{"title":"Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism | Call for Proposals for Special Issues 2025 and 2026","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"148 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140760404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue that Kant has a far more communitarian theory of aesthetic life than is usually acknowledged. I focus on two aspects of Kant’s theory that might otherwise be taken to support an individualist reading, namely, Kant’s emphasis on aesthetic autonomy and his characterization of judgments of taste as involving demands for agreement. I argue that the full expression of autonomy in fact requires being a member of an aesthetic community and that within such a community, judgments of taste are issued as invitations to others to engage their faculties towards the goal of shared aesthetic appreciation.
{"title":"Autonomy and Community in Kant’s Theory of Taste","authors":"Jessica J Williams","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I argue that Kant has a far more communitarian theory of aesthetic life than is usually acknowledged. I focus on two aspects of Kant’s theory that might otherwise be taken to support an individualist reading, namely, Kant’s emphasis on aesthetic autonomy and his characterization of judgments of taste as involving demands for agreement. I argue that the full expression of autonomy in fact requires being a member of an aesthetic community and that within such a community, judgments of taste are issued as invitations to others to engage their faculties towards the goal of shared aesthetic appreciation.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"6 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140438881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whether you are a sophisticated critic or an untrained spectator, when it comes to our experience of dance, we are generally able to appreciate the way a dancer’s bodily movements fit the music. Our experience of dance thus lends itself to a range of crossmodal judgments, that is, our perception of dance enables us to make claims that purport to be about how bodily movements which can be visually seen fit together with aspects of the music which can be heard or felt. But we are not determined to perceive every case of fit unproblematically. That it is possible one may fail to initially perceive a fit that others claim ought to be viewable suggests that there is a normative dimension to this phenomenon. In this article, I argue that we can explain the source of this normativity with a multisensory account of dance. More specifically, I argue that dance is a novel feature type, a feature of perceptual experience that is essentially multimodal. The basic perception of dance, which grounds more sophisticated forms of judgment concerning crossmodal fit downstream, is the actualization of a unique multisensory capacity that non-inferentially tracks a real, fundamental connection between music and movement.
{"title":"The Perceived Fit Between Music and Movement: A Multisensory Account of Dance as a Novel Feature Type","authors":"Tyler Olsson","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Whether you are a sophisticated critic or an untrained spectator, when it comes to our experience of dance, we are generally able to appreciate the way a dancer’s bodily movements fit the music. Our experience of dance thus lends itself to a range of crossmodal judgments, that is, our perception of dance enables us to make claims that purport to be about how bodily movements which can be visually seen fit together with aspects of the music which can be heard or felt. But we are not determined to perceive every case of fit unproblematically. That it is possible one may fail to initially perceive a fit that others claim ought to be viewable suggests that there is a normative dimension to this phenomenon. In this article, I argue that we can explain the source of this normativity with a multisensory account of dance. More specifically, I argue that dance is a novel feature type, a feature of perceptual experience that is essentially multimodal. The basic perception of dance, which grounds more sophisticated forms of judgment concerning crossmodal fit downstream, is the actualization of a unique multisensory capacity that non-inferentially tracks a real, fundamental connection between music and movement.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"190 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139800695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whether you are a sophisticated critic or an untrained spectator, when it comes to our experience of dance, we are generally able to appreciate the way a dancer’s bodily movements fit the music. Our experience of dance thus lends itself to a range of crossmodal judgments, that is, our perception of dance enables us to make claims that purport to be about how bodily movements which can be visually seen fit together with aspects of the music which can be heard or felt. But we are not determined to perceive every case of fit unproblematically. That it is possible one may fail to initially perceive a fit that others claim ought to be viewable suggests that there is a normative dimension to this phenomenon. In this article, I argue that we can explain the source of this normativity with a multisensory account of dance. More specifically, I argue that dance is a novel feature type, a feature of perceptual experience that is essentially multimodal. The basic perception of dance, which grounds more sophisticated forms of judgment concerning crossmodal fit downstream, is the actualization of a unique multisensory capacity that non-inferentially tracks a real, fundamental connection between music and movement.
