As recognized, taxation is not only an instrument for government to collect revenues from the economic agents but also an instrument of fiscal policy to influence the agents’ behaviour. In this work, we develop a DSGE model to assess the macroeconomic impact of three tax items (taxes on individual income, on firms’ income and on consumption) on the dynamics of both individual tax items and on the aggregate revenues as well. Moreover, we also intend to evaluate how macroeconomic aggregates behave in a presence of stochastic shocks in taxation.
{"title":"A DSGE Model to Evaluate the Macroeconomic Impacts of Taxation","authors":"José Alves","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293899","url":null,"abstract":"As recognized, taxation is not only an instrument for government to collect revenues from the economic agents but also an instrument of fiscal policy to influence the agents’ behaviour. In this work, we develop a DSGE model to assess the macroeconomic impact of three tax items (taxes on individual income, on firms’ income and on consumption) on the dynamics of both individual tax items and on the aggregate revenues as well. Moreover, we also intend to evaluate how macroeconomic aggregates behave in a presence of stochastic shocks in taxation.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75181491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study aims to assess the impact of double taxation treaties (DTTs) on FDI inflows in 10 ASEAN countries from 1989 to 2016. There are two objectives of double taxation treaties. The first one is to alleviate the problem of global double taxation, which has a stimulating effect on FDI. The second objective is the sharing of information between governments, which can prevent tax evasion and thus discourage FDI. The findings suggest that new DTTs tend to have a positive but insignificant impact on the FDI inflows into Southeast Asia. However, the impact of older DTTs on FDI is significantly negative, suggesting that the increasing number of DTTs signed by ASEAN countries over time does not lead to more FDI inflows into the region. Overall, the results show that tax treaties have little or even negative effect on FDI inflows into the ASEAN region, which is consistent with most prior findings that DTTs’ impact on FDI into low-income countries is not significant. However, the negative association between DTT and FDI is unlikely to be due to the information-sharing function of tax treaties based on an examination of the exchange of information (EOI) provisions contained in the 430 DTTs signed by ASEAN countries. The author proposes that the negative impact of DTTs on FDI inflows in ASEAN could be driven by factors associated with the ‘age’ of some existing DTTs. For example, certain provisions in some older treaties may have become outdated or irrelevant, thus hindering investment flows into the region.
{"title":"The Impact of Double Tax Treaties on Inward FDI in ASEAN Countries","authors":"Yue Dong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3349388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3349388","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to assess the impact of double taxation treaties (DTTs) on FDI inflows in 10 ASEAN countries from 1989 to 2016. There are two objectives of double taxation treaties. The first one is to alleviate the problem of global double taxation, which has a stimulating effect on FDI. The second objective is the sharing of information between governments, which can prevent tax evasion and thus discourage FDI. The findings suggest that new DTTs tend to have a positive but insignificant impact on the FDI inflows into Southeast Asia. However, the impact of older DTTs on FDI is significantly negative, suggesting that the increasing number of DTTs signed by ASEAN countries over time does not lead to more FDI inflows into the region. Overall, the results show that tax treaties have little or even negative effect on FDI inflows into the ASEAN region, which is consistent with most prior findings that DTTs’ impact on FDI into low-income countries is not significant. However, the negative association between DTT and FDI is unlikely to be due to the information-sharing function of tax treaties based on an examination of the exchange of information (EOI) provisions contained in the 430 DTTs signed by ASEAN countries. The author proposes that the negative impact of DTTs on FDI inflows in ASEAN could be driven by factors associated with the ‘age’ of some existing DTTs. For example, certain provisions in some older treaties may have become outdated or irrelevant, thus hindering investment flows into the region.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89159179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims at providing a comprehensive overview of existing literature on the topic of comparability adjustments. Based on existing literature the most commonly used adjustments can be categorized in two broad categories: "accounting and financial risks adjustments" and "strategic/market adjustments". With the exception of working capital adjustments, the lack of guidance and recognized standardized application will quite possibly lead to continued discrepancies in their use. Taxpayers continue to struggle with the immense amount of documentation as well as justification requirements when it comes to adjustments, as there is no clear path to follow and very few practical application examples, which would unify the application of adjustments. As seen, even though the topic of comparability adjustments has been around since before the first version of the OECD TP Guidelines, the topic is yet to be fully explored in both official guidance as well as literature, research and especially practical tools.
