German Abstract: Der technologische Sprung bei den Netzwerk- und Datenbankentwicklungen ermoglicht Verknupfungen von Kunden und Unternehmen, die die wirtschaftlichen Tatigkeiten masgeblich pragen. Netzwerke werden andere finanzielle Organisationsformen erganzen oder gar ersetzen und verschiedene Transaktionsplattformen aktivieren, die auch die Aufgaben der Finanzmittler und Banken verandern werden.Die Bewertung von Finanzinformationen ist von der Qualitat der Inhalte und der zeitlichen Verfugbarkeit abhangig. Spezielle Inhalte wie Finanzinformationen sind per se werthaltiger, weil sie auf eine zahlungsbereite Nachfrage treffen. Jeder private User oder auch jede Firma musste in der Lage sein, aus dem Netz relevante Informationen uber ein bestimmtes Finanzprodukt zu selektieren. Crowdfunding – Portale ermoglichen den Nutzern, geeignete Investitionsobjekte zu finden – zurzeit allerdings in Deutschland noch uberwiegend aus dem Start-Up- Bereich. In diesem Artikel wird die kurze Historie der Plattformen in Deutschland dargestellt und eine Aussicht auf zukunftige Entwicklungen gewagt. English Abstract: The technological leap in network and database developments enables links between customers and companies that dominate the economic activities significantly. Networks are complementary to other financial organization forms, or even replace them.The review of entrepreneurial financial information depends on the quality of the content and the temporal availability of this content. Specific content like specific financial information is more valuable than non specific content like single financial news. Each user or any company should be able to select relevant information from the network on a particular financial product. Crowdfunding portals allow users to find suitable investment objects - currently in Germany still from the start-up area and obliged the companies to present valueable entrepreneurial information to the possible investors in a persuasive manner. In this article, a brief history of the platforms in Germany is represented and some views on future developments will be presented.
{"title":"Crowdfunding-Portale in ihrer Bedeutung für die Unternehmensfinanzierung in Deutschland - ein kurzer Rückblick ('Crowdfunding Portals' and the Impact on Corporate Finance in Germany - A Short Review)","authors":"Harald Meisner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2537424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2537424","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Der technologische Sprung bei den Netzwerk- und Datenbankentwicklungen ermoglicht Verknupfungen von Kunden und Unternehmen, die die wirtschaftlichen Tatigkeiten masgeblich pragen. Netzwerke werden andere finanzielle Organisationsformen erganzen oder gar ersetzen und verschiedene Transaktionsplattformen aktivieren, die auch die Aufgaben der Finanzmittler und Banken verandern werden.Die Bewertung von Finanzinformationen ist von der Qualitat der Inhalte und der zeitlichen Verfugbarkeit abhangig. Spezielle Inhalte wie Finanzinformationen sind per se werthaltiger, weil sie auf eine zahlungsbereite Nachfrage treffen. Jeder private User oder auch jede Firma musste in der Lage sein, aus dem Netz relevante Informationen uber ein bestimmtes Finanzprodukt zu selektieren. Crowdfunding – Portale ermoglichen den Nutzern, geeignete Investitionsobjekte zu finden – zurzeit allerdings in Deutschland noch uberwiegend aus dem Start-Up- Bereich. In diesem Artikel wird die kurze Historie der Plattformen in Deutschland dargestellt und eine Aussicht auf zukunftige Entwicklungen gewagt. English Abstract: The technological leap in network and database developments enables links between customers and companies that dominate the economic activities significantly. Networks are complementary to other financial organization forms, or even replace them.The review of entrepreneurial financial information depends on the quality of the content and the temporal availability of this content. Specific content like specific financial information is more valuable than non specific content like single financial news. Each user or any company should be able to select relevant information from the network on a particular financial product. Crowdfunding portals allow users to find suitable investment objects - currently in Germany still from the start-up area and obliged the companies to present valueable entrepreneurial information to the possible investors in a persuasive manner. In this article, a brief history of the platforms in Germany is represented and some views on future developments will be presented.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85462641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The demographics of south African economy have changed since 1994 dispensation. This was followed by global recession of 2009, which changed the attitude in business world that promulgated stringiest regulations to ensure the success of companies. That compliment need for a vivid company law that relish sustainable development. Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether South African Companies Act 2008 will achieve its role adequately and possible borrowing from other statutory to embrace development.The main aim of this paper is to determine what is the effect of Companies Act 2006 UK on management by directors and in particular how does it affect any influence of shareholders on company action, and what would the effect be if introduced into South Africa.
