Unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations is pervasive but our understanding of it is shallow. This paper strives to partly redress this lacuna on the theory side by introducing three novel political economy mechanisms with particular emphasis is on the role of production unbundling. One mechanism studies how lowering frictional barriers to imported parts can destroy the correlation of interests between parts producers and their downstream customers. A second mechanism studies how Kojima's pro-trade FDI raises the political economy cost of maintaining high upstream barriers. The third works via a general equilibrium channel whereby developing country's participation in the supply chains of advanced-nation industries undermines their own competitiveness in final goods, thus making final good protection more politically costly. In essence, developing nations' pursuit of the export-processing industrialisation undermines their infant-industry industrialisation strategies.
{"title":"Unilateral Tariff Liberalisation","authors":"R. Baldwin","doi":"10.3386/W16600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16600","url":null,"abstract":"Unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations is pervasive but our understanding of it is shallow. This paper strives to partly redress this lacuna on the theory side by introducing three novel political economy mechanisms with particular emphasis is on the role of production unbundling. One mechanism studies how lowering frictional barriers to imported parts can destroy the correlation of interests between parts producers and their downstream customers. A second mechanism studies how Kojima's pro-trade FDI raises the political economy cost of maintaining high upstream barriers. The third works via a general equilibrium channel whereby developing country's participation in the supply chains of advanced-nation industries undermines their own competitiveness in final goods, thus making final good protection more politically costly. In essence, developing nations' pursuit of the export-processing industrialisation undermines their infant-industry industrialisation strategies.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133220831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides Russia’s financial system strategy covering three blocks: banking sector, monetary policy and taxes. The post-crisis strategy in banking sector contains proposals on achieving soundness and stability of Russian banking system, problem banks restructuring, as well as increase in efficiency of banking institutions. The post-crisis monetary policy presumes multi-targeting of different goals, among which are economic growth and balanced, less volatile financial system. Proposals on tax regime improvement include tax burden decrease and stimulating innovations.
{"title":"Russia’s Financial System Strategy: Stimulating Modernization of Economy (Banking Sector, Monetary Policy, Taxes)","authors":"Y. Mirkin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1709862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1709862","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides Russia’s financial system strategy covering three blocks: banking sector, monetary policy and taxes. The post-crisis strategy in banking sector contains proposals on achieving soundness and stability of Russian banking system, problem banks restructuring, as well as increase in efficiency of banking institutions. The post-crisis monetary policy presumes multi-targeting of different goals, among which are economic growth and balanced, less volatile financial system. Proposals on tax regime improvement include tax burden decrease and stimulating innovations.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126163739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China's high corporate savings rate is commonly claimed to be a key driver for the country's large current account surplus. The mainstream explanation for high corporate savings is a combination of windfall profits in state-owned firms, especially in resource sectors, and mis-governance of state-owned firms represented by their low dividend payout. The paper casts doubt on these views by comparing the savings of 1557 Chinese listed firms with those of 29330 listed firms from 51 other countries over 2002 to 2007. First, Chinese firms do not have a significantly higher savings rate (as a share of total assets) than the global average because corporations in most countries have a high savings rate. The rising corporate savings rate is also consistent with a global trend. Second, there is no significant difference in the savings behavior and dividend patterns between Chinese majority state-owned and private listed firms, contrary to the received wisdom.
{"title":"The Chinese Corporate Savings Puzzle: A Firm-Level Cross-Country Perspective","authors":"Tamim A. Bayoumi, Hui Tong, S. Wei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2138718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2138718","url":null,"abstract":"China's high corporate savings rate is commonly claimed to be a key driver for the country's large current account surplus. The mainstream explanation for high corporate savings is a combination of windfall profits in state-owned firms, especially in resource sectors, and mis-governance of state-owned firms represented by their low dividend payout. The paper casts doubt on these views by comparing the savings of 1557 Chinese listed firms with those of 29330 listed firms from 51 other countries over 2002 to 2007. First, Chinese firms do not have a significantly higher savings rate (as a share of total assets) than the global average because corporations in most countries have a high savings rate. The rising corporate savings rate is also consistent with a global trend. Second, there is no significant difference in the savings behavior and dividend patterns between Chinese majority state-owned and private listed firms, contrary to the received wisdom.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133876619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Das Saumendra, Anwesha Patnaik, Prasanta Kumar Padhy
Gold is a large Global business and represents the most liquid commodity market other than crude oil. These notes offer an overview of issues relating to Gold market and should be looked at as only information presented after the investigation of the structure of gold, trading as a futures contract on the NCDEX. In Part I, as an introduction to the precious metal Gold and its origin, a brief review of a prominent book on Gold and its history titled “The Ages of Gold” by Timothy Green is presented, Part II emphasizes on the demand and supply of gold in the world market with trend analysis, Part III emphasizes on aspects of the Gold Futures market, exchange trading of Gold futures with an overview of the now familiar GARCH properties (autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity). Part IV emphasizes on a the Indian gold futures market and illustrates a rarely used measure in the capital markets–the Garman Klass estimator – is used to provide new insights in intraday and interday gold counter dynamics. As part of the closing remarks an executive summary is presented encompassing latest data on gold from a Global perspective. Scope for further research – Trend analysis of the Indian Gold futures market in the backdrop of the more mature American market would result in better forecasting of prices and demand.
