The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received View’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.
{"title":"Disagreement in Aesthetics and Ethics: Against the Received Image","authors":"Vítor Guerreiro, Susana Cadilha","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received View’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":" 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141675228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper defends a ‘noetic’ conception of aesthetic experience whereby such experience is best conceived as a kind of explorative thought process. Although not directly aimed at acquiring knowledge, this process often leads to an enhanced understanding or improved epistemic grasp of the object of appreciation itself and the world. On this conception, aesthetic value acts as an invitation to engage in a series of contemplative and reflective processes during which we rely not only on the perceptual, imaginative, and affective abilities which have occupied such a central role in aesthetic theory, but also on our capacities for sense-making, problem-solving and theory-building. Cases of intelligible beauty or aesthetic value should thus lie at the heart of accounts of aesthetic experience.
{"title":"The 2023 Richard Wollheim Memorial Lecture","authors":"Elisabeth Schellekens","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper defends a ‘noetic’ conception of aesthetic experience whereby such experience is best conceived as a kind of explorative thought process. Although not directly aimed at acquiring knowledge, this process often leads to an enhanced understanding or improved epistemic grasp of the object of appreciation itself and the world. On this conception, aesthetic value acts as an invitation to engage in a series of contemplative and reflective processes during which we rely not only on the perceptual, imaginative, and affective abilities which have occupied such a central role in aesthetic theory, but also on our capacities for sense-making, problem-solving and theory-building. Cases of intelligible beauty or aesthetic value should thus lie at the heart of accounts of aesthetic experience.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141687687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perplexing Plots: Popular Storytelling and the Poetics of Murder","authors":"Jeanette Bicknell","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141706384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hegel and the Present of Art’s Past Character","authors":"Paul a. Kottman","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"1 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141693946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Biodiversity loss is an immense ecological crisis of our time. But while “biodiversity” has become a buzzword in media and policy, conservationists have found it difficult to build a common understanding on the nature and severity of biodiversity loss and the means to tackle it. Perhaps surprisingly, many biologists and philosophers have proposed that biodiversity might be best defended with reference to its aesthetic value. This article explores whether aesthetic values could provide strong support for biodiversity conservation. By exploring the question from the viewpoints of species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity, we argue that there is a mismatch between apparent and real biodiversity and that aesthetics can, at best, give only limited support for biodiversity conservation.
{"title":"Aesthetics in Biodiversity Conservation","authors":"Jukka Mikkonen, Kaisa J Raatikainen","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Biodiversity loss is an immense ecological crisis of our time. But while “biodiversity” has become a buzzword in media and policy, conservationists have found it difficult to build a common understanding on the nature and severity of biodiversity loss and the means to tackle it. Perhaps surprisingly, many biologists and philosophers have proposed that biodiversity might be best defended with reference to its aesthetic value. This article explores whether aesthetic values could provide strong support for biodiversity conservation. By exploring the question from the viewpoints of species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity, we argue that there is a mismatch between apparent and real biodiversity and that aesthetics can, at best, give only limited support for biodiversity conservation.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":" 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141369138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Virtual fictionalism is the view that virtual reality is a kind of fiction. We imagine that what we see and hear in virtual reality is real, although it is not. The problem with this view is that there are real moral concerns with our use of virtual reality, from violent video games to cases of virtual groping on social platforms. If what we do in virtual reality is just make-believe, the fictionalist cannot explain the real moral harms of our virtual actions. Call this the moral objection to virtual fictionalism. I address the objection in this paper by arguing for a new fictional account of virtual actions. Virtual fictionalists can take virtual actions to be happening within the fiction and consider users to act as characters or actors within the fictional world depicted in the virtual environment. Instead, I argue that virtual actions create fictional representations from outside the fiction; users act in virtual reality as an author might in their work. The alternative I present better addresses the moral objection to virtual fictionalism—it does not conflate the user with a fictional character. Our virtual actions create fictional representations, and we can morally evaluate them as such.
{"title":"Virtual Fictional Actions","authors":"Karim Nader","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Virtual fictionalism is the view that virtual reality is a kind of fiction. We imagine that what we see and hear in virtual reality is real, although it is not. The problem with this view is that there are real moral concerns with our use of virtual reality, from violent video games to cases of virtual groping on social platforms. If what we do in virtual reality is just make-believe, the fictionalist cannot explain the real moral harms of our virtual actions. Call this the moral objection to virtual fictionalism. I address the objection in this paper by arguing for a new fictional account of virtual actions. Virtual fictionalists can take virtual actions to be happening within the fiction and consider users to act as characters or actors within the fictional world depicted in the virtual environment. Instead, I argue that virtual actions create fictional representations from outside the fiction; users act in virtual reality as an author might in their work. The alternative I present better addresses the moral objection to virtual fictionalism—it does not conflate the user with a fictional character. Our virtual actions create fictional representations, and we can morally evaluate them as such.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"82 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141376532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aesthetics of Care: Practice in Everyday Life","authors":"P. Q. White","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"36 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141381996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes a locative function as a defining feature of situated art. All artworks orient their beholders, but situated art is characterized by this context-sensitive orientation entering the work’s content. In so doing, it facilitates ‘here’- and ‘now’-thoughts, not only towards the “real” situation encountered (the work’s outer orientation) but to the work’s “virtual” or “bracketed” realm (its inner orientation). These orientations overlap, but do not necessarily align; indeed, situated works often construct a tension through a deliberate miscalibration of these orientations. But what is the mechanism by which such works afford indexical thought towards their worlds? Drawing upon Gareth Evans’s account of demonstrative content, I contend that sensory imagination—conceived in Evans’s terms as an additional conceptual component—plays a necessary role in negotiating demonstrative thought towards two (or more) separate spaces conceived as “here.” This is something the beholder brings to the work.
{"title":"The Locative Function of Situated Art","authors":"Ken Wilder","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article proposes a locative function as a defining feature of situated art. All artworks orient their beholders, but situated art is characterized by this context-sensitive orientation entering the work’s content. In so doing, it facilitates ‘here’- and ‘now’-thoughts, not only towards the “real” situation encountered (the work’s outer orientation) but to the work’s “virtual” or “bracketed” realm (its inner orientation). These orientations overlap, but do not necessarily align; indeed, situated works often construct a tension through a deliberate miscalibration of these orientations. But what is the mechanism by which such works afford indexical thought towards their worlds? Drawing upon Gareth Evans’s account of demonstrative content, I contend that sensory imagination—conceived in Evans’s terms as an additional conceptual component—plays a necessary role in negotiating demonstrative thought towards two (or more) separate spaces conceived as “here.” This is something the beholder brings to the work.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"124 44","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141125256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three books about the philosophy of Marcel Proust","authors":"Bence Nanay","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":" 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140690601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Soliciting Essay Submissions for the John Fisher Memorial Prize of 2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"72 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140723524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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