{"title":"The Perceived Fit Between Music and Movement: A Multisensory Account of Dance as a Novel Feature Type","authors":"Tyler Olsson","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Whether you are a sophisticated critic or an untrained spectator, when it comes to our experience of dance, we are generally able to appreciate the way a dancer’s bodily movements fit the music. Our experience of dance thus lends itself to a range of crossmodal judgments, that is, our perception of dance enables us to make claims that purport to be about how bodily movements which can be visually seen fit together with aspects of the music which can be heard or felt. But we are not determined to perceive every case of fit unproblematically. That it is possible one may fail to initially perceive a fit that others claim ought to be viewable suggests that there is a normative dimension to this phenomenon. In this article, I argue that we can explain the source of this normativity with a multisensory account of dance. More specifically, I argue that dance is a novel feature type, a feature of perceptual experience that is essentially multimodal. The basic perception of dance, which grounds more sophisticated forms of judgment concerning crossmodal fit downstream, is the actualization of a unique multisensory capacity that non-inferentially tracks a real, fundamental connection between music and movement.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"57 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139860693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When fat people are depicted in popular media, we often take their behavior to be representative of all fat people. How one fat person acts becomes representative of a broader pattern of behavior that all fat people are presumed to share, shaping the way we understand fatness. This way of generalizing presents fatness as a singular experience, reducing fat people to a monolithic narrative that often reinforces anti-fat bias. How do we avoid this reduction? How can we responsibly depict fat characters without perpetuating negative stereotypes about real fat people? Using the case of “Fat Thor” from Avengers: Endgame, I propose the beginnings of an account of responsible artistic agency which can be used to improve the ways that marginalized communities are depicted in art, with a particular focus on fat communities. Central to this account are two features: inclusion of and deference to members of the communities depicted from a variety of backgrounds throughout the production process, and mindfulness of the preexisting narrative web built around the communities depicted. I will use this discussion to highlight the need for a drastic shift in how we consider marginalized populations in art—in reimagining both who tells their stories, and what stories are told on their behalf.
{"title":"Toward a Responsible Artistic Agency: Mindful Representation of Fat Communities in Popular Media","authors":"Cheryl Frazier","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad064","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When fat people are depicted in popular media, we often take their behavior to be representative of all fat people. How one fat person acts becomes representative of a broader pattern of behavior that all fat people are presumed to share, shaping the way we understand fatness. This way of generalizing presents fatness as a singular experience, reducing fat people to a monolithic narrative that often reinforces anti-fat bias. How do we avoid this reduction? How can we responsibly depict fat characters without perpetuating negative stereotypes about real fat people? Using the case of “Fat Thor” from Avengers: Endgame, I propose the beginnings of an account of responsible artistic agency which can be used to improve the ways that marginalized communities are depicted in art, with a particular focus on fat communities. Central to this account are two features: inclusion of and deference to members of the communities depicted from a variety of backgrounds throughout the production process, and mindfulness of the preexisting narrative web built around the communities depicted. I will use this discussion to highlight the need for a drastic shift in how we consider marginalized populations in art—in reimagining both who tells their stories, and what stories are told on their behalf.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"92 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139869426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When fat people are depicted in popular media, we often take their behavior to be representative of all fat people. How one fat person acts becomes representative of a broader pattern of behavior that all fat people are presumed to share, shaping the way we understand fatness. This way of generalizing presents fatness as a singular experience, reducing fat people to a monolithic narrative that often reinforces anti-fat bias. How do we avoid this reduction? How can we responsibly depict fat characters without perpetuating negative stereotypes about real fat people? Using the case of “Fat Thor” from Avengers: Endgame, I propose the beginnings of an account of responsible artistic agency which can be used to improve the ways that marginalized communities are depicted in art, with a particular focus on fat communities. Central to this account are two features: inclusion of and deference to members of the communities depicted from a variety of backgrounds throughout the production process, and mindfulness of the preexisting narrative web built around the communities depicted. I will use this discussion to highlight the need for a drastic shift in how we consider marginalized populations in art—in reimagining both who tells their stories, and what stories are told on their behalf.
{"title":"Toward a Responsible Artistic Agency: Mindful Representation of Fat Communities in Popular Media","authors":"Cheryl Frazier","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad064","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When fat people are depicted in popular media, we often take their behavior to be representative of all fat people. How one fat person acts becomes representative of a broader pattern of behavior that all fat people are presumed to share, shaping the way we understand fatness. This way of generalizing presents fatness as a singular experience, reducing fat people to a monolithic narrative that often reinforces anti-fat bias. How do we avoid this reduction? How can we responsibly depict fat characters without perpetuating negative stereotypes about real fat people? Using the case of “Fat Thor” from Avengers: Endgame, I propose the beginnings of an account of responsible artistic agency which can be used to improve the ways that marginalized communities are depicted in art, with a particular focus on fat communities. Central to this account are two features: inclusion of and deference to members of the communities depicted from a variety of backgrounds throughout the production process, and mindfulness of the preexisting narrative web built around the communities depicted. I will use this discussion to highlight the need for a drastic shift in how we consider marginalized populations in art—in reimagining both who tells their stories, and what stories are told on their behalf.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"89 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139809745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis.