{"title":"The Golden Glow of India: A Financial Perspective","authors":"Das Saumendra, Anwesha Patnaik, Prasanta Kumar Padhy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1667842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1667842","url":null,"abstract":"Gold is a large Global business and represents the most liquid commodity market other than crude oil. These notes offer an overview of issues relating to Gold market and should be looked at as only information presented after the investigation of the structure of gold, trading as a futures contract on the NCDEX. In Part I, as an introduction to the precious metal Gold and its origin, a brief review of a prominent book on Gold and its history titled “The Ages of Gold” by Timothy Green is presented, Part II emphasizes on the demand and supply of gold in the world market with trend analysis, Part III emphasizes on aspects of the Gold Futures market, exchange trading of Gold futures with an overview of the now familiar GARCH properties (autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity). Part IV emphasizes on a the Indian gold futures market and illustrates a rarely used measure in the capital markets–the Garman Klass estimator – is used to provide new insights in intraday and interday gold counter dynamics. As part of the closing remarks an executive summary is presented encompassing latest data on gold from a Global perspective. Scope for further research – Trend analysis of the Indian Gold futures market in the backdrop of the more mature American market would result in better forecasting of prices and demand.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130383202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the uncooperative tendencies of the players. We analyze alternative international agreements as variations of the public-goods game, and examine the incentives for cooperation under each alternative. The addition of cap-and-trade rules to the basic public-goods game is found to polarize the free-rider incentives of that game, encouraging those who would abate the most to target even higher abatement levels and those who would abate the least to target lower, and even negative, abatement levels. Such polarization between developed and developing countries is familiar from both the Kyoto and Copenhagen climate summits. Since cap-and-trade rules decrease cooperation by developing countries, developed countries are led to reject the game’s outcome and in the process prevent agreement on a set of quantity targets. To break this deadlock and shift the equilibrium toward cooperation, a modification of the public-goods game based on price rather than quantities is needed. This involves a global price target and equity transfers via a Green Fund that rewards adoption of and compliance with such a target. The Nash equilibrium of one such game is analyzed for a group of three countries similar to the United States, China and India.
{"title":"International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation","authors":"P. Cramton, S. Stoft","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1646473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646473","url":null,"abstract":"Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the uncooperative tendencies of the players. We analyze alternative international agreements as variations of the public-goods game, and examine the incentives for cooperation under each alternative. The addition of cap-and-trade rules to the basic public-goods game is found to polarize the free-rider incentives of that game, encouraging those who would abate the most to target even higher abatement levels and those who would abate the least to target lower, and even negative, abatement levels. Such polarization between developed and developing countries is familiar from both the Kyoto and Copenhagen climate summits. Since cap-and-trade rules decrease cooperation by developing countries, developed countries are led to reject the game’s outcome and in the process prevent agreement on a set of quantity targets. To break this deadlock and shift the equilibrium toward cooperation, a modification of the public-goods game based on price rather than quantities is needed. This involves a global price target and equity transfers via a Green Fund that rewards adoption of and compliance with such a target. The Nash equilibrium of one such game is analyzed for a group of three countries similar to the United States, China and India.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130078972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze 987 ex-dividend events in Taiwan stock market between January 1992 and December 2006, and find that differential taxes really matter for the share prices and investors behaviors around the ex-dividend day. Ex-day price drop ratio increases with the investors’ average preference for dividend relative to capital gains. The excess volume around the ex-dividend day is positively correlated with the degree of tax heterogeneity and the gains from dividend capturing activities, and is negatively associated with the risk and transaction cost. We also find that wealthy investors sell shares cum-dividend and reverse to buy on ex-day; whilst less-wealthy investors, proprietary traders, and corporation shareholders trade in the opposite direction. Overall, our results provide support for the dynamic dividend clientele hypothesis.