{"title":"Management as Affected by Company Law Application: The Principle of Corporate Governance.","authors":"Luvuyo Sydwell Mfecane","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2627728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2627728","url":null,"abstract":"The demographics of south African economy have changed since 1994 dispensation. This was followed by global recession of 2009, which changed the attitude in business world that promulgated stringiest regulations to ensure the success of companies. That compliment need for a vivid company law that relish sustainable development. Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether South African Companies Act 2008 will achieve its role adequately and possible borrowing from other statutory to embrace development.The main aim of this paper is to determine what is the effect of Companies Act 2006 UK on management by directors and in particular how does it affect any influence of shareholders on company action, and what would the effect be if introduced into South Africa.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87625992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hart and Holmstrom (2010) claim that organizational form conditions the sense of entitlement of the parties. This determines their feeling of being aggrieved by the outcome of the contract and therefore their shading, which creates deadweight losses. Cooperatives constitute integrated organizational forms while privately owned firms are nonintegrated. The main result obtained states that if the intensity of shading depends positively on the existing payoff imbalances between bosses and managers, then (non)integration with coordination is more plausible when the profits of bosses and benefits of managers are (dis)similar. Moreover, given plausible parameter constraints, we illustrate how both organizational forms, an integrated cooperative and a nonintegrated private firm, may coexist in a coordinated equilibrium and how the former may even obtain a higher social surplus than the latter one.
Hart and Holmstrom(2010)认为，组织形式决定了各方的权利意识。这决定了他们对合同结果感到委屈，因此他们的阴影，这造成了无谓的损失。合作社构成一体化的组织形式，而私营企业则是非一体化的组织形式。得到的主要结果表明，如果阴影的强度正依赖于老板和经理之间存在的薪酬不平衡，那么当老板的利润和经理的利益(不)相似时，(非)整合与协调更合理。此外，在给定合理的参数约束条件下，我们说明了整合合作社和非整合私营企业这两种组织形式如何在协调均衡中共存，以及前者如何比后者获得更高的社会剩余。
{"title":"Organizational Form and Payoff Imbalances in an Aggrievement Model: Cooperatives Versus Markets","authors":"F. Santos-Arteaga, Guenter H Schamel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2460516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2460516","url":null,"abstract":"Hart and Holmstrom (2010) claim that organizational form conditions the sense of entitlement of the parties. This determines their feeling of being aggrieved by the outcome of the contract and therefore their shading, which creates deadweight losses. Cooperatives constitute integrated organizational forms while privately owned firms are nonintegrated. The main result obtained states that if the intensity of shading depends positively on the existing payoff imbalances between bosses and managers, then (non)integration with coordination is more plausible when the profits of bosses and benefits of managers are (dis)similar. Moreover, given plausible parameter constraints, we illustrate how both organizational forms, an integrated cooperative and a nonintegrated private firm, may coexist in a coordinated equilibrium and how the former may even obtain a higher social surplus than the latter one.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76170767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
N. Bloom, R. Lemos, R. Sadun, Daniela Scur, J. Van Reenen
Over the last decade the World Management Survey (WMS) has collected firm-level management practices data across multiple sectors and countries. We developed the survey to try to explain the large and persistent TFP differences across firms and countries. This review paper discusses what has been learned empirically and theoretically from the WMS and other recent work on management practices. Our preliminary results suggest that about a quarter of cross-country and within-country TFP gaps can be accounted for by management practices. Management seems to matter both qualitatively and quantitatively. Competition, governance, human capital and informational frictions help account for the variation in management.
{"title":"The New Empirical Economics of Management","authors":"N. Bloom, R. Lemos, R. Sadun, Daniela Scur, J. Van Reenen","doi":"10.3386/W20102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W20102","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decade the World Management Survey (WMS) has collected firm-level management practices data across multiple sectors and countries. We developed the survey to try to explain the large and persistent TFP differences across firms and countries. This review paper discusses what has been learned empirically and theoretically from the WMS and other recent work on management practices. Our preliminary results suggest that about a quarter of cross-country and within-country TFP gaps can be accounted for by management practices. Management seems to matter both qualitatively and quantitatively. Competition, governance, human capital and informational frictions help account for the variation in management.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79749863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish Abstract: La etica no es un anadido para directivos concienciados en empresas con exito, sino una necesidad, porque forma parte de la tarea misma de dirigir. Este articulo parte de que es la etica, que es una empresa y que es dirigir una organizacion para mostrar por que la etica es necesaria: porque proporciona ventajas potencialmente muy importantes, pero, sobre todo, porque hace posible la coherencia de las acciones del directivo en el tiempo, en una organizacion humana.English Abstract: Ethics is not an extra for conscientious managers in successful companies: It is a necessity, because it is an integral part of what management entails. This paper starts by discussing what ethics are, what a company is, and what managing an organization involves in order to show why ethics is necessary: because it offers advantages that are potentially very significant, but, most importantly, because an ethical framework makes it possible for managers to act consistently over time in a humane organization.
