Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2012.00704.x
C. Waddoups
I estimate the incidence and intensity of training with particular emphasis on where along the tenure-training profile formal training occurs. Using data from the Survey of Education and Training gathered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, I find a different relationship between training and tenure than what is suggested by human capital models. Instead of training being concentrated towards the beginning of the employment relationship, it tends to be evenly distributed along the tenure profile. Such findings are more consistent with theories of wage compression and strategic complementarity than traditional human capital approaches.
我估计培训的发生率和强度，特别强调在终身培训概况中正规培训发生的地方。根据澳大利亚统计局(Australian Bureau of Statistics)收集的教育与培训调查(Survey of Education and Training)数据，我发现培训与终身职位之间的关系与人力资本模型所显示的不同。培训不是集中在雇佣关系的开始，而是倾向于在终身职位上均匀分布。这些发现与传统人力资本理论相比，更符合工资压缩理论和战略互补性理论。
{"title":"Employer‐Sponsored Training and Longer‐Tenured Workers: Evidence from Australia","authors":"C. Waddoups","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-232X.2012.00704.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2012.00704.x","url":null,"abstract":"I estimate the incidence and intensity of training with particular emphasis on where along the tenure-training profile formal training occurs. Using data from the Survey of Education and Training gathered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, I find a different relationship between training and tenure than what is suggested by human capital models. Instead of training being concentrated towards the beginning of the employment relationship, it tends to be evenly distributed along the tenure profile. Such findings are more consistent with theories of wage compression and strategic complementarity than traditional human capital approaches.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127256296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joseph Calandro, Jr., P. Delbridge, David Scheinerman
Insurance companies can leverage the regulatory requirement of a "Risk Management Own Risk and Solvency Assessment" (RMORSA) to improve risk-to-reward decision-making in general, and business planning in particular. This paper profiles several RMORSA-based improvements and explains how those improvements can be practically used to more effectively assess and navigate market uncertainties.
{"title":"Using a Risk Management Own Risk and Solvency Assessment to Improve Risk-to-Reward Decision-Making","authors":"Joseph Calandro, Jr., P. Delbridge, David Scheinerman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2150701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2150701","url":null,"abstract":"Insurance companies can leverage the regulatory requirement of a \"Risk Management Own Risk and Solvency Assessment\" (RMORSA) to improve risk-to-reward decision-making in general, and business planning in particular. This paper profiles several RMORSA-based improvements and explains how those improvements can be practically used to more effectively assess and navigate market uncertainties.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131825495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the relationship between the organization of a firm and its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about their local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one. We then show that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about organizational structure. For instance, an increase in competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization over decentralization.
{"title":"When Does Adaptation Require Decentralization?","authors":"Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein, Niko Matouschek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2050134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050134","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relationship between the organization of a firm and its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about their local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one. We then show that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about organizational structure. For instance, an increase in competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization over decentralization.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"44 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134383831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the role of executive functional background in explaining management discretion in financial reporting. Taking goodwill impairment as our reporting setting, we focus on top executives (CEOs and CFOs) whose employment history includes experience in investment banking, private equity, venture capital or management consulting, as we expect these executives to have unique human capital and reputation concerns with respect to acquisitions and valuation modeling related to fair-value reporting. On average, we document that CFOs with prior transaction experience impair goodwill more frequently and in smaller amounts than other executives. Further investigation suggests that CFOs with prior transaction experience report goodwill that is more value relevant. This is consistent with CFO valuation expertise helping impair goodwill in a more informative manner. In contrast, CEOs with prior transaction experience appear to be subject to agency conflicts that affect their propensity to impair goodwill. Overall, our results not only suggest that executive functional background is a significant explanatory factor of financial reporting discretion, but also that a better understanding of its effect relies upon analyses of specific settings and predictions grounded in upper echelons theory and agency theory.