数十年来，美学界一直在争论审美属性的形而上学地位。在任何关于审美属性的讨论中，一个始终存在的问题是，审美属性在本质上是评价性的还是描述性的。审美属性通常被视为与道德属性平行，这意味着许多哲学家想当然地认为审美属性从根本上说是评价性的。但也有一些哲学家，如弗兰克-西伯利（Frank Sibley）和杰罗德-莱文森（Jerrold Levinson），则选择了一条少有人走的路，将审美属性主要视为描述性的。在本文中，我将概述莱文森的一个有趣观点，即审美属性的评价性方面可以被取消，只留下该属性的描述性本质。我将此称为可分性论题。它认为，对审美属性的评价性反应可以从审美体验的客观感知内容中分离出来，从而为我们留下该属性的非评价性核心。接下来，我将从拉斐尔-德-克莱克（Rafael De Clercq）提出的一个强有力的挑战中为可分性论题辩护。最后，我认为，尽管德-克莱克的论证既巧妙又富有洞察力，但它未能破坏可分性论题。
{"title":"The Separability Thesis","authors":"Iris Spoor","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad052","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"14 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139817932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The arrival of image-making generative artificial intelligence (AI) programs has been met with a broad rebuke: to many, it feels inherently wrong to regard images made using generative AI programs as artworks. I am skeptical of this sentiment, and in what follows I aim to demonstrate why. I suspect AI generated images can be considered artworks; more specifically, that generative AI programs are, in many cases, just another tool artists can use to realize their creative intent. I begin with an overview of how generative AI programs, like OpenAI’s DALL-E 2, work. Then, leveraging work by Claire Anscomb, I argue that generative AI programs are a new technique of automatic image-making that affords creative agency to its users, thereby qualifying the images they create as artworks. Finally, I show many of the objections brought against AI artworks—including accusations of plagiarism and artistic devaluation—are due to the social backdrop in which we currently find them, rather than the technology itself. In the end, I aim to open the door to further aesthetic debate concerning AI generated images and art.
{"title":"How Do You Solve a Problem like DALL-E 2?","authors":"Kate Wojtkiewicz","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad046","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The arrival of image-making generative artificial intelligence (AI) programs has been met with a broad rebuke: to many, it feels inherently wrong to regard images made using generative AI programs as artworks. I am skeptical of this sentiment, and in what follows I aim to demonstrate why. I suspect AI generated images can be considered artworks; more specifically, that generative AI programs are, in many cases, just another tool artists can use to realize their creative intent. I begin with an overview of how generative AI programs, like OpenAI’s DALL-E 2, work. Then, leveraging work by Claire Anscomb, I argue that generative AI programs are a new technique of automatic image-making that affords creative agency to its users, thereby qualifying the images they create as artworks. Finally, I show many of the objections brought against AI artworks—including accusations of plagiarism and artistic devaluation—are due to the social backdrop in which we currently find them, rather than the technology itself. In the end, I aim to open the door to further aesthetic debate concerning AI generated images and art.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":" 589","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139617743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Offering aesthetic judgments of gardens is common. These judgments follow an evidentiary structure that is common to the evaluation of other aesthetic objects: summary judgments evidenced by the attribution of narrow formal aesthetic properties, “formal-adjacent” aesthetic properties, and relevant contextual relations. Yet, in a garden, these evidencing properties and relations take on forms that are different from those of other aesthetic and/or art objects. In this article, I consider these differences and consider whether aesthetic analyses of gardens rest on one or more conceptual mistakes. In the end, I conclude that we can meet all challenges.
{"title":"The Aesthetic Analysis of a Garden","authors":"David Fenner","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad061","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Offering aesthetic judgments of gardens is common. These judgments follow an evidentiary structure that is common to the evaluation of other aesthetic objects: summary judgments evidenced by the attribution of narrow formal aesthetic properties, “formal-adjacent” aesthetic properties, and relevant contextual relations. Yet, in a garden, these evidencing properties and relations take on forms that are different from those of other aesthetic and/or art objects. In this article, I consider these differences and consider whether aesthetic analyses of gardens rest on one or more conceptual mistakes. In the end, I conclude that we can meet all challenges.","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"15 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139444038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Unnatural Attitude: Phenomenology in Weimar Musical Thought","authors":"Thomas J Mulherin","doi":"10.1093/jaac/kpad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpad058","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":220991,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138621446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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