From 2022 to 2024, Texas transported more than 100,000 migrants from the U.S.–Mexico border to six cities led by Democratic mayors, creating a unique migration shock far from the border. We use county-level data to estimate the program’s effects on presidential elections. Comparing two elections prior to the program (2016–2020) with one after (2024), we find that the busing program increased Trump’s vote share by more than three percentage points in treated counties. These effects are robust to alternative analyses. To explore mechanisms further, we analyze individual-level data from AP VoteCast. The increase in Trump’s vote share in places receiving buses was driven by swing voters and elevated Republican turnout. Swing voters in busing destinations were moved to Trump by amplified concerns with crime, whereas Republican turnout was linked to heightened concerns over immigration. Our findings highlight the enduring power of minority threat and the growing role of subnational immigration policies.
{"title":"The Effect of the Texas Migrant Busing Program on the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election","authors":"William Scarborough, Ronald Kwon, David Brady","doi":"10.15195/v13.a11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a11","url":null,"abstract":"From 2022 to 2024, Texas transported more than 100,000 migrants from the U.S.–Mexico border to six cities led by Democratic mayors, creating a unique migration shock far from the border. We use county-level data to estimate the program’s effects on presidential elections. Comparing two elections prior to the program (2016–2020) with one after (2024), we find that the busing program increased Trump’s vote share by more than three percentage points in treated counties. These effects are robust to alternative analyses. To explore mechanisms further, we analyze individual-level data from AP VoteCast. The increase in Trump’s vote share in places receiving buses was driven by swing voters and elevated Republican turnout. Swing voters in busing destinations were moved to Trump by amplified concerns with crime, whereas Republican turnout was linked to heightened concerns over immigration. Our findings highlight the enduring power of minority threat and the growing role of subnational immigration policies.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Haowen Zheng, Robert Andersen , Anders Holm, Kristian Bernt Karlson
Influential research shows that college graduates achieve similar labor market outcomes regardless of socioeconomic origin, leading to the view that a college degree is a “great equalizer.” Still, other evidence suggests that family background continues to shape labor market outcomes long after graduation, implying that college’s equalizing effect may largely reflect the characteristics of those who pursue higher education. However, the role of unobserved selection into college has rarely been examined. After formally illustrating how this unobserved selection can bias estimates of the college effect, we present new analyses that correct for this bias using an instrumental-variable approach on white male respondents in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The selection-corrected results suggest that intergenerational mobility is similar among college graduates and nongraduates. Although college yields substantial returns for all, these returns do not differ by family background. We conclude that for higher education to serve as a true equalizer, it must become both less selective and more accessible to students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
{"title":"Is College Really “the” Equalizer? New Evidence Addressing Unobserved Selection","authors":"Haowen Zheng, Robert Andersen , Anders Holm, Kristian Bernt Karlson","doi":"10.15195/v13.a10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a10","url":null,"abstract":"Influential research shows that college graduates achieve similar labor market outcomes regardless of socioeconomic origin, leading to the view that a college degree is a “great equalizer.” Still, other evidence suggests that family background continues to shape labor market outcomes long after graduation, implying that college’s equalizing effect may largely reflect the characteristics of those who pursue higher education. However, the role of unobserved selection into college has rarely been examined. After formally illustrating how this unobserved selection can bias estimates of the college effect, we present new analyses that correct for this bias using an instrumental-variable approach on white male respondents in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The selection-corrected results suggest that intergenerational mobility is similar among college graduates and nongraduates. Although college yields substantial returns for all, these returns do not differ by family background. We conclude that for higher education to serve as a true equalizer, it must become both less selective and more accessible to students from disadvantaged backgrounds.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147358890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates variability in women’s experiences balancing work and family, focusing on the association between early childhood investments and work trajectories. Using longitudinal data and event study models, we examine work participation from two years before to 10 years after first birth across different early childhood investment levels. Although sustained intensive investment is associated with the largest reduction in paid work, the relationship between child investment and work outcomes does not follow a simple “more investment, less work” pattern. Instead, investment intensity and duration both shape work trajectories. Women with more intensive short-term practices or moderate longer-term ones work at similar levels as women making lower investments. Patterns also differ by work outcome: not working is most differentiated by sustained intensive child investment, whereas hours worked are similar across a range of investment levels. Finally, women with constrained family resources consistently work more than those married to college-educated spouses.