{"title":"Comparability Adjustments A Literature Review","authors":"M. Petutschnig, Stefanie Chroustovsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3266107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266107","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims at providing a comprehensive overview of existing literature on the topic of comparability adjustments. Based on existing literature the most commonly used adjustments can be categorized in two broad categories: \"accounting and financial risks adjustments\" and \"strategic/market adjustments\". With the exception of working capital adjustments, the lack of guidance and recognized standardized application will quite possibly lead to continued discrepancies in their use. Taxpayers continue to struggle with the immense amount of documentation as well as justification requirements when it comes to adjustments, as there is no clear path to follow and very few practical application examples, which would unify the application of adjustments. As seen, even though the topic of comparability adjustments has been around since before the first version of the OECD TP Guidelines, the topic is yet to be fully explored in both official guidance as well as literature, research and especially practical tools.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80339357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the potential consequences of the international tax provisions of the recent Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA), drawing on existing research. The TCJA’s dividend exemption provision is expected to eliminate distortions to the amount and timing of dividend repatriations. However, the efficiency gains from increased repatriations – which are primarily expected to increase shareholder payout – are likely to be modest. The paper uses the observed behavior of firms during the repatriation tax holiday implemented in 2005 to infer the relative magnitudes of the burdens created by the repatriation tax under the old (pre-TCJA) regime and by the TCJA’s new “Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income” (GILTI) tax. It concludes that the TCJA increases the tax burden on US residence for many, and perhaps most, US MNCs. The paper also argues that the GILTI and “Foreign-Derived Intangible Income” (FDII) provisions are likely to create substantial distortions to the ownership of assets, both in the US and around the world. Overall, the scholarly evidence implies that the international provisions of the TCJA can reasonably be expected to create potentially large efficiency losses.
{"title":"The Consequences of the TCJA's International Provisions: Lessons from Existing Research","authors":"Dhammika Dharmapala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3212072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3212072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the potential consequences of the international tax provisions of the recent Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA), drawing on existing research. The TCJA’s dividend exemption provision is expected to eliminate distortions to the amount and timing of dividend repatriations. However, the efficiency gains from increased repatriations – which are primarily expected to increase shareholder payout – are likely to be modest. The paper uses the observed behavior of firms during the repatriation tax holiday implemented in 2005 to infer the relative magnitudes of the burdens created by the repatriation tax under the old (pre-TCJA) regime and by the TCJA’s new “Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income” (GILTI) tax. It concludes that the TCJA increases the tax burden on US residence for many, and perhaps most, US MNCs. The paper also argues that the GILTI and “Foreign-Derived Intangible Income” (FDII) provisions are likely to create substantial distortions to the ownership of assets, both in the US and around the world. Overall, the scholarly evidence implies that the international provisions of the TCJA can reasonably be expected to create potentially large efficiency losses.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"2 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85579586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the last year, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS") has announced several compliance campaigns designed to verify a taxpayer’s compliance with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”). These campaigns encourage better tax compliance from U.S. taxpayers, banks, and other financial organizations subject to U.S. taxation on their income and assets. Among FATCA’s reporting requirements is section 6038D of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). This section provides that taxpayers holding financial assets outside the United States must report those assets to the IRS on Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets. It also imposes penalties for noncompliance. This Article will review what tax professionals representing individuals should know about Form 8938 and controversies based on the audit of Form 8938.
{"title":"Reporting Large Foreign Financial Assets, IRS Form 8938","authors":"Frank Agostino, Victor Nazario","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3223783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223783","url":null,"abstract":"During the last year, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS\") has announced several compliance campaigns designed to verify a taxpayer’s compliance with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”). These campaigns encourage better tax compliance from U.S. taxpayers, banks, and other financial organizations subject to U.S. taxation on their income and assets. Among FATCA’s reporting requirements is section 6038D of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). This section provides that taxpayers holding financial assets outside the United States must report those assets to the IRS on Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets. It also imposes penalties for noncompliance. This Article will review what tax professionals representing individuals should know about Form 8938 and controversies based on the audit of Form 8938.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89757212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although there is already a variety of papers analyzing tax evasion decisions, only little focus is put on tax evasion of gains and losses. As taxpayers can evade taxes by either underreporting their income or by overdeducting expenses, we study whether there is a significant difference if subject are confronted with a gain or a loss scenario. We find that individuals evade more in the first than in the latter case. As a consequence, subjects are more willing to evade taxes by underreporting income than by overdeducting expenses. We show that this finding can be explained by mental accounting and an asymmetric evaluation of tax payments and tax refunds. Our result is robust to treatment variation. However, if individuals have to complete only one tax declaration (but still decide on gains and losses) and we therefore expect subjects to use only one mental account, the effect vanishes. This provides strong evidence that mental accounting plays an important role in tax evasion decisions. Further results are presented and discussed.