{"title":"Investor Tax Heterogeneity, Ex-Dividend Prices, Volumes, and Trades: Evidence from an Emerging Market","authors":"Hung-Ling Chen, Edward H. Chow, Cheng-Yi Shiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1662211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1662211","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze 987 ex-dividend events in Taiwan stock market between January 1992 and December 2006, and find that differential taxes really matter for the share prices and investors behaviors around the ex-dividend day. Ex-day price drop ratio increases with the investors’ average preference for dividend relative to capital gains. The excess volume around the ex-dividend day is positively correlated with the degree of tax heterogeneity and the gains from dividend capturing activities, and is negatively associated with the risk and transaction cost. We also find that wealthy investors sell shares cum-dividend and reverse to buy on ex-day; whilst less-wealthy investors, proprietary traders, and corporation shareholders trade in the opposite direction. Overall, our results provide support for the dynamic dividend clientele hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126836829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to clarify the relationship between social capital and firm performance, this research extends previous research using business network data collected from emerging markets in electronics companies to explore three questions: (1) Is the relationship between social capital and firm performance a non-linear inverted U-shaped curve? (2) Is the relationship between social capital and firm performance affected by technical uncertainty? (3) How does technical uncertainty affect the optimal level of social capital? Our research suggests that the relationship between social capital and firm performance is an inverted U-shaped curve. When social capital begins to increase, firm performance increases until it reaches equilibrium, after which it begins to decrease with the increase of social capital. This shows that too much or too little social capital has a negative impact on firm performance, while moderate social capital can lead to the greatest firm performance in a company. Also, the higher the technical uncertainty, the greater positive effect social capital has on firm performance. Furthermore, higher levels of technical uncertainty push the equilibrium point for social capital higher. Therefore, the higher the levels of technical uncertainty companies face, the more companies may rely on the building of corporate networks to gain necessary resources and promote business development.
{"title":"Social Capital and Firm Performance: The Impact of Technical Uncertainty","authors":"Sui-Hua Yu, W. Chiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1658792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658792","url":null,"abstract":"In order to clarify the relationship between social capital and firm performance, this research extends previous research using business network data collected from emerging markets in electronics companies to explore three questions: (1) Is the relationship between social capital and firm performance a non-linear inverted U-shaped curve? (2) Is the relationship between social capital and firm performance affected by technical uncertainty? (3) How does technical uncertainty affect the optimal level of social capital? Our research suggests that the relationship between social capital and firm performance is an inverted U-shaped curve. When social capital begins to increase, firm performance increases until it reaches equilibrium, after which it begins to decrease with the increase of social capital. This shows that too much or too little social capital has a negative impact on firm performance, while moderate social capital can lead to the greatest firm performance in a company. Also, the higher the technical uncertainty, the greater positive effect social capital has on firm performance. Furthermore, higher levels of technical uncertainty push the equilibrium point for social capital higher. Therefore, the higher the levels of technical uncertainty companies face, the more companies may rely on the building of corporate networks to gain necessary resources and promote business development.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131202369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing conclusions: only a small number of countries have successfully developed; and development theory has not produced development. In this article we examine one critical fact that might provide insights into the development conundrum: Some autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their economies, despite serious deficiencies along a range of other dimensions. Our aim is to understand how growth came about in these regimes, and whether emerging democracies might learn something important from these experiences. Our thesis is that in these economically successful countries, the authoritarian regime managed a critical juncture in the country’s development - entry into global commerce by the transition from small-scale, relational exchange, to exchange where performance is supported by government action, whether based on the potential for formal third party enforcement or by the threat of informal government sanctions. Compared to a weak democracy, a growth-favoring dictator may have an advantage in overcoming political economy obstacles to credibly committing that rent seeking will not dissipate private investment. We explore this hypothesis by examining the successful development experiences of three countries in the late twentieth century: Chile under Augusto Pinochet; South Korea under Park Chung-Hee; and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors. Although the macroeconomic policies and institutional strategies of the three countries differed significantly, each ruler found ways to credibly commit his regime to growth. Decades of law reform activity by the World Bank, IMF, and other international organizations, along with a vast academic literature, assume that an impartial judiciary is the key to the transition from relational to market exchange. Our study reveals that a variety of alternatives are possible. We then consider a now familiar question raised about contemporary China: Does economic development inexorably lead to political liberalization? The conventional wisdom says yes, drawing support from the experience of Chile and South Korea. We show that the conventional wisdom overlooks important features of the Chilean and Korean historical experiences that bear directly on China. The same incentive structures that have propelled Chinese economic growth are likely slow political liberalization.