{"title":"Early Childhood Investments and Women’s Work Outcomes across the Life Course","authors":"Vida Maralani, Camille Portier, Berkay Özcan","doi":"10.15195/v13.a9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a9","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates variability in women’s experiences balancing work and family, focusing on the association between early childhood investments and work trajectories. Using longitudinal data and event study models, we examine work participation from two years before to 10 years after first birth across different early childhood investment levels. Although sustained intensive investment is associated with the largest reduction in paid work, the relationship between child investment and work outcomes does not follow a simple “more investment, less work” pattern. Instead, investment intensity and duration both shape work trajectories. Women with more intensive short-term practices or moderate longer-term ones work at similar levels as women making lower investments. Patterns also differ by work outcome: not working is most differentiated by sustained intensive child investment, whereas hours worked are similar across a range of investment levels. Finally, women with constrained family resources consistently work more than those married to college-educated spouses.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"228 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147280054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yuan Cheng, John K. Dagsvik, Xuehui Han, Zhiyang Jia
This article develops and applies a stochastic two-sided matching model to analyze marriage patterns in the United States using 1 percent samples from the 2010 and 2019 American Community Survey, accessed via the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. This approach disentangles two sources of change in marriage patterns over time: individuals’ preferences for partner characteristics (“forces of attraction”) and the numbers and composition of potential partners (“partner availability”). As illustrated by our empirical application, the model provides a flexible and unified analytical framework to address a broad range of relevant questions in marriage research, offering valuable new perspectives on marriage dynamics and facilitating future research, despite the limitation that the model does not separately identify individual-specific preferences.
{"title":"Force of Attraction and Partner Availability in the U.S. Marriage Market: A Two-Sided Matching Model","authors":"Yuan Cheng, John K. Dagsvik, Xuehui Han, Zhiyang Jia","doi":"10.15195/v13.a8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a8","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops and applies a stochastic two-sided matching model to analyze marriage patterns in the United States using 1 percent samples from the 2010 and 2019 American Community Survey, accessed via the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. This approach disentangles two sources of change in marriage patterns over time: individuals’ preferences for partner characteristics (“forces of attraction”) and the numbers and composition of potential partners (“partner availability”). As illustrated by our empirical application, the model provides a flexible and unified analytical framework to address a broad range of relevant questions in marriage research, offering valuable new perspectives on marriage dynamics and facilitating future research, despite the limitation that the model does not separately identify individual-specific preferences.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146210400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Secularization is one of the most debated areas of research in current sociology of religion. Despite hundreds of empirical studies, researchers do not even agree on the very existence of secularization in different parts of the world. This article investigates whether some of the variability in findings may be attributed not to the social reality investigated but to bias in the form of researchers’ own religiosity. Specifically, we test whether researchers’ religiosity is correlated with two outcomes: their personal belief in the secularization thesis and the likelihood of supporting secularization in their published articles. To address this question, we constructed an international database of scholars working on secularization and conducted a survey measuring their religiosity and beliefs about religious decline. We then coded their publications according to whether they supported the secularization thesis and linked the two data sets. We find significant evidence of a “(non-)religious bias.” Either in their private attitudes or public writings, religious researchers find less evidence for the secularization thesis, whereas secular scholars find more. This result cannot be explained by differences in research methods, study quality, or the religious and geographic contexts under investigation.
{"title":"The Faith Factor. How Scholars’ Religiosity Biases Research Findings on Secularization","authors":"Valeria Rainero, Jörg Stolz, Ruud Luijkx","doi":"10.15195/v13.a7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a7","url":null,"abstract":"Secularization is one of the most debated areas of research in current sociology of religion. Despite hundreds of empirical studies, researchers do not even agree on the very existence of secularization in different parts of the world. This article investigates whether some of the variability in findings may be attributed not to the social reality investigated but to bias in the form of researchers’ own religiosity. Specifically, we test whether researchers’ religiosity is correlated with two outcomes: their personal belief in the secularization thesis and the likelihood of supporting secularization in their published articles. To address this question, we constructed an international database of scholars working on secularization and conducted a survey measuring their religiosity and beliefs about religious decline. We then coded their publications according to whether they supported the secularization thesis and linked the two data sets. We find significant evidence of a “(non-)religious bias.” Either in their private attitudes or public writings, religious researchers find less evidence for the secularization thesis, whereas secular scholars find more. This result cannot be explained by differences in research methods, study quality, or the religious and geographic contexts under investigation.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146153487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Persistent disparities in academic achievement between students from high- and low- poverty neighborhoods are widely attributed to differences in school quality. Using nationally representative data from more than 18,000 students and nearly 1,000 elementary schools, we examine how the schools serving students from different neighborhoods vary across more than 160 characteristics, including detailed measures of their composition, resources, instruction, climate, and effectiveness. Our findings document significant differences in demographic composition between schools serving high- and low-poverty neighborhoods but comparatively little variation in other dimensions of the school environment. With novel machine learning methods tailored for high-dimensional data, we estimate that equalizing all these different factors would reduce the achievement gap by less than 10 percent, primarily through changes in school composition. These results suggest that the main drivers of place-based disparities in achievement lie outside of elementary schools, underscoring the need to address broader structural inequalities as part of any effort to reduce achievement gaps.