{"title":"Framing and Salience Effects in Tax Evasion Decisions – An Experiment on Underreporting and Overdeducting","authors":"Martin Fochmann, Nadja Wolf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2595070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2595070","url":null,"abstract":"Although there is already a variety of papers analyzing tax evasion decisions, only little focus is put on tax evasion of gains and losses. As taxpayers can evade taxes by either underreporting their income or by overdeducting expenses, we study whether there is a significant difference if subject are confronted with a gain or a loss scenario. We find that individuals evade more in the first than in the latter case. As a consequence, subjects are more willing to evade taxes by underreporting income than by overdeducting expenses. We show that this finding can be explained by mental accounting and an asymmetric evaluation of tax payments and tax refunds. Our result is robust to treatment variation. However, if individuals have to complete only one tax declaration (but still decide on gains and losses) and we therefore expect subjects to use only one mental account, the effect vanishes. This provides strong evidence that mental accounting plays an important role in tax evasion decisions. Further results are presented and discussed.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73347217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effects of increased competition stemming from corporate tax rate cuts in foreign competitors' home countries on U.S. domestic manufacturing firms. We develop a measure of U.S. domestic firms' exposure to changes in foreign country tax rates and validate that the measure captures increased competition in the U.S. We find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms lose market power following declines in foreign country tax rates. We also find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms respond by increasing investment in research and development and capital expenditures and by improving total factor productivity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find the impact of foreign tax cuts is concentrated among U.S. domestic firms with low ex ante product differentiation. Taken together, these findings suggest that foreign country tax cuts escalate the competitive threat faced by U.S. domestic firms, and in response, U.S. domestic firms alter their investment strategies and/or become more productive. JEL Classifications: H2; H22; H25.
{"title":"How Do Reductions in Foreign Country Corporate Tax Rates Affect U.S. Domestic Manufacturing Firms?","authors":"Jaewoo Kim, Michelle L. Nessa, R. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3188368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3188368","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the effects of increased competition stemming from corporate tax rate cuts in foreign competitors' home countries on U.S. domestic manufacturing firms. We develop a measure of U.S. domestic firms' exposure to changes in foreign country tax rates and validate that the measure captures increased competition in the U.S. We find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms lose market power following declines in foreign country tax rates. We also find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms respond by increasing investment in research and development and capital expenditures and by improving total factor productivity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find the impact of foreign tax cuts is concentrated among U.S. domestic firms with low ex ante product differentiation. Taken together, these findings suggest that foreign country tax cuts escalate the competitive threat faced by U.S. domestic firms, and in response, U.S. domestic firms alter their investment strategies and/or become more productive.\u0000 JEL Classifications: H2; H22; H25.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86287114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Trump Administration faces mounting pressure from conservative thinkers and activists — including calls from its own National Economic Council director — to promulgate a U.S. Treasury Department regulation that indexes capital gains for inflation. Proponents of such a move — which is sometimes called “presidential indexation” — make three principal arguments in favor of the proposal: (1) that inflation indexing would be an economic boon; (2) that the President and his Treasury Department have legal authority to implement inflation indexing without further congressional authorization; and (3) that in any event, it is unlikely that anyone would have standing to challenge such an action in court. This Article evaluates the proponents’ three arguments and concludes that all are faulty. First, whatever the merits of comprehensive legislation that adjusts the taxation of capital gains and various other elements of the Internal Revenue Code for inflation, rifle-shot regulatory action that targets only the capital gains tax would be costly and regressive, would open a number of large loopholes that allow for rampant tax arbitrage, and would be unlikely to significantly enhance growth. Second, the legal authority for presidential indexation simply does not exist. The Justice Department under the first President Bush reached the conclusion in 1992 that the Executive Branch cannot implement inflation indexing unilaterally, and doctrinal developments in the last quarter century have — if anything — strengthened that conclusion. Third, a number of potential plaintiffs — including a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, certain states, brokers subject to statutory basis reporting requirements, and investment funds whose tax liability could rise as a result of the regulation — would likely have standing to challenge presidential indexation in federal court. In sum, the promise of presidential indexation turns out too hollow, and calls for unilateral action should be spurned.
