of the refinancing channel of monetary policy on very small and medium-sized businesses. Using data covering the near universe of these businesses, we find that increased household refinancing reduces the probability that a business exits or exhausts its debt capacity in the calendar year, as well as 6 years after the first exposure. It also helps younger businesses maintain credit relationships. Financial factors, like business liquidity, as well as local demand dependence, amplify these effects, especially for very small businesses. These results suggest that the refinancing channel of monetary policy can have large long-run effects on local economies. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136146652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We find that firms reduce toxic emissions at their local plants following EPA enforcement actions against nearby plants operated by peer firms that compete in the same product market. These reductions are more pronounced for plants located near socially responsible mutual funds (SRMFs) that hold these plants’ parent firms’ shares. Close proximity to SRMFs is associated with real investment in abatement measures to mitigate emissions. While plants increase emissions again in the long run, such reversals do not occur in plants located near SRMFs. Taken together, our results suggest that local SRMFs complement EPA enforcement in influencing plants’ emissions. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"Joining Forces: The Spillover Effects of EPA Enforcement Actions and the Role of Socially Responsible Investors","authors":"Sudipto Dasgupta, Thanh D Huynh, Ying Xia","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We find that firms reduce toxic emissions at their local plants following EPA enforcement actions against nearby plants operated by peer firms that compete in the same product market. These reductions are more pronounced for plants located near socially responsible mutual funds (SRMFs) that hold these plants’ parent firms’ shares. Close proximity to SRMFs is associated with real investment in abatement measures to mitigate emissions. While plants increase emissions again in the long run, such reversals do not occur in plants located near SRMFs. Taken together, our results suggest that local SRMFs complement EPA enforcement in influencing plants’ emissions. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136146726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Turan G. Bali, Heiner Beckmeyer, Mathis Rudolf Werner Mörke, Florian Weigert
Abstract Drawing upon more than 12 million observations over the period from 1996 to 2020, we find that allowing for nonlinearities significantly increases the out-of-sample performance of option and stock characteristics in predicting future option returns. The nonlinear machine learning models generate statistically and economically sizable profits in the long-short portfolios of equity options even after accounting for transaction costs. Although option-based characteristics are the most important standalone predictors, stock-based measures offer substantial incremental predictive power when considered alongside option-based characteristics. Finally, we provide compelling evidence that option return predictability is driven by informational frictions and option mispricing. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"Option Return Predictability with Machine Learning and Big Data","authors":"Turan G. Bali, Heiner Beckmeyer, Mathis Rudolf Werner Mörke, Florian Weigert","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Drawing upon more than 12 million observations over the period from 1996 to 2020, we find that allowing for nonlinearities significantly increases the out-of-sample performance of option and stock characteristics in predicting future option returns. The nonlinear machine learning models generate statistically and economically sizable profits in the long-short portfolios of equity options even after accounting for transaction costs. Although option-based characteristics are the most important standalone predictors, stock-based measures offer substantial incremental predictive power when considered alongside option-based characteristics. Finally, we provide compelling evidence that option return predictability is driven by informational frictions and option mispricing. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136122166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, Nathan Converse, Tomas Williams
Abstract We study how the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) affects the sensitivity of international capital flows to the global financial cycle. Using comprehensive fund-level data on investor flows, we show that their sensitivity to global financial conditions for equity (bond) ETFs is 2.5 (2.25) times higher than for equity (bond) mutual funds. This higher sensitivity can be directly linked to ETFs underlying shorter-trading-horizon clientele that trades more often in response to shocks. Using country-level data, we find that where ETFs hold a larger share of financial assets, equity inflows and prices become more sensitive to global risk. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"How ETFs Amplify the Global Financial Cycle in Emerging Markets","authors":"Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, Nathan Converse, Tomas Williams","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) affects the sensitivity of international capital flows to the global financial cycle. Using comprehensive fund-level data on investor flows, we show that their sensitivity to global financial conditions for equity (bond) ETFs is 2.5 (2.25) times higher than for equity (bond) mutual funds. This higher sensitivity can be directly linked to ETFs underlying shorter-trading-horizon clientele that trades more often in response to shocks. Using country-level data, we find that where ETFs hold a larger share of financial assets, equity inflows and prices become more sensitive to global risk. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135081106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers' reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.
{"title":"Designing Securities for Scrutiny","authors":"Brendan Daley, Brett Green, Victoria Vanasco","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers' reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41419781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frederico Belo, Andres Donangelo, Xiaoji Lin, Ding Luo
Abstract We document that the aggregate hiring rate of publicly traded firms in the U.S. economy negatively predicts stock market returns and long-term cash flows, and positively predicts short-term cash flows. In addition, through a variance decomposition, we show that the time-series variation in the aggregate hiring rate is mainly driven by changes in discount rates and short-term expected cash flows, with no contribution from variation in long-term expected cash flows. We estimate a neoclassical dynamic model with labor market frictions and show that labor adjustment costs and time-varying risk are essential for the model to replicate the empirical patterns. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"What Drives Firms’ Hiring Decisions? An Asset Pricing Perspective","authors":"Frederico Belo, Andres Donangelo, Xiaoji Lin, Ding Luo","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We document that the aggregate hiring rate of publicly traded firms in the U.S. economy negatively predicts stock market returns and long-term cash flows, and positively predicts short-term cash flows. In addition, through a variance decomposition, we show that the time-series variation in the aggregate hiring rate is mainly driven by changes in discount rates and short-term expected cash flows, with no contribution from variation in long-term expected cash flows. We estimate a neoclassical dynamic model with labor market frictions and show that labor adjustment costs and time-varying risk are essential for the model to replicate the empirical patterns. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136156543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yen-Cheng Chang, Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Kevin Tseng
Abstract We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
{"title":"Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?","authors":"Yen-Cheng Chang, Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Kevin Tseng","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135200962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper develops a theory that generates an equilibrium relationship between product complexity, transparency, and trust in firms. Complexity, transparency, and the evolution of trust are all endogenous, and equilibrium transparency is nonmonotonic. The least-trusted firms choose the lowest product complexity, remain opaque, and substitute ex ante third-party verification for information disclosure and trust. Firms with an intermediate level of trust choose an intermediate level of complexity and transparency through disclosure, with more trusted firms choosing greater complexity and lower transparency. The most-trusted firms choose maximum complexity while remaining opaque, eschewing both verification and disclosure.
{"title":"Trust, Transparency, and Complexity","authors":"Richard T Thakor, Robert C Merton","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a theory that generates an equilibrium relationship between product complexity, transparency, and trust in firms. Complexity, transparency, and the evolution of trust are all endogenous, and equilibrium transparency is nonmonotonic. The least-trusted firms choose the lowest product complexity, remain opaque, and substitute ex ante third-party verification for information disclosure and trust. Firms with an intermediate level of trust choose an intermediate level of complexity and transparency through disclosure, with more trusted firms choosing greater complexity and lower transparency. The most-trusted firms choose maximum complexity while remaining opaque, eschewing both verification and disclosure.","PeriodicalId":21124,"journal":{"name":"Review of Financial Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135491157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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