{"title":"Poor Neighborhoods, Bad Schools? A High-Dimensional Model of Place-Based Disparities in Academic Achievement","authors":"Geoffrey T. Wodtke, Kailey White, Xiang Zhou","doi":"10.15195/v13.a6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a6","url":null,"abstract":"Persistent disparities in academic achievement between students from high- and low- poverty neighborhoods are widely attributed to differences in school quality. Using nationally representative data from more than 18,000 students and nearly 1,000 elementary schools, we examine how the schools serving students from different neighborhoods vary across more than 160 characteristics, including detailed measures of their composition, resources, instruction, climate, and effectiveness. Our findings document significant differences in demographic composition between schools serving high- and low-poverty neighborhoods but comparatively little variation in other dimensions of the school environment. With novel machine learning methods tailored for high-dimensional data, we estimate that equalizing all these different factors would reduce the achievement gap by less than 10 percent, primarily through changes in school composition. These results suggest that the main drivers of place-based disparities in achievement lie outside of elementary schools, underscoring the need to address broader structural inequalities as part of any effort to reduce achievement gaps.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146129366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Academic and popular interest in nonreligion has risen in parallel with the growth of religiously unaffiliated populations. In many countries, census and survey questions used to measure religion have been modified to better capture nonreligious identities. Little attention has been given to how these changes in measures affect specific claims about the rise of the “nones.” Although there is no doubt that religiously unaffiliated populations have grown in many countries during the twenty- first century, the degree of such growth has sometimes been exaggerated due to measurement effects. We review methodological issues that affect the estimates of the size of religiously unaffiliated populations and their change over time. We call for further study to quantify the effect of these changes.
{"title":"How Measurement Changes Can Exaggerate the Growth of Religious “Nones”","authors":"Matthew Conrad, Conrad Hackett","doi":"10.15195/v13.a5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a5","url":null,"abstract":"Academic and popular interest in nonreligion has risen in parallel with the growth of religiously unaffiliated populations. In many countries, census and survey questions used to measure religion have been modified to better capture nonreligious identities. Little attention has been given to how these changes in measures affect specific claims about the rise of the “nones.” Although there is no doubt that religiously unaffiliated populations have grown in many countries during the twenty- first century, the degree of such growth has sometimes been exaggerated due to measurement effects. We review methodological issues that affect the estimates of the size of religiously unaffiliated populations and their change over time. We call for further study to quantify the effect of these changes.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146115676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sociologists have long argued that the cultural construction of organizations as social actors underpins public expectations of corporate accountability. In recent decades, however, the unified bureaucratic structures that once sustained this construction have given way to increasingly fragmented and opaque organizational forms. This study considers to what extent the diffuse, often illegible nature of twenty-first century corporations undermines the ability of public audiences to demand corporate accountability. We argue that complex, fragmented organizational configurations allow firms to partially evade the negative reputational consequences of misconduct by confounding audiences and obfuscating the “actor” behind the bad organizational action. Drawing on a vignette- based survey experiment, we test whether fragmentation reduces attributions of blame following corporate wrongdoing. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that while respondents generally attribute high levels of blame for wrongdoing, greater fragmentation decreases the blame directed at core firms and heightens audiences’ uncertainty about responsibility. Moreover, in fragmented structures, blame is not simply redistributed to auxiliary entities but is diminished overall. These findings suggest that as corporate structures grow more complex and less legible, the underlying actors behind organizational action become harder to identify and construct, and thereby harder to hold to account.