在成功的公司中，道德不是有意识的管理者的附加条件，而是一种必要条件，因为它是管理任务的一部分。这篇文章的这一部分,他是一家,并领导一个组织来显示的是必要的:因为您更具潜力很重要,但是最重要的是,因为它可以指导行动的一致性在人类的时间,在一个组织。在成功的公司中，道德对有意识的管理者来说不是额外的:它是必要的，因为它是管理工作的一个组成部分。This paper starts by discussing what ethics are, what a company is, and what managing an organization涉及in order to show why ethics是必要的:因为它offers advantages非常that are potentially开展,但最重要的是,由于an伦理框架曾可能制订管理to act贯彻over time in a人道组织。
{"title":"(La Ética En La Empresa Y La Ética Del Directivo) Ethics in Companies and the Ethics of Managers","authors":"Antonio Argandoña","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2538670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2538670","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: La etica no es un anadido para directivos concienciados en empresas con exito, sino una necesidad, porque forma parte de la tarea misma de dirigir. Este articulo parte de que es la etica, que es una empresa y que es dirigir una organizacion para mostrar por que la etica es necesaria: porque proporciona ventajas potencialmente muy importantes, pero, sobre todo, porque hace posible la coherencia de las acciones del directivo en el tiempo, en una organizacion humana.English Abstract: Ethics is not an extra for conscientious managers in successful companies: It is a necessity, because it is an integral part of what management entails. This paper starts by discussing what ethics are, what a company is, and what managing an organization involves in order to show why ethics is necessary: because it offers advantages that are potentially very significant, but, most importantly, because an ethical framework makes it possible for managers to act consistently over time in a humane organization.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77745825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic literature on organizations (Milgrom, 1998; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 2009) points out that when distributive policies are discretionary realized within firms by managers, the agents working in the organization will undertake "influence activities" with possible negative effects on firm's productivity. Following the Milgrom's model (1988), we define a principal-agent framework analyzing alternative organizational governance methods. The paper shows that managerial discretion can always result in improved firm's performance with a principal complying with the organizational goals. Nevertheless, some reforms, especially in the public organizations, have been addressed to limit managerial discretion introducing more rules to template the mangers' behavior. Disappointing results suggest to invest for a greater development of ethical culture within organizations.
{"title":"Organizational Governance: Managerial Discretion, Automatic Rules or Ethics?","authors":"M. Antonelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2407429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407429","url":null,"abstract":"Economic literature on organizations (Milgrom, 1998; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 2009) points out that when distributive policies are discretionary realized within firms by managers, the agents working in the organization will undertake \"influence activities\" with possible negative effects on firm's productivity. Following the Milgrom's model (1988), we define a principal-agent framework analyzing alternative organizational governance methods. The paper shows that managerial discretion can always result in improved firm's performance with a principal complying with the organizational goals. Nevertheless, some reforms, especially in the public organizations, have been addressed to limit managerial discretion introducing more rules to template the mangers' behavior. Disappointing results suggest to invest for a greater development of ethical culture within organizations.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74758584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Varfolomeev, O. Marin, D. Bykov, O. Karasev, N. Velikanova, E. Vetchinkina, Anastasia Edelkina, T. Thurner
This paper studies the integration of social and environmental objectives into strategy through performance indicators based on a sample of multinational world-leading oil- and gas producers. Also, we inquire if the companies under study, which identify certain areas as strategic objectives, do better than their peers. We show that top management of the companies did indeed identify different areas of interest, had different strategic foci, and used different performance indicators. This is often explicable through a company’s own history and past experiences. When comparing a sample of greenhouse gas emissions, safety measures, and energy efficiency indicators between the different companies, we could not identify a consistent development over time trends. In fact, some did worse over time and collective improvements were largely absent. We suggest further research into the link between strategic objectives and a company’s relative position in industry.
{"title":"Connecting Strategy, Environmental and Social Indicators: A Study of Oil and Gas Producers","authors":"E. Varfolomeev, O. Marin, D. Bykov, O. Karasev, N. Velikanova, E. Vetchinkina, Anastasia Edelkina, T. Thurner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2386538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386538","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the integration of social and environmental objectives into strategy through performance indicators based on a sample of multinational world-leading oil- and gas producers. Also, we inquire if the companies under study, which identify certain areas as strategic objectives, do better than their peers. We show that top management of the companies did indeed identify different areas of interest, had different strategic foci, and used different performance indicators. This is often explicable through a company’s own history and past experiences. When comparing a sample of greenhouse gas emissions, safety measures, and energy efficiency indicators between the different companies, we could not identify a consistent development over time trends. In fact, some did worse over time and collective improvements were largely absent. We suggest further research into the link between strategic objectives and a company’s relative position in industry.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90242861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federal prosecutors have explained the absence of any signature prosecutions of financial executives in the wake of the financial crisis to the high level of intent required by criminal laws typically used to prosecute economic crimes. If the barrier to holding individual executives is the lack of evidence of specific intent, the one possibility is to adopt a new crime based on recklessness for executive decisions that result in significant harm. In this essay, I look at how statutes in Germany and the United Kingdom shed light on how a provision can be crafted to hold senior managers responsible for reckless corporate decisions. But the question remains whether such a new law is needed in the wake of the financial crisis, and whether it would deter the type of risk taking expected in a business enterprise seeking a high return on capital.