{"title":"Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies","authors":"R. Gilson, C. Milhaupt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1564925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1564925","url":null,"abstract":"The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing conclusions: only a small number of countries have successfully developed; and development theory has not produced development. In this article we examine one critical fact that might provide insights into the development conundrum: Some autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their economies, despite serious deficiencies along a range of other dimensions. Our aim is to understand how growth came about in these regimes, and whether emerging democracies might learn something important from these experiences. Our thesis is that in these economically successful countries, the authoritarian regime managed a critical juncture in the country’s development - entry into global commerce by the transition from small-scale, relational exchange, to exchange where performance is supported by government action, whether based on the potential for formal third party enforcement or by the threat of informal government sanctions. Compared to a weak democracy, a growth-favoring dictator may have an advantage in overcoming political economy obstacles to credibly committing that rent seeking will not dissipate private investment. We explore this hypothesis by examining the successful development experiences of three countries in the late twentieth century: Chile under Augusto Pinochet; South Korea under Park Chung-Hee; and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors. Although the macroeconomic policies and institutional strategies of the three countries differed significantly, each ruler found ways to credibly commit his regime to growth. Decades of law reform activity by the World Bank, IMF, and other international organizations, along with a vast academic literature, assume that an impartial judiciary is the key to the transition from relational to market exchange. Our study reveals that a variety of alternatives are possible. We then consider a now familiar question raised about contemporary China: Does economic development inexorably lead to political liberalization? The conventional wisdom says yes, drawing support from the experience of Chile and South Korea. We show that the conventional wisdom overlooks important features of the Chilean and Korean historical experiences that bear directly on China. The same incentive structures that have propelled Chinese economic growth are likely slow political liberalization.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115555797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-10DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00908.x
Ayça Tekin‐Koru, A. Waldkirch
We investigate how North–South integration affects the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration affects the incentives of partner and nonpartner Northern countries to locate in the South differently and may lead to investment diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first major North–South integration scheme. We find that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what is implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We also find no evidence that inward US FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of different model and econometric specifications as well as the skill data used.
{"title":"North–South Integration and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment","authors":"Ayça Tekin‐Koru, A. Waldkirch","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00908.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00908.x","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how North–South integration affects the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration affects the incentives of partner and nonpartner Northern countries to locate in the South differently and may lead to investment diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first major North–South integration scheme. We find that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what is implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We also find no evidence that inward US FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of different model and econometric specifications as well as the skill data used.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126524077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sudden stops and international financial crises have been a main feature of developing countries in the last three decades. While their aggregate effects are well known, the disaggregated channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, we study the sectoral responses that take place over episodes of sudden stops. Using job flows from a sectoral panel dataset for four Latin American countries, we find that sudden stops are characterized as periods of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous across sectors: we find that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on external financing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience significantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on external financing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions affects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results confirm the large labor market effects of sudden stops, and provide evidence of financial conditions being an important transmission channel of sudden stops within a country, highlighting the role of financial frictions in the restructuring process in general.
{"title":"Sudden Stops, Financial Frictions, and Labor Market Flows: Evidence from Latin America","authors":"Francisco A. Gallego, José Tessada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1718691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718691","url":null,"abstract":"Sudden stops and international financial crises have been a main feature of developing countries in the last three decades. While their aggregate effects are well known, the disaggregated channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, we study the sectoral responses that take place over episodes of sudden stops. Using job flows from a sectoral panel dataset for four Latin American countries, we find that sudden stops are characterized as periods of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous across sectors: we find that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on external financing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience significantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on external financing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions affects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results confirm the large labor market effects of sudden stops, and provide evidence of financial conditions being an important transmission channel of sudden stops within a country, highlighting the role of financial frictions in the restructuring process in general.","PeriodicalId":213755,"journal":{"name":"International Environment of Global Business eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128680899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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