{"title":"Top Executive Background and Financial Reporting Choice","authors":"François Brochet, Kyle T. Welch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1765928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1765928","url":null,"abstract":"We study the role of executive functional background in explaining management discretion in financial reporting. Taking goodwill impairment as our reporting setting, we focus on top executives (CEOs and CFOs) whose employment history includes experience in investment banking, private equity, venture capital or management consulting, as we expect these executives to have unique human capital and reputation concerns with respect to acquisitions and valuation modeling related to fair-value reporting. On average, we document that CFOs with prior transaction experience impair goodwill more frequently and in smaller amounts than other executives. Further investigation suggests that CFOs with prior transaction experience report goodwill that is more value relevant. This is consistent with CFO valuation expertise helping impair goodwill in a more informative manner. In contrast, CEOs with prior transaction experience appear to be subject to agency conflicts that affect their propensity to impair goodwill. Overall, our results not only suggest that executive functional background is a significant explanatory factor of financial reporting discretion, but also that a better understanding of its effect relies upon analyses of specific settings and predictions grounded in upper echelons theory and agency theory.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114852922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how division managers' access to venture capital (VC) markets affects the internal capital allocation decision of a multi-division firm. Division managers may leave firms and seek venture financing if their project ideas are not funded by headquarters. A successful new venture poses a threat to the revenue of the incumbent firm through product market competition. The paper characterizes headquarters' decision to retain managers and allocate capital for different degrees of product market competition and fundamental parameters in the VC markets. The paper shows that distortions in internal capital allocations arise as headquarters retains managers by allocating more capital to their divisions and increasing compensation. These distortions may lead to under-investment or over-investment in high NPV projects as well as creation of new ventures. The paper also shows that improving efficiency in the VC markets may induce incumbent firms to aggressively retain managers by over-investing in their ideas and may not necessarily lead to more VC-backed startups. The incentive to retain managers is higher in more concentrated industries. The paper derives novel empirical implications linking industry characteristics to diversification benefits and investment behavior of multidivisional firms.
{"title":"Capital Budgeting and Managerial Retention under Product Market Competition","authors":"Myat Mon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1786008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how division managers' access to venture capital (VC) markets affects the internal capital allocation decision of a multi-division firm. Division managers may leave firms and seek venture financing if their project ideas are not funded by headquarters. A successful new venture poses a threat to the revenue of the incumbent firm through product market competition. The paper characterizes headquarters' decision to retain managers and allocate capital for different degrees of product market competition and fundamental parameters in the VC markets. The paper shows that distortions in internal capital allocations arise as headquarters retains managers by allocating more capital to their divisions and increasing compensation. These distortions may lead to under-investment or over-investment in high NPV projects as well as creation of new ventures. The paper also shows that improving efficiency in the VC markets may induce incumbent firms to aggressively retain managers by over-investing in their ideas and may not necessarily lead to more VC-backed startups. The incentive to retain managers is higher in more concentrated industries. The paper derives novel empirical implications linking industry characteristics to diversification benefits and investment behavior of multidivisional firms.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132166076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a behavioral analysis of BP, whose capital budgeting decisions in the last decade have resulted in a series of high profile accidents, including the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. The analysis uses BP as a vehicle to discuss the application of business processes and psychological pitfalls to analyze corporate culture. The paper identifies weaknesses and vulnerabilities in BP’s culture, makes comparisons with the corporate financial practices at other firms, and offers suggestions about how BP can engage in debiasing. Notably, the paper also suggests that insufficient knowledge of behavioral decision making resulted in analysts, investors, and regulators attaching insufficient emphasis to the risks in BP’s operations. The paper calls for more attention to the psychological aspects of corporate behavior by analysts, regulators, corporate managers, and academics.
{"title":"BP's Failure to Debias: Underscoring the Importance of Behavioral Corporate Finance","authors":"H. Shefrin, Enrico Maria Cervellati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1769213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769213","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a behavioral analysis of BP, whose capital budgeting decisions in the last decade have resulted in a series of high profile accidents, including the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. The analysis uses BP as a vehicle to discuss the application of business processes and psychological pitfalls to analyze corporate culture. The paper identifies weaknesses and vulnerabilities in BP’s culture, makes comparisons with the corporate financial practices at other firms, and offers suggestions about how BP can engage in debiasing. Notably, the paper also suggests that insufficient knowledge of behavioral decision making resulted in analysts, investors, and regulators attaching insufficient emphasis to the risks in BP’s operations. The paper calls for more attention to the psychological aspects of corporate behavior by analysts, regulators, corporate managers, and academics.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127784491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder's self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.