{"title":"A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?","authors":"Peter J. Henning","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2379586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2379586","url":null,"abstract":"Federal prosecutors have explained the absence of any signature prosecutions of financial executives in the wake of the financial crisis to the high level of intent required by criminal laws typically used to prosecute economic crimes. If the barrier to holding individual executives is the lack of evidence of specific intent, the one possibility is to adopt a new crime based on recklessness for executive decisions that result in significant harm. In this essay, I look at how statutes in Germany and the United Kingdom shed light on how a provision can be crafted to hold senior managers responsible for reckless corporate decisions. But the question remains whether such a new law is needed in the wake of the financial crisis, and whether it would deter the type of risk taking expected in a business enterprise seeking a high return on capital.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90634908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In studies of corporate governance by default, information asymmetry is assumed, based on the principle-agent theory, between investors and executives, and also by default it is assumed that executives have superior information over investors. In this paper I apply the more rich theory of information from cybernetics, compared to the mathematical theory to this assumed information asymmetry in combination with the theory of decision making, especially with respect to producing eidetic information. The quality of eidetic information turns out to be more critical as is the management or pragmatic information, with respect to the longer-term success of a firm and subsequently its value over the longer term. Due to e.g. psychological phenomena like dominant logic or belief conservation, executives not always produce good quality eidetic information and subsequently decide poor strategies. More in general it can be concluded that the assumption of information asymmetry needs to be understood per type of information and per each phase in decision-making. The resulting model provides a more precise insight in what value investors and non-executives may contribute to improve the quality of the information in a system of corporate governance and thus its effectiveness.
{"title":"Sense Making in Corporate Governance: A Multilayered Model for Information Asymmetries between Investors and Executives","authors":"J. Strikwerda","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2370304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2370304","url":null,"abstract":"In studies of corporate governance by default, information asymmetry is assumed, based on the principle-agent theory, between investors and executives, and also by default it is assumed that executives have superior information over investors. In this paper I apply the more rich theory of information from cybernetics, compared to the mathematical theory to this assumed information asymmetry in combination with the theory of decision making, especially with respect to producing eidetic information. The quality of eidetic information turns out to be more critical as is the management or pragmatic information, with respect to the longer-term success of a firm and subsequently its value over the longer term. Due to e.g. psychological phenomena like dominant logic or belief conservation, executives not always produce good quality eidetic information and subsequently decide poor strategies. More in general it can be concluded that the assumption of information asymmetry needs to be understood per type of information and per each phase in decision-making. The resulting model provides a more precise insight in what value investors and non-executives may contribute to improve the quality of the information in a system of corporate governance and thus its effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89530726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper joins the debate on businessO role in the implementation of sustainable development and argues that firms are beginning to run more sustainable practices as these are becoming increasingly profitable. It is also argued that such evolution of the economics of social environmental performance is the result of a three stage dynamics which involves consumer awareness, industrial policies, new cost structures and stakeholdersO pressure. Moreover, it is also considered that such a phenomenon implies that corporations can be of huge help to regulations in the implementation of sustainability. Finally, by running analyses of the relevant literature on the business case for sustainability, this paper reconciles the mixed and inconclusive results which the academic research on the economic rationale of sustainability has always produced.
{"title":"The New Economics of the Business Case for Sustainability","authors":"M. Pinelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326200","url":null,"abstract":"This paper joins the debate on businessO role in the implementation of sustainable development and argues that firms are beginning to run more sustainable practices as these are becoming increasingly profitable. It is also argued that such evolution of the economics of social environmental performance is the result of a three stage dynamics which involves consumer awareness, industrial policies, new cost structures and stakeholdersO pressure. Moreover, it is also considered that such a phenomenon implies that corporations can be of huge help to regulations in the implementation of sustainability. Finally, by running analyses of the relevant literature on the business case for sustainability, this paper reconciles the mixed and inconclusive results which the academic research on the economic rationale of sustainability has always produced.","PeriodicalId":22151,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75313515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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