{"title":"The False Promise of Presidential Indexation","authors":"Daniel Hemel, David Kamin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3184051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184051","url":null,"abstract":"The Trump Administration faces mounting pressure from conservative thinkers and activists — including calls from its own National Economic Council director — to promulgate a U.S. Treasury Department regulation that indexes capital gains for inflation. Proponents of such a move — which is sometimes called “presidential indexation” — make three principal arguments in favor of the proposal: (1) that inflation indexing would be an economic boon; (2) that the President and his Treasury Department have legal authority to implement inflation indexing without further congressional authorization; and (3) that in any event, it is unlikely that anyone would have standing to challenge such an action in court. This Article evaluates the proponents’ three arguments and concludes that all are faulty. First, whatever the merits of comprehensive legislation that adjusts the taxation of capital gains and various other elements of the Internal Revenue Code for inflation, rifle-shot regulatory action that targets only the capital gains tax would be costly and regressive, would open a number of large loopholes that allow for rampant tax arbitrage, and would be unlikely to significantly enhance growth. Second, the legal authority for presidential indexation simply does not exist. The Justice Department under the first President Bush reached the conclusion in 1992 that the Executive Branch cannot implement inflation indexing unilaterally, and doctrinal developments in the last quarter century have — if anything — strengthened that conclusion. Third, a number of potential plaintiffs — including a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, certain states, brokers subject to statutory basis reporting requirements, and investment funds whose tax liability could rise as a result of the regulation — would likely have standing to challenge presidential indexation in federal court. In sum, the promise of presidential indexation turns out too hollow, and calls for unilateral action should be spurned.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80626864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is analyzes the way that impact factors of global tax revenue affect the transfer pricing and the tax authorities. Therefore are examined the impact factors which are about the bureaucracy, the liability, the intangibles, the risks, the capital, and the costs, of the tax system. The capital and the liability are proportional to global tax income. The charged intangibles, the costs, the risks, and the bureaucracy, are inverted proportional to the global tax income. Thereupon, in this paper extracted conclusions about the global tax revenue and its connection with the prior parameters which affect it.
{"title":"Analysis of Impact Factors of Global Tax Revenue","authors":"Constantinos Challoumis Κωνσταντίνος Χαλλουμής","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3147860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3147860","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is analyzes the way that impact factors of global tax revenue affect the transfer pricing and the tax authorities. Therefore are examined the impact factors which are about the bureaucracy, the liability, the intangibles, the risks, the capital, and the costs, of the tax system. The capital and the liability are proportional to global tax income. The charged intangibles, the costs, the risks, and the bureaucracy, are inverted proportional to the global tax income. Thereupon, in this paper extracted conclusions about the global tax revenue and its connection with the prior parameters which affect it.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89735716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephen Kuselias, Christine E. Earley, Stephen J. Perreault
Recent regulatory and professional developments have increased the frequency with which public accountants work and interact with professionals from other accounting firms. We posit that competitive pressures are particularly salient when clients retain accountants from different firms to perform audit, tax, and/or consulting services, and examine whether the disclosure decisions of professional accountants could be biased in a manner consistent with these pressures. We conduct two experiments in settings where professional services are commonly split among different firms: the provision of non-audit tax services and the completion of a group audit. We find that, when clients retain different accounting firms to perform professional services, accountants share information about possible financial statement errors in ways that protect their competitive advantage over their rivals, although the specific effects differ between the audit and tax settings. Our results have important implications for financial reporting quality and provide new insights regarding the effects of interfirm collaboration.
{"title":"The Impact of Firm Identity on Accountants’ Error Reporting Decisions: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"Stephen Kuselias, Christine E. Earley, Stephen J. Perreault","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3145231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3145231","url":null,"abstract":"Recent regulatory and professional developments have increased the frequency with which public accountants work and interact with professionals from other accounting firms. We posit that competitive pressures are particularly salient when clients retain accountants from different firms to perform audit, tax, and/or consulting services, and examine whether the disclosure decisions of professional accountants could be biased in a manner consistent with these pressures. We conduct two experiments in settings where professional services are commonly split among different firms: the provision of non-audit tax services and the completion of a group audit. We find that, when clients retain different accounting firms to perform professional services, accountants share information about possible financial statement errors in ways that protect their competitive advantage over their rivals, although the specific effects differ between the audit and tax settings. Our results have important implications for financial reporting quality and provide new insights regarding the effects of interfirm collaboration.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82729738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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