{"title":"Finance and Governance in Developing Economies","authors":"R. Morck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1774263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1774263","url":null,"abstract":"Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder's self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130461532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Experimental evidence reveals that there is a strong willingness to trust and to act in both positively and negatively reciprocal ways. So far it is rarely analyzed whether these variables of social cognition influence everyday decision making behavior. We focus on entrepreneurs who are permanently facing exchange processes in the interplay with investors, sellers, and buyers, as well as needing to trust others and reciprocate with their network. We base our analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel and recently introduced questions about trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity to examine the extent that these variables influence the entrepreneurial decision processes. More specifically, we analyze whether i) the willingness to trust other people influences the probability of starting a business; ii) trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity influence the exit probability of entrepreneurs; and iii) willingness to trust and to act reciprocally influences the probability of being an entrepreneur versus an employee or a manager. Our findings reveal that, in particular, trust impacts entrepreneurial development. Interestingly, entrepreneurs are more trustful than employees, but much less trustful than managers.
{"title":"Trust, Positive Reciprocity, and Negative Reciprocity: Do These Traits Impact Entrepreneurial Dynamics?","authors":"Marco Caliendo, Frank M. Fossen, A. Kritikos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1736592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736592","url":null,"abstract":"Experimental evidence reveals that there is a strong willingness to trust and to act in both positively and negatively reciprocal ways. So far it is rarely analyzed whether these variables of social cognition influence everyday decision making behavior. We focus on entrepreneurs who are permanently facing exchange processes in the interplay with investors, sellers, and buyers, as well as needing to trust others and reciprocate with their network. We base our analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel and recently introduced questions about trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity to examine the extent that these variables influence the entrepreneurial decision processes. More specifically, we analyze whether i) the willingness to trust other people influences the probability of starting a business; ii) trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity influence the exit probability of entrepreneurs; and iii) willingness to trust and to act reciprocally influences the probability of being an entrepreneur versus an employee or a manager. Our findings reveal that, in particular, trust impacts entrepreneurial development. Interestingly, entrepreneurs are more trustful than employees, but much less trustful than managers.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125751219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Small businesses make up a majority of businesses in Australia, providing an impetus for economic development. However, guidelines for corporate governance best practices and rules and regulations for compliance are not tailored to the governing small businesses. Since governance is concerned about direction and control by the board of directors for outside shareholders, in Small Businesses this is the role of owner/managers. Governance of small businesses is not clearly defined as there are no rules and regulations governing small business, they do not understand corporate governance. Therefore this study aimed to investigate the corporate governance issues facing small businesses in Australia. This study was conducted using a sample of twenty one participants consisting of small business owner/managers and executive directors of industry associations. Interviews were conducted using structured interview schedules containing both open and close ended questions. Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS and Qualitative data were content analysed. The majority of small businesses did not understand the importance of corporate governance to their business. Therefore, this study suggests a code of best practice tailored to small businesses in order to communicate the governance process and adoption of on-line reporting to reduce the regulatory burdens for small businesses.
{"title":"Corporate Governance Issues Facing Small Corporations in Australia","authors":"Kumi Heenetigala, Anona Armstrong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1717342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1717342","url":null,"abstract":"Small businesses make up a majority of businesses in Australia, providing an impetus for economic development. However, guidelines for corporate governance best practices and rules and regulations for compliance are not tailored to the governing small businesses. Since governance is concerned about direction and control by the board of directors for outside shareholders, in Small Businesses this is the role of owner/managers. Governance of small businesses is not clearly defined as there are no rules and regulations governing small business, they do not understand corporate governance. Therefore this study aimed to investigate the corporate governance issues facing small businesses in Australia. This study was conducted using a sample of twenty one participants consisting of small business owner/managers and executive directors of industry associations. Interviews were conducted using structured interview schedules containing both open and close ended questions. Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS and Qualitative data were content analysed. The majority of small businesses did not understand the importance of corporate governance to their business. Therefore, this study suggests a code of best practice tailored to small businesses in order to communicate the governance process and adoption of on-line reporting to reduce the regulatory burdens for small businesses.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116336498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-11-22DOI: 10.11588/HEIDOK.00011248
Wendelin Schnedler
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identication problem
{"title":"Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design","authors":"Wendelin Schnedler","doi":"10.11588/HEIDOK.00011248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11588/HEIDOK.00011248","url":null,"abstract":"Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identication problem","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116689506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：