{"title":"Ambiguous Actorhood: Twenty-First Century Firms and the Evasion of Responsibility","authors":"Carly R. Knight, Adam Goldstein","doi":"10.15195/v13.a4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a4","url":null,"abstract":"Sociologists have long argued that the cultural construction of organizations as social actors underpins public expectations of corporate accountability. In recent decades, however, the unified bureaucratic structures that once sustained this construction have given way to increasingly fragmented and opaque organizational forms. This study considers to what extent the diffuse, often illegible nature of twenty-first century corporations undermines the ability of public audiences to demand corporate accountability. We argue that complex, fragmented organizational configurations allow firms to partially evade the negative reputational consequences of misconduct by confounding audiences and obfuscating the “actor” behind the bad organizational action. Drawing on a vignette- based survey experiment, we test whether fragmentation reduces attributions of blame following corporate wrongdoing. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that while respondents generally attribute high levels of blame for wrongdoing, greater fragmentation decreases the blame directed at core firms and heightens audiences’ uncertainty about responsibility. Moreover, in fragmented structures, blame is not simply redistributed to auxiliary entities but is diminished overall. These findings suggest that as corporate structures grow more complex and less legible, the underlying actors behind organizational action become harder to identify and construct, and thereby harder to hold to account.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AJ Alvero, Dustin S. Stoltz, Oscar Stuhler, Marshall A. Taylor
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has garnered considerable attention for its poten- tial utility in research and scholarship, even among those who typically do not rely on computational tools. However, early commentators have also articulated concerns about how GenAI usage comes with enormous environmental costs, serious social risks, and a tendency to produce low-quality content. In the midst of both excitement and skepticism, it is crucial to take stock of how GenAI is actually being used. Our study focuses on sociological research as our site, and here we present findings from a survey of 433 authors of articles published in 50 sociology journals in the past five years. The survey provides an overview of the state of the discipline with regard to the use of GenAI by providing answers to fundamental questions: how (much) do scholars use the technology for their research; what are their reasons for using it; and how concerned, trustful, and optimistic are they about the technology? Of the approximately one third of respondents who self-report using GenAI at least weekly, the primary uses are for writing assistance and comparatively less so in planning, data collection, or data analysis. In both use and attitudes, there are surprisingly few differences between self-identified computational and non-computational researchers. In general, respondents are very concerned about the social and environmental consequences of GenAI. Trust in GenAI outputs is low, regardless of expertise or frequency of use. Although optimism that GenAI will improve is high, scholars are divided on whether GenAI will have a positive impact on the field.
{"title":"Generative AI in Sociological Research: State of the Discipline","authors":"AJ Alvero, Dustin S. Stoltz, Oscar Stuhler, Marshall A. Taylor","doi":"10.15195/v13.a3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a3","url":null,"abstract":"Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has garnered considerable attention for its poten- tial utility in research and scholarship, even among those who typically do not rely on computational tools. However, early commentators have also articulated concerns about how GenAI usage comes with enormous environmental costs, serious social risks, and a tendency to produce low-quality content. In the midst of both excitement and skepticism, it is crucial to take stock of how GenAI is actually being used. Our study focuses on sociological research as our site, and here we present findings from a survey of 433 authors of articles published in 50 sociology journals in the past five years. The survey provides an overview of the state of the discipline with regard to the use of GenAI by providing answers to fundamental questions: how (much) do scholars use the technology for their research; what are their reasons for using it; and how concerned, trustful, and optimistic are they about the technology? Of the approximately one third of respondents who self-report using GenAI at least weekly, the primary uses are for writing assistance and comparatively less so in planning, data collection, or data analysis. In both use and attitudes, there are surprisingly few differences between self-identified computational and non-computational researchers. In general, respondents are very concerned about the social and environmental consequences of GenAI. Trust in GenAI outputs is low, regardless of expertise or frequency of use. Although optimism that GenAI will improve is high, scholars are divided on whether GenAI will have a positive impact on the field.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146006005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article updates the empirical picture of categorical tolerance (CT), namely, the pattern of refusing to report dislikes across cultural genres, for the third decade of the twenty-first century in the United States. Analyzing recent survey data from two platforms, I find that CT has continued its march among Americans, reaching approximately one in five respondents. The analysis confirms earlier-observed demographic trends, showing that CT is strongly associated with younger cohorts and non-white individuals. However, I also find that individuals reporting the highest educational attainment are now overrepresented among categorical tolerants, suggesting that CT may increasingly function as an elite cultural strategy consistent with contemporary forms of status display, signaling openness and refusal to refuse. Furthermore, I find that while the odds of being a CT are not strongly polarized by political ideology, the inclination toward symbolic exclusion among non-CTs is, with conservatives significantly more likely to express a greater volume of cultural dislikes than liberals.
{"title":"The Forward March of Categorical Tolerance in the United States","authors":"Omar Lizardo","doi":"10.15195/v13.a2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15195/v13.a2","url":null,"abstract":"This article updates the empirical picture of categorical tolerance (CT), namely, the pattern of refusing to report dislikes across cultural genres, for the third decade of the twenty-first century in the United States. Analyzing recent survey data from two platforms, I find that CT has continued its march among Americans, reaching approximately one in five respondents. The analysis confirms earlier-observed demographic trends, showing that CT is strongly associated with younger cohorts and non-white individuals. However, I also find that individuals reporting the highest educational attainment are now overrepresented among categorical tolerants, suggesting that CT may increasingly function as an elite cultural strategy consistent with contemporary forms of status display, signaling openness and refusal to refuse. Furthermore, I find that while the odds of being a CT are not strongly polarized by political ideology, the inclination toward symbolic exclusion among non-CTs is, with conservatives significantly more likely to express a greater volume of cultural dislikes than liberals.","PeriodicalId":22029,"journal":{"name":"Sociological Science","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145962799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}